ML19253B295

Package Description:Technical Operations Model 676, USA/9029/B

ML19253B295
Person / Time
Site:	07109029
Issue date:	09/11/1979
From:	Marzilli D TECH/OPS, INC. (FORMERLY TECHNICAL OPERATIONS, INC.)
To:
Shared Package
ML19253B294	List: ML19253B293 ML19253B295
References
NUDOCS 7910100672
Download: ML19253B295 (73)

Text

Teph/ Ops Radiaton Products Divison 40 North Avenue m

Burbngton, Massachusetts 01803 Telephone (617) 272 2000 PACKAGE DESCRIPTION TFIH'IICAL OFERATIONS Mol;EL 676 USA /9029/B Prepared by DAVID MARZILLI 1124 179 r

q

'r910100 D 7A

a l

1.

General Information 1.1 Introduction The Tech / Ops Models 676 and 676E are designed for use as gara ray projec-tors and shipping containers for Type B quantities of radirective caterial in special fort. The Model 676 differs frcm the Model 676E only by the addition of an electric circuit, which provides compatibility with Tech / Ops Model 657 Autc=atic Expcsure Device. Throughout this evaluation the Models 676 and 676E are considered interchangeable, except where specifically de-

]~

signated.

%e Model 676 conforms to the criteria for Type 3 packaging in acecrdance with 10CFR71 and satisfies the criteria for Type B(U) packaging in accor-I dance with IAEA Safety Series No. 6'/ ps sealed Source Asse=bly Model No 1973 The source to be used in con-junction with the Model 676 is Tech O A424-13 The Model 676 vill contain a taximum 330 curies of ecbalt-60 as special for=.

1.2 Package Description 1.2.1 Sackaging The Model 676 is 14 inches (356==) high, 29 inches (737:=) lens, and 15 inches (381=m1 vide in everall dimension. The gross weight cf the package is 545 pounds (2k8kg). The radioactive source asseably is stcred in a circalley or titanium "S" tube in the gec=etric center of the package. The "S" tube is cast inside a depleted uranium shield asse=bly. The weight of the uranium shield is 370 pcunds (168kg). The shield is provided with a l

paint finish.

The shield is enclesed in a shell fabricated of inch (6.35==) thick hot rolled steel. The shield is fixed in position within the shell by the re-taining bar assemblies. The void space between the shield and the shell is filled with a castable rigid polyurethane fcam.

Steel-uranium interfaces are separated with 0.010 inch (0.25k==) thick copper separatcrs.

Attached to the sides of the container are 1 inch (25.E==) thick hot rolled steel side frames used for lifting the package.

Mcunted at each end of the "S" tube are pcsitioning devices. The source asse=-

bly is locked in position by =eans of the control cable connector and addi-ticnally secured bv teans of a shipping plug. A protective shipping plate

( ' inch thick steel) is =cunted over the control cable connector asse=bly.

{

Ta=perprcof seals are provided during shipment of these sources. Asse=bly jcints which are not leak tight provide passageways for the escape cf any gas generated free decc= position of the potting fea= in the event the projecter is involved in a fire accident. The outer packaging is designed to avoi'd the collection and retention cf water. The package is painted and finished to provide fcr easy decenta=ination. The radicactive caterial is sesled inside a source capsule, which is the containment vessel of the package.

BEVISION O 1-1 1124 180 se. i i n

The Model 676 has been previously approved for use as a Type B package under USNRC Certificate of Cocpliance No. 9029, Rev. 2 (enclosed in section 13).

1.2.2 Operational Features The source assembly is secured in the proper position by the control cable connector and lock assembly. This assembly requires a key for operation, and thus provides positive closure. A inch (6.35mm) thick steel ship-ping plate is csed to protect the assembly durire shipment. Additionally, the source asce=bly is secured by means of a shipping plug inserted in the opposite end of the "S" tube. This plug is sealvired and provided with a tamperproof seal.

1.23 Contents of Packaging The Model 676 is designed for a capacity of up to 330 euries of cobalt-60 as Tech / Ops Source Assembly A424-13 The source assembly is special for=

as prescribed in 10CFR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6,1973 1-2 REVISION O jjg4 jgj SEP.1 1 1979

w 13 AFFS:QIX

- USNRC Certificate of Ccmpliance No. 9029, Rev. 2

- Nscriptive Assembly Ihaving, Model 676 l

1-3 REVISION Q f

1124 182 E ' ' '"5

'l

. Form NRC418 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSloN u2 3 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE jg c p For Radioactive Materials Packages 1.la) Certificate Number 1.(b) Revision No.

1.(c) Package identification No.

1.(d) Pages No. 1.le) Total No. Pages 9029 2

USA /9029/B( )

1 3

s

2. PRE AMBLE 2.la)

This certificate is issued to satisfy Sections 173.393a,173.394,173.395, and 173.396 of the Department of Trans'ortation Hazardous p

Materials Regulations (49 CFR 170189 and 14 CFR 103) and Sections 146-19-10a and 146-19-100 of the Department of Transportatnn Dangerous Cargoes Regulations (46 CFR 146--149), as amendas.

2.(b)

The packaging and contents described in item 5 below, meets the safety standards set forth in Subpart C of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 71. ** Packaging of Radioactive Materials for Transport and Transportation of Radioactive Material Under l

Certain Conditions.**

2.fc)

This certificate does not relieve the consignor from compliance with any requirement of the regulations of the U.S. Department of I

Transportation or other applicable regulatory agencies, including the government of any muntry through or into which the package I

will be transported.

3. This certificate is issued on the basis of a safety analysis report of the package design or ap;dicrtiorr 3.lal Prepared by (Name and address):

3.(b)

Title and identification of repcrt or application:

Technical Operations, Inc.

Technical Operations, Inc. application dated Radiation Products Division July 31, 1974, as supplemented.

Northwest Industrial Park Burlington, Massachusetts 01803

3. lei cocket No.

71-9029

4. CONDITIONS This certificate is conditional upon the fulfilling of the requirements of Subpart O of 10 CFR 71, as applicable, and the conditions specified in item 5 telow.

5. Description of Packaging and Authorized Contents, Model Number, Fissile Class, other Conditsons, and

References:

(a)

Packaging (1) Model Numbers:

MODEL 676, MODEL 676E (2) Description A steel encased, uranium shielded Gamma Ray Projector.

Primary components consist of an outer steel shell, int'ernal bracing, polyurethane potting material, depleted uranium shield, and a zircalloy "S" tube.

The contents are securely positioned in the zircalloy "S" tube by a source cable locking device and shipping pl ug.

Temper-proof seals are provided on the packaging and a 1/4-inch thick steel shipping plate is bolted over the source i

locking mechanism for additional protection during transport. t

~

The total weight of the package is approximately 545 pounds.

s 1h REVISION O SEP. I 1 lE3 1124 l83 1

.s

I

(

Pase 2 - Certificate No. 9029 - Revision No. 2 - Docket No. 71-9029 5.

(a)

Packaging (continued)

(3)

Drawings The packaging is constructed in accordance with the following Technical Operations, Inc. drawings:

B66001-1,2,3,7,8,12 D67602, Rev. A i

A66001-4,5,6,ll D67602-1 B65502 A67602-2,6,7,13 B65502-1 B67602-3,5,8,10 thru 14 3655E01 D67603 65502 Bill of fiatl's 067603-1 67601 Bill of Matl's C67603-2 67602 Bill of Matl's C67604-1 67607 Bill of Matl's B67607

. CSK 1923 B67607-1 A68003-3 (b) Contents

{

(1) Type and form of material 60 Cobalt as sealed sources whiun meet the requirements of special form as defined in 5 71.4(o) of 10 CFR Part 71.

(2) Maximum quantity of material per package 330 Curies of 60 Cobalt l

6.

Tne source shall be secured in the shielded position of the packaging by the shipping plug, source assembly, and locking device.

The shipping plug, source assembly used must be fabricated of materials capable of resisting a 1475 F fire environment for one-half hour and maintaining their positioning function.

The ba,ll step of the source assembly must engage the locking device. The flexible cable of the source assembly and shipping plug must be of sufficient length and diameter to provide positive positioning of the source' in the shielded position.

7.

The nameplates shall be fabricated of materials capable of resisting the fire test of 10 CFR Part 71 and maintaining their legibility.

(

1-5 REVISIOli 0 SEP. I 1 1979 4

jg4 p#%

S

Page 3 - Certificate No. 9029 - Revision No. 2 - Docket No. 71-9029 l

8.

The package authorized by this certificate is hereby approved for use under the general licesse provisions of Paragraph 71.12(b) of 10 CFR Part 71.

9.

Expiration date:

January 31, 1980.

REFERENCES Technical Operations, Inc. application dated July 31, 1974, requesting approval to deliver special form Cobalt-60 sources in Models Nos. 676 and 676E Gamma Ray Projectors to a e.arrier for transport.

Supplements dated:

September 27 and December 15, 1974, January 8 and June 1;,1975'; and January 3,1977.

l FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b

Charl% E. MacDonald, Chief Transportaticn Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety FEB 4 1977 Date I

I N

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s REVISION O 1-6 1124 185 sce i is "

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2.

Structural Evaluation 2.1 Structural Design 2.1.1 Discussion Structurally the Model 676 consists of five ecmponents: a source capsule, shield assembly, outer shell, side frames and lock assembly. The source capsule is the primary containment vessel.

It meets the require =ents for special form radioactive material as outlined in 1CCFR71 (see Section 2.8).

The shield is 370 pounds (168kg) of depleted uranium. The shield assembly fulfills two functions: it provides shielding for the radioactive caterial and, tcgether with the positioning techanisms, insures proper positioning of the source.

ite shield assemb,1y is supported with retaining bars which are forced togethe. by means of hex nuts threaded on adjusting screws. The adjusting screws and retaining bars are secured with jam nuts. The entire shield assembly is potted in a castable rigid polyurethane fcam and encased in a inch (6.35mm) thick hot rolled steel shell. Steel-uranium interfaces are separated with copper. Attached to the shell are side frames cade of 1 inch (25.htm) thick steel which are bolted together with 7/16 - 20UNF hex head bolts. These are designed as lifting devices and i= pact limiters. The key operated lock asse=bly and control cable connector secure the source in the shielded position. A inch (6.35cm) thick steel shipping plate is in-stalled to protect the lock frcm darage. Positive proof of source position is evidenced by use of a seal-vired shipping plug.

2.1.2 Design Criteria The Model 676 is designed to ec= ply with the require =ents of 10CFR71 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 The device is simple in design, such that there are no design criteria which cannot be evaluated by straight-ferward application of the appropriate section of 10CFR71 or IAEA Eafety Series No. 6, 1973 2.2 Heighte und Centers of Grs rity The Mcdel 676 projectcr weighs 5h5 pounds (2h8kg). The shield assembly centains 370 pcunds (168kg) cf depleted uranium. The center of gravity is 1ccated apprcximately at the gecretric center of the package.

23 Mechanical Properties of Materials The Model 676 Ca==a Ray Projector shell is cade cf het rolled steel. This

=aterial has a yield strength of h0,000 pounds per square inch (276MN/*:2,

3

(

Reference:

Machinery's Handbock, 20th ed.,1976, p. h52).

2.h General Standards for All Packages 2-1 EVISION O SEP. I i 1979 1124 191

=

2.4.1 Chemical and Galvanic Reactions The raterials used in the construction of the Model 676 Ga==a Rey Projector are uranium =etal, steel, zircalloy, beryllium copper, bronze, copper and tita nium. There vill be no significant chemical or galvanic action between any of these components.

The possibility of the phenc=ena of the for::stion of the eutectic alloy of iron uranium at temperatures below the melting temperatures of the individual retals was considered. The iron uranium eutectic alloy temperature is approx-i=ately 1337 F f725 C).

Ecwever vacuum conditions and extrece cleanlir.ess of the surfaces are necessary to produce the alloy at this lov temperature. Due to the conditions under which the shields are mounted, sufficient contact for this effect does not exist.

In support of this conclusion, the folleving test results are presented. A themal test of a sa=ple of bare, depleted uranium =etal was performed by Nuclear Metals, Inc. The test indicated that the uranium sample oxidized such that the radial dimension was reduced by 1/32 inch. A subsequent test was performed in which a sample of bare, depleted uranium =etal was placed on a steel plate and subjected to the ther=al test conditions. The test t

showed no alloying or =elting characteristics in the sample, and the degree of oxidation was the sa=e as evidenced in the first test. A copy of the test report appears in Section 2.10.

Although the likelihood of the formation of an iron-uranium eutectic alloy is remote, copper separators are used at steel-ursnium interfaces.

1 2.4.2 Positive Closure The Model 676 source cannot be exposed withcut opening a key-operated lock.

Access to the lock requires the re= oval of the shipping plate. Additionally, there is a shipping plug which is seal-vired and provided with a tamperproof seal.

2.h.3 Lifting revices The Model 676 is designed to be lifte$ab the side fre=es.

Each is secured by four 7/16-20 UNF SAS-Jh29 Grade 5 bolts. These bolts are installed f

with 7/16 leck washers. The yield str

a. these 7/13-20 L7F bolts is 10,900 pounds (48,600g). As there is 8E e2 3/h inch between the bolt and the ta pped rod

+%

iel swippig strength (apprcximately 21000 e nds A ter_

que cf 30 foot-pounds (alN m) is app 11,$"d h h

• WW factor.

I bolt s.

This corresponds to a tension of apprcximately ho80 pounds 8

ensile leadine

~

n each bolt is hh90 pounds (20'000N)' d ue and three ti=es the weight of the packare. The +o i

p nds (27,60CN). Both

~

1 cads are less than the yield stre th the The veld joining the side frates to the side fra=e insert en the Mcdel 676 is a 3/16 inch fillet veld. The A=erican Welding Scciety " Code for Arc and Gas 'Jel-ding n Building Construction" permits the stress en a fillet FIVISION O 2-2 SEP.1 1 1973 1124 192 r

a weld to be 13,600 psi (89.6fci/m ).

As the shear stress on the threat of the fillet veld is the limiting factor, the allevable stress on a 3/16 inch fillet veld (throat dimension, 0.133 inch, 3 38=m) is calculated to be 1,800 pounds per linear inch (320N/=m). As the perimeter of the side frame insert is 52 inches (132m), the allowable load is 93,600 pounds (kl7,000N).

Hence, the allovable lead on the side frare insert veld is greater than the yield stren6th of the bolt.

2.h.4 Tiedown Devices The tiedevn devices on the Model 676 are the side fraces. As indicated in 2.h.3, above, these frames can safely support the package.

25 Standards for Type 3 and Large Quantity Packages 251 Load Resistance Considering the package as a simple beam supported on both ends with a uniform lead of 5 times the package weight evenly distributed along its length, the raximum stress can be ecmputed frcm:

F1 S

=

E

^

where:

S:

=axi=um stress F: total load (2725 pcunds) 1: length of beam (29' inches) 3 Z:

section modulus of beam (67 7 in )

(

Reference:

Mnchinery's Handbeck, 20th ed., 1976, p. hh2)

Thus, the maximum st ess generated in the beam is 150 pounds per square inch 2

(1.03.'Ci/g).), which is far belev the yield strength of the caterial, 40,000 psi (276fCI/m 252 External Pressure The Medel 676 is open to the atmosphere; thus, there vill be no differential pressure acting on it.

The collapsing pressure of the scurce capsules can be found:

86,670 t _ 1386 P

=

D where:

P:

collapsing pressure in pcunds per square inch 2-3 REVISION Q SEP.1 1 1979 1124 193

t: vall thickness in inches (0.020 inch)

D: outside diameter in inches (0 35 inch)

(

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 20th. ed., p. 4h8)

~he collapsing pressure of the capsules is calculated to be 3570 pounds per squareinch(24.6hCi/=2). Therefore, the capsule can withstand an external pressure of 25 psi.

3 2.6 Normal Conditions of Transport 2.6.1 Heat The themal evaluation is performed in Chapter 3 of this application. From this evaluation, it can be concluded that the Model 676 can withstand the nomal heat transport conditions.

2.6.2 Cold The metals used in the manufacture of the Model 676 can all vitnstand temp-eratures of -kO F (-40 C). The lower operating limit of the polyurethane O

foam is -lC0 F (-73 C). Thus, it is concluded that the Model 676 vill vitt-0 I

stand th2 nomal transport cold conditions.

2.6 3 o t ist.re

_r The Model 676 is open to the atnosphere; thus, there vill be no differential pressure acting on it.

In Section 3 5 4, the source capsules are de=cnstrated to be able to withstand an -nernal pressure reduction of 0 5 at=ospheres 2

(50 7kn/m ),

2.6.h Vibration The Model 676 has been in use eight years. During that time there has never been a vibrational failure of the Model 676 repcrted. Thus, we contend the Model 676 vill not undergo a vibrational failure in transport.

2.6 5 Vater Spray Test The water spray test was not actually performed on the Model 676. We contend that the materials used in construction of the Model 676 are all highly water resistant and that exposure to water vill not reduce the shielding or affect the structural integrity of the package.

2-4 REVISICH Q SEP.1 1 1979 1124 194

2.6.6 Free Drop The drop analysis perfomed in Hypothetical Accident Conditions (see Section 2 71) is sufficient to satisfy the require =ent outlined for the nomal transport free drop condition in 10CFRTl and IAEA Safety Series !To. 6,1973 On this basis, we conclude that the Model 676 can withstand the free drop withcut i= pair =ent of the shielding or package integrity.

l 2.6.7 Corner Drop I

sot applicable.

2.6.8 penetration A penetration test of the Model 676 was not actually performed. However, i

the similar Model 684 was subjected to the penetration test with no resultant loss of shielding or packaEe integrity (a copy of the test report is enclo-sed in section 2.10)'.

The following analysis demonstrates that the =axi-

=um damage exhibited by the Model 676 due to the penetration test is less than that of the Model 68h.

The maximum stress obcerved in a flat rectangular plate supported on all edges due to concentrated central lot ing is:

0.62F in L

(

S

=

0 577 t2 2r o

vhere: F: total load

{l thicknessofplate(inches);

t:

L: length of longest side (inches) r: 0 325t (inches) o i

(

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 20th ed., p. 4h4) l t

The appropriate di=ensions for the Model 676 and Model 68h are:

Model 676 Model 68h i

t 0.25 inch (6.35m) 0.1875 in. (h.76==)

f L

29 inch (737:=)

17 in. (h32:=)

I r

0.0312 in. ( 2. C6== )

O. C6C9 in. (l.55==)

o i

The calculated stress for the Model 676 is 57 2F; for the Medel 68h it is j

i 2-5 REVISION O l

SEP. I ! 1579 i

1124 195

97 3F. In both cases the lead F (40 inch drop of a 13 pound hemispherical

'^

billet) and the =aterial of construction (hot rolled steel) are the same.

The maximum stress, and thus the maximum da= age, to the flat plate occurs in the Model 684. The shipping plate which protects the lock mechanism is

'he same in the two models. As the Model 684 successfully withstood the penetration condition, we conclude that the Model 6T6 can undergo the pene-tretion test with no loss of structural integrity or shielding.

( A copy of the test report for the Model 684 is enclosed in section 2.10).

2.6.9 ccmpression The gross weight of the Model 676 is 545 pounds (248kg). The maximum cross-sectional area of the package is 435 square inches (0.281=2). Thus 2 pounds per square inch times the cross-sectional area (870 pounds, 39hkg) is less than five times the package weight (2725 pounds,1239kg). Fcr this analysis the lead vill be taken to bc 2725 pounds.

The maximum stress generated in a flat rectangular steel plate with all edges fixed and a load distributed uniformly over the surface of the plate can be ec=puted frcm:

S 0 5F

=

2 1 i 0.623 t

where: S:

=axi=um stress-F: total load (2725 pounds) t: thickness of plate (0.25 inches) v: vidth cf plate (15 inches) 1: length of plate (29 inches)

(

Reference:

Machine: r's Handbock, 20th ed.,1976, p. hhh, Eq.13)

um stress generated in the plate is 1160 Frcm this relationship, the maxi;#).

pcunds per square inch (8.0lM'I/m This figure is greatly belev the yield strength cf the material, 40,000 pounds per square inch (276fCl/=2). Thus, it can be concluded that ecnpression vill not adversely affect the package.

s 2.7 Hypcthetical Accident Conditions 2.7.1 Free Drop The Mcdel 676 was not actually submitted to the 30 foot drop test.

Mcvever, the Model 672 was submitted to the d:tp test (the test report appears in Sect ton 2.10).

The Model 676 has apprcximately the same weight and is con-structed frcm the same materials as the Model 672:

anvision o p_g SE?.1 I 1979 1124 196

1 m

Model 672 Model 676 Length 2h inches (61Ct=)

29 inches (737:=)

Width

' 1h inches (356==)

15 inches (381==)

Height 12hinches(318==)

14 inches (356=2)

Weight of Shield hol lbs. (182kg) 370 lbs. (168kg)

Gross 'Jeight of Container 580 lbs. (26kkg)

Sh51bs.(248kg)

Side Frame Faterial 1 inch thick (25.h==)

1 inch thick (25.h==)

hot rolled steal hot rolled steel Shell Material h inch thick (6.35cm) inch thick (6.35:=)

hot rolled steel hot rolled steel Based on the satisfactory perfcr=ance of the Model 672, we cenelude that the Mcdel 676 vill undergo no less of shielding r structural integrity as a result of the 30 foot free drop test.

272 Puncture The Model 676 was submitted to the puncture test of 10CFRT1. There was no resultant da= age to the centainer nor reduction in shielding. A copy of the test report appears in Section 2.10.

273 The mal The therral analysis is presented in Section 3 5 There it is shown that the

=elting point of the materials, except the pcitirg ccrpcund, used in the ecnstruction of Model 676 are all greater than 14750? (800 C).

Also 0

indicated is the pmvicus acceptability of this design (NRC Certificate of Cc=pliance No. USA /9029/B, Rev. 2) using this evaluation.

2.7.4

'4ater I==ersicn Not applicable.

275 Si n nry of En= age The tests designed to induce =echanical stress (drop, puncture) caused =incr defcI=ation, but no reduction in the safety features cf the package. The thermal test resulted in no reduction of the safety of the package.

It can be ccncluded that the hypothetical accident conditions have no adverse effect en the shielding effectiveness and structural integrity of the package.

REVISION O 2-7 SEP.1 1 1979 1124 197

_s

2.8 Soecial For=

,q The Model 676 Gn-m Ray Projector is designed for use with Tech / Ops Scurce Assembly Ak24-13 This source asse=bly has been previously certified as special for= radioactive =aterial.

(IAEA Certificate of Cc=petent Authority No. USA /0045/S, see Section 2.10.

We are presently avaiting issuance of a new certificate which references the 1973 revision of IAEA Safety Series No. 6). We contend that this certificate is sufficient evidence that the require =ents for special for= radioactive =aterials, as established in IAEA Safety Series No. 6, are satisfied.

29 Fuel Rods Not applicable.

s 2-8 ggy73;on o SEP.1 ! 1973 1124 198 s

i

.3 2.10 APPENDIX

- Nuclear Metals, Inc., Test Repert: Iren Uranium Alleying

- Test Repert: Penetration Test,Model 684

- Test Report: Drop Tests, Model 672

- Test Report: Puncture Test, Model 676

- Descriptive Assembly Dravir.gs, Scurce Asse:ioly

- IAEA Certificate of Competent Authcrity No USA /00h5/S 2-9 REVISION O SE?. I ! 1973 1124 199

sh I

N U C L E A It af E T A L S. I N C.

a d/

q m.

..n Sincc, CONCC'no MAS %aCHustt15 05742 j

[

..n 28 January 1974 Technical Operations, Inc.

Radiation Products Division Snuth Avenue Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 Attention:

fir. J. Lima Gentlemen:

In response to a request by Joe Lima of Tech Ops, a simulated iire test was cerfonned on, samples of bare denleted uranium in contact with mild steel, the object being to detennine what, if any, alloying or melting would occur under these conditions.

TEST DATA:

O A 3/4-inch diameter x 5/8-inch lonq hare denleted uranimn specimen was

~

set on a 1-inch diameter x 1/8-inch thici: mild steel plate, placed in a

~

thin wall ceramic crucible.

A mild steel cover plate was used on top of the crucible to act as a partial air seal.

The crucible was loaded in a preheated 1450 F resistance heated furnace, held for 35 minutes, then removed and allowed to air cool under a ventilated hood.

RESULTS:

T'o reaction was evidenced between the two metals.

Both separated readily and showed no alloying or melting characteristics.

Oxidation of the uranium was about the same degree as that reported to Joe Lima on an earlier experiment.

The test was perfonned by fiMI on 25 January 1974.

Very truly your,

GrL L -

John G. Powers Project Engineer Q

t 2-10 REVISION O SEP.1-i G79 e e e.

.6 we MN**

TEST REPCRT RADIATICH FRODUCTS DIVISION BY:

Jchn J. Munro III DATE:

5 Septe=ber 1979 SU3 JECT: Model 684 Penetration Test On 5 Septecter 1979 e penetration test was performed on a Technical 7

Operations Model 684 shipping Container in accordance with 10CFR71 Appendix A.8 and IAEA Safety Series No. 6,1973, paragraphs 71ha and 71hb.

The hemispherical end of a vertical steel cylinder 1.25 inch in diameter weighing lh pounds, vr.s dropped frcm the height of hO inches onto the gecretric center of the botten surface of the Model 68h. There was no deformation and no damage which would affect the shielding or structural integrity of the package.

A second test was conducted using the same cylinder.

It was dropped frem the height of h0 inches onto the shipping plate. There was no defor=stion and no damage which would affect the shielding or structural integrity of the package.

Documentry photcgraphs are enclosed.

Performed by Witnessed by 4

tu (Tch.

J.' yunro III Ang61o Kik1rs 2 - 11 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979 1124 201

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TEST REPORT DESCRIPTION:

Model G72 - 30' Drop OATE March 18,1970 The first drop test landed on the right rear cornce of the side plate and was bent in 1-1/2" and forward 1/2". No other dam 6ge was sustained.

The second drop test landed on the left side of the side plate breaking 2/3 of ihe weld an:) was bent in l.

The Source Tube remained straight and the front ni t turneo freely.

The puncture test (113 drop on to a G" dia, steel billet) Icft a slight mark on the skin.

CONCLUSlON:

b s

3Y Richard Evans WITNESSEO BY Fred Ilauser

-- 15 REVISION O SEP. I 1 19I9 1124 205

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2-16 REVISION O

(

SEP.1 1 1979 1124 206

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N L10 DEL 672 DROPPING FROM 30 FEET ONTO STEEL PLATE 2-]7 REVISION O SEP. ! ! 1979 1124 207

l P00lrDRGINAL

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N E i l k )[ $ [ m ( m %

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MODEL 672 UPON BtPACT ON STEEL PLATE AFTER BEING DROPPED TIIROUGH 30 FEET 2-]a REVISION O r

SEP.1 1 1979 1124 208

j FF' TEST REPORT DESCRIPTlON:

D.C E 9 recember lo7h Puncture Test of Model 676 Container Connector A Model 676 Carma Ray Projector with Shipping Plate installed was dropped from a height of h0 inches onto a six inch dieneter, eight inch high steel Billet as shewn in Figure 1 s. The Container i=pacted on the Shipping Plate as siown in Figure 1 b.

CONCLUSION:

No danage to the c.ntainer, shipping plate or control cable connector resulted. There was no reduction of shielding effectiveness nor loss of Radicactive Material.

s

./

' WL W I TN ES S E D BY [J..hn J. ' n o 111 Bf Icn Erssceur

)

J 2-]9 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979 1124 209

s

./

PUNCTURE TEST C0ffrROL CABIE CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY J

Model 676 Gamma Ray Projector (weight 545 pounds) dropped frcm a height of 40 inches onto a steel cylinder (61n die x 8 in high)

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1124 211

AL-0060 J REv.

oATE oL R Ti MODEL.

CAPACfiY CAP 5ULE STYLE DlM A DlM 8 (CURlE5)

(INCHE5)

(lNCHE5)

A424-2 22 0001l3GOCol N.A.

9 "As A4 24 22 60011360001 N.A.

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60011,60001 N.A.

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A424 -16 55' 600iii 60000 2.373 138/2 A424-17 55 600II, 60000 2 373 l5 %

A424 -18 33 60011,60000 l.2.25 IO %

A424-19 0.11 60001, 60004 l.229 7%

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17'/4 M55-5 550 600I2, 60002 N.A.

Il4 M 55-6 l10 0 600l3s 60003 N.A.

17 W A453 -7 110 600113 60000 N.A I IISAs

/A 55 -8 50 6001Is 60000 N.A.

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13 W A4 53 - 10 55 6001I.60000 2.373 13 W 8

=

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MATERIALS TECHNIC AL OPER ATIONS IN C.

RADIATION PRODUCTS DIVISION B U RLIN G TO N, MA 01803 f,

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RADIATION PRODUCTS DIVISION B U R LIN GTON. MA 01803 flNfSH DWG TITLE g

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RADIATION PRODUCTS DIVISION j,

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seautoinc co., inc. 21-sos se Pt.6E 2-24 1124 214

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION I.

MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION BUREAU y

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20590 x

'4 s s IAEA CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENT AUTHORITY Special Form Radioactive Material Encapsulation Certificate Number USA /0045/S (Revision 1)

This certifies that the encapsulated sources, as described, when loaded with the authorized radioactive contents, have been demonstrated to meet the regulatory requirements for special form radioactive material as prescribed in IAEA l/

and USA 2/ Regulations for the transport of radioactive mate-rials.

I.

Source Description - The sources described by this certificate are identified as either of 30 Tech / Ops encap-sulated source assemblies, Models A-424-1 through A-424-19, A-453-1 and A-453-2, A-453-5 through A-453-10, A-581, 68309, and 697.

Each source assembly is of CRES 304L steel and is welded using one of seven source capsule styles (6 0 0 0 C, 6 0 0 0 1,

60002, 60003, 60004, 60006 and 68310) ranging in length from 0.780" to 1.312" by 0.250" diameter.

Each source, wita the exception of Model A-581, is attached to a source wire and connector assembly.

Source detail and other data is described on Technical Operations, Inc. drawing Nos. C42401, two sheets, B600ll, B60012 and B60013.

II.

Radioactive Contents - The authorized radioactive contents of the. sources consists of from 0.05 to 1000 curies of either Iridium-192 or Cobalt-60 in solid metallic form as listed in drawing Nos. C42401, B600ll, B60012 and B60013.

III.

This certificate, unless renewed, expires on September 30, 1979.

J This certificate is issued in acccrdance with Marginal C-6.1 I

of the IAEA Regulations 1/, and in response to the April 23, 1975 petition by the Technical Operations, Inc., Burlington, Massachusetts, and in consideration of the associated information therein.

Revision 1 issued in response to the August 31, 1976 petition by Technical Operations, Inc.

Certified by:

'/

/

/

N, Olb Alfred W. Grella,fChief, Technology Division Date Of fice of Hazardous Materials Operations U.

S. Department of Transportation 1124 215 a _ 23

e Certificate Number USA /0045/S Page 2 s

-1/

" Safety Series No.

6, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, 1967 Edition",

published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, Austria.

2/

Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 100-199, USA.

Revision issued to incorporate drawing Nos B600ll,B60012, and B60013, to revise authorized contents and to extend expiration date.

e g

s O

2 26 1124 216

~.

l i

3 Thermal Evaluation 31

_ Discus sion The Model 676 Ga==a Ray Projector is a co=pletely passive thermal device and has no =echanical cooling syste=s or relief valves. All cooling of the package is through free convection and radiation. The only heat scurce is the maximum 330ci cobalt-60 source. The corresponding decay heat is 5 5 vatts (see Section 3 4.1).

32

_s.u==ary of Thermal Properties of Materials The melting points of the =etals used in the construction cf the Model 676 are:

Depleted Uranium Metal 2070 F (1133 c)

Carbon Steel 2h53 F (1345 c)

Copper 19ho F (1060 C) 0 Eronze 18h0 F (1005 C)

(

Reference:

Machinery's Handbook, 20th ed.,19% )

Titantium 3300 F (1820 c)

Eerylliu= copper 1600 F ( 670 C) o o

Zirealloy 3350 - (lSh5 c)

(

Reference:

Metals Handbeck,1961) c The rigid polyurethane fea= has a minimum operating range of -100 ? to 200 F

(-73 c to 93 c).

It will decc= pose at the 1' ire test te=perature cf lh75 ?

(800 C). Decc= position vill result in gasecus byproducts which will burn in air.

33 Technical Stecifiestions of Cc=cenents s

Not applicable.

3.h Ncr=al Conditions of Transcort 3.h.1 Themal Model The heat scurce in the Model 676 resu:.ts frc= a maxirum cf 33cci cf ccbalt-60.

REVISION O SEP. I 1 1979 1124 217

{

}

Ccbalt-60 decays by beta emission' beta = 2.819MeV (

Reference:

Radiological Health Handbeck, p. 389). Thus:

2.81[MeV x 3 7 x 10 disint) x 1.6 x lo-13J x 330C1 = 5 5 vatts s-Ci /

MeV To qualify as a Type B(U) package the requirements of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973, paragraphs 321 and 232 must te satisfied. The calculational model used to de=onstrate ecmpliance with these regulations is described in detail in Section 3.6, along with the results of the analysis. Essentially, it is assu=ed that one-fourth of the entire decay heat lead is deposited unifcrmly in each of six sides. The a=allest of the sides is assumed to reach the

=axi=um surface ter=reratule. Heat transfer frcm the side is restricted only to convective heat transfer frcm the upper face of the plate.

To =eet the additional require =ents of paragraph 2h0 of the IAEA regulations, a separate analysis was perfor=ed. To do this, a heat balance was set up over the surface of the package, using insolation data in Table III of the IAEA regulations. The decay heat source was considered negligible. The cuter shell was assumed to be insulated from the interier of the package.

Heat transfer frem the package was ta%en to occur by radiation, and over specific surface areas by free convection. A detailed description of the =edel is given in the analysis, in Section 3.6.

3 4.2 Maximum Te=reratures An exa=ination of the =elting Icints of the raterials used in construction of the Model 676 shev that the maximum te=peratures encountered under ncr=al ecnditions cf transport engender no loss of structural integrity or less of shielding of the package. The specific Type B(U) analyses (section 3.6) shcw the package temperature to be belev h0 C (lCh F) in the shade and belov c

0 6c C (151 F) when insolated.

3.h.3

.vini=um Te=reratures ne =ini=um ncr=al operating tempcrature of the Mcdel 676 is hO C (-ho F).

This te=perature vill have no adverse effect en the package.

3.h.h Maximum Internal Pressure Normal operating conditions generate negli ible internal pressures. Any E

pressure generated is significantly below that of the hypothetical accident pressure, which is shcvn to result in no loss of shielding or centainment.

3.h.5 Maximu= Sermal stresses The =aximum te=peratures that occur during nor=al transpcrt are 1cv encugh to MSN O 3-2 SEP.1 1 1979

_.l.l 2.4 2 l b

l 3

insure that themal gradients vill cause no significant themal stresses.

3....

Evaluation of Package Perfer=ance for Nor=al conditions of Transcort The themal conditions of nor=al transport are obviously inaignificant frc=

a functional point of view for the Model 676. Also, the applicable condi-tions of IAEA Regulations for Type B(U) packages have been shcvn to be satisfied by the Model 676.

35 Hyoothetical Accident Ther=al Evaluation 351 Thermal Model The Model 676, including the scurce asse=bly, is assumed to reach the fire test te=porature of 800 C (1h75 F). At this te=perature the polyurethane

. pctting compound vill have deccuposed and the resulting gases vill have escaped the package through the vent holes and the asse=bly joints which are not leak-tight.

352 Fackage conditions and Environ =ent The Model 676 is considered to have undergene no significant da=ege during the free drop and puncture tests; thus, the package in this analysis is assumed to be free frc= da= age.

353 Pscksge Te=ceratures As indicated in 3 51, the package reaches a =axi=u= of 800 c (1475 F) thrcugh-cut. An exa=ination of the =elting points of the materials used in the con-struction of the Mcdel 676 (except the potting ec= pound, as noted) indicates that there vill be no damage to the package as a result of this te=perature.

The possibility of the for=ation of the iron-uranit= eutectic allcy was addressed in Section 2.h.1,- where it was concluded that the for=atien of the alloy was unlikely.

3 5.h Muiru= Internal Pressures I'he Model 676 packaging is open to the at=csphere, insuring that there vill be no pressure buildup within the package. In section 3 6 there is an analysis of the source capsules under tre fire test conditions. It is shown tha*

maxi =u= internal gas pressure s-this te=perature is 54.7 psi (0 377MN/=b)the Thecritical1p)ationforfai'reistheveld. vill generate a =axi=u= stress of h55 psi (3 14M1 An interhal pressure c psi (0.377xN/=

in the 30hL stainless steel is 10,000 psi (69.cMN/=2) yield strength of Type 30h cr veld. At a te=perature of 870 C (1700 F) the 3-3 REVISION O 1124 2 FY.1 11979 c

Thus, at 800 C (lh75 F), the maximum stress in the package vould be only N

5% of the yield strength at tha' point.

355 Maximum Ther=al Stresses There are no significant thermal stresses generated durira the themal test.

3 5.6 Evaluation of Packace Perfor=ance The Model 676 vill undergo no loss of structural integrity or shielding when subjected to the conditions of the hypothetical ther=al accident. The pres-cures and te=peratures generated have been de=cnstrated to be within accep-table limit s.

3-h REVISION O SE?.!

ts79 1124 220

i s

..A 3.6 AFFE?IDIX

- Model 676 Themal Analysis:

IAEA Safety Series No. 6,1973, paragrapha 231, 232

- Model 676 Ther=al Analysis:

IAEA Safety Series :To. 6, 1973, paragraph 2ho

- Ther=al Analysis Capsules 60002, 60012 I

s 3-5 REVISICN O SEP.1 1 1979 1124 221 s

i 1

=

i i

Model 676 - Ther=al Analysis s

Tyre B(U), Paragraths 231, 232, IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 This analysis is perfomed to de=enstrate that the Model 676 Gama Ray Projector =eete the specific Type B(U) ther=al requirements of paragraphs 231, and 232 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6,1973, i.e., that the maxi =u=

0 surface te=perature does not esceed 50 C in the shade, assuming 36 C ambient te=perature.

To assure conservatis=, it is assumed that: (1) the entire decay heat (6%atts) is deposited in the exterior faces of the Model 676, (2) the inte-ior of the Model 676 is perfectly insulated, providing heat transfer frc= the vall only to the atmosphere. This rectangular shape of the container =eans that each face eclipses a different a= cunt of the solid angle through which the radiation (and thus de. ay heat) is distributed.

To (conservatively) si=plify, it is assured that each of the six exterior faces receives 1/4 cf the total source (1 5 watts) unifomly distributed over the face.

Considaring the s=allest face as undergoing one dimensional convective heat transfer :

/

q Interior (Insulated)

T T

a y

g vall T

q

+T where :

=

y a

hA temperature at the vall cuter surface T

=

y (decay) heat scurce (1.5 vatts) q

=

surface area of the s=allest face (0.140 square =eters)

A

=

h free convective heat transfer coefficient for air

=

5 vatts/=eter2 C.

(

Reference:

Heat Transfer, J.P.

C Hol=an, h th Edition, p.13) is 40 C (1040?) under nor=el 0

Thus, the =axi=u= te=rerature at the vall Ty ecnditions of transport. This satisfies the requirements of the afore-

=entioned regulations.

1-1 2

3-6 REVISION O j g/

}g'}

SEP.1 1 1978 j

4

Model 676 - Ther=al Analysis Type B(U), Parneraph 240, IAEA Safety Series No. 6, _'.973 This analysis is perfor=ed to de=enstrate that the Mode] 676 Can=a Ray Srojector =eets the specific Type B(U) ther=al require =<.ts of paragraph 240, IAEA Safety Series No. 6, 1973 This paragraph requires that the 0

maxi =um surface te=perature of a Type B(U) packa6e not exceed 820C (130 F) under nomal conditions of transport, given insolation as outlined in Table III of the regulationc and an ambient temperature of 38cc (loo F).

o The calculational codel consists of taking a steady state baat balance over the surface of the package. To facilitate calculstions, certain si=plifying assumptions are =ade.

These are outlined below:

Insolation 800 cal /c=2-12hr (775W/=2) for the top surface, 200 cal /c=2-12hr(19k'4/=2) for the sides and side fraces, none for the base as outlined in Table III of IAEA Regulations.

The package is finished with russett enacel. The solar absorptivity of this ena=el is o.81 (

Reference:

Themal Radiation Properties Survey, G.G. Cubareff et. al., 2nd ed, 1960, p260). A conservative figure of 0 90 was used as the package absorptivity.

recay Heat Load The decey heat load (5 5vatts) is assumed negligible.

Package Crientation The packsge rests on the side fraces, i.e.,

in tne nomal transpcrt orientation.

Heat T-ansfer Mechanis=s The Model 676 is assumed to undergo free convection and to radiate to the environ =ent.

The inside faces are considered to be insulated, so there is no conduction into the package. Further, the sides are taken to be thin enough so there are no temperature gradients present.

Radiation:

The package is assumed to radiate frc= the cuter shell only 1.e., a cube sik) inches (0 368=) x 11 7 inches (0.291=) x 15 inches (0 381m).

E This assumption provides for conservatism by not con-sidering any radiative heat loss through the side fra=e. 3-7 SEP. I 1 1979 1124 223

l w

Convection, Top:

The upper surface of the outer shell is taken to undergo free convection. To provide censerva-tism, the upper surfaces of the cide fra es are considered not to undergo convection. The heat transfer ccefficient of a hcrizontal flat plate is given by:

=132[aTf ht

\\L /

(

Reference:

Heat Transfer, J.P. Holman, 4th ed. 1976, p253) where L is the average of the lengths of the sides, 0 375m Thus:

= 1.69 (A T)0 5 h

t Convection, Sides: The vertical ;;cmponents of the outer shell are considered to exhibit free ccnvective heat transfer.

For conservatis=, the side fraces are taken to be insulated. Effectively, the vertical ccnvective heat transfer area is that of a vertical plate o.291m high x2 (0 368m + o.38b) long, convecting on one side only.

The heat transfer coefficient for a vertical flat plate is:

hs = 1.42 AT

(

Reference:

Heat Transfer, J.P. Holman, hth ed. 1976, p253) where L is the height cf the plate, 0.291=.

Thus:

= 193 (AT)o.25 h3 i

TakinE a heat balance cver the package surface:

i heat in = heat cut h ad. + con. tcp + conv. sides) s 9

9 1n rad et cs q

= 0 90 (775 V x A + 194 V xA) a in p

p o.90 (775 x o.140 + 194 x o.632) = 208 vatts

=

k A

q

=6CA (T

-T

)

rad r

v a

.- 3-8 REVISION O SEP. I 1 1973 1124

..,36

i I

W

) (0 79222)

(T

- (311 k) ]=

N,

= (0.9) (5 669 x 10-0 v

t&- %*

9ct

= hag g ( o T) where AT=T T

y a

(1.69 x ( o T) *

]

(0.1M=) (a T)

=

4cs

" h As ( o T) s 2

{193(oT)0.25]

0.436m

( a T)

=

Iteratica yields a vall temperature T cf 6o#C (151 F). Thus, the Mcdel v

676 satisfies the requirements of paragraph 2h0, IA1A Safety Series No.6, 1973 s s 3-9 REVISION O SEP. I 1 1979 1124 225

Source Capsules 60002, 60012 - Therral Analysis Hypothetical Fire Conditions This analysis is intended to demonstrate that Tech / Ops Source Capsules, styles 60002 and 60012, approved as speial form containers under IAEA Safety Series No. 6,1973, also meet the requirements of paragraph 238, of the sa=e IAEA Regulations, i.e., containment under specified ther=al test conditions.

The actual containment vessel for the radioactive material is either of the velded source capsulesy styles 60002 or 60012. The source capsules are of the same overall external di=ensions. The source capsule 60012 is a doubly encapsulated version of Source Capsule 60002. The outer dia=eter of the capsules is,0 350 inch (8.89=m). The overall length of the capsule is 1.3 inches (33=m). The exteml valds on both capsule styles are tungsten inert gas velds, with a minimum penetration of 0.020 inch (0 51=m).

This analysis vill treat each capsule cs a cylinder of 0 350 inch (8.89=m) outer diameter ami thicknese of 0.020 inch (0 51=m).

The internal volu=e cf the cource capsule contains only cobalt (a 3 a solid) and sir. It is assumed at the t me of loading that the entrapped air in 0

sule is at standard temprature and pressure (20 C, 0.101 Mega-thecap/squaremeter).

newtons We contend that this is a conservative assumption be-cause during the velding process, the internal air is heated, causing scme of the air mass to escape before the capsule is sealed. When the velded capsule returns to ambient tencerature, the internal pressure would be secevhat reduced.

As noted, the minimum veld penetration is 0.020 inch (0 51mm). Under conditions of internal pressure, the critical location for failure is this veld. Since the capsule has an outside diameter of 0 35 inch 8.89:m),

this veld has a cross-sectional area of 0.021 square inches (13 5== ).

Under conditions of paragraph 238 of IAEA Safety Series No. 6, it is assu=ed that the capsule could reach a temperature of 1kT5 F (800 C).

0 Using the ideal gas law and requiring the air to occupy a constant volu=e:

TTl2 P

=

2 1

2 initial pressure (0.10l!Ci/m )-

P1=

1=

initial temperature (293 K)

T final temperature (1093 K)

T2=

2 The internal Eas pressure could reach 0.377?Ci/m. It is assu=ed that the 3 REVISION O 3 - 10 SEP. I I 1979

=0

^

stress x erea

- pressure x areap s

2 Tr(D6 D1) 0 P W Di

=

Si 4

4 where S1 = lon6 tudinal stress i

Do = outer diameter (8.89t:m)

D = inner diameter @.@ d i

2 P = pressure (0377E/m)

Thus, the longitudinal stress is 137 M/m2, The hoop stress can,be found in a similar fashion. Taking a longitudinal cross section and summing forces:

0 hoop stress x area

- pressure x areap

=

s 0

2S Lt - pD L

=

h i

h hoop stress where S

=

length of cylinder L

=

thickness of veld (0 51=m) t

=

Thus, the hcop stress is 2 91EI/m. At a temperature o~f 1600 F (870 C 0

the yield strength of type 304 stainless steel is lo,coopsi (69.ctar/m ),

2)

Thus the pressure induced stresses are less than 5% of the yield strength 0

at 800 C.

.- 3 - 11 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979 1124

22y,

4.

Containment

,s k.1 Containment Boundary h.1.1 Containment Vessel The containment syste= for the Model 676 Ga==a Ray Projector is the Tech / Ops Model Ah2h-13 Source Asse=bly. The source assenbly is currently certified (IAEA Certificate of Cc=petent Authority No. USA /00h5/S) as special for=

contain=ent for radioactive materials.

The actual containment vessel is the velded source capsule, either style 60002 or 60012. The capsules are made cf Type 3ch or 30hL stainless steel.

They are seal velded with a mini =um veld penetration of 0.020 in. (0 51=m).

The capsules are. rounded cylinders 0 35 inches (8.9=m) in dia=eter and 13 1,ches (33=m) in length.

Capsule s.tyle 60012 is a double encapsulation, the inner capsule located inside the capsule cf the above dimensions. App ropria te design drawings are snelosed in section 2.10.

h.l.2 Containment Penetrations There are no penetraticns of contain=ent. The source capsule is seal velded to provide conformity to special form requirements.

h.l.3 Seals and welds The containment vessel is tungsten inert gas velded by General Electric at their plant in Vallecites, California. This is done in acccrdance with Tech /

Ops standard source encapsulation precedure (see Section 7.h).

The mini =um veld per.etration is 0.020 inches (0 51=m). This has proved acceptable for li-censing this vessel as special form.

h.l.h Closure Not applicable.

h.2 Requirements for Ncr=al Ccnditions of Transpcrt h.2.1 Felease of Radicactive Material The source asse=blies used all =eet the reqairements of special for= radic-active material as delineated in IAEA. Safety Series No. 6,1973 and 10CFR71.

Thos, there vill be no release cf radicactive materials under ccnditions of ner=al transpcrt.

k-1 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979

4.2.2 Idessurization of Containment Vessel s

The source asse=blies used all meet the require =ents of special form radio-active material.

Pressure buildup due to the conditions of the hypothetical ther=al accident has been shcun to create stresses well belcw the structural limits of the capcule (see Section 3 5). Thus, the contaic=ent vessel vill withstand the pressure variations of ncr=al transport.

h.2 3 Coolant Conta=ination Not applicable.

h.2.k Coolant Less Not applicable.

4.3 Contaitrent Nequirements for the Eypothetical Accident Condition 4.3 1 Fission Gas Products Not applicable.

4.3 2 Release of Contents The hypothetical accident conditicos as outlined in 10CFR71, Appendix B, l.,

2., and 3. have been shcun (Sections 2.7.1, 2.7 2, and 3 5 resrectively) to result in no less of package containment.

4-2 REVISION O SEP.1 1 13'9 1124 229

s 5

Shielding Evaluation 51 Discussion and Results The Model 676 is shielded with 370 pounds (168kg) cf depleted uranium. The uranium metal is cast around the zircalley or titaniu= "S" tube which holds the source. The stcrage position for the source is at the inflection in the "S" tube.

A radiation profile of Model 676 S.N.152 containing 250Ci cf ccbalt-60 (see Section 5 5) was made. An extrapolation for 330Ci source yielded the results which are presented in Table 5 1.

Frcm this data, and frem previous accepta-bility (NRC Certificate of Compliance No. USA /9029/3, Rev. 2) it is concluded that the Model 676 ccmplies with the regulatory standards in 10CFR71 and IAEA Saftety Series No. 6,1973 TABLE 5 1 SuetARY OF MAXIMUM DOSE RATES (mR/hr)

Contact At 1 Meter Side Top Bottom Side Tcp Ecttcm Gamma 191 145 158 4.2 1.7 15 Neutron Nct Applicable Not Applicable Total 191 las 158

-4.2 1.7 15 Hypothetical accident conditions vill result in essentially no change in the abcve readings.

I 52 Source Specificatien i

5 2.1 Gemma Scurce i

The gs=ma source used is encapsulated cobalt-60 in the quantity of up to 330 curies.

5 2.2 Neutron Scurce Not applicable.

53 Mcdel Specifications Not applicable.

REVISION O 1124 23 0 sta i i 1979

w 54 Shielding Evaluation i

The Model 676 shielding evaluation was perfor=ed on Model 676 serial Nu=ber 152, containing 25CCi of ecbalt-60. The radiation profile is included in Section 5 5 Extrapolation of this data to the capacity of 330 curies (Section 51) clearly indicates that the Model 676 confor=s to regulatcry radiation limits. As the hypothetical accident evaluation (Section 2 7) re-vealed no change in the shielding arrange =ent, it is concluded that shielding after the hypothetical accident is essentially unchanged. Therefore, the radiation profile indicates the package vill be within acceptable limits.

5-2 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979 1124 231

s

\\

55 AFFENDIX

- Model 676: Radiation Profile i

l l

P i

i 6

~

i

(

5-3 REVISION Q l l 2 4 2 3 2 SEP.1 11979

t t

i i

RADIATION HloFILE Model 676 Serial Number 152 Source Model Number A424-13 60 Serial Number 1537:

250 curies cobalt l

Lccation At Contact At 1 Meter

.i Top 110 13 I

i Right Side 145 1.8 l

Ecttc=

120 1.1 Left Side 35 0.8 i

Front 140 23 Back 14o 32 j

i 5

NOTES:

1.

All intensities are expressed in units of millircentgens per hour.

2.

Intensities expressed are the maximum intensities en the particular surface.

3 Neasurements were made with an AN/PRI - 27(J) Survey Meter.

t REVISION O CCP' 1 1 1979 5-4 1124 233

^

^

6.

Criticality Evaluation Not applicable.

1 i

i i

6-1 REVISION C 1124 234 see. i i m a

+

x 7

Operating Procedures 71 Procedures for Loadire the Package Radioactive source asse=blies for this package are fabricated by the General Electric Co., Pleasanton, CA, in accordance with Technical Operations, Inc. standard scarce encapsulation procedure which is enclosed in Section 7.4.

The procedure for loadin6 this source assembly into the package is also er'

' sed in Section 7.4.

7.2 Procedures for Unloading the Package The procedure for unloading the source asse=bly frc= the package is enclcsed in Section 7.4.

73 Preparation of an E=oty Package for Transport The procedure for preparing an empty package for *,ransport is enclosed in Section 7.4.

7-1 REVISION O SEP.1 1 1979 1174 235

i x

i T.4 AFFENDIX

- Encapsulation of Sealed Sources

- Technical Operations Model 676:

Procedures of Leading-Unloading the Fackage REVISION O 7~24 23h SEP.1 1 1973

I h RADIATION SAFETY PE UAL s Part II In Plant Operations Section 2 ENCAPSULATION OF. SM5' SOURCES A. Personnel Requirements Only an individual qualified as a Senior Radiological Technician shall perform the operations associated with the encapsulation of 192 Iridium. There must be a second qualified Radiological Technician available in the building when these operations are being perfor=ed. B. General Requirements ~ The 192 Iridium loadiug cell shall be used for the encapsulation of solid netallic 192 Iridium and the packaging of sealed sources such 60,3,13 as 170 Thulium, 137 esium and 169 g C Ytteraium. Solid metallic , not exceeding one curie may be handled in this cell also. The maximum amount of 192 Iridium to be handled in this cell at any one time shall not exceed 1000 curies. The maximum amount of 13'Cs to be handled in this cell at any one time shall not exceed 100 curies. This cell is designed to be operated at less than etmospheric pressure. The exhaust blower provided shall not be turned off except when the cell is in a decontaminated condition. Sources shall not be stored in this cell overnight or when cell is unattended. Unencapsulated =aterial shall be returned to the transfer centainers and encapsulated sources transferred to approved source centainers. '4 hen any of the "through-the-vall" tools such as the velding fixture or transfer pigs are removed, the openings are to be closed with the plugs provided. These tools shall be decentaminated whenever they are removed from the hot cell. s C. Preparatory Procedure 1. Check velding fixture, capsule drawer and manipulator fingers from cell and survey for contamination.' If contaminatica in excess of 0.001 A Ci of removable contamination is found, these items must be decontaminated. 2. If the velding fixture or the elec'.rodes have been changed, perform the encapsulation precedurt mitting the insertion of any activity. Examine this dummy capsule by sectioning thru veld.' '4 eld penetration must be not less than 0.020 inch. REVISION O II.2.1 . ))}4 ggp, j 1979 7-3

a d If weld is sound and penetration is at least 0.020 inch, the preparation of active capsules may proceed. If not, the condition responsible for an unacceptable veld =ust be corrected and the preparatory procedure repeated. 3 Check pressure differential across first absolute filter, as measured by the =anometer on the left side of the hot cell. This is about inch of water for a new filter. When this pressure differential rises to about 2 inches of water, the filter must be changed. D. Encapsulation Procedure 1. Prior to use, assemble and visually inspect the two capsule components to determine if veld zone exhibits uy misalign=ent and/or separation. Defective capsules shall be rejected. 2. Degrease capsule ecmponents in the Ultrasonic Bath, using isopropyl alcohol as degreasing agent, for a period of 10 0 minutes. Dry the capsule components at 100 C for a minimum of twenty minute ~s. 3 Insert capsule components into hot cell with the posting bar. 4. Place capsule in veld positioning device. 5 Move drawer of source transfer container into hot cen. 6. Place proper a=ount of activity in capsule. Disposable funnel =ust be used with pellets and a brass rivet with vafers to prevent contamination of veld zone. 7 Be=ove unused radioactive caterial from the hot cell by with-drawing the drawer of the source transfer container from the cell. 8. Recove funnel or rivet. 9 Assemble capsule ecmponents.

10. Weld adhering to the fonoving conditions:

a. Electrode spacing.021" to.024" centered on joint +.002"; use jig for this purpose. b. Preflow argon, flush 10 seconds c. Start l$ amps. d. Weld 15 a=ps. 6. Slope 15 a=ps. f. post f1cv 15 seconds REVISION O 4 ~ s.2.2 1124 238 se1nm

11. Visually inspect the ve3d. An acceptable veld cust be continuous without cratering, cracks or evidence of blev out. If the veld is defective, the capsule cust be cleaned and revelded to acceptable conditions or disposed of as radioactive vaste. x 12. Check the capsule in height gauge to be sure that the veld is at the center of the capsule. 13 Wipe exterior of capsule with flann 31 patch vetted with EI7fA solution or equivalent.

14. Count the patch with the scaler counting system. Patch must show no more than.005p Ci of contamination.

If the patch shows more than.005 Ci the capsule =ust be cleaned and reviped. Iftherevipepate$stillshowsmorethan0.005pCiofcontamina-tion, steps 8 through 11 cust be repeated. 15 Vacuum bubble test the capsule. Place t he velded capsule in a glass vial containing isopropyl alcohol. Apply a vacuum of 15 in Hy(Gauge). Any visual detection of bubbles vill indicate a leaking source. If the source is determined to be leaking, place the source in - dry vacuum vial and boil off the residual alechol. Eeveld the e atle. s lo. Transfer the cansule to ths svaging fixture. Insert the vire and connector asse=bly and svage. Hydraulic pressure should not be less than 125v nor role than 1500 Ocunds.

17. ; Apply the tensile test to assembly between the capsule and connector by applying proof load of 75 lbs.

Extension under the load shall not exceed 0.1 inch. If the extension exceeds 0.1 inch, the source must be disposed of as radioactive vaste.

18. Fosition the source in the exit port of hot cell. Withdraw all personnel.to the control area. Use re=ote control to insert source.in the ion chamber and position the source for

=aximum response. Eecord the meter reading. Compute the activity in curies and fill out a te=porary source tar;. 19 Using re=ote centrol, eject the source from cell into source changer through the tube gauze vipe test fixture. Monitor before reentering the hot cell areato be sure that the source is in the source changer. Remove the tube gauze and count with scaler counting system. This assay must show no more than 0.0C5 pCi. If contamination is in excess of this level, the source is leaking and shall be rejected. 20. Ccmplete a Source Loading Leg (Figure II.2.1) for the operation. ~ g; uv1sm SEP.1 1 1979

1 1 Technical Operations 3 Model 676 Proceduras for Loadirg - Unloading the Package Wear personnel =onitoring devices during all source changing procedures. Moni-tor all operations with a calibrated, operable survey meter. Note: All the precautions used when =aking radicgraphic exposures must be followed. 1. Survey the projector to ensure that the source is in the proper position. 2. Locate the projector and source changer in a restricted area. Lccate the devices so as to avoid sharp bends in the guide tube or control housing. The control cable housing bend radius should not be less than 36 inches (0 914m), and the guide tube bend radius should not be less than 20 I I inches (0 508c). 3 Set the scurce changer for operation. 4. Attach one end of a guide tube fitting to the fitting above the empty chamber in the source changer and the other end to the projecter. 5 Attach the control cable to the projector: a. Unlock the projector with the key provided and turn the connector selector ring frc= the LOCK position to the CONNECT position. When the ring is in the CCICECT position, the stcrage cover vill disengage from the projector. b. Slide the control cable collar back and open the java of the svi-vel connector, expcsing the tale portien of the connector. En-gage the male and fe= ale portions of the swivel connector by de-pressing the spring loaded lecking pin tcvard the projectcr with the thu=bnail. Release the locking pin and test that the ccnnec-l tion has been made, c. Close the jaws of the ccrtrol cable c< nnector over the swivel type g connector. d. Slide the centrol cable collar over the connector jaws. Hold the centrol cable collar flush against the projector connector and rotate the selectcr ring frem the CO CECT position to the CFEEATE position. 6. Crank the scurce into source changer. a. Survey this operation with a survey reter to be sure the scurce _1_ REVISION O i 7-6 seg. i i is73 11N 40 i

t has been transferred fran projector to changer. b. With a survey =eter verify radiation level does not exceed 200 mR/hr at the surface of the changer. 7 Disconnect the control cable fran the source assembly. Disconnect the guide tube from the source changer. Secure the source in the source changer. 8. I? THE UROJECTOR T6 TO REMAI'i E*1PTY

• a.

Fully retract the control cable. Disengage the control cable frcm the projector and 1cck the projector. b. Attach the identification plate of the source to the source changer. c. Affix a green " empty" tag to projector, d. Perform,a vipe test of the projector to assure that the radiation observed is less than 0.001 microcuries per 100 square centimeters. e. Survey the projector to assure that the radiation levels do not exceed 200mR/hr at the surface nor 10mR/hr at three feet frem the surface. f. Mark the projector: Padioactive "LSA". Affix the proper ship-ping labels to the package. g. Complete the proper shipping papers as specified in Tech / Ops Radi-ation Safety Manual II.6.3E(4), (5), (6). 9 IF THE FROJECTOR IS TO EE RELOAI:ED: connect the source changer end of the guide tube to the fitting above the new source in the source changer. 10. Crank source to full retraction within the projecter, a. Survey this operation with a survey meter to be sure the scurce has been transferred into the projector. b. With a survey meter verify radiation level dces not exceed 200tr/hr at the surface of the projecter. s 11. Disconnect the control cable and lock the projectcr. 12. Disconnect the source guide tube frem the projector and scurce changer. 13 Affix the identification plate of the new source to the projector and attach the identification plate of the old source to the scurce cha nger, lh. tpare for shiptent: 1. a. Again survey projector to insure that the radiation level does not REVISION O ~I ))24 24} SEP. I 1 1979

i 3 exceed 200mr/hr at the surface of the projee, tor. b. Survey the radiation level at a distance of three feet from the surface of the projector. This radiation level should not exceed 10=r/hr. The highest radiation level measured at three feet from the container is used to determine the Transport Ir.dex in accor-dance with h9CFRlT3 389(h). c. Affix the proper shipping labels. 1 i I REVISION O ' 2 1124 ,4,> 7-8 sgp. : 1 1979

I i 8. Acceptance Tests and Maintenance Prcgram 8.1 Acceptance Tests 8.1.1 Visual Inspection The package is visually examined to assure that the appropriate fasteners are seal wired properly and that the package is properly marked. The seal veld of the radioactive source capsule.s visually inspected for proper closure. 8.1.2 Structural and Pressure Tests The svage coupling between the source capsule and cable is subjected to a static tensile test with a lead of seventy-five pcunds. Failure of this test vill prevent the source see=bly frcm being used. 8.1 3 Leak Tests The radioactive source capsule (the primary containment) is vipe tested for leakage of radicactive contamination. The source capsule is subjected to a vacuum bubble leak test. The capsule is then subjected to a second wipe test for leakage of radicactive contamination. These tests are described in Section 7.h. Failure of any of these tests will prevent use of this scurce assembly. 8.1.4 Component Tests The lock asse=bly of the package is tested to assure that security cf the scurce vill be maintained. Failure of this test will prevent use of the package until the lock assembly is ccrrected and retested. 8.15 Tests for Shielding Integrity The radiation levels at the surface cf the package and at three feet frcm the surface are measured using a small dete,cter survey inctrument (i.e. AN/PER-27). These radiation levels, when extrapolated to the rated capacity cf the package, must not exceed 200 millircentgens per hcur at the surface nor ten millircentgens per hour at three feet frcm the surface of the package. Failure of this test will prevent use of the package. 8.1.6 Thermal Acceptance Tests Not applicable. 8-1 REVISION O 1124 243 SEP.1 1 1973

j I. 8.2 Maintenance Program 1 8.2.1 Structural and Pressure Tests Not applicable. 8.2.2 Leak Tests As described in Section 8.13, the radicactive scurce assembly is leak tested at manufacture. Additionally, the source assembly is wipe tested for leakage of radioactive contamination every six =onths. 8.2 3 Subsystem Maintenance The lock assembly is tested as described in Section 8.1.h, prior to each use of the package. Additionally, the package is inspected for tightness of fasteners, proper seal wires and general condition prior to each use. 8.2.h Valves, Rupture Discs and Gaskets Not applicable. 8.2 5 Shielding Prior to each use, a radiation survey of the package is =ade to assure that the radiation levels to do not excees 200 nit.liroentSens per nour at tne surface nor ten millircentgens per hour at three feet frcm the surface. 6.2.e Ther=a1 Not applicable. 8.2.7 Miscellaneous Inspecticns and tests designed for secondary users cf this package under the general license provisions of 10CFRT1.y(b) are included in Section T.4. ,...~c J 8-2 BEVISION O 1124 244 SEP ' ' '578 .. - -}}