ML19255F933
| ML19255F933 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/19/1982 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Oneill T HOUSE OF REP., SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19255F934 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8212080023 | |
| Download: ML19255F933 (1) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION W ASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 OF FICE OF THE November 19, 1982 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill,.1r.
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
In accordance with Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980 I am enclosing a report of the non-disclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the quarter ending September 30, 1982.
Sincerely, Or$Etnal signed by~
Tunzio J. Palladino Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman
Enclosure:
Report Distribution:
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t The Honorable Geor e H. W. Bush President of the Un ted States Senate Wasnington, DC 205 0
Dear 11r. President:
In accordance with Pu lic Law 96 95 of June 30, 1980 I a;'enclosina a report of the non-dis losure of safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Cornission or the arter ending September 30, 1982.
Sincerely, Nunzio J. Palladino Chairman
Enclosure:
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION QUARTERLY REPORT ON NON-DISCLOSURE OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION Section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of specific types of Safeguards hformation.
This section also directs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to prescribe such regulations as necessary to prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of Safegunds Information.
NRC's regulations implementing Section 147 were published in the Federa' Register on October 22, 1981 (46 FR 51718). The attachment to this report identifies the specific types of information, documents, and reports that are protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Section 147, also requires that the NRC report on a quarterly basis the Commission's application during that period of every regulation or order prt:cribed or issued under this section.
As required by Section 147, the following items indicate the Safeguards Information withheld from public disclosure under the provisions of the implementing regulations during the period July 1,1982 through September 30, 1982.
I.
Type of Information Withheld In the NRC's February 12, 1982 report to Congress on non-disclosure of Safeguards Information we indicated that the Commission was withholding the Appeal Board decision and underlying record in Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Flant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-653 (1981)
(physical security) in their entirety pending a determination of whether they contained any releasable portions.
The Commission on July 30, 1982 released a version of ALAB-653 and Governor Brown's Petition for Review to the public.
The Safeguards Information which was withheld from the released versions identified the details of the physical security plan at the Diablo Canyon facility, e.g., the type of alarm system, local law enforcement response times, and the number of armed responders. The Commission also withheld the meaning of "several" as used in the design basis threat of 10 CFR 73.l(a)(1).
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Public disclosure of this type of information could reasonably be expected to significantly increase the likelihood of illegal entry into the facility.
This type of information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
2 Assurance That Only The Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld Large portions of ALAB-653 and the Governor's petition were made available to the public. The withholding of the Safeguards Informatica does not deny the public information concerning the possibility of an unauthorized entry into a nuclear reactor.
A lice-by-line review was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.
II.
Type of Informati.on Withheld In connection with item I above, the reaning of "several" was again withheld fran public disclosure in a transcript of a Commission briecir.g held on May 12, 1982.
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact Public disclosure of this type of information could reasonably be expected to significantly increase the likelihood of illegal entry into the facility. This type of information could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur ir. considering or planning a sabotage attempt.
Assurance that Only The Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld A ';rge portion of the transcript was made available to the puolic.
A line-by-line review was conducted to ensure that only the minimum amount of information was withheld.
III.
Type of Information Withheld On one occasion information was withheld from public disclosure which identified loca' law enforcement response capabilities, sz fe havens for use during safeguards emergencies, and communications shortcomings along particular routes used to ship irradiated nuclear reactor fuel (spent fuel).
Unauthorized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of local law enforcement capabilities (LLEA), the safe havens, and the information identifying communications shortcomings could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the health and safety of the public, because public disclosure would significantly increase the likelihood of theft, diversion, or sabotage of spent fuel shipments.
The LLEA response capabilities contain detailed
3 information about the expected timing and extent of LLEA response to an incident r emergency involving a spent fuel shipment.
LLEA response is an important aspect of the safeguards measures required for spent fuel shipments to protect the public, and knowledge of LLEA capabilities could be of considerable value to a potential saboteur in considering or planning a sabotage atterrpt.
Furthermore, public release of information concerning LLEA capabilities that was obtained in confidence by NRC could reduce the effectiveness of local police with regard to crimes not associated with the shipment.
The listing of safe havens could reveal to a potential saboteur an aspect of a licensee's contingency planning in case of emergency, as well a potential route vulnerabilities revealed by the absence of nearby safe havens.
Communications shortcomings reveal specific vulnerabilities in the route which could be of significant assistance to a saboteur in planning an attack.
Assurance that Only the Minimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of information about LLEA response capabilities, safe havens, and com1unication vulnerabilities does not deny the public basic information about spent fuel ~ transportation, but does leave information gaps for a potential saboteur.
The potential saboteur may risk detection in attempting to discover the additional information.
The documents which contain the withheld information were reviewed on a line-by-line basis to ensure that the minimum amount of information necessary to prevent possible diversion was withheld.
IV.
Type of Information Withheld
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On one occasion information, which identified the location of and barriers to vital areas, was withheld from public disclosure which was contained in an internal NRC memorandum from a Regional Office to Headquarters concerning the imposition of a civil penalty at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant.
Unau'.horized Disclosure Could Have Adverse Impact The public disclosure of this type of information could reasonably be expected to significantly decrease the effectiveness of the vital area access control systLm used to insure that only authorized individuals having work related needs are permitted access to certain sensitive safety-related equipment.
.. Assurance that Only the flinimum Amount of Information was Withheld The withholding of this type of Safegeards Information does not deny the public infomation the possibility of an unauthorized entry into a nuclear reactor.
ATTACHMENT IDENTIFYING SPECIFIC TYPES OF INFORMATION PROTECTED FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE Physical Protection at Fixed Sites Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to the protection of facilities that possess formula quantities of strategic special riuclear material and power reactors.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite physical security plan for the nuclear facility or site.
(ii)
Site specific drawings, diagrams, sketches, or maps that substantially represent the final design features of the physical protection system.
(iii)
Details of alarm system layouts showing location of intrusion detection devices, alarm assessment equipment, alarm system wiring, emergency power sources, and duress alarms.
(iv)
Written physical security orders and procedures for members of the security organization, duress, codes, and patrol schedules.
(v)
Details of the on-site and off-site communications systems that are used for security purposes.
(vi)
Lock combinations and mechanical key design.
(vii)
Documents and other matter that contain lists Jr locations of certain safety-related equipment explicitly identified in the documents as vital for purposes of physical protection, as contained in physical security plans, safeguards contingency plans, or plant specific safeguards analyses
'or production or utilization facilities.
(viii)
The composite safeguards contingency plan for the facility or site.
(ix)
Those portions of the facility guard qualification and training plan which disclose features of the physical security system or response procedures.
. (x)
Response plans to specific threats detailing size, disposition, response times, and armament of responding forces.
(xi)
Size, armament, and dispositen of on-site reserve forces.
(xii)
Size, identity, armament, and arrival times of off-site forces committed to respond to safeguards emergencies.
2.
physical Protection in Transit Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relative to the protection of shipments of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material and spent fuel.
Specifically:
(i)
The composite transportation physical security plan.
(ii)
Schedules and itineraries for specific shipments.
(Routes and quantities for shipments of spent fuel are not withheld from public disclosure.
Schedules for spent fuel shipments may be released 10 days after the last shipment of a current series.)
(iii)
Details of vehicle immobilization features, intrusion alarm devices, and communication systems.
(iv)
Arrangements with and capabilities of local police response forces, and locations of safe havens.
(v)
Details regarding limitation of radio-telephone cordnuni-cations.
(vi)
Procedures for response to safeguards energencies.
3.
Inspections, Audits and Evaluations Information not otherwise classified as Restricted Data or National Security Information relating to safeguards inspections and reports.
Specifically:
Portions of safeguards inspection reports, evaluations, audits, or investigations that contain details of a. licensee's or applicant's physical security system or that disclose uncorrected
. defects, weaknesses, or vulnerabilities in the system.
Information regarding defects, weaknesses or vulnerabilities may be released af ter corrections have been made.
Repor i of investigations may be released after the investigation has been completed, unless withheld pursuant to other authorities, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552).
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wash NGTON.D.C.20555 OF FICE OF THE November 19, 1982 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515
Dear fir. Speaker:
In accordance with Public Law 96-295 of June 30, 1980 I am enclosing a report of the non-disclosure of Safeguards Information by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for the quarter ending September 30, 1982.
Sincerely, cl[ uk/
c~-
Nunt o 0. Palladino i
Chairman
Enclosure:
Report