ML19256B763
| ML19256B763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1979 |
| From: | Deyoung R, Sidell G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908280851 | |
| Download: ML19256B763 (60) | |
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Transcrrpt f Proceedings e
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il if UNITED STATES OF AMERICA y
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' RESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT o
i THREE MILE ISLAND o
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DEPOSITION OF:
RICHARD C. DE YOUNG, JR.
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Bethesda, Maryland o
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Acme Reporting Company Q0icial Reponer:
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CERTIFICATE I certify that I have read this transcript and corrected any errors in the transcription that I have boon able to identify, c;: cept for unimportant punctuation errors.
Date: b,a f 15 jf79
).
aichard c. BeYou Jr. k/
1885 287 t
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND 3
4 5
6 7
DEPOSITION OF:
RICHARD C.
DE YOUNG, JR.
9 10 11 12 13 14 Room 6211 l
7735 Old Georgetown Road I '.
Bethesda, Maryland 20014 16 Monday, July 30, 1979 2:10 o' clock, p.m.
1 1_
APPEARANCES:
14 i
i On Behalf of the Commissier.:
g GARY M. SIDELL, Attorney
,,g Associate Chief Counsel 2100 M Street, N.W.
-,3 Washington, D.C.
20037 22 On Behalf of the NRC:
.v#
MARIAN E. MOE, Attorney l
General Counsel's Office 24 Nuclear Regulatory Commission I
25 Acme Reporting Company 202t 62 -4688
i 2
a 4
1 PROCEEDINGS 9
2 Whereupon, 3
RICEARD C. DE YOUNG, JR.
I 4
having been first duly sworn, was called as a witness herein j 5
and was examined and testified as follows:
6 EXA.V.INATION i
7 BY MR. SIDELL:
Q Would you state your name for the record, please?
9 A
Richard C. DeYoung, Jr.
10 Q
And at the time of the March 1979 accident at Three 11 Mile Island, what was your position in the NRC?
I Director cf the Division of site Safety and EnvironI 12 A
13 mental Analysis; the Office of NRR.
14 Q
And what were your responsibilities in that office?
l 15l A
I was the director of a division of about 140 te people.
The division staff included at that time about 140 17 people.
It was organized into four assistant directorships.
s Two had to do with the environmental assessments that went i
19 with licensing; one had to do with what we term the "clogies":
I I
20.
that was hydrology, geology, seismology and meterology.
And ;
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the other assistant directorship had to do with accident i
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analysis, waste management and radiological assessmG1+ 5 2 8 9
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23 0
Are you still in the same position?
~
i e4 A
7 was detailed as of May 7 to the Commission Special 23 Inquiry into the Three Mile Island Accident.
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O That is the informally known Rogovin Comm3ttee?
A That is correct.
g 0
Mr. DeYoung, have you previously had your deposition 3
taken?
A Not on Three Mile Island accident.
O Q
Y u have had a prior deposition?
6 A
Yes, I have.
l I
Q Let me just explain briefly what we are going to be g
doing with this deposition.
Your testimony is sworn under g
oath, and even though we are sitting in an informal confer-g ence room at the NRC's offices in Bethesda, your testimony has the same effect as though it were before a judge or jury in a court of law.
13 Therefore, it is necessary to be as precise and accurate as possible in your responses to my questions.
Should you not understand a question, please ask for clarification.
I will try to explain what I am looking for in the way of an answer.
l' i
l' i
1el In view of the fact that the report is going to be l
i j
transcribed eventually, I would ask you that you allow me to
't l finish my questions prior to your response, and I will try and 21 i
d 22 ll operate in a similar basis since it is difficult. to record two l people speaking simultaneously.
1885 290 '
03 y j
I would further ask you to answer the questions 24 l
audibly without head gestures or hand movements since it is
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i obviously impossible to pick it up with a tape recording e
system.
When the deposition is completed, your testimony 3
fwillbetranscribedandwillbepresentedtoyourforyour 4
review and corrections if any and for your signature.
Shoald a
y u consider it necessary to make any changes in the deposi-6 tion and should we consider those changes to be of a substan-tial nature, we will be entitled te comment on those changes g
which may adversely affect your credibility.
g And therefore again it is necessary to be as precise g
as possible in your responses.
31 Do you have any questions?
A No.
g O
Did you bring a copy of a resume with you?
A I did.
g O
Can I see that, please?
,6 1
Is the information contained in the resume that you l
Just provided me complete and accurate to your professional l a, i
i qualifications?
19 l i
A Yes, it is.
MR. SIDELL:
Let's have this marked as exhibit one 21 to the deposition, please?
-o i
REPORTER:
Marked and received?
1885 29i MR, SIDELL:
Yes.
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Acme Reporting Company
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4 1
(The document referred to was 2
marked for identification as 3
exhibit one to this deposition 4
and was received in evidence.)
5 BY MR. SIDELL:
6 C
I note that in your resume one of the sections of 7
individuals reporting to you deals with accident analysis.
9 Specifically what situations does that group deal with?
9 A
That group is a branch that consists of about 20 10 individuals.
It reviews the trasportation types of accidents:
11 railroad shipments, truck shipments.
It also calculates the 12 doses from design basis accidents, and it reviews the assump-13 tions made for most of the accidents involved in the review of 14 an application.
15 0
Would I be correct in concluding that most of the 16 accident analysis includes matters not within the operation, 17 the normal operation, of a nuclear reactor?
13 A
That is correct.
19 O
So it is accidents either before or raterials before 20 they get to or after they leave the particular plant?
21 The transportation type of accidents, true.
1 22 O
Did you approve the TMI operation license, February !
23 19787 l
885 292 24 Yes, I did.
A 25 0
And in that capacity, you were responsible for Acme Reporting Company a w.,,,...
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6 reviewing the list of open items which may have been included 1
2 with the application?
A Yes, I did.
3 Q
How many open items were there, if you can recall, 4
on that list?
5 A
I can't recall.
There were a relativelv large 6
number.
I would say 20.
0 would 20 be relatively more than on any other appliq 3
cation for an OL?
g A
I did not sign all of the licenses.
I did sign ig Three Mile II, so I wouldn't directly recall the number that 11 was. normal.
But I would say that was a number that was not 1g to be unexpected at that time, during that year.
13 o
can you remember any specific items that were u
included on that list?
la. j O'
16 Q
Do you recall whether there was any matter dealing 1-with the PORVs on that list?
l 1g l
A No.
g O
Do you recall wheth'er or not all of the items 3
included on the list were of the same significance in terms t
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of their effects?
i A
They were not.
That I am sure of.
l
.,3 Q
can you give me an idea as to the types of signifi-g, cance of some of these :.tems?
25 1885 293 l
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y A
One of the items might be a requirement for the 1
utility to proceed with a low level power test, which was not o
3 very significant.
The core would have been new.
It would not have a large build up of radioactivity in it yet.
And if 4
anything had happened, there would be no really important 5
hazard involved.
6 Another one might have been required for them to 7
proceed to full power from a lower level.
That would have 3
been much more sianificant, g
Q Were most of these items the type of matter that g
would have prevented DOR from accepting the reactor from the 13 i
licensing group?
l i
A I don't think so.
I think that the Droblem with the 13 acceptance of a licensed reactor by DOR from DPM was more in 34 the nature of who would continue to resolve the matters that 15 were left open during that period.
g Q
Are you aware of situations where DOR has refused g
to accept an application or specific reactor from the licens-l s-i ing group?
T L wr4e[
l A
S-: -
eLare it refused is hard word; but I understand.
gg Yes, I am aware of a few cases where they would not readily
.g l
accept it until certain matters were resolved; and the l
matters being how the open matters would be handled.
They 23 wanted to see, for example, that they were either closed -out g
or arrangements had been made for DSS and DPM to accept the a5
~ l 1885 294 Acme Reporting Company 2n u.....
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burden of closing the matter out.
2 O
Was the reluctance to accept a reactor on the part 3
of DOR based on the available manpower, or I should say person power, to resolve any open items --
4 A
Yes, it was.
5 Q
It did not deal with the technical considerations e
of resolving problems then.
Is that correct?
A Yes, that is correct.
They did not want to take the g
burden manpowerwise of resolving the matters.
They did not g
have enough manpower to do it, and they wanted the other 19 divisions to conclude it before they accepted the transfer.
33 Q
It was not a situation where, for instance, there g
may have been a possible generic problem recognized in a g
particular plant that needed further technical analysis.
14 A
Not to my knowledge.
- g Q
Would that have been Within the function of DOR to 16 make that determination?
A I believe so.
If it had been made, I am sure they g
would have notified the DPM and DSS groups.
If they had some
- g real concern about those, we would have looked into it.
.,g Just for the record, DPM is Division Project Manage I Q
,, 3 A
ment --
A Division of Project Management; and DSS, Division ofj Systems Safety.
1885 295 g4 Q
Are you aware of any instances where DOR has 3
Acme Reporting Company m,.......
10 determined there were specific generic problems and on that 1
basis either refused to accept or did not accept a reactor?
2 A
I don't quite understand the question.
3 Q
You previously indicated that with TMI-II, the 4
items that were open were such that additional work was going 5
to be needed to complete them, not from a technical point of 6
view, but just from a physical capability point of view resolving the open items.
g My question is whether or not concerning the second 9
classification of items, the items that may deal with possible in generic problems of the particular operating reactors, those g
ther operating reactors; whether or not DOR ever refused to 12 accept a plant because of matters of that nature.
13 In other words, did they find a specific potentially y
generic matter that was of sufficient concern to say, "We are 15 not going to accept this plant until you technically change 16 this character or principal of the applicant."
g d
That is/true, not to my knowledge.
They never said A
g I
that to my knowledge.
ig Q
And they do have the responsibility for saying that, 20 A
I think they do have a responsibility to say that.
31 O
Is there any other section of the NRC that has the l same or similar responsibility?
23 A
I would expect DPM and DSS to also say that if they 24 had reached a point on a technical problem that they g3 1885 296 Acme Reporting Company x a
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11 considered to be generic in a sense and were proposing to I
license the facility with an understanding with that utilit-g that was different than the understanding they would normally 3
have with other utilities that they had previously licensed.
4 0
Are you aware of any instance where DSS or DPM ever 5
raised such a generic issue or concluded that they had found g
such a generic issue?
A No.
O And at least within the last several years at the 9
NRC, you would have been in a position to be aware of resolu-7g tions of that nature?
1; A
I think so.
77 Q
How would either DPM or DSS or DOR determine in the 73 first instance that they might have a generic problem with an 14 applicant?
33 A
It is fairly straightforward.
If they have a 16 technical problem-for example, if they determine that a pump g
in a category one subsystem needs to be upgraded as a result g
I of a new analysis that was performed, it is clear that that i
3g same pump is used in many older plants, will be used in some gg plants that are more distant in the line of processing for
.g licenses.
So therefore it would be generic.
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It is very clear when a problem is generic.
i 3
Q Or at least it should be very clear.
g4 A
It should be very clear.
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12 Q
And as Director of the Division of Site Safety and 1
Environmental Analysis, were you responsible for reviewing g
control room design of TMI-II?
Or someone who reported to youb 3
A Not of TMI-II.
At the time I' signed the license 4
for TMI-II, I was the Deputy Director of the Division of 5
Project Management.
That review had been done before the 6
period of time that I became the Director of DSE.
Q But in your oosition as say Deputy Director of DPM, g
you were responsible for reviewing control room design?
9 A
The division was responsible for managing the
- g review.
The review of the control room design was distributed 3;
amonst various parts of the staff.
DSS would have part of it.
1.;
DSE would have part of it, and DPM was responsible for coor-13 dinating those reviews.
To that extent, they should have been y
knowledgeable as to what was going on with respect to the
- 3 review of the control room.
16 Q
Are you aware of the location of the indication or the indicators for quench tank in Three Mile Island?
g A
I am --
1g Q
Control room?
gg A
I am now.
g; 0
Where are those indications located?
A To me, I believe they are located in the rear of
.y the panel.
g4 g3l O
Of the control panel.
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of the control panel.
1 O
Is that generally an area readily available to an 2
operator as he is running a plant?
3 A
Yes.
4 0
Let me put it this way.
The quench tank indications 3
are on the back of a panel somewhere in the control rcom.
6 Are there many other indications on the back of a control roor panel similar to the quench tank ones?
g A
Yes, I believe so.
g 0
Are most of the indications in the control room on 10 the front of the panel?
11 A
Most of the indications are on the front of the ig panel.
1,0 Q
What general percentage are we talking about of u
controls or methods of determining what is going on in a 15 plant that are on the back of a panel rather than the front?
16 A
I would have to guess, and I would say 10 percent.
g Q
New of that approximately 10 percent of indications g
on the back of the panel, are any others of a similar level g
of importance to the quench tank indicators?
Dealing
.,g primarily with non-normal operating conditions of a plant?
l A
I don't know.
I can't recall.
I think there are.
i l
O There are.
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1885 299 A
There are.
What is your assessment of the importance of the O
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pressure, the temperature and the level indications for the 3
quench tank during transient $ involving the primary system o#
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a reactor.
Are those relatively important pieces of informa-tion to an operator, or are those matters which he can review 4
them when he gets around to it?
5 6
A I didn' t believe they were critical measurements.
I Q
Now you say you didn't believe they were critical
- i measurements.
Does that indicate that you are now of a dif-3 ferent frame of mind?
9 A
If there were no other measurements provided than in those that'had been provided at the time of Three Mile Island, 11 I believe they would be critical.
i.;
Q What about if those indications that were provided 13 but were nonfunctional?
In other words, shorted out through 14 1
13l an electrical problem in the system?
They were physically 1
there, but they were incapable of providing any accurate ig information.
Would the important of the quench tank indica-g tions increase in your opinion?
g A
Yes.
19 I
O What about if the other indicators were present, 3
did not short out and therefore were operating, but neverthe-
.,3 i
less were producing inherently unreliable or ambiguous
_. g results; would that change the level of significance for the g
quench tank indicators?
,885 300 o'
I A
Yes.
3 Acme Reporting Company
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Q When we are referring to other non-normal operating g
condition indicators, what are we speaking of precisely?
3 How about pressurizer level indicator?
A Non-normal?
4 5
Q The elements that an operator mcst rely on during 6
abnormal operating conditions in order to get the plant back to where it should be.
A That is an important non-normal.
9 9
Q How about reactor pressure?
A Essential, 10 Q
So that is more important than pressurizer indica-13 tion in your opinion?
ig A
Yes.
33 Q
What about the tail pipe temperature?
Is that a 14 relatively important indicator of problems in the primary 73 16 system?
A Again it depends; that if you have a direct measure-ment of the valve location, or I should say the valve status, g'
i that is less important.
If you do not, I think'it is just as 19 important as an indication of the electrical input to that 20 valve to close or to remain on open.
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Q So an indirect measure of, for instance, the PORV i
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i would be an equivalent of tail pipe temperature.
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A Yes.
3 Q
But an actual position indicator for the PORV would g3 Acme Reporting Company a:2 u.....
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be preferrel, and therefore there is an alternative parameter G
that would be more preferable to tail pipe temperature.
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
For instance, reactor pressure?
5 A
I think they are both important, but'I think the 6
,!, critical parameters to be measured are reactor temperaturc, i
pressure, flows.
Those are the critical things.
You have to know what is going on in the core.
Of less importance is what is going on inside in some other component such as the 10 pressurizer, the relief,gp the pressurizer and so on.
'l I don't know if I answered your question.
I O
In your assessment of the importance of these para-n
~
meters to determine what is going on in the core, the tail 14 pipe temperature, the pressurizer indication level, reactor 15 temperature and pressure, and quench tank indications; are 16 these your determinations of importance for these criteria 1'
after the accident at TMI or before?
14
~
A I don't understand after the accident at TMI.
You 19 mean --
40 0
Well, did you consider the quench tank indications,
-33 the tail 'iye temperature, the pressurizer level indication, T
l and the 1.'; tor temperature and pressure to be of the same
+3 level of significance to inform an operator of what is going l
04 on with his reactor before the March 28th accident at TMI?
A No, I didn't.
No, I thought the pressurizer level Acme Reporting Compony 1885 302
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indicator was a true indicator of the true pressure in the 1
reactor itself.
2 Q
Am I correct in concluding that you just mentioned 3
that the pressurizer level indication was an accurate measure 4
of pressure in the core?
A I am sorry.
The pressurizer level indicator would 6
Il have indicated to me that the primary coolant system itself 7
was water solid and that the pressure indicated in the core g
and the pressure indicated in the pressurizer were related, g
directly related.
3g 0
And the system only would have gone solid if, based 33 on an accurate pressurizer level indication reading, had it 37 gone off scale high?
l,a A
Yes.
34 Q
Which is a rather exceptional or unusual circum-g stance?
g A
Yes.
g Q
Do you recall how many times other than TMI-II in g
I March of 1979 there has been an experience with a loss of i
ig pressurizer level indication off scale high?
A I don't know exactly how many times, but I do know
.g I
that it was a problem maintaining the le'rel on scale during j
transients in that type of plant.
)
O By that type of plant, you mean B&W?
A B&W type of plant.
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Q Can you recall any other specific instance where there was loss of pressurizer indication off scale high?
g A
No.
3 Tape 2 0
Wegh'were previously discussing the responsibilities 4
of DSS, DPM, and DOR for assessing possible generic problems 5
6 with applications.
Can you recall pre-TMI-II of this vear whether there were established procedures for reviewing generic problems or possible generic problems?
g A
Yes, there were.
9 Q
What were those procedures?
m A
They had a special group that was organized within 11 13 l NRR to process the resolution of generic problems.
There was a committee assigned to assign priorities and schedules and 13 agree on management of each generic problem and the plan for y
its resolution.
15 The committee initials were TASC.
It was called 16 the task group.
1-Q Did TASC stand for anything in particular?
Is that g
an acronym?
19 A
I am trying to recall.
It is an acronym.
Let's 3
see, TASC stands for Technical Activities -- I can't remember.
31 I
I Q
Okay.
Who were the individuals on this task g;
committee?
l 23 A
I believe that --
- 4 0
I don't specifically need names, but rather the 3
Acme Reporting Company i885 304
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19 2
types of people who were involved.
1 A
I believe the chairman was the Deputy Director of i
2 NRR.
The members of the committee were the division directors 3
for the divisions within NRR.
And the Secretary was a member 4
from the progrem support staff.
5 O
So the Director or chairman of this committee would 6
have been the Deputy Director of NRR.
And at the time, this would have been Edson Case?
g A
All the time it was Edson Case.
9 Q
So that if there were generic problems or potential ig generic problems with any applications that arose, let's say !
1,'
l l
from January 1,
'78, to the present; Edson Case would have ig I
been primarily responsible for resolving those?
g A
He would have been responsible for assuring that 14 the process was directed towards a resolution.
I don't know 13 16l what you mean by responsible for them.
The staff would have been responsible once it was assigned and the priority agreed g
upon and the schedule established.
g i
l 0
So if Mr. Case upon reviewing this list of possible 1g l
generic problems considered for instance the last item on the'
~9 l
list of priorities to be of more importance than that indi-
.,1 cated by the staff, he would have been in a position to accelerate the process of resolving that problem?
In other words, moving it up the list?
3
~
He or any one of the division directors could have, A
.,3 1885 503 Acme Reporting Company x,........
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accelerated, called for a meeting of the N group, written i
a memo or something.
2 3
Q How frequently did the Ndd, group meet, if you know.
Is it a periodic thing or --
4 A
They met sporadically.
For a while it was very 3
heavy while they were developing the accepted plans for the 6
resolution of the generic matters.
Q Do you know when that was?
Was it before TMI-II?
g A
Yes, before TMI-II.
I would say two years ago, a 9
year and a half ago.
g Q
So that would have been early spring 19777 31 A
Yes.
- g Q
And they developed formal guidelines for resolving 13 possible generic problems.
14 The N e$ committee established, as I said, priorities A
15 for which of the generic problems would be handled [ firct, 16
& a-,0 andtheyreviewedplagschedules;theyapprovedthem; they 1
tried to manage the resources within NRR with respect to the g
timely resolution of these generic problems.
1g Occasionally there would be a reassessment of the 3
priorities on the basis of some new information, and they g3 would try to manage the activity directed towards the resolu '
gg
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tion of all the generic problems.
g.3 Q
Well, you just mentioned M dd reaction to new.infor g4
~
Would any of that new information have come from mation.
.,3 1885 306 Acme Reporting Company w...-....
21 l
other branches of the NRC concerning generic problems?
3 2
A It could.
It could come from many sources.
For 3
example, a reassessment was made on the basis of probabilities M
of 93. +- ; and severe consequences from the accidents as a 4
2D euibg 5
result, I believe, of a request made by Harold #m4 Nu, the Director of NRR.
And on the basis of that comparative listing 6
of the importance of the generic problems, there was a realig ment of priorities and so on.
g But a reconsideration could come from any one of 9
several sources.
An event might occur at one of the plants 39 or during one of the reviews, new information would come up, 11 and some reconsideration would be given to the priority for 13 that generic problem and the method of its resolution.
13 0
Was there any involvement with.possible generic y
-T45d problems between the A.alf% committee and ACRS?
13 A
There was a relationship.
The NRR reported its 16 plans for proceeding with the resolution of the, generic g
problems on a few occasions, as I recall.
They received g
1 comments, I believe, from the ACRS.
And to that extent, 39 I
there was a communication between e two groups.
gg 0
Now I take it that was a rather infrequent situation.
21 A
In' frequent.
gg 0
Do you know the specific matters with which the-23 TASC ACRS was concerned and did relay those concerns to the tesk j
34 11385 307 committee?
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22 A
No, I don't recall.
I know they were concerned with 1
in a general way with the priorities established by the NRR 2
TASC group, by the.taek committee.
3 By the way, I do recall what it stands for:
Technical Activities Steering Committee.
5 They were concerned, the ACRS was concerned, with 6
some of the priorities, I believe, the relative priorities assigned to the various generic problems and with the method 3
proposed to obtain resolution.
9 Q
Do you recall how the ACRS felt problems should be 39
~rASC resolved which was distinct from the way in which the tesk 31 committee was operating?
13 A
No, I do not.
13 Q
Can you recall any of the generic problems that the y
T'45
. committee was involved with?
15 A
Oh, yes.
One of the problems is termed systems 16 interactions.
It was generated more or less by Mr. Ebersole 1-of the ACRS through the method cf questioning the staff on g
applications that were reviewed by the ACRS with the staff
- g He
' present.
Ywould raise specific questions about interactions:
20 of various plant systems.
,,3 I
Q Do you recall when Mr. Ebersole raised these con-i,
._m.
I cerns?
1885 308 A
Not exactly, but I would say about at the time he 3
was a consultant rather than a member of the ACRS.
He became 25 Acme Reporting Compony
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23 a member '.fter he had served for a year or two as a consul-tant to the ACRS.
He br'ame a regular member of the commit *.ee.
g 3
During the period he was a consultant, he began to probe into that one generic problem amongst some of the others.
4 3
And he persisted after he became a member.
And because of E
the continuity of his concerns being voiced, it was 6
j
-e established within the staff as a generic problem.
I al It affected all plants, not only B&W plants, but
~l all plants; the concept of one system interacting with another 9
10 system.
Q Well, I take it by virtue of the fact that the 11
'CASL Aest committee viewed Mr. Ebersole's comments sufficient to 13 13 create a method of attempting at least to resolve his con-cerns, his comments were viewed with some degree of credibili-y 13 ty.
A Oh, yes.
16 Q
What precisely was Mr. Ebersole's concern with g
systems interactions?
Are you familiar with that?
g I
r A
Yes.
Somewhat.
I can't precisely say what hir 19 i
- concerns were because a great deal of time was spent on t ry-l go
~
ing to determine whether or not the staff approach to it was 21 addressing the true problem that Mr. Zbersole had in his own i gg f
mind as he was raising this.
It is a very difficult thing.
I 3
i 0
Well let me ask you first whether cr.not g4 i
i Mr. Ebersole's concerns with system interaction was concerned l 3
t J885 309 i Acme Reporting Company
.me1......
24 i
with the way in which the NRC was operating.
Was it systems interaction of the NRC that concerned him?
2 3
A The systens interaction considering the plant itself.
The systems within the plant.
4 5
0 And was his primary concern that the NRC was not e
sufficiently addressing the way in which system A, for instance, interacted with system B in a reactor.
A That was his primary concern.
I think it was as 3
much concern that the utilities were not also reviewing that g
39 from this same standpoint.
He was not only concerned about i
the NRC requirements but the designer's requirements.
n 0
Why was that a problem if, you know, from l
13 73 Mr. Ebersole's perspective?
A I don't know what Jesse Ebersole had in his mind, u
I g
but I do know him personally.
I have known him for many years.
16 He is an excellent engineer.
He has a very good method of analyzing responses of various components.
He has a long 1-history of experience with TVA where he saw the effect that 1
i one system could have on seme of the other systems.
l 39 i
And I believe it was just on the basis of his
.y 2, I experience and his analytical bent that he came to the point i where he thought it was not being handled perhaps adequately.
g.;
4 O
Can you recall specifically when the NRC established
-3.3 l
this committee to deal with Mr. Ebersole's concerns about 24 33 systems interaction?
I885 310 l i
i Acme Reporting Company 1
2:2......
25 A
The com=ittee was not established to deal with 3
Mr. Ebersole's concern.
The committee was established to g
manage the resolution of the large number of generic problems 3
that had arisen.
The staff resolved that Mr. Ebersole's 4
concerns should receive increased attention as he brought it 3
up on case after case in order to resolve the ACRS's concerns.
g Mr. Ebersole would raise the matter, but I believe
,i the majority if not all of the ACRS concurred with him in i
that it warranted increased attention from the staff.
The g
staff members who bore the brunt of the questioning by the g
ACRS on a few cases were the first ones to become aware that g
l more attention needed to be given if only to resolve it in the 1g cyes of the ACRS.
73 So the staff itself, the staff members, the branch g
chiefs, the assistant directors that attended the ACRS meet-g ings began to develop an increased demand for increased g
attention to the generic problems no matter what they were, g
one after the other.
The systems interaction was only one of g
those generic problems.
g O
What were the methods that the directors of these various offices were using to further the cross communication, g3 if you will, of possible generic problems among the staff?
Did they institute specific procedures, comrunications I
!885 311-between two various divisions?
g4 A
I can't recall any specific ones.
They had various 3
I Acme Reporting Compony
. m..>.....
26 ways of communicating.
There were periodic meetings of the i
division directors with the office director.
2 There is another mechanism for the control of new 3
requirements, for example, on the staff.
That is another 4
rt W c committee.
We call it the,ggs committee; regulatory require-5 ments review co=mittee.
The division directors within NRR r,
l are members of that committee.
Edson Case being Deputy
+
Director of NRR has always been the chairman of that committae..
a Other members came from other divisions outside of NRR.
9 One other member, for example, was Robert Minogue, 39 the Director of the Office of Standards Development.
So it g
was a rather important committee, and any changes from staff g
requirements that were proposed by the staff -- and changes 33 might be proposed to resolve a potential generic problem ---
l y
would be reviewed by that committee; was supposed to have g
been reviewed by that committee.
And most of the changes in 16 requirements were reviewed by that committee.
g I
Occasionally they were not.
They were, the changes ;
g wW yAs~made without processing by the RQC.
19 Q
Are you aware of specific instances that were not
.y reviewed?
g; A
I know that some were not.
I can't recall the exact type of event.
Occasionally an assistant director would gg, make a decision to make the change.
He would make it during g4 RW the review of the plant without going through the Ja4-to g3 18853i2 Acme Reporting Company m..-...
27 obtain its approval.
2 0
Do you know why an assistant director would take that action?
Was that f aster?
3 A
It was certainly faster.
He thought it was needed.
4 5
Again, I don't know exactly, but I would presume that he
~
thought it was needed and that it would just be a waste of a
GWC valuable time to proceed through the JMW.
W.C 0
In the operation of the resk committee, was it g
necessary that the staff propose a specific resolution of the 9
in problem as well as the problem itself?
Or were resolutions considered secondary to at least recognition of the problem?
y A
The problem would be recognized by the matter 12 being considered a generic problem.
Recognition is there.
- 3 The plan to resolve the matter did not point towards a speci '
34 fic resolution.
It would be a plan that would consider alter 33 ig native types of resolutions, perhaps based on analyses and so 3-on.
The plan incorporated the time and manpower to i
g perform analyses which would indicate at the compikion of the
- 9 analyses the directions one might want to proceed in with 20 various alternative methods of resolution.
gi TMc O
Can you recall whether or not the besk committee
_s.,
dealt with problems involving pressurizer level indication?
23 Pre-TMI?
74 A
I don't think it did.
1885 313 Acme Reporting Compony m..>.a...
28 0
Do you know whether or not they were provided with 3
a copy of what has come to be known as the Michelson Report?
g A
I don't know.
3 O
In view of the fact that thera was some interaction 4
TMC between the ACRS and the tm comittee, would it be more or 5
6.
less likely that they would have been at least provided with a copy of the Michelson Report?
A It would have been more likely.
p T45 C g-0 And on the assumotion that the essk committee did receive a copy of the Michelson Report, would that have been g
filtered down the staff for further resolution or analysis?
g Twsc.
A on the assumption that the -tssk did receive a copy 1g of the Michelson Report, it would ha
, I believe, been trans-g mitted to the lower levels of the staff.
O By the time there was a staff resolution on one of l a.
Tasc e genedc concem of We M comMee, wod dat 16 normally be a substantial period of -time between initiation g
j and completion?
A Normally it would; many, many months.
A year, two l
g l
g
. years.
l l
O A year to two years would not be an exceptional i
g, lenghth of time for resolution?
I
.g.
It would not be exceptional length of time.
A W5a Q
So on the assumption that the tsob comittee was g,
provided with a copy of the Michelson Report in January 1978, !
1885 314 I
Acme Reporting Compony l
. m.......
29 3
they could stil.1 be working on it right now for all we know.
A Yes.
2 TRS C 3
Q Are you a member of the 553k committee?
A From the time I became a division director, I was 4
T46C y
a member of the caRFie comittee, g
Q And that was in August of 197E?
A Late August of '78.
g Q
And as of late August '78 to date, are you aware of g
whether or not the Michelson Report has been floating around TASC in the taBat-comittee?
10 A
I am not.
7 Q
But you would be aware if it had been submitted ig during your tenure there?
33 A
If it had been submitted, ;dkF I believe the indivi-14 g
dual that would have received it would have distributed copies 16 of that to the other members of the task committee, I think I would have been aware of it.
~
g Q
Now you just mentioned the individual who received g
h 19y the Michelson Report.
Are you speaking of a particular I
gg -1 individual or just whoever happened to receive the Michelson Report?
g3 A
Whoever ha to receive it.
You can't give a report
.gg 23 h to a committee; you can only give it to an individual.
i l
Who-l i
ever on that committee received it, I think he would have seen 24 that copies were distributed to the other members of the g3 Acme Reporting Company 1885 315
- 2
- 2.,.....
30 committee.
And I do not recall seeing the Michelson Report.
1 Q
Are you accuanited with someone by the name of 2
Sandy Israel?
3 A
Yes, I am.
4 Q
Who is he?
5 A
He is a reviewer in -- I forget the name of the 6
branch -- the core performance branch or --
O Reactor system?
e A
Reactor systems branch.
9 Q
And the chief of that branch is?
10 A
I believe Tom Novak at the present time.
11 Q
And was that also the case in January 19787 12 A
I believe so.
13 0
Sandy Israel was also in his current position as 14 of January 1978?
15 A
Yes.
16 0
Would Sandy Israel be one of the people to whom 17 analysis to resolve potential generic problems would have been 1"
TaSt directed by the 6 committee?
19 T46c 20 A
What the tzsk committee did was it considered each l
of the generic problems.
It agreed on the assignment of a t
21 I
task manager for that problem; JJgbr they would choose an l
22 individual that they thought could manage that problem best.
23 They.would assign the responsibility to that task manager to 24 develop a plan for its resolution which included participation; 25 P
Acme Reporting Company 1885 316-2=>.
.2..
31 by various branches within NRR.
i And if a generic problem involved the core perfor-2 maAce or reactor systems, the task manager would have 3
included a proposal to involve that branch in the review of 4
Itwaslefttothenegotiationbetweenthetaskl that problem.
manager and the branch chief as to which individuals in that 6
branch would be assigned the responsibility for providing that part of the problem that their area would warrant, g
Q So for matters concerning the reactor systemr. branch, g
the committee and Tom Novak would have come to a joint 10 decision as to whether or not Sandy Israel would have been it further involved.
3.,
A The task manager would be the individual that would 33 T6SC go before the t=sk group and describe the proposal for the u
resolution which would involve the participation of the 1,.,
reactor system 5 branch, for example.
Whether or not Sandy 16 Israel would have been that individual would have been left 1
open to the branch chief to determine.
g He may have been assigned in the beginning.
It was!
79 4
possible that because of shifting priorities, personal
.,9 p
problems that there might have been a change made from 21 Mr. Israel to one of the other reviewers.
So it was a i
I fluctuating thing.
.,3 l
1 Sandy Israel, in my opinion, would have been 24 involved in many of the problems that were reviewed by or 33 1885 317l Acme Reporting Company a n.>......
I 32 i
processed by the task managers.
g Q
Since Three Mile Island in March of 1979, I take it 3
you have had occasion to look at the Michelson Report?
A Yes, I have.
4 5
0 Have you seen that prior to the accident at Three e
Mile Island that you can recall?
A To my knowledge, I never saw it prior to the i
accident.
3 0
When you reviewed the Michelson Report after the 9
s accident, was Mr. Michelson# concern clear to you?
Or did it 39 seem to be an excessively complex complicated technical 33 33 report?
A After the accident and reading the report, they were 13 clear to me.
Promptly, immediately they were clear.
a Q
Would you consider the Michelson Report an accurate g
summary of the events that occurred at Three Mile Island in g
March of '797 g
A I would.
g 0
If it had received the consideration commensurate 39 with its significance before the accident, would you conclude go that it might have prevented the accident?
gi A
I do.
gg Q
Are you familiar with something referred to as the 3
Novak memorandum?
g4 h T~
A Yes.
Not very familiar, g I know about it.
.I 33 1885 3l{
Acme Reporting Company
. m.,,,....
33 I
can't recall how long it is, but I know that Tom Novak has 2
a memorandum that was prepared, I urMerstand by Sandy Israel, j
3 and was distributed to the members of the staff that addressed 4
the problem that was highlighted in the Michelson Report.
5 Q
But you have not read a copy of the Novak memorandum.
6 A
I think I have read it, not recently.
I can't 7
recall it.
Letmeshowyouacopy,bbathasbeenmarkedas 6
Q 9
exhibit five to the Foster deposition among others I will y
'O represent to you is a copy of the Novak memorandum in addition
~
11 to my own notations.
12 (Witness reads document) 13 BY MR. SIDELL:
14 Q
Now Mr. DeYoung, having occasion %ef the opportunity 15 to review the Novak memorandum and based on your understanding 16 of the Michelson Report, would it appear as though the two 17 reports are dealing with the same basic problem?
14 A
Yes.
19 Q
What does it appear from the Novak memorandum that 20
~ the -- strike that.
21 What does the basic problem as stated by the 22 ;
Michelson Report and now your recent reading of the Novak l
r 23 memorandum appear to be?
24 A
The basic problem is that the operators could be 25 mistaken as to the true conditions within the reactor I
1885 319 Acme Reporting Company a
n......
34 coolant system.
They would assume the pressurizer level was 3
f indicating a true level of a -- what I would call t -- solid water system to the level within the pressurizer.
There were 3
no voids, no large voids, within the reactor coolant system.
4 They could be misled by an assumption.
There could 5
he voids within the system and not have them indicated by the 6
i pressurizer level.
0 And what is the significance of the pressurizer 3
level indication from an operator's perspective during an g
abnormal or unusual occurrence in the operation of the plant?
- g A
The significance is that he thinks if he assumes 11 there is no voids, he would assume that the level indication 3g is truly indicating the condition throughout the primary 33 coolant system.
His concern would be to prevent that level 34 within the pressurizer from going off scale, from having a g
truly solid primary coolant system, solid with water.
16 O
So if the pressurizer level indication goes off 1
scale high and therefore indicating the entire pressurizer g
.is filled with water, by indirection that establishes from 3g l
the operator's perspective that the entire primary system is j
l filled with water or is water solid.
21 A
And any increase in pressure would be instantaneous throughout the system.
23 0
And the problem an operator wants to try to avoid j
24 i
with increases in pressure in a water solid system are what?
I g3 1885 320 Acme Reporting Company j
\\
.a w
.2. o..
t
35 1
A Yes.
He wants to prevent an increased pressure in 2
the solid water system.
3 Q
For what specific reason?
4 A
It could cause pressures within the system to 5
exceed the design ~ pressures for that system.
6 0
What problem is that going to create?
7 A
In the extreme, a core meltdown because it would s
lead to a major loss of coolant accident perhaps beyond that 9
for which the plant was designed.
10 0
So essentially the basic problem with going solid 11 is breaking a pipe.
Is that correct?
12 A
Breaking a pipe or some other component; a valve, 13 a pump.
14 0
Okay.
And therefore producing a LOCA, be it small 15 break or large break.
16 A
Right.
Or multiple break.
17 0
If we go in the reverse direction on the pressurizer 1"
level indication, in other words off scale icw, frcm the i
19 operator's perspective what does he necessarily conclude is 20 going on in the primary system?
l l
21 A
If it goes off scale low, he would be concerned i
22,
about moving the steam bubble, the void, into the core i
23 region.
1885 32li 24 0
And what consequences does that have?
23 A
The consequences would be very high temperatures l
Acme Reporting Company 2:,,.......
36
[
in the core itself and melting,/ water reactions and so on.
3 9
So you would face a meltdown if the primary --
O strike that -- if the pressurizer level indication goes off 3
scale low, 4
k s
A That is potential.
A Q
And given a choice between core uncovering on the 6
II i
_ I one hand and going solid on the other hand, prior to the l
accident in March of 1979 what was the operator going to g
choose if it was one or the other?
g A
I don't know. It would be a guess.
You would have g
to leave it up to the individual operators.
I would presume g
most of the operators would try to prevent the solid system, g
high level in the pressurizer.
g Q
So that pre-TMI, operators were more concerned with g
breaking a pipe than uncovering the core.
la.
A Not really.
The problem is that it is very diffi-g cult to uncover the core.
When you say uncover the core, I g
l don't know what ycu mean.
It is not very significant to g
reduce the water level of the core even with @the top of the g
core.
gg Now, if you want to take it down twv-thirds of the
,, 3 way, he would be more concerned with that, i
i Q
Okay.
I am using a term uncover the core.
It is
.,3 uncover the core to the point where damage. 0cc++2<f '
g4 A
That would receive priority attention over the high 3
Acme Repo ting Company 188532$
37 level of the pressurizer.
O And the primary mechanism that an operator possesses 3
to regulate the inventory in the core is what system?
A The volume control system and the letdown system.
4 Q
So that --
5 A
The volume, the make-up and the letdcwn system.
6 0
Are you aware as to whether or not at TMI-II the make-up pumps and high pressure injection pumps are one and g
the same or at least perform the same functions?
g A
I don't know.
I believe they could be.
Many of g
them are.
g Q
Based on several depositions and statements today, g
I will represent to you that we have been informed that they
+
13 are one and the same.
So that based on pressurizer level u
l indication, an operator will choose between breaking a pipe 33 or uncovering the core with his manipulation of the HPI system, g
either turning it on or turning it off.
g A
Yes.
g Q
Therefore it seems that pressurizer level indication 39 is of critical importance in the safe operation of a nuclear gg 1
21 l
reactor.
l A
Critical.
. m.
i O
Does --
l
.,a, j
A Also critical is the control of the pumps.
There g4 was some concern I guess a few years ago that a utility not 25 Acme Reporting Compony m a,.......
33 I
be permitted to turn off those pumps once they were 1.11tiated.
2 They are permitted to be turned off now, as you know.
- They, 3
have been for some years.
But there was some concerns within 4
the staff, I would say three or four years ago, that these 5
pumps not be permitted to be turned off.
I
{
Q Do you remember what prompted that specific concern?'
6 i
7 A
No, I don't.
But I read it.
The concern is H U R i &'
report 0138, which is the 5
expressed, I believe, in _ _ _ _
_3 9
staff responses to differing views expressed by some members 10 of the staff.
I don't know which individual is responsible 11 for that view or what led him to it.
I just don't recall.
12 But I know there was a point that one of the staff had 13 expressed that ECCS pumps not be capable of being turned off 14 once initiated by a proper signal.
15 Q
Do you remember what the resolution of that problem 16 was?
17 A
The resolution is described in 0138.
What --
l' This is the best of my reccliection.
The staff that had the l
19 majority view determined that the concern expressed in the l
20
' minority view did not warrant immediate attention.
Whether i
21 or not it recommended additional analysis be performed of 22 that condition, I just don't recall.
l 23 Q
Would that -- M 24 A
But it should be both the description of the con-
^
99$29 25 cern and the resolution by the staff is in a T w g report Acme Reporting Company m 2, 2.....
39 submitted to the commission.
3 TMSC Q
Is this the type of genecic concern that the tsv.
g committee would have been interested in?
3 A
Yes.
4
~ThSt Q
Do you recall whether or not the 4enk committee was 3
involved in this matter?
c, I'-
A I can't recall.
I don't think the committee was l
formed at that time yet.
I think many of the individuals y
currently on the committee perhaps were involved with it, g
I shouldn't say many; a few of the --
g
%C 0
In view of the ta3E membership including some peopig 33 who had concerns that the HPI system might be prematurely 3g term 3 rated once actuated, did any of them raise the matter g
'T46d after the creation of the tssh committee?
in A
No, not to my knowledge, g
O After your reading now of the Novak memorandum, is exhibit five of the Foster deposition, is there any question 3_
at all in your mind as to what the primary concern of that g
memo is?
g A
Not in my mind.
Q And what is that concern?
g3 l
A I think as I stated before, thehighlikelihoodthatf g.,
an operator could erroneously misinterpret the situation
.g i
within the core from an indication of the pressurizer level.
1 Q
Would you consider the title of that memorandum,
.g 1885 325 i
Acme R e p o rh.ng Company I
a:,,.
40 1
" Loop Seals and Pressurizer Surge Line," to be representative 2
of the level of significance of the information concern, 3
contained in the memorandum?
Or could a better title have 4
been created?
5 A
A better title could have been created.
6 0
Would I be correct in concluding that the title as 7
contained on the Novak memorandum is a bit aseptic relative 9
to the concerns raised in the memo?
In other words, if some-9 one were reading merely the title alone and not the entire 10 memorandum, wculd the title as represented on the memo itself 11 be sufficient to alert someone of the problems raised and the 12 seriousness of those problems in the memo?
13 A
To many people, it would not raise the problem to 14 the extent that it should have been raised.
15 0
And we are referring to the Novak memorandum which 16 is a sum total of one page.
17 A
Yes.
19 Q
With a one-page diagram.
19 A
Yes.
20 0
Is the premature termination of the HPI system 21 based m erroneous or ambiguous information contained in the 9D950 pressuriser level indication a matter that the 43sk"ccamittee' 22 d
23!
would be interested in as a generic problem?
24 A
I think they would be very interested in that type i
I 25 of a problem.
Acme Reporting C o m p a n y~
a;2
,a.....
I
41 Q
can you recall the first time that you have seen 1
this memorandum?
A I can't recall.
I think this is the first time I 3
have seen the actual memorandum.
4 Q
Today during this deposition.
3 A
Today during this deposition.
g Q
As far as you can recall, have any other members of wasC l
the t=mx committee considered the Novak memorandum?
3 gl A
To the best of my knowledge, they would not have considered it.
g O
What do you base that conclusion on?
1, I
A Can I ask a question?
l g
Q Sure.
g A
What is the date of the Novak memorandum?
g O
January 10, 1978.
I n.
A I am not positive.
I can't recall when the division, g
I director of the division in which Tom Novak and Sandy Israel are located assumed his present responsibilities.
Roger g
Mattson, as I recall, became the division director about two g
years ago.
That would be --
I Q
On the far side of the Novak me-andum.
3 I
A Yes.
So I would presume that they may have seen
-- Il i
i f
this memorandum.
D 1885 327 l
Q Pre-TMI?
D i
l A
Pre-TMI.
,, a j
i i
Acme Reporting Compony 2:2......
l 42 0
I believe you mentioned that some of the members of 1
TASC 2
the tzWK committee might be at the assistant director level.
Is that correct?
3 A
No, the director level.
4 5
0 only the director level.
A Only the director level.
6 O
So pre-TMI, Denny Ross would not have been a member TASC of the 4:mek committee.
g TASd A
Denny Ross was not a member of the W committee.
9 The plans for resolution of a generic problem would include 10 a task manager -- and I forget the term that was used -- but 11 a technical supervisor to whom the task manager could look g
for assistance in managing that task.
Denny Ross may have g
been one of these technical supervisors.
g 0
W uld you expect that Denny Ross might have been in 15 TMt a position to provide the tu:t committee with a copy of this 16 memorandum going through normal channels?
gl A
Yes.
ig-O How long would that have taken?
Would that have been a lengthy process?
gp l
A If the, if anyone of the type of Denny Ross or any-
.g 1 one else with his training and experience became aware of a j
.gg memorandum of this type and of its importance to the safety 3
of plants, I think he would have made it aware, brought it to 3
the attention of his management promptly and thus perhaps to 25 1885 328 Acme Reporting Company m..-....
i
43 SMC the tz@. group itself.
1 0
That would have been part of his responsibilities, 2
ThSC to provide possible generic safety concerns to the carrk 3
committee.
4 A
Oh, yes.
If it was very important, he wouldn't even 5
TAsc h
wait for the tzsk committee; he would bring it up to his 6
management for resolution.
He would be concerned with the operating plants more than the plants that were on paper.
So he would bring it to his management prchlcm. F % P" /
g T450 Q
So essentially the ::szi committee gets information g
concerning possible generic problems from two directions:
one g
is from the ACRS which may pose questions or at least raise g
TASC possible generic problems to the c:mst committee for staff 13 resolution, is that correct?
14
~TP.66 A
The W group becomes aware of generic problems 15 p
a o
sa eS a s ale ded to de 16 existence of the generic problems by its dealings with the g
i T45 c-ACRS, by its individual reviews and so on.
So the task group g
itself becomes aware of few generic problems from the ACRS or
,g any other unit other than the staff.
The staff advises the TA6C 12Eik group as to the existence of generic problems.
1
,y i
Q Are you aware that the ACRS when it has questions g
i dealing with possible generic problems requests NRC's staff i
,,3 l
review of those problems?
l I885 329 A
Yes.
3 Acme Reporting Company l
12:2,..4...
44 0
So that one way or another, you might be getting 3
ACRS concerns to resolve through the staff; whether or not 2
the staff themselve< generated the possible generic problem 3
or on action requested by the ACRS.
4 A
Yes.
5 T7h5o 0
Can you recall whether or not in late 1977 the M 6
committee was involved with any questions concerning the Pebble Springs plant application?
Or for that matter, at any g
time; not necessarily late 1977.
g A
I can't recall.
ig Q
Do you have any question that upon considering the 33 Novak memorandum the matters raised in it would be @e type g
Tec to have gone to the tzsk comittee?
g A
It is hard to say in light of Three Mile.
In light 34 of Three Mile, the importance of this consideration, that is g
o essed bod h de McMson mem ad h 16 the Novak memorandum, probably would have resulted in its 1
resolution on a more expedited basis than taking it through g
TA5c the imecsk group.
- g It would have been a problem with the knowledge 20 j
that we gained from Three Mile of the type that the Brown's
.,1 Ferry fire was.
It would be a problem that everyone was aware g
of and the importance of it was recogni::ed, and they would l
not have to go through the priority establishing review by the' g,
nec
=
1885 330 25 Acme Reporting Company
)
m
.2
45 It would have been clearly recognized, and it would 1
2 have been implemented across the board on all the plants.
So TAbC 3
it would not have had to be directed to the t=st group.
It would have been clear that it had to be resolved promptly.
4 5
0 In other words, the more, if I could use the term 6
blatant, generic problems are resolved before they have to TASC get to the committee; whereas, the *~-k committee may concern itself with --
a 9
A Generic problems by their nature, by their defini-tion, are problems that do not interfere with the licensing to u
of plants nor with the continued operation of plants.
There is time, the staf f has determined that there is time, to 12
~
resolve them.
There is no immediate pressing requirement from 13 the standpoint of safety to get them resolved immediately.
14 So a generic problem is one that the staff has g
16 made a determination, and gererally the ACRS has agreed that j
time can be taken to resolve _it completely.
There is no i-g immediate hazard to the public health and safety, So where there is a determination of a more 19 20 immediate concern to public health and safety, expedited attention is given to the resolution of that on a case by 21 22 case basis immediately.
And I might refer again to the fire protection requirements that we established after Brown's I
p
&h f
Ferry; what I call the protection against sabotage requirements 24 A
that were established when that was recognized. '
y^
1885 331 Acme Reporting Company 2::........
46 It is immediate.
The staff takes action to resolve 1
the problem.
It doesn't go to the generic problem listing.
3 TASC i
Q Previously you when discussing the besk committee 3
indicated that there office director involved, I believe.
4 Do you recall your comments in that regard?
3 ThSt A
The te==r. committee is chaired by a deputy office 6
i director, Edson Case.
l Q
So in that case, the office director of NRR would 5
l
- pe 44 be Harold Lusden.
Is that the office director --
g Oc tp ;
A The office director is Harold C
?'=1 3g of the type that you --
Q 3;
l Bu R A thP A
Prior to that, it was,3
% Ldy.
Edson Case for 1,
a period of time was the acting director of NRR.
At that 13 T45c time, he was both the chairman of the 4:ask group and the 34 acting director of NRR.
13 T+5d.
Q Would Lee Gossick be a member of the tftsk c'or,it-16 tee?
3.
j A
Mo, he would not.
g 1
i igl Q
Are you acquainted with someone by the name of
. Jim Creswell?
3
.,3 l I am acquainted with the name and his position.
A Q
How do you know the name?
gg Y
f A
As I recall prior to Three Mile Island event, that 3
g I was aware that Jim Creswell in I and E had raised some con-l 3
l cerns.
I don't believe I was aware at the time of the specifi 3
i Acme Reporting Company 1885 732
- l us..a,,...
47 1
nature of the concern.
But it was continuing to be a problem.-
2 He had views that differed from the majority view within the 3
region and within headquarters.
I was aware that there was a situation with an 4
3 individual by the name of Jim Creswell.
e Q
Do you recall how you became aware of that?
A No, I do not.
5 Q
Have you seen any of Mr. Creswell's inspection reports dealing with Davis-Besse in September 19777 o
to A
Since I joined the special inquiry group, I have become aware of them.
I have seen them, several of his u
i' 32 reports.
n Q
What do his reports deal with?
A As I recall it, and I didn't read them in any n
g depth, they are concerned mostly with the voiding of the 16 pressurizer; the potential for reducing the level in the i-primary coolant reactor system to a level where you would g
get voids in the lines themselves, perhaps in the candy canes I
i h of the steam generators in the B&W plants or in the pumps.
39 gob I vaguely recall that being the primary point.
I g3 O
Were the types of concerns mentioned by TAS
~TMP l
~
Mr. Creswell matters that the force or the h=sk committee u
-- l 1885 333 i
i would be interested in?
23 l
A If the staff had made a determination that the 3
3 types of concerns were valid, were likely eventSand were Acme Reporting Company a n.a.....
48 valid or concerns that should be reviewed in more depth by 3
the staff; yes, they would be very interested in examining 2
them.
3 0
Can you recall whether or not Mr. Creswell's 4
concerns found their way to the] bh committee?
3 W., C A
I don't believe so.
Now the t=st committee is an 6
il all NRR committee; it doesn't go outside the NRR group.
O So in order for Mr. Creswell's concerns to get to S
9 you, since he is a member of I and E in region three, he would l
have to essentially climb the entire I and E ladder from the I
g field through I and E headquarters here in Bethesda and have 33 someone in that office made a decision to forward his concerns 33 to NRR, for instance.
g A
That is the way it would happen.
If he got the g
headquarters staff within I and E to accept his concerns as 3,.,
valid and as important; I and E in my opinion would inform 16 NRR, and the concern would be, would get to MRR in that way.
1 O
And once it does get to NRR, it moves down the NRR g
ladder to the particular individual where there can be some 19 i
form of resolution.
Is that --
1 3
^
1885 334 22 Q
You have previously mentioned that where there was l
a generic problem with immediate safety consideratior_s, it g3 would be resolved quickly; at least more quickly than a normal 3
i 7hdf
-1:mk review method.
g3 Acme Reporting Company m en n..
49 l
1 A
Yes, I would not expect that they have to go through to the = Asp R fuldC T-o mc group or through the -st@C.
It might go to the R fuld[
43%, but I think it would be resolved promptly by immediate 4
attention by the management within NRR.
O So the NRR management would be responsible for the immediate resolution of possible safety problems.
-l A
Yes.
O Did NRR act on the basis of established cr formal o
q$F procedures in such matters?
Or did they just say, "Well, m
we have a problem here; we better fix it right away."
I t.
,3 A
It was just the instant recognition that something I2 '
would have to be done, and no procedures had to be established.
l I3 It would be so clear that attention would be taken right away.
Q Would that be by NRR or if it was another matter, would it go to a different division?
16 A
NRR is not a division.
It is a group of divisions, 1'
NRR office is generally --
14 Q
When I use the term division, it is on the order of I9 an NRR type organization.
885 335 A
It would stay within NRR.
NRR might request assis-
.y tance from other groups outside of NRR; for example, the
.n i
Office of Research, Office of Safety Research, or the Office
-- i I
'1 1
of Standards Development.
But generally they would keep the i
.y responsibility for the resolution of that problem.
5 Tape 4 Q
Would there be an occasion for NRR to refer a Acme Reporting Compony l
50 1
matter dealing with a generic problem to, for instance, 2
Licensing?
A Who is Licensing?
I don't know what you mean.
NRR 3
is licensing.
4 3
0 Well, since I haven't got my handy orgsnizational 6,
chart in front of me, --
A I understand.
Q Would there be occasion for NRR to refer the matter l I
9 to another group of divisions or section, either earlier in g
the process of licensing or in the other direction?
In other words, an inter-group or divisional solution to the problem:
11 or would NRR have a tendency to say, "Well, we will take care 2
of it.
We have found the problem.
We will fix it."
13 A
NRR would generally do what. had to be done.
It y
would accept the responsibility itself for resolving a problem l.
15 If it concluded that there was time, that. there was no press-16 1-ing need for the resolution of that problem, they would probably request another office, for example I and E, to g
obtain information for NRR to better define the problem.
39 go For example, it might request I and E to have its l
inspectors provide information that would indicate the 3,
i generic scope of that problem.
The inspectors know the plants 22 l
better, and perhaps they could go to the plants, seek informa-23 tion.
Or they would have it in their own reports, logs and 24 i885 336 so on.
25 Acme Reporting Company-au, a.....
51 But generally NRR would not pass on a responsibility' 1
for a problem that it had the responsibility for resolving.
2 Q
Have you generally found that there is an inherent 3
problem within the NRR with naving an inadequate amount of 4
time to properly analy::e matters?
5 A
Yes.
g
-l 0
So that it might be.more functional to get a quick i
J resolution of a problem if NRR was to essentially farm out g
9, parts of the issue to other sections that might have more time to work on a finite or a smaller part of the problem.
3n l
A Yes.
11 Q
Which is generally not their procedure.
g A
They would tend more to let a contract with a 13 national laboratory or university to :ssist them.
Unlese it 34 knew that the other group within NRC had a special expertise 3.,
n a specMc region, den h wouM go to dat group.
M 16 example, the Office of.Research has the probabilistic 1_
g[ analysis branch; and I guess they are as good as any group in i
i the United States to direct that type of evaluation.
They I
39 i
would go there before they would go outside.
l a
.,g 1
Q If the Novak memorandum was perceived by Mr. Novak 21 i
, as a pressing immediate problem that needed quick resolution,l!
2; i
k l would there procedures available so that he could have l
- 3 g obtained the resolution necessary?
.885 337 l
9
.,4 1
A I think he coald have elevated the problem to his
.,3 Acme Reporting Company
, m,
.a.
~
53 management.
I don't know if it would have been resolved.
It was up to his management, whoever the assistant director was 2
and the director and so on.
3 But there were procedures that he could have used 4
5 to elevate the problem.
0 What were those procedures?
6 l
A Just either a memorandum to his assistant director g t*- or director; usually to the assistant director.
He would provide a memorandum generally through his assistant director 9
to the director the division to highlight the problem.
30 I
He could have done that.
i; A problem generally is that there is a time problem.
g It takes time to dictate memoranda.
There is just so much time in the day, especially for a branch chief of a large 34 branch.
There is a lot of work to be done, and it is just 13 difficult to find the time to get the memoranda out.
16 So it would depend.upon the importance that he g
I
. placed en the matter from a hazard point of view.
g Il 1[
Q Having read the Novak memorandum and on the basis 39 i
^
l
-that Sandy Israel was in fact the author of that memorandum, 29 l
would you conclude from your contacts with Sandy Israel that 33
_ l he would have known about the memo's relationship to TMI of i
this year, shortly after learning the relevant facts?
g3 I
A I would presume so.
1885 338 g4 0
In other words, the title merely stating that the g3 i
Acme Reporting Company m
.2......
a
['
l 54 memo concerns the loop seals and the pressurizer surge lines 1
2 is not really what is represented by that memo.
3 A
I don't think it is.
Q So for me to conclude that the only thing or the 4
primary matter contained in that memo is loop seals and 5
6 pressurizer surge lines would be to say the least totally incorrect.
3' A
Yes.
9 Q
Were you involved in the accident at TMI-II at the Incident Center shortly after it occurred?
jo A
I was not.
I was not on duty at the time.
I was in the hospital at the time.
I returned to work in mid-13 April, part time; and shortly thereafter I was detailed to 13 the special inquiry.
So I was not involved in the event at 34 all.
g Q
And in terms of your function now with the Rogovin 16 investigation, are you primarily managerial in terms of seeing g
g it, that various people perform various functions?
Or are you I
in fact providing some substantive analysis as well?
e 19 A
I think primary, I would say principally I will be y
I a manager responsible for seeing that the people do the task n
that they have been assigned to.
I think I will be partici-22,
I!
- .3 l pating in specific parts of the assessment.
I am not sure l
what parts yet, but I am sure I will be involved in assessing 34 what changes perhaps might be recommended for the licensing 23 Acme Reporting Compony 1885 339 232 2......
a 55 2
process.
2 O
Well, at this point in time, would you conclude that 3
there are going to be substantial changes made in the way the NRC does business?
4 5
A I would conclude yes, there have been substantial 6
changes and there will be more.
Q The changes you refer to as a result of the lessons g
learned task force?
9 A
Yes.
to MR. SIDELL:
Do you have any questions?
MS. MOE:
No, I don't.
11 MR. SIDELL:
That will exhaust me for the day.
What.
13 13 we have been doing in terms'of our procedure is to recess rather than adjourn the deposition in the hopefully unlikely y
13 event we would come up with a few more questions we would like 16 you to answer.
g We will certainly make every effort to avoid that g
and probably will not find it necessary.
But just in the t-39 event, we will recess rather than adjourn the deposition.
BY MR. SIDELL:
u go gj Q
After almost two hours of testimony, is there any-gg thing that you would like to change or correct that you have stated so far?
g3 A
Not that I can recall.
i885 340 24 MR. SIDELL:
Okay, you will agaia get the 33 Acme Reporting Company x a,.a..a...
4 56
,.e I
opportunity when you review the transcript.
Thank you very 2
much, Mr. DeYoung.
h'ITNESS :
You are welcome.
3 (Whereupon, at 3 :51, the taking of the deposition 4
5 was concluded.)
I have read the foregoing pages, 1 3
tnrough 56, and they are a true ana accurate record of my testimony 3
therein recorded.
9 10 RICHARD C.
DEYOU;iG, JR.
11 Subscribed and sworn to before me 12 this day of 1979 13 Iiotary Public 34 My Commission Expires:
15 16 gj b.-
g 19 20 21 22 1
23,
24 1885 341
., a Acme Reporting Company aca,.a.....