ML19254F055
| ML19254F055 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1979 |
| From: | Broehl D, Erickson L, Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | OREGON, STATE OF |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254F054 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911050509 | |
| Download: ML19254F055 (30) | |
Text
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UIIITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
LICE?iSEE'S RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES DATED AUGUST 27, 1979 FROM THE STATE OF OREGON The following are Licensee's responses, dated September 17, 1979, to Interrogatories, dated August 27, 1979, received from the State of Oregon.
Persons responding to each Interrogatory are indicated by their initials as follows:
D. J. Broehl, PGE (DJB)
B. D. Withers, PGE (BDW)
L. W, Erickson, PGE (LWE)
W. H. White, Bechtel (WHW)
E. W. Edwards, Bechtel (EWE)
D. L. Damon, Bechtel (DLD)
Interrogatory 1
" Table 3.5-1 of PGE-1020 shows that the calculated total forces during an OBE on walls 6 and 8 between elevations 45' and 61' exceed the calculated wall capacities. Please justify in tech-nical detail the consequences of this result including:
(a) the fact that these walls are not continuous plane walls as modeled in the STARDYNE computer program; (b) wall deflections; (c) load transfers to other walls and the acceptability of such load transfers; 1269 054 7911050 5k
Interrogatory 1 (Concluded)
(d) the probability and extent of damage to walls 6 and 8 includia:g spalling; (e) the consequences of such wall damage to equirment, cables, and piping contained within, peaetrating, adjacent to, or in the vicinity of the walls and identify all such equipment, cables and piping; (f) the personnel hazard associated with such wall damage."
Response to Interrogatory 1 (a) Wails 6 and 8 are minor shear walls constructed of two wythes of heavy weight masonry block. The walls are adjacent to Column Lines K and H, respectively, in the Auxiliary Building of the Complex. Although each of these walls is somewhat staggered, they have been modeled in the STARDYNE as con-tinuous walls along the grid lines.
In calculating the capacities of these walls by application of the flexural analysis equation described in Section 3.4.2.2 of PGE-1020, the lengths of the wills were taken to be cnly the actual lengths of their plane continuous portiot.s. Hense, modeling of these walls in the STARDYNE computer program is consis-tent with their capacity evaluation.
(b) All of the walls in the Complex are connected by reinforced concrete diaphragm floor slabs which force the deflections of neighboring walls to be approximately equal. These slabs provide the means for distributing the lateral loads to the various shear walls and they control the deflection of a wall that may have exceeded its elastic limit. Thus, 1269 055
_2_
Response to Interrogatory 1 (Continued) even for a wall beyond its elastic limit, its deflection is limited to the deflection of the walls of the Complex which deform elastically.
(c) The shear forces due to the 0.25 g SSE do not exceed the ultimate capacities of any of the e' aar wclls. Although the calculated total shear forces i. Walls 6 and 8, due to a 0.15 g OBE, exceed their OBE capacities, the ulti-mate capacities of these walls will not te =xceeded.
(The OBE capacities are 0.9/1.40 = 0.64 of the ultimate capa-cities.) Since the ultimr te capacities of these two walls are not exceeded during an OBE, these walls will maintain their structural integ sty and no load redistribution to other walls will take place.
In the unlikely event of some limited redistribution occurring, the walls in the immediate neighborhood have cf 2quate reserve capacity (capacity less OBE shear force). The reserve capacities of Walle 5 and 7 are 2357 kips and 95 kips, respectively.
(d) Both Walls 6 and 8 are limited to their lateral load resist-ing capabiliH es by the flexural resistance as provided by the vertical reinforcing steel. Neither of these walls would, therefore, exhibit a shear mode of failure. As explained in response to (c) above, these walls would still be within their ultimate capacities. Furthermore, as demon-strated by the results of the testing program, test,ecimens which are controlled by flexure develop flexural cra :s 1269 056
Response to Interrogatory 1 (Concluded) as the lateral loads are progressively increased beyond the specimens' elastic limit and do not show any spalling at or below their ultimate loads. Therefore, Walls 6 and 8 will not suffer any damage beyond development of flexural cracks, and the walls will not experience large lateral deformation because of the connecting diaphragm slab at Elevation 61 ft.
Thus, spalling will not occur during either the SSE or the OBE.
(e) The only safety-related equipment that could be affected by deterioration of either of these walls is a cable trr/
(BBR411) which is supported laterally from Wall 8.
Since damage to Wall 8 will be limited to the flexural cracks described above, the ability of the wall to support the cable tray will not be affected.
(f) Damage to Walls 6 and 8 would be limited to the develop-ment of distributed flexural cracks and, therefore, would not cause personnel hazard.
(WHW) 1269 057 Interrogatory 2 "What are the consequences of a design basis hurricane, tornado, earthquake, etc. occuring during movement of the steel plates into position and prior to tensioning of the attachment bolts?
Please include in the response the effects on the lifting and transporting equipment and the effects of the plates slamming against nearby structures and equipment."
Response to Interrogatory 2 The occurrence of a design basis tornado or an earthquake during the movement of the steel plates into position and prior to tension-ing of the bolts has been considered. Hurricanes, however, are not part of the design bases listed in FSAR Section 3.8.1.1.
As described in FSAR Section 2.3, tornadoes are rare in the vicinity of Trojan. Steel plates will not '.e hoisted during conditions under which a tornado might occur (e.g., thunderstormes).
Prior to plate hoisting, the National Weather Service will be contacted for the current local weather forecast to ensure that at least eight (8) hours of acceptable weather is forecast.
We have investigated the effects of a seismic occurrence on the crane girder during the lifting operation, and on the floor beams at elevation 93'-0" during the transportation of the plate. In both instances it has been verified that the stresses in these elements, including those created by the seismic event, are within the allowables as specified in FSAR Paragraph 3.8.1.3.3.2.
- Thus, the crane girder and the floor beams will withstand the seismic effects of an SSE occuring during a hoisting or movement operations.
It has also been verified that the lif ting equipment is capable 1269 058
Response to Interrogatory 2 (Concluded) of withstanding the additional forces and stresses created by the the seismic event.
The steel plates being transported at elevation 93 ft will be restrained during the entire movement to assure that they cannot overturn during a seismic event and damage the floor beam or the adjacent wall or equipment. The steel plates being transported at elevation 45 f t will be restrained when they approach wall R to assure that they cannot overturn during a seismic event and damage that wall. Although a seismic event might cause the plates to over-turn in the course of movement at elevation 45 ft outside the vicinity of wall R, analyses have verified that such overturning sould not damage any equipment below the floor and any damage to the floor slab is not of any safety concern.
While Plates 1 through 6 are being lifted into place along the west face of the R wall, guide columns will preclude the plates slamming against nearby structures and equipment.
Lead lines will be used to prevent excessive swinging of Plates 7 and 8 while they are being lif ted from elevation 45 f t to the Turbine Building floor at elevation 93 f t. and thereby prevent them from impacting on adjacent structures. Guide plates for Plate 8 and Z-bars for Plate 7 will keep the plates from swinging and impacting on adjacent structures as they are being lowered into position along the west face of the R wall.
)269 059 Response to Interrogatory 2 (Concluded)
In the sequence of erection of the plates, the bolts will be first tightened snug. At this point the bolts will prevent the steel plates from moving during an earthquake. At the same time, the plates' inertia load will be imposed upon the wall, which is capable of sustaining such a load generated by an earthquake.
The only equipment that could be damaged during the installation of the plates are the exhaust stacks and fuel oil day tank vent for the B diesel generator which could be damaged by Plate 8.
Since this plate will be installed during cold shutdown, damage to that equipment would not impair the Plant's ability to maintain that condition.
(DLD/ EWE)
Interrogatory 3 "Please justify in detail the quality and acceptability of the transporting equipment including each item in the system such as chains, slings, etc. the qualification test procedures and accept-ance criteria, and when testing will be done. Also, regarding PGE's response to NRC question 1(c) of July 20, 1979, please state the operators' actual qualifications and the actual extent of supervision during lif ting and transporting the plates."
Response to Interrogatory 3 1.
Transporcing Equipment: The transporting equipment con-sists of the Turbine Building overhead crane and dollies (including carriages and plate support framing) to move the plates on the floor slabs.
a) The overhead crane will be tested at 110 percent of the rated hoist capacity prior to beginning 1269 060
Response to Interrogatory 3 (Continued) the lifting operation. The test will be accom-plished by lif ting a test load (such as concrete slabs or steel plates) and moving the hoist in two norizontal directions. The test will be certified by the Bechtel Senior Construction Engineer, whose qualifications are described in the response dated August 13, 1979 to NRC Ques-tion 1(e).
b) Dollies - The dollies will only be used to roll the steel plates on the Elevation 45-ft and 93-ft floor slabs.
If the dollies collapse and cause the steel plates to drop the maximum 12 in. to the floor, analyses have shown that the floor slabs at each elevation can absorb the resulting kinetic energy without damage. The dollies te not relied upon to prevent the plates from overturning during transportation.
Instead, as discussed in the answer to Interrogatory 2 above, restraints will be used during the entire course of the movement at elevation 93 ft-and during the movement adjacent to wall R at elevation 45 ft.
Based on these facts, no certification program for the dollies is planned; dollies will be visually inspected to deter-mine that they have been manufactured in accordance with the plans and specifications. 1269 06i
Response to Interrogatory 3 (Continued) 2.
Rigging Equipment, Such as Chains, Slings, Etc.: All rigging items are designed with a five-to-one safety factor and will be inspected as follows:
a) Chain hoists will be new equipment tested by the manufacturer to 125 percent of the rated capacity or the manufacturers specification, whichever is higher. The test will be conducted and certified by the manufacturer prior to the hoists being shipped.
b) Slings will be tested by the manufacturer at 100 per-cent rated load and to ultimate strength. This will be accomplished by testing a sling identical to and from the same cable roll as the slings manufactured for the modification work. This test will be conducted and certified prior to the slings being shipped.
c) All shackles and the bridle ring will be tested and certified by the manufacturer at two (2) times the rated load prior to the items being shipped.
d) A visual inspection of all lifting equipment will be performed just prior to any lif t by the Senior Con-struction Engineer. This inspection will determine that all rigging equipment is positioned correctly and has not been damaged.
Response to Interrogatory 3 (Concluded) 3.
Operator Qualifications: The overhead crane operator will be a journeyman operator with at least 1,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of operating experience on lift cranes. The operator will receive instructions from a Plant Staff crane operator and will then operate the crane in a no load and test load situation until he is familiar with the crane opera-tion and satisfies the Senior Construction Engineer that he can competently operate the crane.
The construction workers operating the chain hoists and moving the dollies will be journeymen who have successfully completed an apprenticeship pregram in their trade as well as a written qualification test which requires knowledge concerning use of construction equipment.
4.
Supervision: All modification work, including the moving and lifting of steel plates, will be accomplished under the supervision of the Senior Construction Engineer.
This individual will be physically present and will supervise all lif ting and transporting of the steel plates.
(DLD/ EWE) 1269 063 Interrogatory 4a "Although PGE states that in response to NRC Question 2 of July 20, 1979 that in the event of a plate drop sufficient equipment will remain operable to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition, please justify how the plant operator can be expected to take the appropriate actions to achieve a safe shutdown condition considering all of the possible alarms, failure indications, inoperable instrument meters, false meter indications, noise, smoke, dust, etc., that may occur as a result of cables, piping, and equipment being damaged or rendered inoperable as a result of the plate drop."
Response to Interrogatory 4a As indicated in Licensee's response dated September 5, 1979 to NRC Systems Branch Question 4, the Licensee plans to install Plate 8 with the Plant in cold shutdown (Reactor Coolant System temperature
<200*F.
This added precaution will obviate the need for the manual actions to achieve cold shutdown referred to in Licensee's response dated August 13, 19'/9 to NRC Questions 1(e) and 2.
When the Plant is in cold shutdown, decay heat is the only source adding energy to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). For a conserva-tive analysis, it is assumed that the Plant has been shutdown for 20 hr and has been in cold shutdown for one (1) hr when Plate 8 is being moved into position. The decay heat, 20 hr after shutdown, is 75.2 million BTU per hr.
Assuming that the cables in the upper three penetrations are completely severed by a plate drop accident and the associated train A equipment is not available, the entire train B components would still be available to maintain the Plant in cold shutdown with power supplied by the train B Emergency Diesel Generator.
1269 064 Response to Interrogatory 4a (Continued)
A single train of RHR along with its support services (CCW and SW) can maintain RCS temperature below 180*F and thus is suffi-cient to maintain the Plant in cold shutdevn.
If the cooling water (i.e., river) temperature is above 75'F, manual actions will be required to reduce the heat loads on the CCW system by eliminating nonessential loads, such as CCW to rad-waste evaporators, until the decay heat load has naturally decreased. These actions can be accomplished from the Control Room by the assigned operator on orders from the Shif t Supervisor as discussed further below.
During handling of Plate 8, operating personnel will be briefed, assigned specific duties and provided with communications such that:
1.
The operators in the Control Room will know whethe.
a plate drop has occurred.
2.
In the event of a plate drop, the assigned operator will immediately: a) verify from indication in the Control Room that B train RHR and supporting systems remain in operation; b) check his indications to determine if the train A RHR and supporting systems have been affected by the plate drop; and c) begin to monitor RHR/RCS temperatures.
1269 065
_u_
Response to Interrogatory 4a (Continued) 3.
Other operators assigned in the Control Room will deal with other alarms and consequences (e.g., loss of offsite power) so the assigned operator need not be distracted from maintaining control of reactor temperatures.
4.
If both train A and B are available to cool the reactor, or if time and temperatures are such that one train of RHR is sufficient to maintain tempera-tures as described above, the assigned operator need only continue monitoring RHR/RCS temperatures and equipment status.
5.
If only train B RHR is available and RHR/RCS tempera-tures begin to rise such that action is necessary to reduce heat loads on CCW, the assigned operator will then begin isolating nonessential loads on CCW by clesing motor-operated isolation valves from his position in the Control Room. (This is accomplished in a matter of minutes by merely turning control switches on the control boards.)
6.
In the event that Spent Fuel Pool Cooling is affected by the plate drop as described in Licensee's response dated September 17, 1979 to Intervenor's Interroga-tories 4 through 7, the Auxiliary Operator making the valve alignments in the Auxiliary Building, as 1269 066 Response to Interrogatory 4a (Concluded) described in that r esponse, would communicate with the assigned operator in the Control Room to coordinate the control of temperatures in the Spent Fuel Pool with train B RHR and in the reactor with train A RHR.
(The train A service water, CCW and RHR pumps, and Emergency Diesel Generator, if required, would be started earlier - those actions would have to be taken from local control stations if their con-trolcableswereaffectedbytheplatedrop.)
(BDW/LWE)
Interrogatory 4b "Please estimate the time required for the operator to achieve a safe shutdown condition in the event of a plate drop and justify the acceptability thereof including specific reference to the standards on which tha response is based."
Response to Interrogatory 4b As indicated in the response to Interrogatory 4a above, the Plant will be in cold shutdown during the installation of Plate 8.
(LWE)
)2b Interrogatory Sa "What are the estimated time intervals between the initiation of the lifts of plates 7 and 8 and completion of attachment of these plates to the wall?"
Response to Interrogatory 5a The approximate time interval between the initiation of the plate 7 lif t and the attachment of plate 8 is 10 calendar days as follows:
Calendar Days Required Item (Approx.)
- 1) Set plate 7 and install bolts to the snug condition.
1
- 1) Weld plate 7 to surrounding plates 2
- 3) Place and cure grout behind plates 5, 6 and 7 so that plate 8 can be set (5-/.,y cure time prior to setting 6
plate 8)
- 4) Set plate 8 and install bolts to the snug condition (bolts in a snug con-dition are adequate to secure the plates for seismic lcading) 1 Total 10 The welding of plate 8 to plates 5, 6 and 7, the placement and curing of the grout behind plate 8, and the tensioning of the bolts will require approximately an additional 34 calendar days.
(EWE) 1269 068 Interrogatory 5b "Please state why these two operations could not be scheduled to coincide with plant shutdown in order to minimize the risks involved."
Response to Interrogatory Sb As set out in the response dated September 5,1979 to NRC Staff Systems Branch' Question 4, Licensee plans to install Plate 8 with the plant in cold shutdown (Operational Mode 5 or 6).
As set out in the responses dated August 13, 1979 and September 5,'
1979 to NRC Staff Question 1(e) and Structural Branch Question 4, respectively, a potential drop of Plate 7 would not damage safety-related cables.
In addition, it is in the public interest to avoid unnecessary thermal cycling of the plant and to minimize unavaila-bility of a valuable regional power resource and expenditures for power purchase. In light of these considerations, Licensee does not believe that it is necessary to install Plate 7 while the plant is shut down.
(DJB) 1269 069 s
Interrogatory 6 "Flease. set forth the standards PGE considers committed to follow during the modification work. For example, w+11 PGE specifically and fully comply with the License Technical Specifications, the modification procedures contained in PGE-1020, as well as each statement in response to questions and interrogatories in the proceeding?"
Rpsponse to Interrogatory 6 During the modification work, the Licensee will comply with all applicable provisions of the Operating License, including the Technical Specifications and any requirements added to the Operating License as a result of this proceeding. Licensee also intends to comply with all of the information describing modification work contained in PGE-1020, responses to NRC Staff Questions and Interrogatory responses.
It should be reco'gnized, however, that in the course of any work, field conditions or other developments may necessitate deviations from such informa-tion which are not important to safety. There will be no such deviation unless Licensee determines that it does not involve a change in the requirements Lnposed in the Operating License or an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(c). (DJB) 1269 070 Interrogatory 7 "Please justify in detail the technical acceptability of the partial penetration welds between the plate segments.
In your response please identify and discuss each of the following:
(a) the minimum defect size detectable by the proposed non-destructive examination; (b) the acceptance criteria for the proposed non-destructive examination; (c) the effect of the maximum undetectable or maximum acceptable defect (whichever is worse) in the worst case configuration and orientation; (d) welder qualification."
Response to Interrogatory 7 The partial penetration welds between the plate segments are technically accepta.le from considerations of both strength and code requirements.
The acceptability of the welds for satisfying the strength requirements has been established by performing a finite element analysis and determining the stress levels at all critical locations of the plate. The loads considered in this analysis were seismic loads to which thermal loads have been superimposed to arrive at the final maximum stresses to be sustained by the welds. The stresses in all casec are below the code allowable stresses. The maximum stress level is approximately 13 kips /in.2, as compared to the code allowable stress of 21 kips /in.2, Also, stress concentrations at all critical locations were determined and a fracture mechanics analysis was performed to 1269 071
Response to Interrogatory 7 (Continued) establish acceptability with emphasis on such critical material behavior as brittle fracture, plastic rupture, and fatigue under cycling loads (such as seismic loads). The analysis has shown that the calculated stress levels are below those that may create a failure of the welds.
All welds on the plate will be performed in accordance with the Standard Code for Arc and Gas Welding in Building Con-struction, AWS D1.1-79, American Welding Society (AWS).
The proposed nondestructive examination of the welds is a magnetic particle examination using A-C yoke and dry powder in accordance with Section 6.7.5 of AWS D1.1-79.
With respect to the specific items raised in Interrogatory 7:
a.
Magnetic particle examination will be performed at 1/4-in. intervals of weld depth (depth of one weld pass), cnd at each interval, the surface of the weld will be examined. Therefore, the minimum size of detectable defect depth will be 1/4 in.
Surface defect lengths as small as 1/8 in. are detectable by this method of examination.
b.
The acceptance criteria of the proposed nonde-structive examination are those specified in D1.1-79, Section 8.15.2 (copy attached). Based on a 3/4-in. weld size, the maximum acceptable defect size is 1/2 in. 1269 072
Response to Interrogatory 7 (Concluded) c.
The 1/2-in. acceptable discontinuity described in (b) above, in the worst-case configuration and orienta-tion of the defect, has been factored into the frac-ture mechanics analysis. This analysis verified that the calculated stresses were below those that make this analysis verified that the calculated stresses were below those that may create a failure of the welds.
d.
Welders will be qualified to the requirements of AWS Dl.1-79, Section 5, Part C.
(DLD/ EWE) 1269 073 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE'S RESPONSES 9/17/79 TO STATE OF OREGON INTERROGATORIES PAGE 1 0F 1 1RTERrG6 ATCR4 7 a.15.2 Radsosraphie and Magneck Partscie inspects.
Welds that are subject to radiographic or magnetic particle nesting in addition to visual inspection shall have no cracks and shall be unacceptable if the radiograph or magnetic particle inspection shows any of the types of discon-tinuiues given in 8.15.2.1 or 8.15.2.2.
8.15.2.I Individual discontinuities, having a greatest dimension of 3/32 in. (2.4 mm) or greater, if (1) The greatest dimension of a discontinuity is larger than 2/3 of the affective throat,2/3 the weld size, or 3/4 in. (19.0 mm).
(2) The discontinuity is closer than three times its greatest dimension to the end of a groove weld subject to primary tensile stwsses.
(3) A group of such discontinuities is in line such that (a) The sum of the greatest dimensions of all such discontinuities is larger than the effective throat or weld size in any length of st times the effective throat or weld size. When the length cf the weld beirts examined is less than six times the effective throat or weld size, the per-missit,le sum of the greatest dimensions shall be propor-tionally less than the effective throat or weld size.
(b) The space between two such discontinuities which are adjacent is less than three times the great.
est dimension of the !.rger of the discontmustics in the pair being considered.
8.15.2.2 Independent of the requirements of 8.15.2.1, discontinuaties having a greatest dimension of less than 3/32 in. (2 4 mm),if the sum of their grea'.est dimensions exceeds 3/8 in. (9.5 mm) in any linear mch of weld.
1269 074
Interrogatory 8 "Please state whether the bumping post will be of sufficient strength to stop a runaway rail car of the maximum possible load and speed (see NRC question 19 of July 20) and provide the basis for your conclusion including all assumptions and the sources thereof."
Response to Interrogatory 8 The bumping post described in Licensee's response dated August 13, 1979 to NRC Question 19 is neither intended nor necessary to stop a runaway rail car.
A locked derail located approximately 150 ft northwest of the west entrance to the Turbine P.ailding railroad bay physically prevents rail cars from advancing on the rails beyond that location. This derail would be unlocked and removed to allow passage of scheduled rail traffic only after specific permission to pass this location is granted by the Plant General Manager, and only after the completion of required searches and other security-related precautions. All rail cars, thus, must come to a full stop near the derail.
(From that point on, rail car movement is controlled as described in the response to NRC Ques-tion 19.) Therefore, a runaway rail car vill be stopped before it can present a hazard to the plant.
(BDW) i26L9 075 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THC ATOMIC SAFETY AND _ LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
e STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
ss County of San Francisco )
AFFIDAVIT OF D.
J.
BROEHL D. J. BROEHL, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is Assistant Vice President Generation Engineering-Construction, Portland General Electric Company and that the answers associated with his name and contained in the Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
p
(/
)XL4. BROEHL Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17 day of September 1979.
J l
O [D 8 QGMAN Notary PubllMf C ifornia l
notaav musue cAut00mA l
SAN FRAMIV O COtlNTY
)
,, _7," ".*" "' i 3 % Commission Expires 1269 076
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
STATE OF OREGON
)) ss County of Multnomah )
AFFIDAVIT OF LIEF W. ERICKSON Lief W. Erickson, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is Trojan Licensing Supervisor, Generation Licensing & Analysis Department, Portland General Electric Company, and that the answers associated with his name and contained in Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true anc: correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
b V
Lief W. Erickson '
Subscribed and sworn to before me thi.s 17th day of September 1979.
d d
Notauf'Public of Oregon f
My Commission Expires DEP. l @ )@81 1269 077
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
STATE OF CREGON
)) ss County of Multnomah )
AFFIDAVIT OF BART D. WITHERS Bart D. Withers, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is Assistant Vice President, Environmental and Analytical Services, and was formerly Plant Superintendent, Trojan Nuclear Plant, Portland General Electric Company, and that the answers associated with his name and contained in Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Bart D. Withers Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of September 1979.
Notary Public of Oregon My Commission Expires 1269 078
9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARC In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
ss County of San Francisco )
AFFIDAVIT OF D.
L.
DAMON D.
L. DAMON, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is a Project Engineer, Bechtel Power Corporation, and that the answers associated with his name and contained in Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
M D.
L.
DAMON Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17 day of September 1979.
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6.f QQg OFFICIAL SEAL N
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FRED BORGM AN Notary Public bf ifornia svotasy pu8l.sC CWFADMA I
...y.
.- -,.... M My Commission Expires 1269 079
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
ss County of San Francisco )
AFFIDAVIT OF E.
W.
EDWARDS E.
W. Edwards, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is a Field Construction Manager, Bechtel Power Corporation, and that the answers associated with his name and contained in the Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
1-_
E.
W.
Edwards Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17 day of September 1979.
^
OYICIAL Eb l
FRED BORGMAN Notary Public of C G1fornia NOTAQv PUBLIC CALrFORNIA M
l san nAncisco coimtv s______-1 "f'_"E"_# **"f My Commission Expires 1269 080
f s
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
)
et al.
)
(Control Building Proceeding)
)
(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
)
ss County of San Francisco )
AFFIDAVIT OF W.
H.
WIIITE W. H. WHITE, being duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is an Engineering Specialist, Bechtel Power Corporation, and that the answers associated with his name and contained in Licensee's Responses dated September 17, 1979 to Interrogatories are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
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W.
H. WHITE Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17 day of September 1979.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA lh I5 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION q
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6 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD g
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Docket 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,
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(Control Building Proceeding)
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(Trojan Nuclear Plant)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that on September 17, 1979:
- 1) " Licensee's Responses to Intervenors' Interrogatories Dated August 27, 1979";
- 2) " Licensee's Responses to Interrogatories Dated August 27, 1979 from the State of Oregon"; and
- 3) Affidavits of D. J. Broehl, L. W. Erickson, B. D. Withers, D. L. Damon, E. W. Edwards, and W. H. White; have been served upor time persons listed below by depositing copies thereof in the United States mail with proper postage affixed for first class mail.
Marshall E. Miller, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean Docketing and Service Section (3)
Division of Engineering, Office of the Secretary Architecture and Technology U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oklahoma State University Washington, D. C.
20555 Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Joseph R. Gray, Esq.
Dr. Hugh C. Paxton Counsel for NRC Staff 1229 - 41st Screet U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544 Washington, D. C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad & Toll Panel 1025 Connecticut Ave., N. W.
U. 3. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 1214 Washington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20036 1269 082
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Frank W. Ostrander, Jr., Esq.
Mr. David B. McCoy Richard M. Sandvik, Esq.
348 Hussey Lane Assistant Attorney General Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 State of Oregon Department of Justice Ms. C. Gail Parson 500 Pacific Building P. O. Box 2992 520 S. W. Yamhill Kodiak, Alaska 99615 Portland, Oregon 97204 Mr. Eugene Rosolle William Kinsey, Esq.
Coalition for Safe Power Bonneville Power Administration 215 S. E. 9th Avenue P. O. Box 3621 Portland, Oregon 97214 Portland, Oregon 97208 Columbia County Courthouse.
Ms. Nina Bell Law Library 728 S. E. 26th Avenue Circuit Court Room Portland, Oregon 97214 St. Helens, Oregon 97051 Mr. John A. Kullberg Route 1, Box 250Q Sauvie Island, Oregon 97231 J
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7' G. A. Zimmerman censing Supervisor Portlan General. Electric Company Dated: September 17, 1979 kb 4kk66.27B11