ML19254E354
| ML19254E354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/05/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Oconner J COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E351 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910310483 | |
| Download: ML19254E354 (2) | |
Text
j?%q
, [*w UNITED STATES j J W ]7 j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
%f.{,hg f
W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 s, /
Ctober 5, 1979 OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN Mr. James J. O'Connor President, Commonwealth Edison P.O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
This responds to your July 26, 1979 letter expressing concern over the public availability of the NRC " Barrier Penetration Database" handbook-NUREG/CR 0181.
By way of background please recall that commercial power reactor licensees were required by 10 CFR 73.55 to submit revised physical security plans t.o the NRC by May 25, 1917.
These plans were evaluated against the criteria outlined in NUREG-0220, " Interim Acceptance Criteria for Physical Security Plans for Nuclear Power Plants." Acceptance Criterion ll.A of that document requires each licensee to " Demonstrate that the physical security system satisfied the general performance requirement, i.e., it provides high assurance protection against industrial sabotage."
Chapter 11 describes an approach to demonstrate high assurance protection which is summarized as fol'ows:
"It must be demonstrated that given initial detection the onsite response force must be able to intercept and engage an adversary force in less time than is available for the adversary force to successfully penetrate any single or multiple vital area barriers such that disablement of equipment within those areas would lead to a significant release of radioactivity.
This demonstration must consider minimum distances (in time) which the adversary must travel, times of delay in penetrating barriers, and times of response by security force personnel.
Delay and response time determination begin with detection of the attempted intrusion."
These calculations would include barrier penetration times and the publicly available documents present a considerable range of times for any type of barrier.
The database was subsequently produced by the NRC staff to provide a baseline set of industrial barrier penetration times that would ensure consistent application of the requirements.
The penetration times in our database were to be used as a basis for the evaluation of protective systems and do not indicate the actual or most
{1'h bb\\
7910310 M S
Mr. James J. O'Connor effective penetration methods at a specific site.
The database contains information on typical industrial barriers and not the barriers actually found in m ace at any specific nuclear power plant.
This type of information can only be obtained from each site and because of security procedures it is not available to the public.
It must also be emphasized that actual barrier penetration times are entirely dependent on the specific, as installed, construction of the barriers.
Such things as locks, hinges, door frames, rebars, and items hidden by architectural coverings, all affect the penetration times.
The Freedom of Information Act requires the Commission to make available upon request to members of the public all documents that are not exempt under the Act.
The " Barrier Penetration Database" is not exempt.
It is Commission policy to comply with the requirements of the F0IA by placing non-exempt documents in the Public Document Room and reports at the National Technical Information Service.
To classify information under Executive Order 12065 as national security information requires a determination that the information concerns one or more of the criteria in Section 1.301 of the Order and that the unauthorized disclosure of the infomation could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security (defined as the national defense and foreign relations of the United States).
The Commission b?lieves that no such determination can be made for the database.
We share your concern for the protection of this type of information and believe that there should be a legal way to protect it.
Consequently, we have sought an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 granting the Commission authority to withhold certain unclassifiable but sensitive information, from disclosure.
This authority was included in the NRC authori-zation bill for FY '80 (H.R. 2608) as reported by the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.
Subsequent to sequential referral of the bill to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. 2608 was superseded by H. R. 5297, which, although containing partial authority for the NRC to classify sensitive information, does not provide the authority to withhold non site-specific safeguards related information such as the " Barrier Penetration Database."
If the authority originally contained in H.R. 2608 had been available to us at the time of the publication of the database, we certainly would have withheld the sensitive parts of it from public disclosure.
\\ Sincerely,
\\
1 4_ Lb
' Doseph M. Hendrie Chairman l}
$32
'