ML19256B782
| ML19256B782 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/1979 |
| From: | Floyd J, Goldfrank J METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290216 | |
| Download: ML19256B782 (15) | |
Text
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216
x C
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
x CONTINUED DEPOSITION of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY by JAMES R.
FLOYD, held at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the 9th day of August 1979, com-men.:ing at 1 25 p.m.,
before ROBERT ZERKIN, Notary Public' of:the State of New York.
C 1907 16t IJENJAMIN IIEPORTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHORTilAND PEPORTERS I'IVE IIEER.%3 AN MTItEIT NEw voitu, NEw voitK 10038 (212] 374-1138 790829gggs 4
}
217 2
A P P E A RA N C E S :
3 ME T_ RO P O L _I T A_ N_ _ E_ D _I S O N _ C O_ M _P A N_ Y :
4
(~
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, ESQS.
5 sttorneys for Metropolitan Edison Company 1800 M Street, NW 6
Washington, D.C.
20036 7
BY:
ALAN R.
YUSPEH, ESQ.
of Counsel 8
9
______E__ ISLAND:
_ PRESIDENT'S MIL COMMI THR
_________________S_SION ON__________EE ll JOAN GOLDFRANK, ESQ.
Associate Chief Counsel 12 13 ooo 14 15 JAME S R
F L OY D having been 16 previously duly sworn, took the stand and 17 testified as follows:
18 MS. GOLDFRANK:
We are continuing the 19 deposition of Mr. Floyd.
I 20 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) f 21 BY MS. GOLDFRANK:
l (
22 o
On March 30, 1979, you were on shift in t
l 23 the control room that morning, right?
24 A
Yes, ma'am.
1907 162 25 Q
And you were in unit 27 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Floyd 218 2
A Yes, mh'am.
3 Q
What was your role with respect to the 4
decision to vent the makeup tanks?
(
5 A
I think it was my decision.
6 Q
What was that decision based on?
7 A
I don't want to belabor the point, but this is 8
already on the record in front of the Presidential 9
commission on May 31.
May I have reference to that 10 testimony, please, and read the questions and answers.
11 MS. YUSPEH:
Off the record.
12 (Discussion held off the record.)
13 MR. YUSPEH:
What is the question?
14 (Record read.)
15 MR. YUSPEH:
Shall I get a copy of the 16 testimony?
17 MS. GOLDFRANK:
Yes, he wants to refer to it.
18 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)
{
19 MS. GOLDFRANK:
Is that a copy of the May 31 20 transcript of the testimony taken before the 21 President's Commission?
g jg}
22 MR. YUSPEH:
Yes, that is my understanding.
23 MS. GOLDFRANK:
Let the record show that 24 Mr. Floyd is referring to a transcript of the 25 May 31, 1979 hearing taken before the President's B ENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVIC E
I Floyd 219 2
Commission, at which he testified.
3 A
May I quote from here?
4 Q
If you would like to quote from there,
(
5 do so.
6 A
"The main events in that train," and this is, 7
parenthetically, to answer your question concerning 8
the reasons on the makeup tank vent, end of my 9
parenthetical and back to the quote, "was the gas 10 coming out of the reactor coolant system into the 11 makeup tank, causing the pressure..in the makeup tank 12 to rise.
The on.ly way I had to get rid of it was to 13 open the vent to the gas header and let the gas 14 compressors, as they would normally do, compress 15 this gas into the waste gas decay tanks."
16 Is that sufficient for your question.
II Q
Do you feel that that was the information I
18 upon which you based the decision to vent the makeup 19 1907 164 tanks?
0 2
A Briefly, yes.
It does get much more complicated i
21 I
in about six different technical areas, all of which 22 l
was part of that decision, but the major portion of 6
23 j
that decision was the fact that if I did not try to 24 capture that gas in the waste gas system, it would 25 probably vent to the public through a relief valve.
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 Floyd 220 2
Q Which relief valve would that be?
3 A
Well, the liquid relief was open on that tank, 4
relieving to the reactor coolant bleed tanks, and 5
if the gas continued to build up, the gas would have 6
kept that water relief open, relieved the gas to the 7
reactor coolant drain tanks, which were just about 8
full; that gas going into the bleed tanks would have 9
lifted the bleed tank relief valves, and that in turn 10 would have vented to the plant vent.
11 Q
And because of tha t, you made the decision 12 to vent the makeup tank?
13 A
That is part of the decision, yes.
14 Q
What else went into your decision?
15 A
I could have stopped accumulating gas in the 16 makeup tank by securing the letdown.
This would have 17 meant that I would have had to have secured the reactor 18 coolant pump seal injection water and increased the 19
.ikelihood of reactor coolant sesi failure, hence a 20 loss of coolant accident.
That path was undesirable 1907 165 -
~
21 to me.
(_
22 There is one other thing I wish to bring out, 23 and that is, the water relief that was open on the 24 makeup tank was relieving water from the boiling water 25 storage tank, which is the source of emergency core B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
I Floyd 221 2
cooling water, down into the reactor coolant bleed 3
tanks in the basement of the auxiliary building, where 4
it was not available to cool the core as a source of
(~.
5 water to the emergency core cooling system, so that 6
if I would have had a LoCA, for whatever reason, then 7
that water wou'Id not be available to me.
8 believe those are the factors which influenced 7
9 my decision ~to open the makeup tank vent.
10 g
was anybody cise consulted in that decision?
11 A
The shift supervisor, probably.
I probably con-12 firmed my suspicions with him before I ordered him to 13 open the vent.
14 Q
Who would that shift supervisor have been?
15 A
I believe it was Bill Zewe, but I wouldn't swear 16 to that. I know the operator was Craig Faust.
Craig 17 is normally Bill's operator, but I can't be sure of 18 that.
19 g
You ordered Bill zewe to open the vent 20 to the makeup tank?
1907 166 21 3
y,3, 22 g
old you consult with an emergency director 23 that was in charge at that point, who I believe was 24 Mr. Seelinger?
25 A
I picked up the red phone to the ECS and told BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERViCE
1 Floyd 222 2
them that I needed the heli put in the air.
I needed 3
the o n-a nd o f f-s it e radiation monitor beams to move 4
downwind to'try watching for radiation, since I had 5
a probability that I would increase the radiation 6
being let loose to the public at that point in time.
7 o
You communicated that to Mr. Seelinger?
8 A
I wouldn't swear that Mr. Seelinger was on the 9
other end of the red phone at the ECS.
I don't know 10 who was on the other end of that phone that morning.
11 The log would show that though.
12 Q
Where would the ECS have been located at 13 that time.
Would it have been Unit 17 14 A
Yes, in the control room.
15 Q
Did you discuss with Mr. Seelinger your 16 decision to vent the makeup tanks prior to authorizing 17 that?
18 A
Not to my knowledge.
19 Q
Did you discuss your decision with any of 20 your superiors prior to that?
1907 167 21 A
No.
b 22 Q
Did you discuss <your decision prior to 23 taking action with anybody from the NRC?
24 A
Not before the fact.
25 Q
What was the expected outcome of taking BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
I Floyd 223 2
the action to vont the nakeup tank?
3 A
I hoped to minimize the exposure of the public 4
through ionizing radiations that role immediately C
5 seemed contradictory, so I am going to have to talk 6
a little bit.
7 I knew that I had a leak in that system, and 8
therefore, some of the gas that I took of f of the 9
makeup tank would get loose to the public, but if I e
10 did nothing, all of it would get loose to the public, 11 so in an attempt to ' minimize the exposure of the 12 public to ionizing radiation, it was my decision that 13 that action had to be taken and had to be taken 14 immediately since I was in the process of losing 15 my emergency core cooling water to the reactor coolant 16 bleed tanks
.'.n the auxiliary building.
II Q
What did you think would be th< radiation I8 exposure icvel as a result of venting the makeup tank?
19 '
A I didn't know an exact number.
we had opened 20 that vent several times during the course of the night 21 for short periods of time, and what we were aware of 22 at that point in time was th a t the longer we had that 23 vent open, the larger the dose to the public was, so I og had several historical cyclings of the valve which 25 showed me radiation levels escaping from the plant.
BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVIC
1 Flcyd 224 2
I was now opening it and planning to leave it open 3
for an extended period of time, and I knew the radia-4 tion levels would increase, which is why I had the 5
helicopters-put in'the air and had on-and off-site 6
radiation monitor teams downwind of the plant so I 7
could monitor what was leaving the plant and reclose
~
8 the valve if the radiation levels got too high.
9 Q
For what extended period of time had you 10 thought you would leave that vent ope.?
11 A
Until I brought the vent makeup tank from 80 12 pounds to zero pounds pressure.
13 Q
You indicated that you had ordered equip-14 ment to measure the radiation level, correct?
15 x
- yes, 16 Q
what radiation level did you indicate 17 would be too high so that you would close that vent?
18 A
I did not indicate a number that was too high.
19 I listened to the reports as they came in from the 20 helicopter, and of course from the off-site teams, 21 but the helicopter got the first look at it, and'he
(_
22 reported numbers that went up gradually until. I think 23 it was in the area of 1.2 R par hour, and then they 24 decreased from that p L;it onwnrd in time, although 25 much more slowly Am ' hey had gone up.
1907 169 B ENJ AMIN 17EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Floyd 225 2
Once they started to go down, I stood with my decision to leave the vent open, knowing that there 4
would be at least a factor or a thousand dilution 5
on those radiation dose levels before they reached 6
the general public on the east shore.
7 Q
You indicated earlier that you had 8
planned to leave that vent open for an ex*. ended 9
period of time until the radiation level got too high, is that right?
11 A
No.
My plan was to leave the valve open until 12 the makeup tank pressure reduced to zero psig if the 13 radiation levels to the public did not prevent me from 14 doing that.
15 Q
In your mind, had you made a decision as 16 to what radiation level you would stop that action?
17 A
I had not made a predetermination that at the l
18 EPA guideline, for instance, I would stop venting.
19 j
However, had we approached that number or even one-20 tenth of that number, I certainly would have been 21 tempering my judgment with the EPA guidelines.
Q Was the outcome of your action of venting 23
_he makeup tank what you expected it could have been?
24 A
Yes, ma ' an.
The pressure reduced, the relief 25 receded, the water was leaving the BWLST and going
,1 c NJ AMI N R EPO RTIN G S E RVICE -
1907 170
1 Floyd 226 2
to the reactor coolant bleed tanks, and in fact, the 3
degassification of the reactor, the removal of the 4
hydrogen bubble, could then proceed.
5 Q
After you took this action, who was 6
notified?
7 A
The first notification went to the ECS to get 8
helicopters up and off-site and on-site monitor 9
radiation teams moving.
If there was an NRC man at 10 my shoulder, as there usually was, I would have told 11 him that I had opened the MUV-13 on my way to the 12 supervisor's office to call Civil Defense.
13 At that point in time, I did not know the state 14 of preparedness of the State Civil Defense to evacuate 15 people, but if the radiation level from that vent 16 would have gone too high, and when I went to close that 17 valve it would not close, although it had closed suc-18 cessfully for me many times that night, but if it had 19 not closed, then the possibility would have existed 20 that we would have had to evacuate people downwind of 21 the plant.
Since I didn't know the state of preparedness C
22 of the State Civil Defense to move people, right after 23 ordering the heli into the air, I went to the shift 24 supervisor's office and called the State Civil Defense, 25 which is the Pennsylvania Emergency Management B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
~
1907,171
1 Floyd 227 2
Association today.
3 Q,
Do you remember if there was an NRC 4
person next to you?
5 A
No, ma'am, I-do not.
6 Q
was anybody else from Metropolitan Edison, 7
aside from the Emergency Control Center, notified?
8 A
I wouldn't have notified anyone else, at least 9
until I got of f the phone with the State Civil Defense, 10 and then I don't know whether the communication had 11 already gone across the Island to our management 12 center over there, or if I made such a call immediately 13 after the Civil Defense call.
I knew that after the 14 Civil Defense call, I came out and monitored the i
15 radio to the helicopter pilot, and that is sitting 16 right adjacent to, across the river to our 17 management center, and I don't know if at any time 18 I picked up that radio and told our management 19 center what was happening there.
20 Q
Did you receive any response from Met 21 Ed management with respect to your action?
C 22 A
No thirig saying why or how come or close it.
23 If I had a discussion, it was nothing that I wasn't
~
24 capable of explaining on the spur of theroment, so 25 the conversation never stuck with me, memorywise.
B ENJAMIN R E PO RTIN G' S ERVICE 1907,177 ~
I Floyd 228 2
Q You don't remember what reaction you 3
received from Met Ed.aanagement?
4 A
No, if any.
They may have asked me to discuss 5
my action.
If I could do that successfully, it 6
wouldn't have stuck with me.
7 Q
You do not remember if they did or did not?
8 A
No.
9 Q
For what period of time did you leave the 10 vent open?
11 A
I planned to leave it open continuously.
I 12 have since read some of the sequence of events that 13 indicates it may have been closed for two or three 14 short periods of time prior to my being relieved at 15 12 o' clock that morning -- rather, noontime.
Whether 16 or not it was actually closed for those short periods 17 of time that morning, I do not know.
18 Q
Was it open when you were relieved at 19 noon?
20 A
I think it was because I passed on to my relief 21 what I had done and why and the desirability of leaving 22 it open to degas the reactor coolant system.
j 23 Q
Did you give any instructions.to your 2
relief with respect to actions to be taken oncer ng venting the makeup tank?
B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
'~
l Floyd 229 2
A No.
It was my belief taat the valve was open 3
and was going to remain open, and I would have told 4
him that.
It would have been his prerogative to 5
override that decision when he took the watch, if he 6
so desired.
I wouldn't have been telling him what 7
to do with the plan;, just why it was in the condition 8
it was in now.
9 Q
-Did he articulate any agreement or dis-10 agreement with your actions with respect to that?
11 A
Not based on the state of my memory now.
12 Q
Did the NRC express any agreement or 13 disagreement with respect to your actions?
14 A
No disagreement that I remember.
What would 15 have been the most likely to stay in my memory bank 16 would have been a disagreement, and I don't remember 17 such.
l 18 Q
Did the NRC become involved at any point i
19 subsequent to you taking your action with respect 20 to the monitoring of the radiation?
21 A
I am sure they did.
I remember NRC HP types, C
22 health physics types, coming into the control room 23 conferring with the NRC types that were already in 24 the control room, and they were listening to the 25 helicopter pilots just as closely as I was, I should BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE 1907 174
1 Floyd 230 2
think.
They were standing in the control room, and 3
the loudspeaker was going on, and the subsequent 4
decay from the peak would have carried their interest C
5 also.
By then, they probably had their own teams 6
out in the field checking, the same as my people were 7
checking, to see if we were getting the dilution that 8
we thought we would get.
9 Q
Did the NRC health physics personnel 10 indicate to you any concerns-sit.h respect to venting 11 the makeup tank?
12 A
Not that were in strong enough terms to convince 13 merto change my mind, if any concerns were expressed.
14 We may have had some exchange of information, but it 15 did not become controlling in my mind.
16 Q
Do you remember anything generally that 17 they indicated to you?
18 A
I don't know that they indicated anything to me.
19 Q
How long had the makeup tank continued to 20 be vented?
2I A
I think for days after.
Again, the sequence 22 of events will bear that out one way or the other.
23 The sequence of events does show that it was closed 24 sporadically, as opposed to being open sporadically, 25 as it was earlier in the evening, but for the most B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE 1907 115
I Floyd 231 2
part it stayed in an open position from then on.
3 Q
During your shift it was closed sporadically?
4 A
I said the sequence of events indicates that it
~.
5 was.
At no time did I order it closed or order it
~'
6 reopened.
If it was closed and reopened, it was done 7
without my knowledge at the time, but as long as the 6
8 makeup tank pressure was staying down, I would not 9
have objected to that, however.
10 Q
At any time subsequent to you taking your 11 action, did anybody from Metropolitan Edison indicate 12 anything with respect to that action?
13 A
They must have, tot I don't remember who or what..
14 Q
Do you know if Gary Miller indicated to 15 you any concern with respect toventing the makeup tank?
16 A
He could have.
I do not recall if he did.
17 Q
Do you remember if Mr. Herbein indicated 18 any concern with respect to venting the makeup tank?
19 i
A If Mr. Herbein was on the site in the area, I l
20 am sure he wouldhave expressed a concern about it.
21 Q
Do.you remember if he did express a C
22 concern to you?
23 A
I do not remember.
24 g
Do you remember if Mr. seelinger expressed 25 concern?
- ~
a l907 176 B ENJ AM'N REPORTING SERVICE
I Floyd 232 2
A No, I don't remember.
3 Q
Did Mr. seelinger come into Unit 2 control 4
room soon after you took the action on March 307 5 ~
A I do not know?
6 Q
You do not remember?
7 A
No, I do not know whether he came in or not.
8 If he in fact was the emergency director at that 9
time, I would have expected him to show up there 10 pretty soon thereafter, yes, but I don't even know 11 that he was the emergency director that night.
12 Q
Do you remember if you had a conversation 13 with the emergency director with respect to venting I4 the makeup tank?
15 A
bc, I do not remember,but I would have expected 16 that I would have.
17 Q
You do not remember what that conversation 18 would have been?
19 A
No.
'20 Ms. coLDFRANK:
At this time we will 2I recess this deposition.
I do not anticipate C
22 that we will have further questioning, but it 23 is possible that we will.
24 (continued on following page.)
25 1907 177 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Floyd 232a 2
(Wh e re upon, at 2:00 p.m.,
the within 3
deposition was recessed.)
4
(
5 JAMES R.
FLOYD
~
6 subscribed and sworn to 7
before me this' day 8
of ________________ 3979, 9
i Notary Public 10 o0o 12 13 14 15 16 17 t 18 19 i, 20 21 C 22 23 1907;l78 24 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE
I 233 2 STATE OF NEW YORK )) ss.: 3 COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) 4 I, ROBERT ZERKIN, Notary Public of the ~. 5 State of New York, do hereby certify that the 6 foregoing continued deposition of METROPOLITAN 7 EDISON COMPANY by JAMES R. FLOYD was taken 8 before me on the 9th day of August 1979. 9 The said witness was previously duly sworn. 10 The said testimony was taken stenographically by 11 myself and then 12 The i";n transcript is a true record of u 13 the said continued deposition. 14 I am not related by blood or marriage to 15 any of the said parties nor interested directly 16 or indirectly in the matter in controversy; nor 17 am I in the employ of any of the counsel. IO IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set I l 19 23Y'dayofAugust my hand thi s 1979. 20 s / J / l 21 l- '7 %'9 ROBERT ZERKIyf 23 2' 1907 I79 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE __.}}