ML19254E760
| ML19254E760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/05/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Staats E GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E744 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911020297 | |
| Download: ML19254E760 (16) | |
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UNITED STATES f i,gy.' j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
VJ ASHIN GTON,0.C. 20555 j '
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3 October 5, 1979 O F FICE OF T*.E C H AIRM AN The Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States General Acccunting Office Washincton, D. C.
20548
Dear Mr. Staats:
In accordance with section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, the fluclear Regulatory Comission is hereby submitting a statement on the Commission actions being taken with regard to the recommendations made by the Comptroller General of the United Sta+.es in a report entitled " Federal Actions Are Needed to Improve Safety and Security of Nuclear Materials Transportation." The Commission's general response to the GA0 report and specific responses to GA0 recommendations regarding the NRC are enclosed.
Sincerely, 6
N Mbb Josach M. Hendrie Chairman
Enclosure:
Responses to GA0 Report 1249 085 7911020hf
NRC RESPONSE TO GA0 REPORT EMD-79-18 General Response The Commission recognizes that the safety and security of nuclear materials transportation is an important component of its overall responsibility in the regulation of nuclear materials.
Both the safety and security aspects of trans-port are under continuing review.
In many instances, we find that we are in general agreement with the recommendations of the report.
As a result, regula-tory solutions to carry out several of the recommendations of the report are either complete or well underway.
Before addressing the specific recommendations, we wduld like to describe some recent actions taken to strengthen requirements for the safe transport of low-level radioactive waste destined for burial.
This subject is of partic-clar concern in the States of Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington, the States where the burial facilities are located.
A bulletin entitled " Packaging of Low-Level Waste for Transport and Burial" has Deen issued to power and research reactors with operating licenses, fuel facilities except uranium mills, and about 4,500 materials licensees who generate or are likely to generate low-level waste.
This bulletin requires licensees who generate waste to (a) maintain a current set of DOT and NRC 1249 086 Enclosure
2 regu'.ations for the packaging and transport of radioactive waste; (b) maintain a current set of requirements piaced on the waste burial firm by the Agreement State; (c) designate in writing people who are responsible for the transfer, packaging and transport of low-level radioactive material; (d) provide management approved procedures to all people involved in the transfer, packaging and transport of low-level radioactive material; (e) provide training and periodic retraining for all personnel involveo in the transfer, packacing and shipment of low-level radioactive material; (f) provide training and retraining to employees who generate waste to assure that the volume is minimized and that such waste is processed into acceptable chemical and physical form for transfer and shipment to a waste burial facility; (g) establish and implement an audit function for all transfer, packaging and transport activities to ensure safety and compliance; (h) perform an audit within 60 days of August 10; and (i) report to the Regional Office within 45 days of their' plan of action and schedule for the aoove items.
Licensees were also required to provide infor-mation on the volume of waste generated in 1978 and 1979 and on their liquid solidification process.
Licensees who do not generate waste for commercial burial must so notify the NRC.
A secor.J bulletin, entitled " Packaging, Transport and Burial of Low-Level Radioactive Waste," was issued to all uranium mill licensees and about 4,000 materials licensees who did not receive the above bulletin and are not likely to generate waste.
If these licensees generate waste, they are required to take actions required by the first bulletin.
Copies of both bulletins were made available to Agreement State licensees.
A three month trial program to inspect packages and carriers at the waste buriti facilities has been initiated.
This effort is being coordinated with the Agreement States, with the burial licensees, and with DOT.
1249 087
3 An NRC rule change which would require all shipments of radioactive material to be in accordance with DDT requirements for radiation safety has been drafted and is under consideration.
Concurrently, the applicability of existing inspection and enforcement procedures for transfer, packaging and transport activities is being reviewed.
Procedures will be revised to incorporate DOT 1
requirements.
An information notice providing additional information on radioactive waste form for commercial burial and on DOT requirements for shipping radioactive material has been issued to all NRC licensees.
We turn now to the NRC response to each of the specific recommendations con-tained in the GAO report.
Response to Individual Recommendations Reco.mendation Nc. 1 (Dage v and page 13)
The Commission and the Secretary of Energy shoulc:
perform periodic, independent physical inspection and testing of nuclear materials packages on a rancom basis curinc f ab-ication and after repeated use.
Such inspection and testing shculd either be done by incependent contractors or by the agencies themselves.
URC Resoonse The NRC staff conducts periodic, unannounced inspections of licensees, who ship packages containing Type e quantities of radioactive material.
Because
.be 'nscections are unannounced, it is not possible to ir.spect all aspects of transoort activity which are subject to NRC jurisdiction.
- hcaever, 1249 088
4 when the transport activity is ongoing, the NRC inspection program requires the NRC inspector to verify by observation that the physi al aspects of the package, including maintenance and refurbishing aspects, are in accordance with the NRC Certificate of Compliance.
The inspection program also requires the NRC inspector to verify that the radioactive contents in the package and the closure of the package are as authorized by the NRC certificate.
The NRC inspector reviews the records generated by these processes, both for the observed processes and for the processes which occurred when the NRC inspector was not present.
All of this inspection effort is performed on a sampling basis.
To the extent possible, direct observations of physical characteristics of the packagings are made during inspections.
Although independent tests are not made by NRC inspectors on packages which are to be reu' sed, NRC inspectors observe such tests by the user if they occur during the course of the unannounced inspection.
Based on the results of tests conducted by shippers and by the lack of reports of packaging failure from shippers, consignees, carriers, and State and DOT officials, the NRC staff has not deemed it necessary to conduct independent tests.
The NRC staff also conducts periodic inspections during the f abrication of casks for high-level waste (spent fuel).
These inspections include observa-tions of (a) implementation of the quality assurance program, (b) the materials of construction, (c) fabrication techniques and processes, and (d) design verification testing.
This inspection effort has not been extended to other 1249 089
5 types of packagings because most of these other packagings ar9 less complex in design and are amenable to inspection for physical properties in the users' facilit*es.
The program of NRC regulation, including inspection, has been established in a manner designed to provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public is nct subject to undue risk from the shipment of radi] active material.
This risk is subject to frequent review by the NRC staff, most recently reportet in N'JREG-0170, " Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes," December 1977.
Other assessments of the risk are now in progress.
As these assessments are completed, the NRC program will be reevaluated and modified as appropriate, including tae reevaluation of the need for additional independent verification and testing of packagings.
Recommendation No. 2 (cage v and oaoe 23)
The Commission and the Secretary of Energy should:
jointly develop a graduated scale of security measures for the transportation of special nuclear materials, rather than the present all-or-nothing strategic cut-off level.
In establishing these levels, the dispersal hazard of plutonium should be considered.
In addition, the criteria should take into account the enrichment level of uranium since smaller amounts of highly enriched uranium are needed to make a weapon.
1249 090
6 NRC Response We agree that there is a need to extend graduated security measures to ship-ments of less-than-strategic quantities of licensed, weapons grade material.
A program is in progress to amend NRC regulations to require licensees to provide the needed measures.
On May 24,1978, we issued for public comment proposed amendments that set f' orth the needed requirements.
These amendments are comparable to the physical protection guidines in IAEA publication INFCIRC 225.
Public comments on the proposed aaendments have been considered, and the amendments have been coordinated with []E.
The proposed amendment:
were approved on June 21, 1979, and were published in the Federal Recister as a final rule on July 24, 1979, to be effective on November 21, 1979.
A study of the risks associated with the deliberate dispersal of plutonium has been carried out, and the results of the study were t~aken into account when the new proposed amendments were being drafted.
On the basis of the informa-tion developed in the study, we determined that additional protection measures against plutonium dispersal (beyond those proposed in the reculations issued for public comment) were not needed for licensed shipments.
We plan to under-take, in coordination with DOE, a reexamination of this area and to determine and to apply modifications, if deemed necessary, to NRC regulations.
The rule published on July 24, 1979, takes into account the cecreasing amounts of uranium neeced to make a weapon as enrichment level increases.
The regulations specify three security levels, three enrichment levels, and five weicnt (quantity) ranges.
A shipment will be assigned one of the three different security levels, depending on both the quantity of materials in the shipmcr.t and the enrichment level.
g
7 Recommendation No. 3 (pace vi and pace 23)
The Commission and the Department of Energy should:
take immediate action to preclude enroute consolidation of two or more special nuclear materials shipments thao together exceed the strategic levels.
NRC Response We agree that the situation described in the recommendation is unacceptable and have taken steps to correct it.
Although such a situation did exist in the past for shipments of licensed materials, we believe that currently there is l' le risk of its reoccurrence.
Since July 15, 1976, license conditions have been in effect that limit the risk of shipment consolidation at transport terminals by the following means:
Practically all shipments that would likely be of interest to an acversary -- for example, shipmerits in the range of 1,000 to 5,000 formula grams -- are made by licensees who are licensed to possess more than 5,000 formula grams.
Under current license conditions, eacn of these licensees is prohibited from having more than one unprotected shipment of 200 fornu h grams or more enroute to any one consignee at any rne time.
Thus, even under current conditions, the risk of chance consolidation of shipments by two or more licensees is small.
The small remaining risk will soon be reduced even further.
The rule published on July 24, 1979, requires all licensees who contemplate making a shipment of 1,000 fornula grams or more to provide advance notification to the NRC.
The NRC will use this information to determine and control the risk of collocaticn of two or more shipments during transport.
DOE shipments of more than 350 grams of U-235 (220 grams for plutonium) are accompanied by an escort, and, therefore, there is no opportunity for chance consolidation.
1249 092
8 Recommendation No. 4 (Dace vi and page 24)
The Commission and the Department of Energy should:
determine if there is a need to safeguard spent fuel shipments from sabotage by developing experimental data on the amount of radio-active material that could be released i a sabotage attack on spent fuel casks using high explosives.
NRC Resoonse We agree with the recommendation that experimental data need to be developed.
In May 1978 we began to formulate the requirements for the develcoment of the needed experimental data, and a contract for the program has been issued.
The program probably will not yield useful results before FYSO.
Accc-dingly, even thcugh we be'.ieve that the likelihood of a sabotage attack on a spent fuel shipment is low and that the difficulty of breaching 'a cask is nigh, we have issued an amendment to NRC regulations requiring interim protective measures for spent fuel movements pending the completion of the research program.
In the amendments, the focus of concern is on possible successful ac.s of sabotage in censeiy populated urban areas.
Because of the possibility tna. spent fuel shipments could be hijacked and moved from low population areas to high popula-tien areas, the interim requirements apply to all shipments even thouch the planned shipment route may not pass through densely populated urban areas.
jecommendation No. 5 (caoe vi and page 24)
The Commission and the Department of Energy should:
if excerimental data shorts safeguards are warranted, cevelop a security system considering communication requirements, armed escort 1249 093
9 personnel, the least vulnerable transportation mode, and vehicle disabling features.
NRC Response We agree with the recommendation.
Our interim regulations for the protection of the spent fuel shipments, referred to above, require for all shipments that arrangements be made with local law enforcement agencies along the route to respond to an emergency or a call for assistance, that escorts be trained as outlined in the rule, that shippers develop procedures for coping with threats and safeguards emergencies, and, if a shipment must pass through heavily populated urban areas, that an armed escort be provided in those areas.
Further, for truck and rail shipments, the interim regulations require that radio communications reporting the status of the shipment be made every two hours with a designated location.
Trucks must also bd equip;.ed so that they can be immobilized.
These interim requirements and the GAO recommendations will be carefully reviewed when the research program is completed, and permanent physical protection measures for spent fuel shipments will be adooted to the extent the research shows they are needed.
Recommendation No. 6 (Dage vi and oage 13)
The Commission should:
amend its regulations to require receivers of radioactive materials to also monitor Type A packages for radiation levels to make sure they comply with Federal regulations and to report any violations to the Commissior, 1249 094
10 NRC Response We agree that the question of monitoring Type A packages should be reconsidered, and this will be done.
However, our principal reason for restudyir.g this matter is limited to the protection c. persons receiving the packages.
A recent judgment by the NRC legal staff indicates to us that the current radia-tion survey provisions (10 CFR 20.201 " Surveys") cannot be relied upon for the purpose.
A recent rule change drafted by the staff and now being considered by the Commission would be directed toward assuring compliance with Federal regulations for Type A packagings.
The rule change would allow NRC to directly enforce DOT regulations at NRC licensee sites and thus significantly upgrade inspection and enforcement actions in packaging and transportatien.
The rule change would be supplemented with new programs for inspecting transport activities and new enforcement criteria for violations of NRC-DOT shipping regulations.
The Commission is also exploring ways to provide training and packaging informa-tion.
These regulatory actions are being supplemented by investigations aimed at improved design of Type A and other low specific activity material packages.
Our reasons for believing that the other aspects of our current regulation are satisfactory can be understood from a brief review of the provisions of the current regulation and its background.
The present specific requirements to monitor packages on receipt is limited to Type B and large quantity packages.
These requirements were developed for protecting workers a.id the general public in the transportation system.
They require much rore than nonitoring for protection of the recipient.
Included in the requirement are provisions for receiving the package quickly from the transportation system. for quickly 1249 095
11 monitoring the package on receipt, and for quickly notifying appropriate persons of any problems for which remedial actions would be appropriate for protection of persons involved in the transportation syster...
It was recognized that monitoring of the Type B and large quaniity packages on receipt would not prevent incidents in transportation but, where there are potentially serious consequences, would allow detection of incidents and subsequent remedial actions.
Consideration was given at the time the regulation was developed to extending its provisions to Type A packages, where the potential for serious consequences is very small.
Such an extension was even proposed for public comment.
Information received on the burden of such a requiremer.t, when considered with the li; ced benefits of extending the rule tc Type A packages, resulted in a judgment that the requirements should be applied only to Type B packages.
Incidentally, our judgment on this matter coincided with that of the National Transoortation Safety Board when it recommended the requirement to monitor radioactive material shipments on receipt (NTSB-AAS-72-4 "Special Study of the Carriage of Radioactive Materials by Air").
In related actions since the requirement to monitor Type B ard large quantity radioactive material packages on receipt was imposed in 1974. NRC has emphasizec quality assurance in the fabrication and use of packages to reduce even further the very small risk of serious consequences f rom transportation incidents.
The GAO recommendation states that one purpose for monitorinc packages on receipt is to assure that shippers are complying with reculatory recuirements.
To ronitor packages on receipt for this purpose wouM recuire a rare complete 1249 096
12 survey (e.g., to determine the exact radiation level at three feet from the package surface to verify the transport index assigned) which results in more radiation exposure to the surveyor.
This additional radiation exposure to the recipient in monitoring all packages on receipt merely for the purpose of assuring regulatory compliance after the shipment is completed, probably cannot be justified.
We note the GA0 recognition, in its evaluations on pages 41 and 43, that certain types of Type A packages could be exempted from.Tonitoring require-ments.
We agree with that recognition, but note that the recomnendation does not reflect it.
Reccamendation No. 7 (cace vi and cace 13) ine Commission and the Secretary of Transportation sh6uld:
reduce permissible contamination levels for packages a: ' vehicles to levels compatible with that industry can reasonably achieve.
NRC Resconse de agree that reconsideration of allo./able contamination levels is prudent and will be carried out.
Allowable contamination levels permitted by U.S. regula-tions are currently censistent with those in the regulations of tne International Atomic Energy Agency.
As a practical matter, virtually all cf the 2.5 million rackages per year in the U.S. transportation system have no cetectable external contamination levels.
The allowable levels referred to are included in recogni-tien of the difficulty of decontaminating external sur' aces cf spent fuel 1249 097
~~
13 casks and those few other packages which are loaded under conta.-inated water or in contaminated hot cells.
There is a balance to be drawn between additional decontamination of such packages and the additional radiation exposure to the persons involved in that decontamination.
The present balance was determined a number of years ago and has been scheduled for reconsideration.
Recommendation No. 8 (cage vii and page 14)
The Commission and the Secretary of Transportation should:
expand their use of existing State resources to assure that shippers and carriers comply with Federal radioactive materiais transportation regulations.
NRC Resconse We agree with this recommendation.
Since 1975, the NRC and C:T have been jointly involved in & contract program with $tates for the su~.eillance of radioactive materials in transport.
To date. 17 States have een involved.
(Six States, Illinois, South Carolina, Kentucky, Michigan, Ge:rgia, and Washington are currently involved.)
State participation in the program has not been limited to the Agreement
$tates only.
The recent activities with the Agreement States relates only to waste shipments cricinating in their own borders.
Tm State Surveillance Program is broader and includes all shipments of radioactive ma.erials by eny
=cde.
The progran will be expa.;ded if the funding is grantec.
1249 098
14 Recommendation ha. 9 (cace vii and cage cage 14)
The Commission and the Secretary of Transportation should:
continue thei efforts to develop consistent regulations for packaging low specific activity radioactive materials.
NRC Resoonse We agree that NRC anu XT regulations should be aligned on this issue.
Both NRC and DOT reqe ements are being consolidated in the DOT regulations.
Reccmmendation No. 10 (cage vii and cage 29)
The Acting Administrator cf the Federal Energency Management Agency (FEMA) should:
assume tne respcnsibility for making policy and cocrdinating radio-logical emergency response planning for nucTear transportation accidents.
The Agency should wcrk with State and local agencies to develco and test plans fer responding to accidents invciving nuclear materials and should expedite tre development of Federai guidelines for State and local planning for nuclear agencies to ceselop and test plans for responding to accidents involving nuclear materials and should expecite the develeprent of Federal guidelines for State and lccal planning for nuclear transportation accicents.
These plans should include emergency respcnse actions to be taken oy all responsible parties, including ship;ers and car-iers, in the event of an accident.
1249 099
15 NRC Response The NRC supports.he rction that FEMA should have an active policy and coordi-nating role in this area.
It will be necessary for the technical agencies such as NRC, EPA, DDE, and HEW to continue providing assistance to State and local governments in emergency planning and preparedness.
In this regard, the NRC is prepared to work with FEMA in developing guidelines for Federal, State and local planning and creparedness to improve protection of the public in the event of a radiciogical trar.sportation emergency.
1249 100
.