ML19253C112
| ML19253C112 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1979 |
| From: | Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Cavanaugh W ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911280503 | |
| Download: ML19253C112 (1) | |
Text
CENTRAL FILES PDR:HQ L R UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Nb1b R EGloN IV 3
611 RYATJ PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000 7 i,$$,
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ARLINGTO!J, TEXAS 76012 5;
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Noven.ber 5, 1979 Docket Nos.
50-313 50-368 Arkansas Power and Light Company ATTN:
Mr. William Cavanaugh III Vice President of Generation and Construction P. O. Box 551 Little Pock, Arkansas 72203 Gentlemen:
This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, IE Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions.
If you have questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Sincerely, JM k
't L
& rl V. Seyfrit Director
Enclosures:
1.
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 2.
List of IE Information Notices Issued in the Last Six Months cc:
James P. O'Hanlon, Plant Manager Arkansas Nuclear One P. O. Box 608 Russellville, Arkansas 72801 1443 55 7911280 5 0 3 h
SSINS:
6870 Accession No:
7908220133 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C.
20555 IE Information Notice No. 79-26 Date:
November 5, 1979 Page 1 of 2 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Description of Circumstances:
On September 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that had resulted in containment integrity being breached for an indeterminate length of time.
While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a 3" bypass line around the main 48" containment purge valve, plant personnel dis-covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi-tion. These valves should have been locked closed.
Investigation by the licensee indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April,1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed. The plant has operated at power for the major portion of that time period.
The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health. However, in the event of a design basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a significaat path for a radioactive release from the containment.
The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long-term hydrogencontro}jcapability for the containment atmosphere following a de. sign basis accident.- It was intended that after approximately 30 days following an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently to pcmit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment atmosph9re, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack.
Thus the enmponents in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves open during the initial pressure surge of the design basis accident, and signif-icant uncontrolled release would recult. High radiation in the vicinity of the bypass line would also make immediate closin even if identified as the source of lea DUPLICATEDOCUMENT}kk)
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Current. NRC requirements call for Entire document previously control hydrogen buildup.
Palisad entered into system under:
ANO E I I
No. of pages:
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