ML19250C148
| ML19250C148 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1979 |
| From: | Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19250C147 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911080345 | |
| Download: ML19250C148 (83) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ e 4, 3 -t D
- n. E FC ~ 'I.. > ~. <
October 26, 1979 'rojan Nuclear Plant Locket 50-344 License NPF-1 License Change Application 49 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20535
Dear Sir:
This letter responds to your Request for Information dated February 7, 1979 in connection uth the review of License Change Application 49 for applying the Westinghouse Improved Thermal Design Procedure to the Trojan Nuclear Plant. The material provided in this response is propri-etary to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation and supporting documents are enclosed to justify the proprietary nature of the material. The questions addressed in this response have been previously addressed in connection with the D. C. Cook 2 application. The Trojan respcases are essentially the same as those provided for Cook, except where plant differences dictated otherwise. Specific differences in the plan.s include the use of the plant computer in parameter surveillance (Cook) versus the use of the control board indicators (Trojan). The signal isolators and process cabinet instrumentation at Trojan are those found in the Hagan (Westinghouse-7100) Process Equipment, while the similar equipment at D. C. Cook 2 is the Foxboro H-Line Equipment. There are procedural differences in the methods by which Trojan and Cook personnel perform secondary calorimetric measurements. The appendices and the response to Question 2 ara plant-specific, since they are br,ed on actual plant calibration data. Enclosed with this letter are the following items: 1. 25 copies of Additional Information Required for Trojan to Justify Use of Improved Thermal Design Procedure s (proprietary). I 1275 006 P 99ll010 3 WO
Per-Jcrd Gecem! Ecdc CctrpEr?/ Mr. A. Schwencer Oct >ber 26, 1979 Pat 2 2. 40 copies of Additional Information Required for Trojan to Justify Use of Improved Thermal Design Procedure (nonproprie:ary). 3. 40 copies of revised pages to our original submittal that correct unintended errors. 4. I copy of Application for Withholding, CAW-79-23 (non-proprietary). 5. 1 copy of original Af fidavit (nonproprietary). As this submittal contains information proprietary to the Westinghouse riectric Corporation, it is supported by previously submitted affidavits signed by Westinghouse, the owner of the information. The affidavits set forth the basis on which the information may be withheld from public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the considera-tions listed in Paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. Accordingly, it is respectfully requested that the informa-tion which is proprietary to Westinghouse be withheld from public disclo-sure in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. Correspondence with respect to the proprictary aspects of this applica-tion for withholding or the supporting Westinghouse affidavit sho'ild reference CAW-79-23 and should be addressed to: R. A. Wiesemann, Manager Regulatory and Legislative Affairs Westinghouse Electric Corporation P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, PA 15230 Very truly yours, Y . w)4 ,/~ s e-C. Goodwin, Jr. Assistant Vice ? resident Thermal Plant Operation and Maintenance CG/CJP/4 sala 20 Enclosures c: Mr. Lynn Frank, Director w/ encl 1275 007 State of Oregon Department of Energy
Westinghouse WaterReactor w kn=lon omsca Electric Corporation Divisions ac 355 Pmsturgh Pemsylvarta 15230 June 26,1979 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director CAW-79-23 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation D. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SUBJECT:
Additional Information Required for hojan to Justify Use of Improved Thermal Design Procedure REF: Portland General Electric Company Letter, Goodwin to Denton, dated July 1979
Dear Mr. Denton:
The proprietary material being transmitted by the referenced letter supple-ments the proprietary material previously submitted concerning the Westing-house Improved Thermal Design Procedure. Further, the affidavit submitted to justify the previous material, AW-76-60, was approved by the Commission on April 17, 1978, and is equally applicable to the subject material. Accordingly, this letter authorizes the utilization of the previously fur-nished affidavit in support of the Improved Thermal Design Procedure. A copy of the non-proprietary affidavit.. AW-76-60, dated December 1,1976, is attached. Correspondence with respect to the proprietary aspects of the application fcr withholviing, or the Westinghouse affidavit, should reference CAW-79-23, and should in addressed to the undersigned. Very truly yours, ll4&nd /bek Robert A. Wiesemann, Manager Attachment Regulatory & Legislative Affairs cc: J. A. Cooke, Esq. Office of the Executive Legal Director, NRC 1275 008 .e
Ws::tinghouse Electric Corporation Power Systems Bns Fats:fcnPr.4W3105 December 1,1976 AW-75-60 Mr. John F. Stolz, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No.. Division of Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20014 APPLICATION FOR WITHHOLDIG PROFRIETARY INFORMATION i 1 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
SUBJECT:
Information relating to NRC review of WCAP-8567-P and WCAP-8568 entitled, " improved Thermal Design Precedure," defining the sensitivity of DNB ratio to various core par-ameters. REF: Westinghouse Letter No. NS-CE-1298 Eicheidinger to Stolz dated December 1, 1976.
Dear Mr. Stolz:
This application for withholding is submitted by Westinghouse E,ectric Corporation (" Westinghouse") pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (bj(1) of Section 2.790 of the Cnnmission's regulations. Wi thholding from public disclosure is requested with respect to the subject infor-mation which is further identified in the affidavit accompanying this application. The undersigned has reviewed the information sought to be withheld and is authorized to apply for its withhoiding on behalf of Westinghouse, WRD, notification of which was sent to the Secretary of the Commission on April 19, 1976. The affidavit accompanying this application sets forth the basis on which the information may be withheld frcm public disclosure by the Commission and addresses with specificity the censideratins listed in paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations. Accordingly it is respectfully requested that the suoject information which is proprietary to Westinghouse and which is further identified in the affidavit be withheld from public disclosure in accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.790 of the Cor. mission's regulations. 1275 009
December 1,1976 Mr. John F. Stolz AN-76-60 Correspondence with raspect to this application for withholding or the accompanying affidavit should reference AW-76-60 and should be addressed to the unders;9iled. Very truly yours, Lt) fAUNJAA' Robert A. Wiesemann, Manager Licensing Programs /sch Enclosure cc: J. A. Cooke, Esq. Office of the Executive Legal Director, NRC 1275 010 O
~ ". AW-76-60 AFFIDAVIT. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: ss COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY: Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Robert A. Wiesemann, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, de-poses and says that he is authorized to execute this Affidavit on behalf of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (" Westinghouse") and that the aver-ments of fact set forth in this Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. fb<4 E& MLLL% Robert A. Wicsemann, Manager Licensing Programs Sworn to and subscribed before,me this /____ day ~ ~ of.l$sadtd 1976. bOk. h M4r fs / Notary Public, 1275 011 O
. AW-76-60 (1) I am Manager, Licensing Programs, in the Pressurized Water Reactor Systems Division, of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and as such, I have been specifically delegated the function of reviewing the proprietary information sought to be withheid frcm public dis-closure in connection with nuclear power plant licensing or rule-making proceedings, and am authorized to apply for its withholding on behalf of lestinghouse Water Reactor Divisions. (2) I am making this Affidavit in conformance with the provisions of 10 CFR Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations and in con-junction with the Westinghouse application for withholding ac-companying this Affidavit. (3) I have personal knowledge of the criteria and procedures utilized by Westinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems in designating information as a trade secret, privilag2a or as confidential commercial or financial information. (4) Putsuant to the provisions of paragraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, the following is furnished for consideration by the Commission in determining whether the in-formation sought to be withheld from public disclosure should be withheld. (i) The informatien sought to be withheld from public disclosure is owned and has been held in confidence by Westinghouse. 1275 012
. AH-76-60 (ii) The information is of a type customarily held in confidence by Westinghouse and not custenarily disclosed to the piolic. Westingaouse has a rational basis for determining the types of information customarily held in confidence by it ar.d. in that connection, utilizes a system to determir.e when and whether to hold certain types of information in confidence. The ap-plication of that system and the substance of that system constitutes Westinghouse policy and provides the rational basis required. Under that system, information is held in confidence if it falls in one or more of several +vpes', the release of which might result in the loss of an existing or potential com-petitive advantage, as follows: (a) The information reveals the distinguishing aspects of a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.) where prevention of its use by any of Westinghouse's competitors without license from Westinghouse constitutes a competitive economic advantage over other companies. (b) It consists of supporting data, including test data, relative to a process (or component, structure, tool, method, etc.), the application of which data secures a competitive economic advantage, e.g., by optimization or improved marketability. 1275 Ol3
. AW-76-60 (c) Its use by a competitor would reduce his expenditure of resources or improve his competitive position in the design, manufacture, shipment, installation, assurance of qua~iity, or licensing a similar product. (d) It reveals cost or price information, production cap-acities, budget levels, or commerciai strategies of Westinghouse, its customers or suppliers. (e) It reveals aspects of past, present, or future Wes t-inghouse or customer funded development plans and pro-grams of potential commercial value to Westinghouse. (f) It contains patentable ideas, for which patent pro-tection may be desirable. (g) It is not the property of Westinghouse, but must be treated as proprietary by Westinghouse according to agreements with the owner. There are sound policy reasons behind the Westinghouse system which include the following: (a) The use of such information by Westinghouse gives Westinghouse a competitive advantage over its ccm-petitors. It is, therefore, withheld from disclosure to protect the Westinghouse competitive posit on. 1275 014 O
. AW-76-60 (b) It is information which is marketable in many ways. The extent to which such information is available to competitors diminishes the Westinghouse ability to sell products and services involving the use of the infontation. (c) Use by our competitor would put Westinghouse at a competitive disadvantage by reducing his expenditure of resources at our expense. (d) Each component of proprietary information pertinent to a particular competitive advantage is potentially as valuable as the totai competitive advantage. If com.petitors acquire components of proprietary infor-mation, an, one component may be the key to the entire puzzle, thereby depriving Westinghouse of a competitive advantage. (e) Unrestricted disclosure would jeopardize the position of prominence of Westinghouse in the world market, and thereby give a market advantage to the competition in those countries. (f) The Westinghouse capacity to invest corporate assets in research and development depends upon the success in obtaining and maintaining a competitive advantage. I275 015
~. 6-AW-76-60 (iii) The information is being transmitted to the Commission in confidence and, under the provisions of 13 CFR Section 2.790, it is to be received in confidence by the Commis3 ion. (iv) The information is not available in public sources to the best of our knowledge and belief. (v) The proprietary information sought to be withheld in this sub-mittal is that which is appropriately marked in the attach-ment to We5tinghouse letter number NS-CE-1298, Eicheldinger to Stolt, dated December 1,1976, concerning information relating to NRC review of WCAP-C567-P and WCAP-8568 entitled, " Improved Thermal Design Procedure," definin; the sensitivity of DUB ratia to various core parameters. The letter and attachment are being submitted in response to the NRC request at the October 29, 1976 NRC/ Westinghouse meetu.; This information enables Westingnouse to: (a) Justify the Westinghouse design. (b) Assist its customers to obtain licenses. (c) Meet warranties. (d) Provide greater operational flexibility to customers assuring them of safe and reliable operation. (e) Justify increased power capability or operating margin for plants while assuring safe and reliable operation. 1275 016 e v.w.
.. ~ - bd-76-C3 (f) Optimize reactor design and performance while maintaining a high level of fuel integrity. Further, the information gained frcm the improved thermal design procedure is of significant commercial value as follows: (a) Westinghouse uses the information to perform and justify analyses which are sold to customers. (b) Westinghouse sells analysis services based upon the experience gained and the methods ceveloped. Public disclosure of this information concerning design pro-cedures is likel; to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of Westinghouse because competitors could utilize this information to assess and justify their own designs without commensurato expense. The parametric analyses performed and their. evaluation represent a considerable amount of highly qualified development effort. This work was contingent upon a design method development pro-gram which has been underway during the past two years. Altogether, a substantial amount of money and effort has been expended by Westinghouse which could only be duplicated by a competitor if he were to invest similar sums of money and pro-vided he had the appropriate talent available. Further the deponent sayeth not. ?N 0ll w -
1 IEA 49 Page 7 of 97 TABLE A.1 REACTOR DESIGN COMPARISON TABLE Cycle 2 Cycle 1 Thermal and Hydraulic l!rsign Parameters Trojan Trojan FSAR Ruactor Core Heat Output, MWt 1.11 3411 0 Reactor Core Heat Output, 10 BTU /hr 11,641.7 11,641.7 Heat Generated in Fuel, % 97.4 97.4 Core Pressure, Nominal, psia 2,280[h] 2,250 Core Pressure, Minimum Steady-State, psia 2,250[h] 2,220 Minimum DNPR at Nominal Condition Typical Flow Channel 2.67[a] 2.04 Thimble (Cold Wall) Flow Channel 2.42[a] 1.71 Design DNBR for Design Transients IDI _1.30 Typical Flow Channci >1.73 Thimble Flow Channel >1.71[b] >1.30 DNBR Correlation WRB-1 "R" (W-3 with modified spacer fat -) Coolant Flow Total Thermal Flow Rate, 106 lb /hr 139.0 132.7 m Effective Flow Rate for Heat Transfer, 106 lb /hr 135.2 126.7 m Effective Flow Area for Heat 2 Transfer, ft 51.1 51.1 Average Velocity Along Fuel Rods, ft/sec 16.6 15.7 6 2 2.65 2.48 Avera.ge Mass Velocity,10, lb /hr-f t m Coolant Temperature Nominal Inlet, *F 554.0 552.5 Average Rise in Vessel, 'F 61.5 64.2 Revised 10/26/79 1275 018
LCA 49 Page 9 of 97 TABLE A.1 [a] Based on Improved Thermal Design Procedure, Reference 2. [b] Including 20.2 percent margin. [c] This limit is associated with the value of Fq = 2.50. [d] See Section 4.3.2.2.6 of Reference 1. [e] See Section 4.4.2.2.6 of Reference 1. [f] Based on Best Ertimate Flow. [g] Based on 7 grida and conservatively estimated grid loss coefficients. [h] Pressure at core outlet used in Improved Thermal Design Procedure is 30 psi higher than pressurizer pressure. 1275 019 Revised 10/26/79
LCA 49 Page 89 of 97 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS DNB PARAMETERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.5 The following DNB related parameters shall be maintained within the limits shown on Table 3.2-1: Reactor Coolant Systen T,yg. a. b. Pressu.12 .-ressurt APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 ACTION: With any of the above parameters exceeding T.s limit, restore the param-eter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.2.5.1 Each of the parameters of Table 3.2-1 shall be verified to be within their limits at least once per 12 hours. 1275 020 TROJAN-UNIT 1 3/4 2-12 Revised 10/26/79 C-16
E TABLE 3.2-1 DNB PARAMETERS &5 H LIMITS 4 Loops In 3 Loops in PARAMETER Operation Operation Reactor Coolant System T 1 589*F 1 580.4*F avg Pressurizer Pressure > 2220 psia * > 2220 psia
- R
? C7 C N N tn
- Limit not applicable during either a THERMAL POWER ramp increase in excess of 5% RATED THERMAL POWER g
per minute or a THERMAL POWER step 11. rease in excess of 10% RATED THERMAL POWER. a g C E mr 29 -R a. U 8* O w m N
i ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR TROJAN TO JUSTIFY USE OF "IMPP.0VED. THERMAL DESIGN PROCEDURE" QUESTION Provide a block diagram depicting sensor, process equipment, computer and readout devices for each parameter channel used in the uncertainty analysis. Within each element of the block diagram, identify the accuracy, drif t, range, span, operating limits and setpoints. Identify the overall accuracy of each channel transmitter to final output and specify the e.inimum acceptable accuracy for use with the new procedure. Also identify the overall accuracy of the final output value and maximum, accuracy requirements for each input channel fo this final output device.
RESPONSE
I. INTRODUCTION The following figures and tables present the information requested above for pressurizer pressure, primary temperature, power and primary flow. Figures 1, 2, 3 and 7 present the block diagrams for the instrumentation channels required to measure the above parameters from the sensor to the readout device. The accuracy, drift, range, and span are specified on these block diagrams. There are not operating limits or setpoints because there are not alarms required for the survaillance of the above parameters. Figures 4 through 6 present the Protection Systea Process Control Block Diagrams for those pro-tection channels which are used to make measurements of the above parameters. The accuracy components listed in Figures 1, 2, ? and 7 are combined as shown in Tables 1 through 4 into the overall measurement accuracy. Figures 8 and 9 present flow charts which indicate how the different raw measurements involved in calculating power and primary flow are combined to give the final result. A full discussion of the above considerations is presented below for each of the above four parameters used in the uncertainty analysis. The components of accuracy are combined in Tables 1 through 4 using the statis-tical methodology presented in WCAP-8567. The error for each component is listed 1275 022 e
c' \\ in terms of its range R; the deviation from the desired value would be +R/2 These errors represent uniform distributions with a variance in percent of span. The variances of independent error components are summed to give 2 of R /12. The tables also show the total variance of the resulting normal distribution. the standard deviation of the actual accuracy allowance used in the Trojan application for each of the four parameters. II. W SSURIZER PRESSURE ~ nm Trojan Nuclear Plant Standard Technical Specifications (STS) require pres- .cirizer pressurc to be verified within the limits assumed in the safety analysis This verification is performed by plant personnel by every twelve hours. observing the main control board indication of pressure derived from the protection channel for pressurizer pressure, which is shown in Figure 4. There are four pressure channels as shown in the figure which are used to provide actuation logic for reactor trip and safety injection. The operator performs a channel check to verify pressure. The portion of the channel used for the periodic verification of pressurizer pressure is circled and is equivalent The test jack is an input point for test signals used during to Figure 1. The transmitter channel calibration and does not affect channel accuracy. is located inside containment with sensing lines connected to the upper portion The remainder of the channel is contained in the process of the pressurizer. protection set cabinets, except for the connection to the main control board ~ after the isolator. As shown in Figure 1, the transmitter model is Barton Model 393 pressure The isolator and all other process cabinet instrumentation are those found cell. in the Hagan (W 7100) Process Equipment. The basis for the calibration error for the transmitter and isolator is provided in Appendix A which contains the Trojan calibration data for this equipment. An allowance has been made for ambient temperature changes at the transmitter location after the transmitter has been calibrated. Typical specifications for transmitters show ambient temperature effect of [ ]*a,b c percent per !275 023 r
4, 100*F change. The worst effect noted for Barton transmitters supplied for safety related functions is a [ ]*a,b.c percent error on Zero and span for a 50*F-100*F change. Based on thase figures [ ]*a,b,c percent of output span has been established as a reasonable error allowance for temperature effects on all Barton transmitters. The basis for the drift allowance:. is shown in Appendix A and in the response to Question 2. -Table 1 shows how all the error components for pressurizer pressure (in percent of span) are combined to give the totsi measurement error. -The calibration and drift allowances for the sensor and the isolator are added to give [ ]*a,b,c percent since these two allowances can be dependent effects when they are checked. The range R is twice this total, or [ ]*a,b,c percent of span. The temperature effect component for the sensor and the other effects are mutually independent and are thus convolved statistically. The error allowances in 2 Table 1 are the same allowances specified in Figure 1. The total variance a is the sum of t!.e variances of each independent error component. The standard deviation e of the total pressure uncertainty actually used in the Trojan application is also shown in Table 1. This standard deviation is based c,n the total uncertainty of +30 psi which was treated as a uniform distribution in WCAP-8567. Thus, there is considerable margin between the estimated and assumed standard deviations of the pressurizer pressure measurement error. The standard deviation is the correct basis for c..mparison between estimated and assumed valt.es since it is the value used in the Improved Thermal Design Procedure. III. PRIMARY AVERAGE TEMPERATURE 4e Trojan Nuclear Plant STS require Tavg to be verified within the limits assumed in the safety analysis every twelve hours. This verification is per-fomed by plant personnel by observing the main control board indication of Tavg derived from the protection channel for AT and Tavg, which is shown in Figure 5. There are four Tavg channels, one of wMch is shown in the figure, which are used to provide actuation logic for reactor trip on Overtemperature 1 1275 024
t' and Overpower AT, safety injection actuation, and feedwater isolation. The other three channels are identical to the one shown in Figure 5. The operator performs a channel check to verify Tavg. The portion of the channel used for periodic verificatien of Tavg is circled and is equivalent to Figure 2. The test juck is an input point for test signals used during channel calibration and does not affect channel accuracy. The RTD is located inside containment in the RTO bypass manifold for each loop. The remainder of the channel is contained in the process protection set cabinets. As'shown in Figure 2, the primary element is a [ ].*a,bg The converters, sumer, isolator and all other process cabinet instrumentation are those found in the Hagan (W 7100) Process Equipment. The basis for the calibra+ ion error for the RTD, converters, summer, and isolator is provided in Appe. dix A which contains the Trojan calibration data for this equipment. No allowance has been made for ambient temperature changes at the RTD location or drift since RTDs do not exhibit these effects. The basis for the other drift allowances is shown in Appendix A and in the response to Question 2. Table 2 shows how all the error components for T are combined to give the ayg total measurement error. The errors are given in *F which is equivalent to percent of span since the T,yg span is 100*F. In Figure 2 the R/I converter has a calibraticn accuracy of [ ]*a,b,c percent of T and T span (120'F) hot cold which is [ ]*a,b,c The sum of the T and Tcold calibration errors times ]*a,b,ogout of a span of 100*F. The cali-the sumer gain of 0.6 is [ bration accuracy of the remainder of the channel (the isolator) is [_ ]*a,b,c, The total rack calibration accuracy is [ ]*a,b,c,which is listed in Table 2. The calibration and drift allowances for the sensor andtherackareaddedtogive[ ]*a,b,c and'[ ]*a,b,c, respectively, The since these two a'lowances can be dependent effects when they are checked. range R is twice this total, or [ ]*a,b,c and [ ]*a,b,c, respectively. The error allowances in Table 2 are the same allowances specified in Figure 2, 1275 025
e .s. except for the process measurement error. The process measurement error of [ ]*a,b c in T,yg is a conservative allownace for the effect of flow streaming in the reactor coolant hot leg, as discussed in Section V of this 2 response. The tetal variance e is the sum of the variances of each indepen-dent error component. The standard deviation of the total T uncertainty avg actually used in the Trojan application is also shown in Table 2. This standard deviation is based on the total uncertainty of +4 F which was treated as a uniform distribution in WCAP-8567. Thus, there is considerable margin between the estimated and essumed standard deviation of the Tgyg measurement error. The standard deviation is tne correct basis for comparison between estimated and assumed values since it is the value used in the Improved Thermal Design Procedure. IV. CORE POWER The Trojan Nuclear Plant STS require core themal power to be verified within the licensed power level every 24 hours. Plant personnel perform this veri-fication by conducting a secondary side calorimetric power measurement, which is described below. Core power operating percentage is detemined by summing the thermal output of each steam generator, correcting the total secondary power for steam generator blowdown and dividing by the rated BTU /hr at full power. Since the primary and secondary heat rates are in equilibrium the percentage secondary rated power and percentage core power are considered equal. The equation for detemining core power is as follows: RP I Qsg x 100 = 11682.6 where: corepower(%) RP = steam generator themal output (Btu /hr) Qsg = 1275 026
e , The thermal output of the steam generator is deterinined by a calorimetric measurement defined by the following equation: (hs-h)Wf Osg = f steam enthalpy (Btu /hr) where hs = teedwater enthalpy (Btu /hr) hf = feedwater flow (1b/hr) Wf = The steam enthalpy (h ) is based on the measurement of steam gcnerator outlet s steam pressure, assuming saturated conditions. The feedwater enthalpy (h ) f is based on the measurement of feedwater temperature and an assumed feedwater pressure bLsed on steam generator pressure plus 100 psi. The feedwater flow (W ) is determined by several measurements and a calculation based on the f following equation: Wf KxF X p f op = a feedwater venturi flow factor where K = feedwater venturi correction for themal expansion Fa = feedwater density (1b/cu.ft.) = of feedwater venturi pressure drop (inches H O) 2 ap = The feedwater venturi flow factor (K) is the product of a number of constants including as-built dimensions of the venturi, and calibration tests performed by the vendor. The thermal expansion correction (F ) is based on the a coefficient of expansion of the venturi material and the difference between feedwater temperature and calibration temperature. Feedwater density (pf) is based on the measurement of feedwater temperature and feedwater pressure (average steam pressure + 100 psi). The venturi pressure drop (Ap) is obtained from the output of a differential pressure cell, a Barton 0-500 in. do gauge : 1*a,b,c (FI 511AX, FI 520BX. FI 530CX, FI 540nx), The local feedflow differential pressure indicators have higher accuracy than the control room indicators. 1275 027
i
- The care power measurement, therefore, is based on measurements from the following plant instruments:
Steam pressure (Ps) Feedwater temperature (T ) f Feedwater venturi dit. 'rential pressure (aP) and on the following calculated values: Feedsater venturi flow factors (K)
- Feedwater venturi thermal expansion correction (Fa)
Feedwater density (of) Feedwater enthalpy (h ) f Steam enthalpy (hs) Static fluid measuring head in flow differential pressure gauge Blowdown heat load (Qg) Design heat load Btu /hr for core at 3411 MWt plus the net heat load contri-bution from Reactor Coolant Pumps after suttracting nominal expected 6 Btu /hr). heat losses: (11682.6 x 10 These measurements and calculations are presented schematically on Figure 8. The instrumentation used to perform the above measurements is shown in Figures 1, 3 and 7 and is discussed below. Steam pressee is derived from the protection channels shown in Figure 6. The figure shows the instrumentation for loops 3 and 4. Steam line pressure is also used for safety injection actuation. The portion of the feedwater flow channel used for the calorimetric measurement is circled in Figure 6 The and is equivalent to Figure 3 which includes the venturi element. manually read Barton DP cell is the feedwater venturi differential pressure (Ap). The pertion of the steam pressure channel used for the calorimetric measurement is circled in Figure 6 and is equivalent to Figure 1. For pro-tection channels the test jacks are an input point for test signals used The feedwater during channel calibration and do not affect channel accuracy. 1275 028 O
i, 8 Ap gauges are located near the' venturi in each loop with sensing lines connecting them with the venturis. The steam pressure transmitters are located near the main steam isolation valve in each loop with sensing lines connecting them with the main steam lines. The remainder of the steam pres.iure channels are contained in the process protection set cabinets. As shown in Figures 1 and 3, the feedflow g3uge is a Barton[ ] a.L,e nd the transmitter model for steam pressure is a [ ] a,b,c. The isolator and all other process cabinet instrumentation are those found in the Hagan The basis for the calibration error for the (W_7100) Process Equipment. gayges, transmitters, isolators, and the feedwater venturi is provided in Appendices A and B which contain the Trojan calibration data and portions of the venturi calibration manual for this equipment. An allowance has been made for feed flow and steam pressure for ambient temperature changes at the gauge or transmitter location after calibration. Typical specifications for transmitters show ambient temperature effects of [ ]*a,b,c percent per 100*F change. The worst effect noted for Barton transmitters supplied for safety related functions is less than a [ ]a,b,c Based on these percent error on zero and span for a 50-100*F change. figures a [ ]*a,b,c percent of output span has been established as a reasonable error allowance for temperature effects on all Barton transmitters. Barton gauges are less susceptible to ambient temperature chang ~ [ ]peIcentofoutputspanhasbeenallowed. The basis for the drift allowances is shown in Appendix A and in the response to Question 2. Feedwater pressure is derived by adding 100 psi to the average steam pressure measurement. The feedwater Feedwater temperature is not a part of the protection system. temperature sensor shown in Figure 8 is located in the common header of the The feedwater main feedwater lines prior to the division into four S/G lines. temperature sensor is a Rosemount 104AGp 100 ohm platinum RTD with a stated accuracy of + 1.6*F at normal operating temperature of 440*F. 1275 029
.g. As shown in Figure 7 the sensor model for feedwater temperature is a Rosemount 104 AGP RTD. The computer readout accuracy bounds any possible errors due to analog-to-digital (A to D) convertors which would be the largest component of the total computer error. Table 3 shows how all tha error components of the calgrimetric power measurement are combined to give the total error. In Item 1 of Table 3 the Range R is given in percent of loop power. As in previous sections, the Range R is twice the plus or minus error value. The manner in which the error for each parameter in'the table is translated into its effect on power is discussed below. Unless otherwise noted, all input parameter errors are in percent of span. Each of the feedwater venturis is calibrated by the vendor in a hydraulics laboratory under controlled conditions to an accuracy of [ ]*a,b,c percent of span. The calibration data which substantiates this accuracy for the four venturis at Trojan is provided in' Appendix B. An additional uncer-tainty factor of [ ]*a,b c percent is allowed for installation effects resulting in an overall flow factor uncertainty of [ ]*a,b,c percent. Since steam generator thermal cutput is proportional to feedwater flow, the flow factor uncertainty is expressed as [ ]*a,b,c percent power. The uncertainty applied to the feedwater venturi thermal expansion correction is based on the uncertainties of the measured feedwater temperature and the coefficient of thermal expansion of the venturi material, 304 stainless steel in this case. A[ ]*a,b,c.Funcertaintyonfeedwatertemperatureintroduces an uncertainty of [ l*a,b,c percent in the correction factor or in steam generator thermal output. Based on data to be introduced into the ASME code, the acertainty for the coefficient of thermal expansion of 304 stainless steel is [ ]*a,b,c percent, which, when applied to the venturi correction factor, introduces an uncertainty of [ ]*a,b c percent of steam generator thermal output. A convolution of these two effects results in an overall uncertainty of [ ]*a,b,c percent of themal output. Based on the ASME Steam Tables, the combined effect of a feedwater temperature uncertainty of [ ]*a,b,c.F and a pressure uncertainty of [ ]*a,b,c psi introduces a (square root of) feedwater density uncertainty equivalent to [ ]*a,b,c parcent of steam generator thermal output. 1275 030
. The calibration and drift allowances for the dp cell for feedwater flow are added to give [ ]*a,b,c percent since these two allowances can be dependent effects when they are checked. The factor of.596 is used to transform the error in percent of op span for the sensor into percent of feedwater flow (loop power) at 100% of nominal feedwater flow. The expression for deriving this factor is 17 ( span of feedwater flow transmitter in cercent of nominal flow)2 100 Based on the ASME Steam Tables, the combined effect of a feedwater temperature uncertaintyof[ ]*a,b,c*Fandapressureuncertaintyof[ ]*a,b,c psi introduces a feedwater enthalpy uncertainty equivalent to [ ]*a,b c percent of thermal output. For steam enthalpy, the calibration and drift allowances for the sensor and the isolator for steam pressure are added to give [ ]*a,b,c percent since these two allowances can be dependent effects when they are checked. Since the change in steam enthalpy with pressure is str. ail, the effect on thermal output is minimal. Based on the ASME Steam Tables, the steam pressure uncertainties intro-duce a steam enthalpy uncertainty equivalertt to + 0.046 percent of steam generator thermal output per percent uncertainty in steam pressure. This factor applied to the steam pressure uncertainties yields the R values listed in Table 3. The steam generator themal output calculation ine 'es the assumption that the steam is saturated which is the most conservative assumption related to maxi-mizing themal output. The small measured (<.10%) moisture carryover is insignificant. 2 The total loop variance o is obtained by summing the variances of all the error components in tems of loop power. Within each loop these components are independent effects since they are independent measurements. Since 1275 031
feedwater temperature is measured in the common header, the uncertainty is common to all loops. The main effect of the temperature uncertainty is on feedwater enthalpy, eFE. This term has been left out of total loop = variance, and added in separately to the plant total variance. 2 evaluated on a The plant total variance is N times the total loop variance c per plant basis, or o. This assumes that all loops are independent of each 2 r other. All the measurements are independent from one loop to another since separate instrumentation is provided for each loop except feedwater temperature as discussed above. The only other effect which tends to be dapendent, affecting, all loops, would be the accumulation of crud en the feedwater venturis, which can affect the ap for a specified flow. Although it is conceivable that the crud accumulation could affect the static pressure distribution at the venturi throat pressure tap in a manner that would result in a higher flow for a spec-ified ap, the reduction in throat area resulting in a lower flow at the speci-fied ap is apparently the stronger effect. All reported cases of venturi fouling have been associated with a significant loss in electrical output, indicating that the actual thermal power has been below the measured power rather than above it. Losses in net power generation which have been correlated with venturi fouling have occurred in about half of the more than 20 Westinghouse pressurized water reactors operating in the United States. These power losses have been generally in the range of two to three percent. Power losses have also occurred in at least three, and possibly five plants out of the more than ten Westinghouse plants operating abroad. In no case has venturi fouling been reported which resulted in a non-conservative feedwater flow measurement. Because the venturi crud fomations have resulted in a conservative, reduced power condition, no uncertainty has been included in the analysis of power measurement error for this phenomenon. Trojan has experienced flow element fouling in the 2 to 3% range during cycle 1.as shown in Appendix C. The net pump heat input assumed in the full power heat load number of 6 6 11682.6 x 10 Btu /hr is 40.9 x 10 Btu /hr. The implication of possible uncertainties in the number is negligible The possible uncertainty considered in previous license submittals is [ ]% of core power. !'275 032 4
, 2 The total calorimetric variance is the sum of the plant total variance c 7,;, c the feedwater enthalpy variance hE,andthenetpumpheatuncertaintych;.The standard deviation of the total power uncertainty actually used in the Trojan application is also shown in Table 3. This standard deviation is based on the total uncertainty of + 2 percent power which was treated as a unifom di'stri-bution in WCAP-8567. Thus, there is considerable margin between the estimated and assumed standard deviation of the measurement error. The standard deviation is the correct basis for comparison between estimated and assumed values s:nce it is the value used in the Improved Thermal Design Procedure. V. REACTOR C00LAtiT FLOW The Trojan fluclear Plant STS require verification every 31 days that the reactcr coolant flow is within the bounds assumed in the safety analysis and a flow indicator calibration measurement every 18 mo. Plant personnel accomplish the 18 month measurement by performing a secondary side calorimetric power measurement (es described in Section IV) and a measurement of the primary side coolar.t temperature rise across the reactor vessel, which is described below. Reactor flow is determined by calculating the total secondary power and deducting the assumed net pump heat contribution and then dividing by the average enthalpy rise (ah) of the coolant through the core. The equations for determining reactor and loop flow are as follows (IQ -IQrco) y x.1247 sg r (hg-h} c reactor flow (gpm) where W = r secondary steam generator total output Q = 3g net pump heat addition Q = rep y specific volume of RCS at T temperature = c hot leg enthalpy (Btu /lb) h = H h cold leg enthalpy (Btu /lb) g conversion constant for gpm from cuft/hr .1247 = 1275 033
~ ' The definitions and development of the other terms in these equations are presented in Section IV. The hot and cold leg enthalpies are based on the measurements of hot and cold leg temperatures and pressurizer pressure. The reactor flow measurement, therefore, is based on the measurements and calculations performed for determination of core power, plus the following plant instruments: Hot leg tempcrature (T ) H Cold leg temperature (T ) C Pressurizer Pressure (P ) ~ p These measurements and calculations are presented schematically on Figure 9. The instrumentation. sed to measure the parameters for the calorimetric power calculation is discussed in Section IV. The temperature difference across which is the vessel is derived from the protection channel for AT 7,nd Tavg shown in Figure 5 and discussed in Section III. The test points at which Thot and T are measured to obtain AT are indicated in the figure. The portion cold of the channel from the RTD to the test point can also be seen in Figure 2 (the test point is immediately downstream of the R/I converter). A digital and T A discussion voltmeter (DVM) is used in the rack to measure Thot cold. of the error allowances for calibration and drift is presented in Section III. Table 4 shows how all the error components of the primary coolant flow calcu-The discussion of letion are combined to give the total measurement error. the combination of error components presented in Section IV also applies to and T. The RTD calibration coolant flow with the following addition for TH c error is [ )*a,b c. the rack R/l converter calibration error is [ 3*a,bc and the DVM readout error is [ ]*a,b,c as shown r. Figure 2. Based on the ASME steam tables, the temperature measurement uncertainties introduce enthalpy uncertainties equivalent to the following loop flow uncer-tainties: i1.90 percent flow /*F (Thot) I275 034 11.58 percent flow /'F (Tcold)
. Similarly, the pressurizer pressure uncertainty of 130 psi introduces enthalpy uncertainties equivalerc. to the following loop flow uncertainties: 1 0.26 percent flow (Thot) 10.07 percent flow (Tcold) A process measurement error has been introduced to account for the steady-state temperature gradient of up to [ . ]*a,b,c in the hot leg, caused by incomplete mixing of the coolant flowing out of different regions of the core at different temperatures. To offset the effect of this temperature gradient, the hot leg temperature is measured on a bypase loop connected to the hot leg at three locations around the pipe circumference, as shown on Figure 10. Each connecticn is provided with a probe, or scoop, which samples the coolant over a distance of 7 inches into the 29 inch diameter pipe. With this arrangement, the potential for a difference between actual average temperature and measured temperature u is minimized, to a magnitude of less than [ ]*a,b,c, For this analysis, it has been conservatively assumed that the difference between actual and measured hot leg temperatures is less than [ ]*a,b,c A similar arrangement is not required on the cold leg since the pump and the -g suction piping elbows provide adequate m'xing of the steam generator outlet flow, and there is no process measurement error. The process measurement l error for 7,yg, therefore, is [ ]*a,b,c, or one-half of the sum of the hot leg and cold leg errors. i The net pump heat ur. certainty is [ ]*a,b,c percent of loop flow. i 2 The total flow variance c is found in the same manner as o in Section IV. 3 The standard deviation of the total flow uncertainty used in the Trojan application is also shown in Table 4. This standard deviation is based on the total uncertainty of [ ]*a,b,c percent flow which was treated as the 2a value of a nomal distribution in WCAP-8567. Thus, there is considerable I margin between the estimated and assumed standard devi;tions of the flow il measurement error. The standard deviation is the correct basis for comparison 16 between estimated and assumed values since it is the value used in the Improved 1 i Themal Design Procedure. t t !?75 035
Figure 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE STEAM PRESSURE Range 1700 - 2500 psig Range 0 - 1200 psig Span 800 psig Span 1200 psig a,b,c I Calibration Transmitter Barton 393 ( .r. Press.)' Temperature Effects Barton 345 (Stm. Press.) Drif t i i I __ a,b,c Calibration Isolator Drift )[ 7100 Process Equipmer.t I I i 1 . a,b,c Calibration and Drift Indicriar l 1[ VX-252 Note: All ei? ors in percent of span. !775 036 9
Figure 2 Tava Range 530 - 630*F T Span 100 F T hot cold Range 530 - 650*F Range 510 - 630*F Span 120*F Span 120 F a,b,c RTD a,b,c a,b,c RTD a,b,c [ ] *F Sensor [ ] [ ] *F [ ] F Calibration [ ] *F Drif t l i 8 I i a,b,e N Rack R/I Converter R/I Converter Calibration W 7100 Process Equipment l Summer Gain = 0.6 ! _ a,b,c I Test Rack Drift i Point (100 F Span) .]____ [ _ _ _ _J _ Test Point l[ 3a :.,
- T
&T hat cold _ a,b c i sensor cal. i rack cal. DVM i, I I [ 3a,b,c I fS 0 ali ration Process Equipment I Indicator [ ~]a,,e Calibration W VX-252 and Drift Note: Errors in percent are in terms of span. 1275 037
b Jl ? .eedwater 6P Range 0 'LO% AP Span 100% AP y U s% - a,b,c Local AP Gauge Calibration { 3a,b,c Drift Temperature Effects Note: All errors in percent of span. 1275 038 e
.... i.......w c..,.g >.....,...:.:..-.... s - .y: : . J.i{ lm' 1 o 5t ' 3. !. h-2 4 s 4 63 gf
- 3..,.
...,f e p..gi;s
- s
'r ig j
- v..
,s. =1 - ' 'p - l . nl. ;i, 2 :, - p.1........ wg9ng..;t...ay..pf : :
%v y
- . ', l ig j-
- 6. s' 3
- $.{T.,,'r
- 4. '-l. 4,
- 1. r
- h. p
- ..-....-......-;<--- w I.
- 7...v i
- gb(k:e e gi' en i ',
- n.
- s.
- S',
- n. ps.,1 m.:
- 5
- i
- a e r
- 12..t l,.
- CA, ' -
- o o
- (a,b,c) 12'75 046 e
- (a,b.c)
- (a,b.c) 1?75 048
- (a,b,c) 2'_'+0
- s'.
- n. ;
- u... :..:.....
- 979 9ss
- c. r. e F
- < ;-._37.00 202.36494 38,00 20P.aOA70
- _, _,,,
- c. 9. 0 0 216.s3nO7
- 5 --. t' 1 n _s c.
- 17.00 237.64006 11 c. O v U 3 8. O '/ H 1 2 119.00
- 2. 5 0. '7 4 o g p 14 o. O,
- 16..Ou 239.PJ': -
- e o. > (. 1 9 0
- ' -. '..00 278.033a0
- e. 1 e.UU 402.06"DU
- i O.'.1 1 #45>
- /.tip n
- i...
- a,'. i
- r, s' ;-
- e..i ;: ?
- 0 fi 19 300.00
- 30).00 32u., u :> s a
- .1 u. u u 321..:.'76l'7 311.OO 3 2 1.'7 o 0 '. O 31 P. 0 0
- 3. 4. l' 4 3 f. G _
- 8. i :-
- > 4 6.1 1 r. *( o
- / T e, 414.OV 3. <..,. 4 1 5 415.00 3u3.00007 41' 00
- / ~. c 117.Os 3 e 5. 0., 4 1.3 416.00
- u. -,, n
- /.Ou 3 6 3. 4.5 5 1 ti 4'
- o. O O
- , s. 9. 5 ' n e
- 7.
- . O. 3 2 */ o '
- 1 f: 61 f
- ?]',.ikJ0tr eAMC 1'.)75 064
- I 469.00 3 0 6. 9 1.
- ..t 3 9 ::. , 4 s
- c. i.s...,
- , r U & Uf 0h$h ]
- i. I; 12,
- s..e
- I,
- ae o
- e. n 3 9 r,
- 37361
- f. n r, ns4 r-1 n (,
- n
- 53..00
- .':, 7. 6 J 4in.30x r.
- e. x o o c.
- r.,
- c. - >
- 573.00 429.v4a3U 574.00 4 5 0. 3 4 '< 6 5
- c. e n:
- . v... O e 3.;. h 0 4 b o
- c. o ',
- ,.y 4 4 3. 2 C 2 4 T.
- r. :> e n
- t. u S. 's 4 n '.?
- r..: 1 nn
- r. s i n.,
- s. r ->
- r. e o n.~,
- o. */. 0 U 475.t 9. 5.5 t-eo:.i U 4 7 u. ':
- / > ',
- 2; o
- ~
- ja P-87-s p
- p. g7-3 g
- FE-Sl0 Tar Ser 2.
- A87-8 P*B7-3 AlI. FW Noz2Les /lLE STA Iffa WrTH lle 7 lidt102e.S CA1 EAhl TilP '
- b eop
- 4. i.J.
- 4. A
- .l:..:..! l
- l(:$l,(~ p>p !,,;-
- c3 M. 4+f
- 4..p y.
- a..
- i ~. -
- p... O n
- .: l i.i
- i l
- 4..
- f.
- - l,. *
- ..' l' '. g..
- '....lgt
- .i 7..,
- .-..l.;
- Et.-p W-,
- 5. i 4.,.1
- .)g
- +..
- I I -
- c i :-
- -- ~ :L -
- }-Pl7!-k'
- .,:.1
- -c L t t 1
- -
- 1. of th,oot i pipe diameter = o.s2es J
- [h
- 3 pig q
- {] !L :f ' ~
- iE
- !._ a_
- L ya e-
- . c g.g j., 3 s.
- n...
- t:: < !, q; p;
- JI;-
- 3 r[
- s
- 4 -
- i. p - a --,-- J.b s..--
- l..,
- .t...
- T
- c 3.-
- e. v-u i.:
- [ I; h '
- 03548 g2$3 8.
- e, e
- d*'
- 3~
- I.i
- h
- I
- .k.3:. I:.k a !.. !
- T.:.~g..
- [ -
- 5. M [
- j,
- L L'..J-J+h@4'
- l i e ! J l~'b. N~I i
- _M i
- p A -Q-+l ]2!
- ..( a.: l ; l :.
- y...-: y a. J Hr-.p
- .. p -. g. r. ' -; !--
- . ; J. "_.
- ._i _
- j. l.. ;F g.)
- f 4. ]l, i rt
- !r ": t Si;; -bf ;"y::,[ *- r,,
- c;- f;-! r.p q 7
- 3'.1025 for 96* F T1mt WORCESTER F OLY T E C H NIC $NSTIT UT!
- COMPANY under their Purchase Order Number L-53595-1107, Changes B and l
- v
- 4
- ..l:
- +
- 4....,.
- c. 2.
- 4...
- .
- L.:
- i
- a..::
- r-
- 2..:'=
- 6 m.I 4 1; t p 4' u
- m. --li.
- r 7;
- ;,. 8. 6 o
- ; i e r...
- l. d.L.
- , s :
- ? :..- 4...... ;...-!,
- ).
- -l ;
- .. - Je, -
- j
- /5" _.
- Vj-p4 3.09I5 for 08'F 8 89'F Broo' WORCESTER FOLYTECHNIC INS TIT U T E Upmece.
- * $5===t a.ma in up. fees. O.35 4 4 12.0 8 6=
- Ir el eteetention of g,e,1,y. 32.163 feet per seenad sapored O t H F.f!S1Q,N.S__8T.P. C...,
- 8"*****
- 'io e' +.o.e se pipe die ie,. 0.6265
- l.
- r
- 4..
- .......~.i I-...
- i. --
- * *d. -.
- 8. (
- 4.,..
- 1...
- 1....
- 1...
- t............_
- m.....
- t
- 9..,....
- 3...
- ......n..
- i... _..
- z......
- t...
RESPONSE
In order to demonstrate that the instruments in Trojan will perform within their design accuracies, the operating history was evaluated. Trojan was convenient for this evaluation since its Standard Technical Specifications (STS) require the formal reporting of instances where the protection channel errors exceed the allowances including drift assumed in the safety analysis. The period of time covered by the Trojan data is from the date of the operating license (November,1975)throughFebruary1,1979. The ratio of reported occurre.nces O the total number of channel functional tests gives an estimate of the probability that the assumed drift allowances will be exceeded over any one test interval. The acceptance criteria for equipment per-fomance is that this probability will be ro greater than 5%. The number of functional tests is based on the 31 day test interval for protection racks and the 18 month interval for sensors. Table 1 contains the evaluation results for the variables identified in Questions 1 and 2. The occurrences consist of excess drift for sensors and protection racks. The sensor and process rack checks are lumped together since many of the sensor occurrences were detected at times other than the nomal sensor test interval, e.g., at the monthly rack test interval. '975 087
- 4-.
Therefore, the acceptance criteria stated above is satisfied for these six functions. The highest occurrence rate on a single parameter basis (steamline pressure) is still below the 5% acceptance level. I')?5 088 4 O e 9 5 m e e a
A ' Table 1
- Channels _
- Checks * # Occurrances Trip Steamline Pressure 12 504 2
4 168 0 Overtemperature aT 4. 168 0 High Neutron Flux Low Pressurizer Pressure 4 168 1 4 168 0 RCS Undervoltage 8 336 0 Feedwater Flow 36 1512 3
- Based on a 39 month operating history - through February 1,1979.
0.00198 % 0.2% => a 99.8% success ratio 3/1,51 2 = A further breakdown of the above occurrances yields the following: Success Trip
- Channels
- Checks
- Occurrances Ratio Steamline Pressure 12:
502 2 99.6% Low Pressurizer Pressure 4 168 1 99.4% ~ l')75 089 e o}}