ML19254D136
| ML19254D136 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | (XSNM-1477) |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1979 |
| From: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| SECY-79-200A, NUDOCS 7910220429 | |
| Download: ML19254D136 (1) | |
Text
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X UNITED STATES SECY-79-200 September 27, 1979 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 INFORMATION REPORT For:
The Commissioners From:
James R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs Executive Director for Operations /3/2 h L.U4.
Thru:
7
Subject:
EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONS (Ott PEtlDIf;G EXPORT APPLICATI0t1 DATED 9/19/79, SNM01477, LEU FOR SPAIN h
Purcose:
To inform the Comission'of the above subject Discussion:
Enclosed for the information of the Commission are copies of the Executive Branch responsa on a pending export license application.
(See SECY-79-200).
Copies of the Executive Branch comments have been placed in the Public Document Room.
A Commission Action Paper will be forwarded soon.
Comissioners are requested to advise the staff of any particular issues or information which they can identify at this stage and which they wish included in the staff's analysis, 4
v 4 rJames R. Shea, Director Office of International Programs
Enclosure:
As stated
Contact:
DISTRIBUTION:
M.R. Peterson, IP (492-8155)
Commissioners J.D. Lee, IP (492-7984)
Commission Sta.'f Offices Executive Director for Operations Secretariat 1193 278 701022044 1
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DEPARTM ENT OF STATE wnv;m. o.c. :os:o BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS ASNDIO I September 19, 1979
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MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES R.
SHE3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Enclosed is an Executive Branch analysis covering an application for the export of low-enriched uranium to Spain.
In accordance with P.L.95-242, the analysis explicitly addresses how the requirements of Section 126 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, are met, including the specific criteria of Sections 127 and 128, as well as certain additional factors, envisaged by Section 126 a.
(1).
The Executive Branch, on the basis of its review of this case, has concluded that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by P.L.95-242, have been met and that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States.
Moreover, Spain has adhered to the provisions of its Agreement for Cooperation with the United States.
There-fore, the Executive Branch recommends issuance of the re-quested export license.
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IXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSES XSNM01477 Country:
Spain Transaction:
10 kilograra of U-235 contained in 51 kilograms of uranium en-riched to a maximum of 19.9 per-cent in the form of uranium hexa-fluoride Applicant:
Junta de Energia Nuclear Date of Application:
February 28, 1979 Purpose of the Export This quantity of low enriched uranium will be used for reload of the U.S.-built, JEN-1 swimming pool-type, 3 megawatt thermal, researun reactor which first achieved criticality in 1958.
JEN-1 is owned and operated by Spain's Junta de Energia Nuclear.
Shipment of the material is scheduled in September 1979, to allow loading by January 1980.
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. :_;j' EMBASSY OF SPAIN WASHINGTON Ret No. 212 INDUSTRY AND ENERGY OFFICE
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-t t'ay 1, 1973 t' r. Vance H. Hudgins international Security Affairs Department of Energy Wa s h ing ton, D. C. 20545 s
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
In response to your letter of April 17, I am pleased to inform you that confirmation has been given by the spanish JUNTA DE ENERGI A NUCLEAR regarding License Appiication No. XSNM-1477, as follows:
a)
The transfer of the material, as identified on the License appl ica t ion,
will be subject to all the terms and conditions of the current Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civii Uses of Atomic Energy between the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain; b)
The ultimate consignee, as identified on the application, is authorized by the Government to receive and possess the material.
Sincerely,
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German Dominguez l'.dustry and Energy Attach 6
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WASHINGTON INDUSTRY AND ENERGY CFFIC:E
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3 Mr. Vance H. Hudgins Di r'ector for Pol i tico-Mi1 i tary Securi ty Af f a i rs Division of International Security Affairs Department of Energy Wa sh i ng ton, D. C. 20545
Dear Mr. Hudgins:
Enclosed please find a new document issued by the Spanish Authorities on August 6,1979, providing assurances about the physical security of Spanish nuclear instalations.
This document supersedes the one issued on July 13, 1979, which I mailed with my letter of August 8.
Sincerely, i
German Dominguez, Ph.D.
Industry and Energy Attachs 1193 282 Encl. 1
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MTNISTE!UO DE INDUST!UA v ENERGIA JUNTA DE ENEROL4 NUCLE.A.R si 21
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de I as autoridades espa5olas responsables
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Como consecuencia, se han ido tomando todas Ies me-E-
li didas adecuadas para obtener un grado de proteccion fisica
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compar ab l e al establecido en o.1 documerto INFCIRC/225 Revi-g
- y si6n 1, del OlEA.
3 Por otra parte, la Junta de Energfa Nuclear ha pre-Ee parado tamb i en, dentro de su colecci6n de sufas sobre Seguri-dad Nucl ear, una titulada "Criterios sobre la seguridad Ff-sica de las instalaciones nucleares", hecha pdbl ica en mar-
- o del a5o actual. La Junta de Energfa Nucl ear ha real i: ado las i nspecciones correspondientes a las centrales nucleares 5
en funcionamiento para garantizar que se cumplen las normas I
I dictadas anteriormente.
Ac En consecuencia, puede afirmarse que I as medi das 4
kL, han adoptado en Espa5a para ma-N de protecci6n Pfsica que se k
teriales nucleares y en las instalaciones nucleares espa5o-ik L*, -f adoptardn para las instala-las en explotaci6n y las que se ciones que actualmente se hallan en construcci6n proporcio-k.5 tti y continuarSn proporcionando, un niveI de protecciSn ff-nan sica comparable al establecido en el documento INFCIRC/225 (f
Revisi6n 1, a nte s. -offic'.,h>oa do.
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TRANSLATION 1
Theproblemohthephysicalprotectionofnuclearinstalla-g tions has in recent years preoccupied the Spanish authori-ties responsible for the utilization of this energy form.
j As a consequence, all adequate measures were taken to i
ensure a degree of physical. protection comparable to that g_ f established in the document INFCIRC/225 Rivision,1, of the IAEA.
In addition, the Nuclear Energy Council (la Junta de Energia Nuclear) has also prepared, in its collection of publications on Nuclear Safety, one publication entitled Criteria of Physical Security in Nuclear Installations.
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It was mace public in March of this year.
The Nuclear Energy Council has conducted appropriate inspection visits at the functioning nuclear plants to ascertain compliance with the previously established standards.
Consequently, it can be stated that the physical protec-tion measures adopted in Spain for nuclear materials and for the Spanish nuclear facilities that are cperational, as well as those that will be adopted in the installations j
presently under construction, provide and shall continue providing a level of physical protection comparable to that established in the previously mentioned document INFCIRC/225/'
Revision 1.
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=s SPAIN -- EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION ANALYSIS e e ns 1.
Applicable Agreement for Cooperation Z
The proposed export is subject to all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Spain concerning Civil Uses of Atomic
-Energy, wh ch entered into force on June 28, 1974.
This i
has been confirmed by a letter from the Embassy of Spain, a copy of which folloas the description of the license application.
Spain has adhered to all provisions of its agreement with the United States.
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2.
Extent to Which Export Criteria Are Met
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A.
Section 127 Criteria As provided in Section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act, the following criteria govern exports for peaceful nu-clear uses from the United States of source material, special nuclear material, production or utilization facili-ties, and any sensitive nuclear technology:
Criterion (1)
"IAEA safeguards as required by Article III(2) of the Treaty will be applied with respect to any such material or f acilities proposed to be exported, and to any such material or facilities previously exported and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use there-of."
This enriched uranium and any special nuclear material generated theref rom is subject to safeguards under the tri-lateral Agreement between the U.S., Spain and the IAEA on the Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-Spain Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force December 9, 1966.
Under the latter bilateral agreement, U.S.
safeguards rights are suspended during the time and to the extent that the U.S.
agrees that the need to exercise such rights is satisfied by the trilateral agreement.
IAEA safe-guards also are applied to any material or facilities pre-viously exported and to any material used in or produced through the use thereof under this bilateral Agreement.
The re f ore, it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (1) is met.
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Criterion (2)
"No such material, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported or previously exported
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and subject to the applicable Agreement for Cooperation, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear tech-nology, will be used for any nuclear explosive device or for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device."
The Government of Spain has accepted our note related to the Agreement for Cooperation signed on March 20, 1974 and in its response of April 13, 1977 has agreed that in connection with this agreement and the related trilateral safeguards agreement it is understood that U.S.-supplied materials, equipment, devices, and special nuclear mate-rial generated therefrom will not be used fcr any nuclear explorive device, regardless of how the device itself is intended to be used and that the safeguards provided under the trilateral agreement will verify that such material is not so used.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that cri-terion (2) is met.
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Criterion (3)
" Adequate physical security measures will be main-tained with respect to such material or facilities pro-
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posed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use thereof.
Following the ef fective date of any regulations promulgated by the Commission pursuant to Section 304(d) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, physical security measures shall be deemed adequate if such measures provide a level of protection equivalent to that required by the applica-ble regulations."
Spain has established physical security measures for the protection of nuclear facilities and materials which, as a minimum, meet those recommended oy the IAEA in INFCIRC/225/ Revision 1, "The Physical Protection of Nu-clear Material".
This fact has been confirmed by a letter from the Junta de Energia Nuclear dated August 6, 1979.
A U.S.
Physical Security Review Team including an NRC member, visited Spain in April 1976.
During that visit, the team noted that officials of the Junta de Energia Nuclear w re keenly aware of the importance of adequate e
physical security.
The team also conducted site visits including t,he Centro Nacionci where the Junta del Energia Nuclear and the JEN-1 Research Reactor are located.
The team judged the security measures observed at the Centro Nacional to be adequate to protect the nuclear material covered by this license application.
Therefore, it is the view of the Executive Branch that criterion (3) is met.
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Criterion (4)
"No such materials, facilities, or sensitive nuclear technology proposed to be exported, and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such material, will be retransferred to the jurisdiction of any other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such retransfer.
In addition to other requirements of law, the United States may approve such retransfer only if the nation or group of nations designated to receive such retransfer agrees that it shall be subject to the conditions required by this section."
Article X (3) of the 1974 U.S.
- Spain Agreement for Cooperation provides that:
"No mateiial, including equip-ment and devices, transferred to the Government of Spain or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement will be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the juris-diction of the Government of Spain except as the Commis-sion may agree to such a transfer to the jurisdiction of another nation or group of nations, and then only if, in the opinion of the Commission, the transfer is within the scope of an Agreement for Cooperation between the Govern-ment of the United States of America and the other nation or group of, nations."
Article VIII E.
provides that:
"No special nuclear material produced through use of material transferred to the Government of Spain or to authorized persons under its jurisdiction pursuant to this Agreement or the superseded Agreement, will be transferred to the jurisdiction, of any other nation or group of nations, except as the Commission may agree to such a transfer."
Article XI B.
provides, inter alia, that:
"B.
the Government of the United States of America, notwith-standing any other provisions of this Agreement shall have 3
the following rights:
"(2) With respect to any source or special nuclear material made available to the Government of Spain or any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its juris-diction and any source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered f rom, or produced, as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment, or devices so made available:
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"(a) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designat;d by the Commission,"
"(ii) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of Spain or any person under its juris-diction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guaranties set forth in Article X;"
These articles give the U.S. an unqualified approval right over the retransfer of material from Spain supplied by the U.S.
or produced through the use of such material and allow retransfers only if it is determined to be within the scope.af an agreement for cooperation with the recipient country.
This right would apply to irradiated fuel because it contains U.S.-supplied material.
Therefore, it is the Executive Branch view that, as the U.S.
has the right of prior approval over retransfer of U.S.-supplied material and material produced through the use of U.S. material, criterion (4) is met.
1193 290 m,me
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Criterion (5)
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"No such material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced through the use of such
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material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel ele-ments containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained for such reprocessing or al-2 teration."
Article VIII C. of the U.S. - Spain Agreement for Co-operation provides that:
"When any special nuclear mate-rial received from the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or to the superseded Agreement requires reproce ss ing, or any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement or to the superseded Agreement are to be removed from a reactor and are to be altered in form or content, such reprocessing or alteration may be pe rformed in facilities acceptable to both parties upon a joint determination that the provisions of Article XI may be effectively applied."
As no joint determination under Article VIII C.
can be made without the agreement of the United States, and since the facilities to be used must be acceptable to the U.S.
as one of the Parties, it is the view of the Execu-tive Branch that criterion (5) is met.
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Criterion (6)
"No such sensitive nuclear technology shall be ex-ported enless the foregoing conditions shall be applied to any muclear material or equipment which is produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the recipient nation or group of nations by or through the use of any such exported sensitive nuclear technology."
The proposed export does not involve the transfer of sens ttive nuclear technolgoy.
Criterion (6) is, therefore, not applicable.
9
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- Me B.
Section 128 Criterion TE_
Section 128 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act estab-lishes the following additional criterion:
"As a con-dition of continued United States export of source material, c'ecial nuclear material, production or util-ization facilities, and any sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear-weapon states, no such e.: port shall be made unless IAEA safeguards are maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in, under the juris-diction of, or carried out under the control of such state at the time of the export."
As the export under this license is expected to take place well before March 10, 1980, it is the view of the Executive Branch that this criterion does not apply.
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3.
Additional Factors A.
Safeguards Implementation The IAEA Secretariat has notad in its Special Safe-guards Implementation Report that with regard to nuclear material subject to IAEA safeguards, while some deficien-cies exist in the system, no diversion of a significar i.
quantity of nuclear material was detected in any of th:
45 states in which inspections were carried out.
AlthtLgh recognizing the nee'
- r orrect existing deficiencies in safeguards implemer..
un, the Executive Branch has no reason to believe that the IAEA Secretariat's report is not valid.
In the light of this and other factors asso-ciated with the proposed export, the Executive Branch believes the framework of commitments, assurances, and safeguards is adequate for the purpose of this export.
The Spanish currently have one reactor, Vandellos I,
not under IAEA safeguards.
In response to our inquiry last year, the French have stated that this reactor, which is a joint Spanish/ French project, is under French bilateral safeguards.
In addition, the arrangement is such that all fuel from the reactor is r eturned to France for reprocessing, with resulting recovered plutonium re-tained in France.
We have on-going discussions with the Spanish Govern-ment concerning renegotiation of the U.S.-Spain Agreement for Cooperation.
A key element of this renegotiation is the requirement vf the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L.95-242) to seek universal NPT adherence and, as a minimum, to require that U.S.
recipients have all of their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards 24 months af ter enactment (March 10, 1980) as a condition of U.S.
supply.
This full-scope safeguards requirement of U.S.
legis-la' ion has been extensively discussed with the Spanish authorities who expressed no difficulty in principle with the idea of applying IAEA sefeguards to all relevant nu-clear activities, including the Vandellos reactor project.
We have had technical discussions to identify the steps necessary to bring remaining Spanish facilities under IAEA safeguards.
The Spanish Government is now considert g this matter at the political level.
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B.
Special Non-Praliferation and Other Foreign Policy Considerations In addition to the non-proliferation considerations
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set forth under 3.A.
above, the continued friendship and cooperation of Spain in other areas is important to the United States.
Our basic goal with regard to Spain is support of the establishment of democracy in that country and the implementation of the 1976 U.S.-Spain Treaty of Friendship and Comperation.
The 1976 Treaty continues and expands the defense relationship which has existed since 1953 and provides the framework for a wide range of U.S.-
Spanish cooperation in security, economic, scientific and cultural affairs.
The Treaty provides for U.S.
use of certain Spanish military base facilities and makes an im-portant contribution to Western defense and Mediterranean security.
The United States also has significant economic in-terests in Spain.
As the world's tenth largest industrial economy, Spain is a major market for American export and the U.S.
Export-Import Bank counts Spain among its most important customers.
We can look forward to closer cooperation with Spain as democratic institutions become stronger and political, economic and security integration with the European Com-munity and the NATO alliance moves forward.
As Spain as-sociates more rlosely with the other Western European nations, its acceptance of full scope safeguards and event-ual adherence to the NPT should be facilitated.
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4.
Inimicality Judgment Based on review of the proposed export, it is the judgment of the Executive Branch that the proposed export will not be inimical to the common defense and security, and that the license should issued.
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