ML19256A354

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Presents Staff Conclusions Re Proposed License to Export low-enriched U to W Germany.License Should Be Granted
ML19256A354
Person / Time
Issue date: 09/18/1978
From: Moore R
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP)
References
NUDOCS 7901050064
Download: ML19256A354 (4)


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SEp 181978 MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM TO WEST GERMANY (XSNM-1281)

In February 1978, Transnuclear, Incorporated applied for a license to export 107,386 kilograms of uranium, enriched to 3.25% U-235 to West Germany.

Except for 3 kg samples, the material will be converted and fabricated into fuel by Reaktor Brennelement Union for use as the initial core for the GROHNDE Unit I reactor.

The GROHNDE Unit 1 is a 361 MWe pressurized water reactor scheduled to begin operation in 1981.

Snipmei. of the material is scheduled to begin in September 1978.

In response to our February 28, 1978 request for tiews, the Executive Branch has (1) conclu b that issuance of the proposed license would not be inimical to the int rests of the United States, including the common defense and security, and (2) confirmed that the material will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the United States and EURATOM.

These views and license application analysis by the Executive Branch were forwarded by the State Department memorandam of May 9, 1978.

Confirmation of the applicability of the US-EURATOM Agreement was set forth in a letter of March 3, 1978 from the Delegation of the Commission of European Communities.

The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below.

I i

o Safeguards. The export will be subject to EURATOM safeguards, which may be regarded as equivalent to IAEA safeguards. As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the FRG has undertaken an obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the FRG, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. The State Department memorandum of May 9, 1978 notes that (1) the IAEA-EURATOM safeguards agreement has come into force and subsidu?y arrangements are now being negotiated to bring IAEA verification into practical effect; and (2) the IAEA has the right to apply the verification procedures of the safeguards agreement prior to completion of the subsidiary arrangements.

79010500Gu

~ Memorandum to the File The staff is not aware of any problems with application of EURATOM safeguards in the FRG.

o No Nuclear Explosive Use.

As a party to the NPT the FRG has undertaken the obligation not to receive any transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufactre or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

In addition, under the US-EURATOM Agreement, the Community guarantees that (1) no material, including equipment and devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, and no source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or devices transferred pursuant to the agreement, will be used for atomic weapons, or for any other military purpose; and (2) no material transferred pursuant to the agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons.

Therefore, the staff believes Criterion (2) of the NNPA is met.

o Physical Security.

As noted in the State Department memorandum of May 9, the FRG is committed to maintaining a level of protection for their program fully comparable 1, that set forth in the recommendations in IAEA INFCIRC/2Ea/Rev. 1.

Based upon visits of physical security review teains, subse-quent exchanges and review, and information provided by the

' Executive Branch, the staff has concluded that the proposed export would be consistent with the NNPA, including the requirement that the physical security program adequate to protect the material will be maintained in the FRG.

In view of this, the staff believes that Criterion (3) of the NNPA is met.

Although the written physical security assurance required by 10 CFR 110.43(b) has not been obtained, an exemption from this requirement will be issued pursuant to authority under 10 CFR 110.10(a).

Memorandum to the File o

Retransfer and Reprocessing.

a.

Retrans fer.

Criterion 4 of the NNPA requires, among other things, that prior approval of the United States be obtained for the retransfer of US-supplied material, facilities or sensitive technology, and special nuclear material pro-duced through the use of such material.

b.

Reprocessing.

Criterion (5) of the NNPA requires that the U.S. be given an unqualified right of approval over the reprocessing of US-supplied material and SNM produced through the use of such material.

Under the US-EURA TOM Agreement, US-supplied material may be reprocessed within the Community. Such reprocessing would be subject to safeguards, as would the recovered special nuclear material.

By note dated July 7, 1978 EURATOM agreed to nego-tiations as called for in Section 404(a) of the NNPA, leading to renegotiation of the US-EURATOM Agreement for Cooperation.

State Department advised the Commission of the receipt of this note on July 20, 1978.

Under the exemption authority of Sections 126(a)(2) of the NNPA, exports to EURATOM are exempted from criteria 4 end 5 of the NNPA until March 10, 1980.

o Sensitive Technology.

The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology.

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The staff is of the opinion that EURATOM meets criteria (1), (2), and (3) of Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the NNPA, or their equivalent.

Under Section 126(a)(2), exports to EURATOM are exempted from criteria (4) and (5) until March 10, 1980.

Therefore, the staff concludes that issuance of the proposed license would be consistent with the recently enacted Nuclear Nonproliferation Act.

. In view of all the considerations above, and as required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has concluded that the export to be made pursuant to the proposed license (1) would be subject to the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the US and EURATOM, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.

R. Neal Moore Senior Licensing Reviewer Office of International Programs

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