ML19254F644

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Forwards IE Info Notice 79-26, Breach of Containment Integrity. No Action Required
ML19254F644
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 11/05/1979
From: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Mary Johnson
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
References
NUDOCS 7911160141
Download: ML19254F644 (2)


Text

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UNITED STATES

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b

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REGION 11 f

101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 o

f ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303 NOV 5 1979 In Reply Refer To:

RII:JPG 50-395 South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Attn:

M. C. Johnsor., Vice President Special Services and Purchasing Post Office Box 7f4 Columbia, South Carolina 29218 Gentlemen:

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.

It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time.

If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.

If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Sincerely, James P. O'Reill Director

Enclosures:

1.

IE Information Notice No. 79-26 2.

List of IE Information Notices Issued in the Last Six Months 1351 293 7911160 ! y

South Carolina Electric and Gas Company.

cc w/ encl:

T. B. Conners, Jr.

Conners, Moore and Corber 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20006 A. A. Smith Quality Assurance Post Office Box 8 Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065

0. S. Bradham, Manager Nuclear Operations Post Office Box 8 Jenkinsville, South Carolina 29065

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SSINS:

6870 Accession No:

7908220133 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.

20555 November 5, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-26 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

' Description of Circumstances:

On September 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that had resulted in containment integrity being breac'ied for an indeterminate length of time.

While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a 3" bypass line around the main 48" containment purge valve, plant personnel dis-covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi-tion. These valves should have been locked closed.

Investigation by the licensee indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April, 1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed. The plant has operated at power for the major portion of that time period.

The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health. However, in the event of a design basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a significant path for a radioactive release from the containment.

The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long term hydrogencontro}jcapability for the containment atmosphere following a design basis accident.- It was intended that after approximately 30 days following an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently to permit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment atmosphere, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack.

Thus the components in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves N -

open during the initial pressure surge of the design basis accident, and signif-icant uncontrolled release would result. High radiation in ths vicinity of the bypass line would also make immediate closing of the manual isolation valves, even if identified as the source of leakage, an extremely hazardous anar=

  • The principal cause for this event was i:

proper use and positioning of these valvi valve line-up checklist, which is perfor:

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously 1/ Current NRC requirements call for the entered into system under:

f hydrogen buildup. Palisades has recombir e

a 051 29D

30. of pages: _

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