ML19254B047
| ML19254B047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/25/1979 |
| From: | Mell C, Shackleton O METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190223 | |
| Download: ML19254B047 (42) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION I
f I
J In the Matter of:
2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW
-i 21 of Charles F. Mell i
' Control Room Operator, Nuclear l
5:
6i, 7!
8!
Trailer #203 91 Nr.C Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10i Middletown, Pennsylvania 11!
. July 14,1979 12 (Date of Interview) 13i July 25, 1979 (Data Transcript Typec) 14!
335 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16!
17,'
ISl 19i 20t 21l NRC PERSONNEL:
22i Cwen C. Shackleton Anthony N. Fasano 23{
- 2:er Sicilia, Jr.
24 25r ra1 003 t
,7909190 QQ 3 7'
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The time is now 10:13 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
The date is July 14, 1979.
2 This is the voice of Owen C. Shackleton and this is an interview of Mr. Charles F. Mell. Mr. Mell is a control room operator nuclear employed by the Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power 4,3 y
Generation Station.
This interview is taking place in Trailer 203 parked just outside the South Security Gate at the Three Mile I'sland installation.
Present from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this interview and to listen to Mr. Mell's comments is Mr. Anthony N. Fasano.
Mr. Fasano 81 is an Inspection Specialist assigned to the Performance Appraisal Branch of Inspection and Enforcement in the Reactor Construction Inspection.
He 11.;
presently is based in Region I.
Present from the Office of Inspection and Audits is Mr. Peter Sicilia, Jr.
Mr. Sicilia is an Inspector Auditor of i
12!
the Office of Inspection and Audits. My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I am 13!
an Investigator assigned to Region V.
Just prior to starting this interview 14' on a tape recording I have presented to Mr. Mell the two page advisement 15.
document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which explains the 16i purpose and scope of this investigation and the authority of the U. S.
17!
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation.
It also 18r advises Mr. Mell of his rights to refuse to be interviewed and to be able 19!
to.efuse to give any form of a signed statement.
Also it advised him that 201 he has the right to have someone of his choice present during the course of 21!
l this interview.
On the second page of this occument are three questions 22!
and Mr. Mell responded to all three questions by marking the yes answers.
231 At this time to make it a matter of record in this recording of this inter--
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view I am going to ask Mr. Mell these questions.
Mr. Mell, did you under-251 stand the statement I am referring to.
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g MELL:
Yes I do.
2!
i SHACXLETON: And do we, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have your j
permission to tape this interview.
Si MELL: Yes.
Si 7J SHACKLETON:
And would you like a copy of the t' ape and the transcript.
Bj 9I MELL: Yes.
10!
11!
SHACXLETON:
All right sir. We will provide a copy of the tape at the con-12l clusion of the interview and will see that a copy of the transcript is made 13 available to you upon its completion.
And now gentlemen, before we go 14 into the interview I would direct that each of us remember that before you 1%
speak you ' ease use your last name.
Mr. Mell you don't have to be concerned 16i with this, but it will assist the girls in typing the transcripts so they 171 know who is speaking.
At this time I will turn the interview over to Mr.
18l Fasano. Parcon me, for background information, Mr. Mell, could you give us 19) a brief. ssume of your work experience in the nuclear field.
20l 21!
MELL:
In 1970 I joined the Navy where they sent me to nuclear, well I went 1
22l to electrician's school first after boot camp.
They sent me to nuclear 23t power school in Sambridge, Maryland, after that I attended Nuclear Prototype 24j in Windsor, Connecticut. After that I spent about three years on a nuclear 25i l
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submarine in the Navy which was a fast attack boat out of Charleston, South 2
Carolina and in 1976 I got out of the Navy six year program.
One month 3
later I started for Metropolitan Edison Company under a special group of 4{
auxiliary operators.
Normally the procedure is a three year program, we came in special one year program for auxiliary operator.
At ;he conclusion g
el of that and plus about six months the CR0 bid went up which I bid on and got and I trained for the CR0 bid of which I have taken my NRC exam on 71 I
parts 19 for the NRC.
Right now 1 am told that the licenses are in the 8i mail, that I did pass the exam.
10i SHACKLETOA.
Very good, thank you, that brings us up to date.
Is that 11'.
correct?
12l 131 MELL:
Yes.
14l 15i SHACKLETON: All right, fine.
Now I will turn the interview over to Mr.
16i Fasano.
17!
1Si FASANO:
Chuck, what I *.,ould like you to do is in your own words describe 191 when you got here and what you saw and your impression and jur c go on as to 20!
when you took over your responsibilities in the control room and what you 21!
did, and in particalar I am interested in the first day.
22!
i 23l SHACXLETON:
You're referring to March 28, 1979.
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lj MELL: Well earlier that morning where I worked the afternoons before 2
earlier that morning I heard something on the radio and I called to the 3
control room and the man was in the respirator so I left him alone then.
I knew something bad had happened. We came: to work-at 3:00 c'ciccK and they 4
sent us over to the Observation Center wh'are we sat for a couple of hours m
before they sent us into the ccr. tral room and told us a 'little bit of what Of 71' was going on. We came into ghe control room, we had to wear respirators to' p
get in.
Once we were in thdre we can take the respirstss off.
Wo looked 8l 4
around a little bit and they told Js. tc malieve the people and myself, I took the secondary plant, we call.it, where you take the cor.densate pumps 11::
and the turbine generator, all the secor.dary equipmer[t cainly;and where we talked for about an hour to get a real goed turaove-because tB.e people had 12l
(
been there all day.
There was quite a few NRC and top officials in there 13) then.
The place seemed to be fairly calm for as bad as an accident we had.
14) 15i FASANO:
Is that it.
161 i
17!
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MELL:
Yes.
18r 191 FASANC:
And you stayed how long.
20l 9
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I worked through till about 8:30 the next morm ng.
22!
23 F%SANO:
8:30 the r. ext morning.
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MELL:
Right.
I believe our whole shift did or at least the CR0s in the control room.
31 FASANO:
So when you arrived, actually you eventually got to the control room about 3:00.
i Si 61 i
MELL:
No.
71 8!
FASANO:
No.
91 10f MELL:
I got to the control room a couple hours afterwards.
We sat in the ll:
Observation Center for awhile so we came over about 5:30, 6:00 o' clock, the 12:
time we got over.
13 14!
FASANO:
5:30, 6:00 o' clock.
At that time they had masks on in the control 5
room.
16i 17!
MELL:
Well I had put them on, matter of fact, I carried some over from the 18i gate, they gave us a box to carry over and they drove over in a vehicle, 191 let us off at the turbine building, we came up through that way.
We had to 20!
wear them to get to the control room.
Once we were in the control room we could take them off.
They had alreacy taken them off in the control room.
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231 FASANO:
So you got to the control roco about 5:00, 5:30.
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l lj MELL:
Right, something like 5:30, scmething like that.
I 2'
FASANO:
3 Anda you took over the secondary panel.
4j MELL:
Right.
5 Si FASANO:
That was about 6:00 or so.
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8 MELL: Yea, we give pretty good turnover.
91 10l FASANO: All right, in the turnover I guess you had two shifts there at the same time or was it three. Were there some left over from the shift.
12' 131 MELL: Well I don't really...I know the dayshift, the guy really was day-141 shift.
15, 16i FASANO:
Okay.
And can you go over the turnover, what kind of information 17!
you were given prior to taking over your responsibilities.
18t 19i MELL: Well basically before we even, well cart of the turnover was we 20t talked about what had happened, or what we thought had happened and at that 21(
time we weren't, we were still sitting there static, we hadn't really done 22 anything yet.
Anyway we were talking about how it got into there and that 23!
possibly er actually they say the steam generator had blown a tube and 24i things like that which condensate pumo was running that we had vacuum and 25i
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gj the turbine was on a turning gear, you know, hot well level and that the 2
water was probably hot from the blown tube in the steam generator. We had 3
walked over and saw the building pressure, the guy showed us the spikes on the building pressure where he said : hat both building spray pumps come on.
They showed those books to me and at that time they hadn't, you know, they 5
know that both of them came on but they really hadn't really postulated why e5 they had come on yet.
No one really had the time to think about it.
7!
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Si FASANO:
So discussion on the parameters that were of interest and also to get you brought up to speed.
11!
MELL:
On what had happened the night before.
13I FASANO: Then what did you do at the secondary side.
When you took it 14!
over.
Now this would be about between 5:30 and 6:00.
15, 16; MELL:
Right.
17' 18t FASANO: What did you have to perform, did you actually do any manipulation 191 on the feed to the steam generators or.
20!
211 MELL:
No, I don't remember if I did that.
I do know that we did begin to 22!
lose vacuum. We started to lose the seals on the turbine and there was 231 i
some discussion or quite a bit of concern if we lost the vacuum that your 24!
bypass steam woulo be going out to the atmospheric dumps and I know that 25i r
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y there for about an hour before we got the boilers back there was a lot of c nearn there. That I was to check on the condenser vacuum, quite often...
2!
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FASANO:
4f Okay they had just, I guess gotten back on the vacuum, probably just a few hours befoPG you got in there.
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MELL: No we lost it when I was there.
Si FASANO: Oh you did.
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10l MELL:
Cause I noticed that the pressure had gone down and we called over 11!
l to Unit 1 and of course Unit 1 had known but they had just found out that 12!
they had lost the boiler over there.
131 14:
FASANO:
Okay.
15i 15i MELL:
So then there was quite a bit of concern, probably about an hour 17:
i before we got it back.
So I was concerned with that immediately.
18!
191 FASANO:
This would be concern mainly for atmospheric dump.
20t i
21t MELL:
Right, that would take your steam and put it in your atmosphere and 22 they... since they said the water was hot, that's...you know you don't do 23l that.
You don't dump to the atmosphere.
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FASANO: Why not sir.
l 2!
I MELL:
You don't dump it.
31 4l FASANO:
Yea, definitely.
And so in the turnover you did mention the Si information that you were given on the reactor buildings.
One of the 6i questions I did want to ask you, the Reactor Building, building pressure 71 i
you actually pulled out the chart to look at that it would be off to the 81 side by that time I guess, no it might not.
Do you remember if it were 91 pulled out.
11!
MELL: We pulled it out and looked at it, yes.
12!
131 FASANO: Okay.
And did anybody make a zerox copy of it that night.
14:
15i MELL:
I...that's been a big question, I know lately they have asked me 16i that too.
I know we talked about it quite a bit that evening and I do 17!
believe someone pulled it out, I didn't and I talked to Ted, I know he i
IS!
didn't and I am not sure about John.
I never really asked him.
191 20t FASANO:
John who.
21!
22l MELL:
John Kidwell is the third CR0 on our shift and I am not sure if he 23 did or not but I know there was a couple of people talking about it and 241 that it was pulled out and xeroxed.
But where that...
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i gj FASANO: That night?
l 2!
MELL:
3 xerox copies, yea the first day.
4l 5l FASANO:
First day.
I Gi MELL:
Right.
71, 81 FASANO:
91
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And this would be after what time.
10l I
MELL:
Probably 8:00 o' clock, 8:00 or 9:00 o' clock at night.
11:
12:
l FASANO:
8:00 or 9:00 o' clock at night.
13) 14!
MELL: Yea.
15i 16i FASANO:
And to do that you would have to take the chart off the mechanism, 17]
which you open up the points.
18l 19i MELL:
Right.
And it wouldn't ink for awhile.
20!
21!
FASANO:
And they you would pick it up and.have to take it over to the 22(
xerox machine.
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MELL:
Right.
2' FASANO:
31 At that time the xerox machine was being used by one of the GPU 4j pe ple, I think Lentz was there, did you see him.
i Si l
MELL: No I didn't go in the back, I didn't xerox it.
I knew there were 65 some of them were talking, because they didn't quite understand what it was yet.
It wasn't until the next day that someone said anything.
The second 8
day and then someone postulated - hey, I wonder if that could have been a hydrogen burn.
I n:
FASANO:
Okay, the second day you started discussing that... it was later, l
that would be the second day you got off shift what about 8:00 in the 131 morning.
141 15!
MELL:
Right.
16i 17!
FASANO:
So ISI ISI MELL:
I had come out the next afternoon.
20i 21; FASANO:
The next afternoon, okay.
So this means 3:00 o' clock the next 22l afternoon.
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Right.
1:
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l 3f FASANO,: Se discussing this.
So the first night there was no discussion 4!
that it was a hydrogen burn.
5l 6j MELL: Not to my knowledge, no.
7!
8l FASANO: Okay, in putting that roll back, I did look at the original, there were two green lines, it wasn't green and red which would be the normal I g
guess you have a green pen and a red pen.
11!
MELL:
Right, one's a wide and one's a narrow, but we were oct the red 12',
pens.
Well it's a capsule.
14!
FASANO:
Do you remember that they were both green.
16 MELL: Yes.
Because I was trying to put a red one in there.
17!
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18t FASANO:
Okay.
I just want to check myself on that.
When I looked at *.
13i trace I did go back, match it where they cut it out and it did look like 201 a...if someone took it out and made a copy they were very very careful to go back and try to match it.
I couldn't see even a little blip, you know 22' I
you can see little darker ink if you go too close or 23) 24j 25; n,
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I gj MELL:
Right.
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FASANO:
3 And so it just, you know, I guess I was questioning that aspect.
All right the...when you left were you, did you get cleared, were you checked for contamination and all that even at 8:00 o' clock the next day.
Si l
MELL:
7l Yea, we, let me think, that day I believe, we left through the processing center and they had a shielded probe up in that area.
We checked Si there generally but the background was so high you know you, it would be tough and then we went over to the substation over there where the back-ground was low and we checked cut the substation.
And I had nothing.
12!
l FASANO:
See the panel you were at was over on the right hand side.
131 14i MELL:
Yes.
15; 16' FASANO:
And then you got the centar panel.
17' 181 MELL:
Right.
191 20f 7
FASANO: And then you have the left hand which would be the primary, I 21!
guess.
22!
23 MELL:
Right. We normally divide that, okay, we have the primary, the 24I reactor and then the secondary plant like the three of us would work together 25!
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i lj the whole 9, 10 months of training, CR0 training, and when anything would happen we normally, you know, one of us on each panel the way we normally 2
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did it ourselves.
41 FASANO: The actual manipulation that you had to do frem, I guess since you
-l 6l took over, I guess you were there when they started the.'.. finally pressurizer, i
started the reactor coolant pump.
71 8\\
MELL: Yea, they did it right after we came in.
g 10i FASANO:
Okay.
I guess you and your group were involved in that repressuri-11!
l zation.
12l ui MELL: Yes.
141 15i FASANO:
Do you recall how the decision came in to repressurize, when you 16i got there they were trying to get down I guess to decay heat.
17!
18f MELL:
They got on decay heat, yes.
191 20!
l FASANO:
Did you have...was all your participation in the control room from 21l the time you got there, say to 8:00 or 9:00 o' clock.
22j 23l j
MELL:
I don't understand.
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FASANO: Well did you have any auxiliary operators do anything, give any 2
rders for anyone to do anything outside the control room.
31 MELL:
4 I, myself I did, because we were losing the seals on the turbine, I 1
5l had the auxiliary operator go out and check then because we had come from about 18, 29 inches, down to 17 and there was some concern over the seals.
5 71 FASANO:
Yes.
81 9!
MELL:
I had a guy go out and check the seals.
In order to do it he had to put on a respirator, but I had him go cut and listen to the seals and see 11l if they were its no time damage the turbine.
12!
13!
FASANO:
That's normal practice that the aux operators wait and then get 14i ord3rs from the control operators, correct?
15i 16; MELL:
Yes, we normally tell them.
17 ISI FASANO:
Okay the actual manipulations that you performed then were just 19!
watching your panel and...
20!
21!
MELL:
Yes.
22i 23l j
FASANO:
Other than that there was nothing out of the ordinary that you had 24!'
to do.
You had your...at this time you were feeding with your condensate 25i system and i
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MELL: Yes.
One other thing I didn't mention on the turnover we talked about the emergency feedwater valves. Okay, it was explained to me what 2
had happened, how the steam generator had gone dry and the tag was pointed 3
4j out, the valve that was shut was pointed out.
Si FASANO: That would be pretty close to where you were op'erating too, right?
Gi 71 MELL: Well that's, yea, that's on the other panel but it would just be to 8
the left, yes. What we consider feedwater, all one emergency and normal g
feedt.i.ter all one system, part of the secondary plant.
So normally unless we are going to start an emergency feedwater pump I would watch the emergency i
feedwater myself, being a secondary plant operator.
12l 13i FASANO:
Okay, you wouldn't have any emergency feedwater operation at that 141 time.
15i 16i MELL:
No, no it was off by that time.
I had been told they had run it 17!
earlier, but it was off then.
- 18I, 191 FASANO:
Prior to this you were an aux operator, I guess, and in training 201 to be a control room operator.
21!
22l MELL:
Yes.
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FASAN0:
So actually your experience as a$ operator would be within the last I guess, weeks in fact, thinking back at the time of the accident.
2 3!,
MELL:
Yes. what I mean as an operator.
I Si FASANO:
Well you were...you weren't at the panel, you were an observer, on 6
job training, and studying.
i 8!
MELL:
I actually participated on the panel.
I did manipulations on the 91 i
10!
panel under supervision of John Kidwell or Ted Illfes.
l n;
FASANO:
12!
Okay, just for background information t cause we are interested in I
13!
the training, and you having been through it so recently, maybe you can give us some insight.
During this occurrence it appeared that the operators 141 were very concerned with the pressuri;:er level.
Is this something that you 15, are taught or is it something that based on experience in the past a* '5is 16i plant that this is such a critical parameter.
What is the basis...it 7,7 '
there... in your training.
18) 191 MELL:
Well I am not sure what you are asking but the big accident that 20t 21[
comes out in our training here is the loss of coolant accident.
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22l FASANO:
Yes.
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I MELL:
And we discuss that that is one of the worst accidents to happen.
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And with this plant, the design of the pressurizer, the pressurizer is 2j rather small, and any trip, reactor trip, we have the problem of keeping 3
water in the pressurizer due to the shrinkage of water.
Okay, so it began j
as a trip and you have your normal problems keeping the water in the prssurizer or in the primary system and that's why they'were concerned with 6i pressurizer level, we know that the problems we have keeping water in the pressurizer.
If we had a correct pressurizer, a larger one, we could g
probably get rid of 30 percent of our headaches or the actions after a trip.
So...and in the training program the loss of coolant, that's one 10l thing you don't want to have and essentially we did have that now that we know that the valve was stuck open, we were actually losing coolant through 12!
the relief valve and that's why they were concerned about the pressurizer 13!
level. We had been taught that you don't take the pressurizer solid either.
14:
That's been rescinded now, now it would have been better to take the pres-15; surizer solid.
15i 17' FASANO:
But prior with 181 t
19!
MELL:
Prior to now the problem was keeping it tall.
So that's, you know, 20:
if there's any problems with putting too much... worrying about the pressur-i 21l izer level too much it is because we are taught the loss of coolant accident 22!
j and the problems we have is keeping water in the pressurizer.
So that kind 23t of lined us up for a loss of coolant accident, the one we. don't want.
The i
24i one we had practice prior to small break loss of coolant accident, we have 2Si
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to practice that every month and that's probably what they thought they had g
there later on in the accident or what they actually did have, loss of 2
coolant accident.
31 4l FASANO:
Un huh. The...okay so...have you been there when they had other trips?
Si 7
MELL: Oh yes.
91 FASANO: And you do...do you get usually a rise in pressure, say where your 10!
EMOV, the electromatic valve does open, does that function pretty well.
11!
12!
I MELL:
No.
The times I have seen it, it has functiu.md properly, but it 131 has stuck open in the past also.
14' 151 FASANO:
So it...in most of the trips you do get the EMOV to, the electro-16i matic operated valve to open.
17' 181 MELL:
I really couldn't tell you.
Normally we could.
It only flashes 191 when it opens or at least when I have seen it operated it flashes, it is 20I almost like a flash cube on a camera, it flashes a light and if you are not 21!
looking in that direction like you know if-you're, if there are only say 22!
l two people and one guy's controlling the feedwater, another guy's controlling 23l the makeup pumps or whatever trying to open the valves to get water in 241 there, you are not looking right at the light you may miss it because it 25!
doesn't come on and stay on or at least it hasn't.
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FASANO: The only other indication would be then your tail pipe temperatures g
on the l
3!
MELL:
Yes. And that's...as we found out that's difficult to tell.
4!
Si FASANO: Yea.
So the light flashes on and so you go on'by, I guess 22, is it 2255 71 81 MELL:
Right.
10!
FASANO:
And then off at 2205 and this may well only 10 - 5 to 10 seconds.
11!
t 12' MELL:
Right. We could tall if we had the panel that's in the back, if 131 that was around to the front or somewhere there we could tell easily what 14!
was going on.
Like that 15!
1Si FASANO:
You are talking about the RCDT, reactor coolant drain tank panel, 17:I on the left hand side. back.
181 19i MELL:
It is in the ba::k of the control room, you have to walk around in 201 the back and when a turbine trip or reactor trip is going on you are defin-2']'
itely not going to go around to the back.
You are watching the primary 1
22l plant and if that pan.nl was up in front, you know, it would be no doubt to 231 look in the tank and see that the temperatures come up and the pressures 246*
come up in that tank.
Then you know exactly what's going on or that you 25i have had a relief anyvays in there.
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7j FASANO:
Yea, I do think you do get an alarm and that's probably on that i
day somebody did go back, that's my impression, to look at that panel.
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MELL:
Yea, but you wouldn't do that immediately.
4t Si FASANO: Okay, so you can recall that...now in the rise 'in pressure that S.i would again you lose some cf your inventory.
7!
l 81 MELL:
Yes.
9I 10:
FASANO: Which then would give you... when you get the shrink you are going 11l to get a further drop off and you are going to get a further potential loss of level in the pressurizer.
13l 14!
MELL:
Right. Well prior to the accident we had lot of leakage through the 15i relief valves anyway. We were adding about 300 gallons of water an hour 16; and to my knowledge about a week before they had called up trying to get 17' permission to shut down to fix them, for a weekend or something like that, 18l and the permission didn't come through.
Permission to shut down to fix the 191 pressurizer relief valves.
20i 21:
l FASANO:
Did you know...actually you weren't too sure which one of the 22
valves were leaking or were you pretty sure.
23 24 251
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1l MELL:
In both of them were leaking.
2!
i f
FASANO:
The code safeties or the...
3 4l MELL:
The code safety valves were leaking by slightly.
g Si FASANO:
This is by looking at the temperature indicator on the left hand i
g panel, on the back, looking at the temperature.
91 MELL:
The exhaust temperature, yes.
10t ll; i
FASANO:
Yes.
12!
Normally when you have no leakage there what temperature do
(
they usually run at, do you recall.
131 14!
MELL:
No I really couldn't tell you.
16; FASANO:
17!
You do have a procedure that says there is a certain procedure limit that you have on those tail pipes.
18!
ISI MELL:
Yes.
20j 21:
FASANO:
Do you know what that temperature is?
23' MELL:
Not right now.
24i 25f ib o-
1 i
23 l
i I guess then you were involved in this automatic... manual operating y
FASANO:
2l the sprays to get your balance between pressurizer and the boron balance.
31 i
MELL: Before the accident?
Si FASANO:
Before the accident.
6i 71 MELL: Yes.
I had the panel the night before the accident, myself and at 8l l
that time the leakage was so bad or I should say it was controlled leakage 9(
into the reactor coolant drain tank was so bad that we had to equalize the 10 So we baron concentration between the primary loop and the pressurizer.
11:
had these spray valves in manual and we have done several things prior to 12l that, we would do it couple times a shift or whatever, but at that time it 131 So the first got to the point where we want to leave it on all shift.
14!
thing we had talked when we had come in on shift that first thing, if 15i anything happens to the plant, we put that in automatic. Okay that was, 16 sure that was done, the guy was over there fumbling around putting every-1T The heaters thing on automatic because we had left the heaters on too.
18(
were all on in manual and the spray valve was in manual.
I am sure when 191 they first had the trip that he was over there turning the heaters on 20; automatic and putting the spray back on automatic also.
21!
22 i
FASANO: Okay on the pressurizer heaters my understanding is, would you 23{
be...see that you were looking...you have to look to see if the pressurizer 24l l
heaters were on and you do have indication.
25!
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i 24 j
MELL:
Yes.
y 2l FASANO: My understanding was that there was some problem in having some of 3
the sub-breakers trip and you, this would have to be checked, you were losing your heating capacity on the pressurizer. Was this an ongoing 6
7J MELL:
Prior to the accident?
81 91 FASANO:
Prior to the accident.
10(
11 MELL:
Yes.
Prior to the accident it had got to the point where we would 12l~
have a log sheet, and the auxiliary op3rator, once a shift, would go down 13j and he would log if any of the breakers were open. We were beginning to 14:
look into that problem and the electrical people... We would fill out 15; which ones were tripped and try to reset them and we would log down what we 16; did with all those breakers.
17!
IS!
SHACXLETON:
Gentlemen, it is time to turn the tape. We will break the 19!
interview just at this point and turn the tape.
The time is now 10:41 a.m.
20!
Eastern Daylight Time.
21:
22) j SHACKLETON: This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Charles F.
23l i
Mell.
The time is now 10: 44 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
Please continue 246 Mr. Fasano.
25!
I i
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i 25 I
i FASANO: Question first was on the pressurizer.
The knowledge of what the status was on the heaters and what I gather is that...would you explain how you knew...would know from the control room that indeed you did have some 31 pres'surizer heater capacity loss.
El MELL:
The only way we could tell from the control room'that we had lost 6t heaters is that well we would have the heaters all in manual and we would 71 set up the pressurizer spray in manual which meant that the valve would not move when you took your hand off the position and at a constant power there gr should be no reason for an RC5 pressure change but if you were sitting i
101 there at a steady state and the RCS pressure wen:. down you knew that you 11 l
had probably tripped one of the breakers down on the heaters down on the
' F['
I 12, y
t sub panel so we would call the auxiliary operator and have him go down and e7 131 check and he would log which one, which breaker it was he had reset.
I ;l "
141 W
y),
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13i
.. '. '. '., c; FASANO:
During the event apparently they were getting some indication that q.
16; g
they were having heater loss.
Now this would mean that your main breaker 1
17!
panel was tripping out.
Is that correct? Does this take so many small i
I O.
18:
sub-breakers or is there a ground fault that would give you the main breaker i*,
l 19j 43,'
on a trip.
- r.,
20!
I, T.
21i F
l MELL:
I am not sure.
As far as a ground fault that gives indication in 22'l the control room.
You have a little white lights, well in the light it 23l a reset also, a little white light will come on and tell you that you have 24l a ground.
As far as the breaker trip, and at far as I know, and as far as
.. -f 25i
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26 y;
I can look at the breaker the only thingThat would trip the breaker is an verl ad.
2 But I am not sure whether small ones would trip it.
It doesn't 3j seem that would be right.
4i FASANO:
51 But when you get a main breaker trip you would see this in the 6
71 l
MELL: Oh yea, that would show up right away.
81 91 FASANO:
~Ind that knocks out all the sub...
10!
i 11!
MELL:
In that group.
FASANO:,0kay.
Apparently they were getting indications during this event
,.q that they were having a whole group go out.
15, 16 MELL:
Yes.
171 r
ISI FASANO:
Okay.
20t MELL: Well prior to this accident we had had an atmospheric relief valve 21, rupture in that area where the heaters are, where the steam lines are and i
22!
j we had quite a bit of moisture down in that area.
I don't know if that is 23t j
a continuing problem through that or what the pressuri::er heater problem 24i I
was.
25i 9
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27 FASANO:
There has been some theories that it was moisture in the reactor g
building that might have been absorbed in the asbestos wires that gave a ng e ec,
guess.
I don 4 how.
haC s some of de Lsdmy.
3 41 MELL: Yes.
O!
I Gi FASANO: As far as you were talking about your shift being really the 71 l
shift... that... prior to the one that was there during the event.
8l 9!
MELL: Yes.
101 n
FASANO:
During that shift there was apparently condensate water problem.
12!
What I would like to know is, what you knew about it and how it was going 131 during your shift.
15!
MELL:
Okay.
I had the panel that day.
You will see my name in the book, 16:
the night before.
I have operated the condensate polishers. When we were 17!
hired in as auxiliary operators we operated the condensate polishers 18!
through the startup program and I, myself, had done quite a bit of conden-191 sate polishing. What the problem was that in our condensate polishing 20!
system you have to sluice the resins over to a regeneration vat and the 21!
problem was that they...the way I understand it is they were done regenerated 22!
and they were sluicing them back into the polisher vessel and as it happens 23{
I never had it happen to me when I was sluicing it back but I have relieved 24l a man already down there on a polisher when I was still an auxiliary operator 25i
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4
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1:
where the resins tend to get caught up in the line where it just chugs over and if that happens there is really no way to back flush it and start all 2
3l over again. You just go to take approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> the time I saw it to get all the resins over that way, over into the polisher vat and the man that called up who was on the polisher called me up and he had told me the 5
pr blem and he asked for suggestions and well there's really no way designed 6
to clear that pipe and then start all over again to get the resins over, but the resins were, like they were clogged, but they do move in the pipe.
g It just takes 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to get the whole bed over.
And that I believe from g
j talking afterwards that it was turned over that way to, it was still moving slowly over into the polisher.
It was turned over to the next shift that way.
12 13l FASANO:
Okay.
In transferring back to seven, you are saying it was coming back to the tank seven.
So they had already regenerated and were getting it, trying to get it back in.
17!
MELL:
Yes.
18:
191 FASANO:
All right, would they then, if they want to unplug, try to go back 20t to the tank where you do the regenerating.
21; 22'I MELL:
To my knowledge there is not a procedure for that.
There is a way 231 to do it but there is not a procedure to cover that.
241 25!
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FASANO:
From my understanding, what they were trying to do was to fluff 2{
and put air in at the same time...put air and fluff and demin water 2 pumps f
and to try to unplug and it sounced to me like they were away from seven.
3 4!
MELL:
5 Well when it is clogged in the line the only thing you try to clear the line.
Si It had been suggested during startup program,' the whole thing, to put in two separate demin water lines to about the middle of the pipe g
run, to flush either way, clear all the resin's out and start all over again.
Okay that was never put in.
9!
10l FASANO:
So you can only go one way.
11!
12!
MELL:
No I am not saying that.
14!
FASANO:
Well what I meant is to do this unplugging at this time.
I am 15i trying to get a feel for what is going on here.
17i MELL:
Okay, the resins get stuck going through the polisher vessel.
18!
19I FASANO:
Fine.
20!
21[
MELL:
Okay.
And that's the only way that you can put water or air into 22!
the system is going througn the polisher but you can't force water back.
I 23l believe we don't have a procedure to cover that.
You can put the condensate 24i i
pressure on there and tend to blow it back into the storage tank.
25j i
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30 FASANO:
Okay so this wuuld be condensate onto the what, onto the regenerator?
2l MELL:
3 On to the polisher, pressurize that polisher vessel and push water back into the storage tank.
That's the one it would be coming out of. You 5!
c uld push it back, flush the line, put_ all the resin still in the line back into the storage tank and then start all over again.
6 7I FASANO:
Okay.
My understanding was what they were doing, they were using g
demin water and air 10!
MELL:
Right.
12!
FASANO:
To unplug this 13) 14:
MELL: And try to push the demin water with the air pressure and to unclog E
the resins pushing it back towards the storage tank.
16 17!
FASANO:
That's right.
+
18!
19!
MELL:
Yes, they did try that.
I know afterwards now they'd done that.
20i 21i FASANO:
But you say they could have actually used the pressure off the 22l l
condensate.
23!
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31 MELL:
Right.
That is not covered by procedure. That can be done and they 1
never incorporated in the procedure because they didn't want to do that.
2 We had suggested that during startup programs.
That's why I know.
3 41 gl FASANO: You wouldn't have the air on at that time though when you do that,
- "1d Y "?
6 7!
MELL:
No. We have had a problem with the air and the demin water where we 81' have got resins into our demin water system, and we got water into the air systems. And we believe the problem is down on the condensate polisher.
10:
That's a continuing problem.
11!
12:
i FASANO: What's your head pressure if you used the condensate.
Could you 131 get up to what 14!
15l MELL:
160, 170 pounds, scmething like that.
17]
FASANO:
Okay. Two demin pumos on there I understand get about 160 also.
18' 19l MELL:
Right. But the demin pumps are controlled from the control room and 20(
we had one pump running.
He called up at one time and suggested to turn a 3
21!
second pump on. Okay.
I ask him why, he told me he wanted to see if the 22!
pressure came up at all to help him out, to clean the resins out of the 23l t
line.
I turned it on, he looked at the pressure, the pressure didn't come 241 j
up much and I turned it back off within fifteen minutes.
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gj FASANO:
Yea. You don't have any knwiedge tr.cn of what they were actually 2j pushing, of course, it was off your ;hift.
Your telling me thay could have 3
used the polisher, the condensate pumps, to actually try to oMve' that 4
through.and get up to 160 psig.
51 g
MELL:
Oh it can be done, yes.
71
~
FASANO-Yea,.bdt 'I.think it would have to take fairly good pressure to s;
aive the water dot,n that instrument ;ervice ai a, I yuess you call it statio: servic!? air.
,i l
MELL:
Yes.
12',
131 FASANO:
And on back through that about 1 inch pipe up about 130 feet away
.ind then into the main plenum all tha way back around and across the n.
7 1
16; s
MELL: hell the fluff air taps into the bottom of :ne tar.k.
~
17) 13r 4
FASANGf, All right.
That's one valv_e tnat's underneath, right?
?
201 I,
b MELL:
Yes.
21i 2
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j FASANO: Anc the prt cadure reads that you jus'. ocen it up and then close 231 it, right?
241 i
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33 Ilj MELL:
The fluff air is not for putting the resh into the polisher tank.
Its before you take the resin out.
Because the condensate flow packs the 2
resins in there with the flow going through the polisher. So before the 3
y proceoure calls for turning on the fluff air before you do it, for what I remember is 15 minutes and allows the resins to break up and become resins g
again and not packed before you sluice it over to the receiving tank.
g That's really the only time that I know you can use the fluff air.
7t i
8!
FASANO:
There was problems prior to the next shift coming on.
10i MELL:
Yes, I know they were stuck in the pipe but that has happened several 12 times to my knowledge.
i 12!
131 FASANO: And several times you have gotten water into the service...
14!
15i MELL: Water in the air and we also got resins in the demin water system.
16i That leads coming from the polishers.
17!
18f FASANO:
That would mean a pressure on the air to be higher than the demin 191 aressure to drive it back that way.
20t 21!
MELL:
Right.
2:!
23l FASANO:
Okay.
That's interesting.
On a normal turnover...okay, back to 24; the polishers again, when you were operating there, did you use a procedure, 25!
4
y l
I, i
34 i
l il y u mentioned a procedure and was silent on the condition they had apparently, 2j at least they didn't give you good instructions as to how you're going to 3l unclog this resin, is that correct?
41 MELL:
I don't understand.
5i Si FASANO:
In the procedure, if you get the condition they had, are you
/t telling me that there was one method that could be used that's not written g
9;3 up, using the condensate pumps, right.
10!
11:!
MELL:
Yes.
It was suggested during startup but for some reason it was never approved to use that.
131 FASANO: Was it used?
14' 15' MELL:
Not to my knowledge. We had suggested it and we figured it would be a good way to do it.
As far as I know it was never incorporated into procedure.
18(
19l FASANO:
It'd be another way to drive the demin up, the resins into the 20t j
demin at that pressure.
21l 22l l
MELL:
Yes.
23!
i 24:
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35 FASANO: Also mess up the water over ir. the demin if you get it back far enough. When you have a trip is there anything that a guy does with that 2
i 3i p lisher to make sure its in the right status, say for restart.
4!
MELL:
For restart.
St i
6i FASANO: Yea. Well what conditica do you, does the guy leave it, I mean a l
normal you get a trip, you get a turbine trip, then your reactor trips, at the guy's on the polisher.
101 MELL: Yes.
11!
12l l
FASANO: What could he do, look over the panel, check out 13l 14!
MELL: Okay, the only thing that controls the flow through the polishers 15, would be your outlet valve and it is an air controlled valve and on a 16i turbine trip, I see no reason for those valves to go shut.
Okay, it was 17' only a malfunction of the air system so we believe now that caused them to 18!
shut. On a trip the man would, I see no reason that the flow would becoming 191 greater.
If any thing it would be less. We would probably call him after 20; we did our stuff in the control room to take one or two polishers off 21t because we don't really need them then.
But there is no restart or anything 22!
on a polisher, their bypass valve is an electric valve which is problem r
23l valve too.
24!
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36 i
1, FASANO: Yes.
So you were... the guy would really be that concerned to go f
and isolate the polisher he would, indeed, he had to, if he knew they were 2
g ing to be down for awhile.
3 41 MELL:
Rig N.
We would probably call him in then and tell him to take one g
or two of them off the line.
.t:i 7;
FASANO: Do you get instructions from operations.
81 9i MELL:
Yes.
i 11:
FASANO: All right.
So as far as...okay so that's about the way you operate down there.
At this time, if you would like, I think I have asked most of 131 the questions I wanted to ask. Would you, if you like, just if you want to 14!
express some of your own feelings as to what you learned or what you learned by your experience being here on the 28th and if you have any suggestions as to how one might cope better with this with a situation similar to this.
17!
You can just give your comments on any aspects.
181 19!
MELL:
Okay.
I have a few.
Well we started a little book up there, I 20;
}
don't know where the book is now, I am working with the rsdwaste group 21; right now, but we started a list of changes we would like to see made.
One 22,5 I
thing would be like a mimic bus of the emergency feedwater system so if 23i' there was any doubt in the man's mind, the way it is laid out up there now 24t is really tough, you know, unless you work with the panel quite often it ir, 25i u
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37 7
really tough to look down and see which valves are open and which ores are 2j closed and know which ones are in line.
If they would put like a mimic bus 3
n there showing the amergency feed pumps, how they tap into the steam generators, stuff like that.
If they would put like the motor driven, the isolation valves, if they were in that mimic bus, if there was any doubt in l
tr.e man's mind, if there was a mimic bus there he could'look down there and 6
he could have seen that the valve was closed.
Okay, and as I said earlier the panel in the back, the reactor coolant drain tank, was about the only 8,
indication that the electromatic relief valve was lifted.
If that could be 101 brought around to the front it would probably help us out in that aspect too.
If those two things had been done, they probably would have known rignt off, right away what had happened.
131 FASANO:
Okay.
That brings back.
You triggered a question in my mind.
14!
When you had your turnover you had a pretty good one, you said, this time.
15i My question really is on a normal day on a normal shift turnover would you 16:
go through your panel, I mean your part of t'he panel, and get a feel for and knowledge of what the status was.
Would you look at the valves and 18!
their lineup, the alarms.
Do you do a formal turnover?
19t 20l MELL:
Okay on a, don't get me wrong about what we talked about panels 21; before.
When the three of us on the panels is not a normal situation.
22l Normally it is a one man operation.
23t 24l 25i
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'l 38 I
y FASANO: Yes.
i 2!
l MELL: Or for me it was, me with someone overseeing me.
We had come in or 3,
at least our shift, we were all, three of us were pretty the same, since we worked together. We would Write a written turnover, a man would Come in, We Would show him the written turnover and ask him if he had any questions.
I We would go through the book, point out any significant thing we had done 7!
8l, that day then we would start up, myself I would start the left hand side of the panel, we would walk through the panel.
Okay. Which makeup pumps running, pressuri::er level, makeup tank level, walk around, you know, which 101 reactor power, things like that in balance which when you are operating it 11!
is rather important. And we would just walk around the, all three panels 12!
there and if there was anything your extra panel, your electrical panel, if 13!
there was anything extra with that we would teli them about that.
And 14!
myself, I never like to leave unless I '
. hat the man had a good idea 15 what was going on.
16i 17!
FASANO:
All right. Then that would be the shift prior to one that was on 18:
again during the event.
You would have gone right across the panel.
19!
201 i
MELL:
Right.
21; 22l FASANO: Would you actually have looked at the lighting on the emergency 231 feedwater 12 valves. Would this be the kind of check you make, because 24l this is a Tech Spec requirement.
25!
\\\\'
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39 l
MELL:
Right.
I understand that and just having taken my license I under-2j stood that probably better than some other people being fresh at it.
I think what you are probably asking me is if I saw that the valves were open 3
4 or closed.
I did not.
I didn't pay any attention.
Every operator has his thing that he looks at and at that I mean like myself I like watching 6
reactor coolant pressure.
I believe that if somethings ' changing with the 7
pressure somethings changing somewhere else.
That's my first indication 8
"~'
S 91 desk and writa something in there then you get up every few minutes and 10l just walk around and look at special checked things that you yourself think are important I'm sure they are differ with other people.
The emergency 11:
feedwater isolation valves was not one that I looked at myself I could not tell you if it was open or closed.
131 14:
FASANO:
Okay.
So in your formal, your semi..., it's a voluntary formal 15, check sheet that you guys did among yourselves it sound like and it was not 16; a formalized check.
Is that true.
1T, 18!
MELL:
Yes, that's right.
191 20h FASANO:
On the turnover.
The suggestions you made, the panel that's 21!
behind the RCDT, reactor coolant drain tank, infnrmation, etc. I guess part 22)'
of that would be in a turnover, of course, if you had made specific checks 2 31 l
of what are required in what position as far as tech specs we might have 24!
caught those two valves in the open position.
cu$\\
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40 8
1 M:
Right. Another thing would probab help out would be, you have 2!
pen and closed indication, what I would suggest would be to hook that open 31 and closed indication up to the computer on your tech spec valves and for j
the computer to come up when you come on shift to print it out and the g;
computer would tell you whether your tech spec valve is open or closed like yu ave a pr n u va ves out of pos W on.
So den you come in ghe 6
7 your turnover, go over and punch it in the computer, you know, it doesn't 8i have to be on the relief... the man your relief, on his time but right into the shift.
Punch that in there and look at it and see if there are any g
valves out of positicn.
That would probably help.
t 11':
FASANO: Okay.
i 131 MELL:
Nice afterthought.
15.
FASANO: Well no its a thought, but if you don't have that then I think 16; maybe the other would be a formalized check sheet to toun over with.
171 ISi MELL:
Right, but we have the computer we would really be in a lot of 191 trouble then, you know, we use the computer to cut down on our time and to 201 help us out.
21:
22l l
FASANO: What would you believe more, the computer or a look at the lights.
23!
24f 25!
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MELL: Well I would look at both if there was a problem.
2!
FASANO:
Okay. Well at this time I have no further questions unless you 3
do.
Si SHACKLETON:
I have no questions.
Pete, any questions.
6, 7!
PETE:
No.
at 9!
SHACXLETON:
If there are no further questions and no further comments, Mr.
Mell we'll bring this recording and interview to a conclusion and termination 11!
at this point.
The time is now 11:06 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time.
12!
131 14' 15:
16i 17!
13!
191 20r 21!
22l 23 24!
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