ML19249C073
| ML19249C073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1979 |
| From: | Goldberg S NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909070279 | |
| Download: ML19249C073 (64) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f'3. t-3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7/13/79 5
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'7( g " b BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY Af1D LICENSIf!G BOARD i(
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Docket Nos. 50-338 SP k
VIRGIllIA ELECTRIC Af!D POWER COMPANY
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50-339 SP i
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(Proposed Amendment to Facility i
(florth Anna fluclear Power Station,
)
Operating License flPF-4 to Permit Units 1 and 2)
)
Storage Pool Modification)
NRC STAFF SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO IllTERR0GATORIES FROM CITIZEflS' ENERGY FORUf1 AND POTOMAC ALLIANCE In its June 29, 1979" Order Allowing Additional Time for Certain Answers and Resetting Time for Hearing", the Board permitted intervenor Potonac Alliance (Alliance) until July 23, 1979 to supplement its answers to VEPCO's motion for summary disposition. The Board further indicated that it would reconsider its June 18, 1979 order partially granting VEPC0's summary disposition motion.
In light of the Board's June 29 order, and per informal agreement with counsel for
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the Alliance, the NRC Staff herewith supplements its response of June 29, 1979 to intervenors' interrogatories in order to address contentions which, though not presently in issue, are the apparent subject of reconsideration. The Staff in-corporates the legal objections noted in its original response with reference to portions of subparts (B), (C), and (D) of each Alliance interrogatory. A supplemental response to the interrogatories follows.
- / Modified responses to Alliance Interrogatories 8 (p. 6) and 9 (p. 6) and sworn
_ affidavits of Messrs. Campe and Wermiel relative to the June 29 interrogatory response attached.
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CEF INTERROGATORIES Interrocatory 1-1 What is the basis for the statement in Section 4.3 of the Environmental Impact Appraisal by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Reculation Relative to a Proposed Increase in Storace Capacity of the Spent Fuel Pool (hereaf ter referred to as EIA), dated April 2,1979, that "any addi-tional atmospheric effects of its operation such as fogging and icing are unlikely to occur offsite? Provide the facts and analyses leading to such conclusion.
Answer The Staff's analysis relative to the statement in Section 4.3 of the EIA that "any additional atmospheric effects of its (station) operation such as fogging and icing are unlikely to occur offsite" was provided in the s
" Affidavit of Paul H. Leech, Francis C. Kornegay and Jared S. Wermeil on Contention 1: Thermal Effects," which accompanied the NRC Staff response to VEPCO's summary desposition motion, dated June 5,1979. The professional qualifications of those individuals were attached thereto. The documents consulted by Mr. Kornegay in making the pertinent calculations are referenced on page 9 of the affidavit.
The affidavit will comprise these individuals' testimony on Contention 1 should it be reintroduced as an issue.
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. Interrogatory 1-2 What is the basis fog the statement in Section 4.3 of the EIA that "The addition of 5.6 x 10 Btu /hr to the total discharge from Units 1 and
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2... would not have noticeable incremental effects on aquatic biota or the environment."? Provide the facts and analyses leading to such j
concl usion.
Answer i
The bases for the statement in Section 4.3 of the EIA are as follows:
1.
If the service water is discharged to the WHTF, it will be mixed in the discharge canal with the station water which increases in temperature approximately 14 F as it circulates from the lake through the turbine 6
steam condensers to the WHTF.
The incremental 5.6 x 10 Btu /hr due to the proposed modification of the spent fuel pool represents a 0.04 percent increase in heat discharged by the plant and would add less than 0.006 F (0.0004 x 14 = 0.0056 F) to the water temperature in the discharge canal.
This is considerably less than the diel variation in water temperature of the surface two meters of the reservoir near the station intake, which exceeds 2 F during much of the year.
Thus, the organisms exposed to temperature increases due to modification of the spent fuel pool experience natural variations in temperature several orders of magnitude greater than 0.006 F.
Impacts on aquatic biota l
from such incremental temperature effects within the bounds of natural variation would be undetectable and therefore insignificant.
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2.
The WHTF water evaporation rates are approximately 8400 gpm in the winter and 25,800 in the summer. These would be increased about 12 gpm if all of the incremental heat due to the proposed SFP modification is l
assumed to be dissipated by evaporation. The resulting increase in i
humidity would be too small to be detectable and the incremental effect would therefore not be noticeable.
(See answer to interrogatory 1-3 below for further information.)
James Wilson responded to 1-2(1) and Howard McLain responded to 1-2(2) above.
Copies of Messrs. Wilson and McLain professional qualifications are attached. They will testify to the above should it become necessary.
Mr. Wilson utilized no references.
Mr. McLain's references are cited in connection with the answer to interrogatory 1-3 below.
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i Interrogatory 1-3 l
t How much of the 1,905,600 gpm of water which is drawn from Lake Anna to circulate through the steam generators is returned to the lake after i
going through the waste heat treatment facility? How much is lost through evaperation? What percentage of the total water from the lake lost through evaporation will be due to the additional heat to be dissipated if the proposed modification is carried out?
Answer Of the 1,905,600 gpm of water drawn from Lake Anna to circulate through the turbine steam condensers, 1,890,200 gpm and 1,879,800 gpm would be returned to the lake from the WHTF in the winter and summer respectively during full-load operation of Units 1 and 2.
The rates of total water evaporation from the WHTF and the lake would be 19,600 gpm and 69,100 gpm in the winter 6
and summer respectively. The addition of 5.6 x 10 Btu /hr of heat to the WHTF and Lake Anna would increase the evaporation rates less than 0.00% in the winter and less 0.02% in the summer.
The water evaporation rates were calculated using the surf ace heat transfer relations outlined in P. J. Ryan i
and D. R. F. Harleman's "An Analytical and Experimental Study of Transient Cooling Pond Behavior," Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Ralph M.
Parsons Laboratory Report No.161, January 1973.
The winter and summer meteorological conditions are assumed to be those given in E. L. Phachston's "Effect of Geographic Variation on Performance of Recirculation Cooling Ponds," Environmental Protection Agency Report I
EPA-660/2-74-085, November 1974, for January and July at Roanoke, Virginia.
This interrogatory was answered by Mr. McLain who will testify to the above r
should it become necessary.
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. Interrogatory 2-3 Section 4.4.1 of the EIA states that "mos t of the gaseous fission products have short half-lives and decay to insignificant levels within a few months." What are the rest of the gaseous fission products, those with longer half-lives? Provide a detailed list of all gaseous fission products expected from spent assemblies to be stored in the pool.
Answer The gaseous fission products which could be released from spent fuel in storage pools is the gaseous gap activity in that small volume of space between the ceramic fuel pellets and the zircaloy tubes in the fuel pins which make up a single fuel assembly. Regulatory Guide No.125 indicates that noble gases (including Kr and Xe radioisotopes) and radioactive iodines comprise the radionuclides which could be released due to cladding failure.
The radioactive half-life of all of these isotopes is snow in the following Table 1.
It can be noted from this table that the only significant isotope remaining after a few months storage is Kr-85 which has a 10.76-year half-life.
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' TABLE 1 Gaseous Fission Products Isotope Hal f-li fe*
I-131 8.05 days I-132 2.26 Hours I-133 20.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> I-134 52.0 minutes I-135 6.68 hours7.87037e-4 days <br />0.0189 hours <br />1.124339e-4 weeks <br />2.5874e-5 months <br /> Kr-83M 1.86 hours9.953704e-4 days <br />0.0239 hours <br />1.421958e-4 weeks <br />3.2723e-5 months <br /> Kr-85 10.76 years Kr-85M 4.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Kr-87 76.0 minutes Kr-88 2.80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> Kr-89 3.18 minutes Xe-131M 11.8 days Xe-133M 2.26 days Xe-133 5.27 days Xe-135M 15.6 minutes Xe-135 9.14 hours1.62037e-4 days <br />0.00389 hours <br />2.314815e-5 weeks <br />5.327e-6 months <br /> Xe-137 3.9 minutes Xe-138 17.5 minutes
- Half-lives obtained from Radiological Health Handbook Revised Edition, January 1970 - U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
This interrogatory was answered by Harry Krug. A copy of his professional qualifications accompanied the NRC Staff response to VEPCO's summary dis-position motion. He will testify to the above should it become necessary.
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' Interrocatory 2-4 Section 4.4.3 of the EIA states
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Storing additional spent fuel assemblies should not increase the bulk water temperature during normal refuelings above the 140 F used in the design analysis.
Therefore, it is not expected that there will be any significant change in the annual release of tritium or iodine from that previously evaluated in the FES.
How do the bulk water temperatures relate to the expected releases of H
r I from the spent fuel pool?
3 Answer Evaporation and iodine and tritium transport from the spent fuel pool are directly dependent on the bulk water temperature.
Radioiadines are soluble and volatile. Most radioiodines are removed by the spent fuel pool cleanup system; however, some airborne releases of radioiodines are released to the air from the pool water surface.
If the gool design temperature is not changed, 'the expected releases will not be changed, as stated in the EIA.
This interrogatory was answered by Harry Krug who will testify to the above km should it become necessary.
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I Interroaatory F-1 What will be the effect of the 40% heat load increase (as stated in the SER) on the rate of corrosion of the zirconium alloy cladding of the
~I spent fuel assemblies? What will be the effect on the corrosion rate i
of the stainless steel racks?
Answer The effect of the 40% heat load increase as stated in the SER refers to the i
I total pool heat load as expected from the additional spent fuel assemblies.
i Since the fuel rack design precludes heat transfer from cell to cell or from fuel assembly to fuel assembly, the Zircaloy i adding on any given fuel assembly will experience no increase in heat load.
Therefore, no effect would be expected on the rate of corrosion for the Zircaloy cladding.
See also answers to Alliance interrogatories 11-14, infra.
Interrogatory 5-1 was answered by M. D. Houston. A copy of his professional qualifications accompanied the NRC Staff response to VEPCO's summary disposi-tion motion.
He will testify to t'r bove should it become necessary.
His testimonj and supporting documentary references are given in the " Affidavit of George B. Georgiev, M. D. Houston, and Jared S. Wermiel on Contentions Regarding Materials Integrity and Corrosion" which further accompanied the referenced Staff resptnse.
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. Interrogatory 5-2 The SER states, in section 2.6, that "The additional spent fuel in the pool will increase the amount of corrosion and fission products intro-
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duced into the cooling water to some extent..."
What effect on workers is postulated through maintenance of the fuel pool purification system (e.g., changing filters) given the additional load on the purification system?
Answer See answer to interrogatory 18, infra.
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. Interroga tory 5-3 What procedure does (sic) the f4RC require w rec.camend for the detection of defective spent fuel storage racks?
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- Anwer, The NRC does not have any prescribed inservice inspection requirements related to the spent fuel racks.
6xperience has indicatn1 that fuel racks fabricated from the stainless steel will not deteriorate in this type of service.
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9 Interrogatory 5-4 What procedures are required or recommended by the NRC in the event of
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discovery of defective spent fuel storage racks?
Answer In the event there is reason to believe that there is degradation of the spent fuel racks, the Staff would require the licensee to perform an inspection and present the inspection results for Staff review.
If any degradation is found, the licensee is required to submit for review and approval a proposal to remedy the situation. The ultimate disposition will be determined by the Staff.
Interrogatories 5-3 and 5-4 were answered by Alexander W. Dromerick, NRC' Safety Project Manager assigned to the proposed spent fuel pool modifica-tion. Mr. Dranerick will be unavailable during the rescheduled hearing dates.
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Potomac Alliance Interrogatories Interrogatory 1 (a) Have you considered and analyzed the possibility of expanding the physical area of the existing spent fuel pool (SFP) as an alterna-tive to the proposed modification?
(b)
If so, describe such analysis and any documents referring to this alternative.
Answer A.
The possibility of expanding the physical area of the existing SFP has been considered and analyzed.
As discussed in Sections 3.8.1.1.4 and 9.1.2 of the North Anna Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), the SFP is I
located in the fuel building.
As shown in the Plot Plan for North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2 (FSAR Fig.1.2-2), the fuel building is located between the containment structures for Units 1 and 2 on a generally east-west axis.
The SFP is a reinforced concrete, seismic Class I structure lined with stainless steel plate a minimum of 1/4-inch thick.
To protect the stored fuel from possible tornado generated missiles, the reinforced concrete walls of the SFP are six (6) feet thick up to 20 ft. 10 in, above grade.
On the west side of the SFP, there is also a 3-1/2 foot reinforced concrete wall, extending from the foundation mat to the top of the pool.
This wall separates the spent fuel cask handling area from the spent fuel storage area and is designed for a cask impact accident.
The SFP is approximately 87 f t long by 40 ft wide by 43 ft deep.
The fuel building is approximately 136 f t long by 41 ft wide.
On the west e;r
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- side, the presence of the Unit 2 containment is, for practical purposes, an absolute barrier to expanding the size of the SFP. On the north, the amount of safety-related equipment that would have to be relocated would amount to a major modification of the plant. On the east, there is a small area (approximately 50 ft) between the SFP and the Unit 1 containment that cont ins the new fuel storage area, the SFP heat exchangers, cooling water pumps and skimmer pump, primary water service and standby pumps, waste gas compressors, etc.
Relocation of this equipment would also be a major modification. To physically expand the SFP on the south side into the decontamination building would require relocation of the primary water storage tanks, the waste processing equipment (waste solidifcation equipment, spent resin processing equip-ment, etc.) and the waste gas decay tanks.
The feasibility of physically expanding the size of the SFP at the Prairie Island fluclear Generating Plants, Units ilos.1 and 2 had been previously evaluated.
The Prairie Island units also share a common spent fuel pool, although the physical arrangement is different.
In the evaluation, the time, cost and radiation exposures associated with a major modification at another VEPC0 nuclear plant - namely, the replacement of the steam generators at Surry Units 1 and 2 were also taken into account.
It was estimated that to physically expand the size of the SFP at florth Anna Units 1 and 2 would require shutdown of the plant for at least 4 months and would cost over $30 million to add storage space for an additional 576 spent fuel assemblies using the U ) /;
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The radiation exposure would likely be in the order of 300 man-rem.
The cost to customers of VEPC0 for replace-ment power could add another $40 million.
Engineering experience with modifications such as this leads one to the conclusion that it would be less expensive and would require less time to build a new spent fuel storage pool onsite rather than to physically expand the size of the existing SFP.
In any case, the total environmental impacts and economic costs associated with physical expansion of the SFP would be much more than the negligible impacts associated with the proposed action.
B.
The FSAR for the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 have been relied upon to determine the extent of modifications that would be required to the plant to expand the physical size of the SFP.
Cost estimates are based on engineering experience and cost data supplied by VEPC0 for the replacement of the steam generators at Surry and cost
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data supplied by other licensees who have requested approval to expand the storage capacity of spent fuel pools.
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Note objection t
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None E.
Richard J. Clark.
A copy of his professional qualifications are cttached.
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Interroga tory 2 l
(a) Have you considered and analyzed the possibility of constructing a separate spent fuel storage pool onsite as an alternative to the
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proposed modification?
(b)
If so, describe such analysis and any documents referring to this alternative.
Answer A.
The alternative of constructing a separate spent fuel storage pool cnsite has been considered and analyzed.
This is a specific variation of an independent spent fuel storage facility which was discussed in Section 6.2 of the EIA regarding the proposed action. The cost esti-mates we have compiled on independent spent fuel storag, facilities show there are economics in terms of cost per storage space as the total capacity of the storage pool increases.
If VEPC0 were to build a separate storage facility onsite designed to store about 1,000 spent fuel assemblies, it is estimated that the cost would be in the order of
$30,000,000.
If the facility were designed for about 1,000 MTU capacity (about 2,000 spent fuel assemblies), the cost would be in the orcer of
$54,000,000.
In the EIA, we estimated that it would take at least five years to design, construct and have an independent storage facility operational.
The proposed action provides support to this time estimate.
8.
All documents and studies relied on in response to this interrogatory are identified in the EIA.
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tiote objection l
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Ilone E.
R. J. Clark I
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Interroaatory 3 A.
(a) Have you considered and analyzcd the possibility of using the SFP at Units 3 and 4 for storage of spent fuel from Units 1 and 27 (b)
If so, describe such analysis and any documents referring to this alternative.
Answer A.
(a) Yes.
(b) This possibility was discussed as alternative (c) in the " Affidavit of Paul H. Leech on Contention 7," which accompanied the NRC Staff response to VEPCO's summary disposition motion, dated June 5, 1979. The May 11, 1979 letter from Virginia and Electric Power Company to NRC amending its application to expand the spent fuel pool capacity at Units 1 and 2 addressed this subject.
B.
See above answer.
C.
Note objection.
D.
None E.
Paul H. Leech.
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I Interrogatory 4 (a) Assuming that the proposed operating license amendment is not granted, when, according to your projections, will.
(1) the first defueling of Unit 1 occur; (2) Unit 2 begin commercial operations; (3) the SFP be filled to capacity, less a reserve for one fuel core discharge; (4) the SFP be filled completely?
(b) Describe fully the basis for the above projections, including any assumption made regarding the number of months between refuelings, the number of fuel assemblies discharge per refueling, and whether the cask loading area will be used for fuel storage.
Answer A.
(a)
(1) The first replacement of 52 spent fuel assemblies is expected in the fall of 1979, probably September.
(2) Approximately fall,1979.
(3)
In the fall of 1981.
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(4) Afte
- both units are refueled in the fall of 1982, space for 36 fuel assemblies would remain unfilled with tha present SFP capaci ty.
This unused capacity could be filled in the fall of 1983 by partial refueling of one unit.
P (b) As stated in Section 2.0 of the Staff's EIA, dated April 2,1979, the licensee plans 52 spent fuel assemblies in each unit beginning
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. in the fall of 1979 with Unit 1 and beginning in the fall of 1980 with Unit 2.
The cask loading area would not be used for fuel storage under normal circumstances.
B.
See EIA references 1 and 2.
C.
None D.
We understand that the applicant is evaluating the possibility of using 18-month refueling cycles.
The Staff has not engaged in research which would affect the answers herein, except as indicated in Sections 2.0 and 6.4 of the EIA, nor does it presently intend to do so.
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P. II. Leech; A. Dromerick.
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. Interrogatory 5 (a) To your knowledge, is any private corporation or consulting group presently preparing a study on the logistics or other aspects of storing and handling spent fuel?
(b)
Identify all preliminary draf ts, working papers, and analyses which have been developed pursuant to such studies, and describe the substance of each document so identified.
Answer A.
(a) Various corporations and consulting groups are studying the storage and handling of spent fuel. Among these are believed to be Stone
& Webster Engineering Corporation, General Electric Company, Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Sandia Laboratories and NUS Corporation. There are probably others.
Tennessee Valley Authority and the U.S. Department of Energy have also performed studies.
(b) The NRC does not have available the information to identify all preliminary drafts, working papers and analyses pertaining to the above studies.
The NRC has issued a Draf t Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactors Fuel (NUREG-0404, March 1978) which contains numerous references. The Department of Energy has also issued a Draf t Environmental Impact Statement on Storage of U.S. Spent Power Reactor Fuel (DOE /EIS-0015-0, August 1978) and a Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Charge for Spent Fuel Storage (DOE /EIS-0041-D, December 1978).
. 8.
See above answer.
l C.
See above answer.
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None E.
R. J. Clark i
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- Interroaatory 11 1
Based upon operating experience with Zircaloy clad fuel, approximately
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how many of the discharged spent fuel assemblies are expected to con-
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tain defective fuel rods? Of these, what percentage of the fuel rods contained therein are expected to be defective?
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Answer i
A.
Operating experience with Westinghouse Zircaloy clad fuel is summarized annually in a topical report.
Other operating experience through January 1976 has been reported by Strasser and Lindquist for both PWRs and BWRs with Zircaloy clad fuel.
Pressurized PWR fuel from all reactors with various fuel designs showed a mean defective rod level of 0.06% at a 32 GWD/MTU.
During the first cycle at Trojan with 17 x 17 fuel similar to North Anna, a calculated defective rod level of 0.004% was approximated after an exposure of 20 GWD/MTU which would translate to 2 defective rods in a core of 50,952 fuel rods.
Caution must certainly be applied when using this figure as an absolute value is the activity l
in the coolant may come from other sources.
Since the 17 x 17 fuel operates at lower linear power density and with increased safety margins, the fuel defect level would be anticipated to remain at some low value, less than 10 fuel rods in the core.
Numbers do not exist for the distribution of defective rods within the fuel assemblies.
Therefore,
one can only estimate the number of defective assemblies. On the basis of operating experience to date, it would appear that at such refueling, one would not expect to see more than one assembly with defective fuel f
rods.
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- l B.1/ (1)
" Operational Experience with Westinghouse Cores," WCAP-8183 (revised annually).
l (2)
A. Strasser and K. Lindquist, " Reliability and Operating Margins of LWR Fuels," ANS Topical Meeting on Water Reactor Fuel Perform-ance, May 9-11, 1977.
(3)
R. B. Elkins, " Experience with BWR Fuel Through September 1974,"
NED0-20922, June 1975.
(4)
R. B. Elkins, " Experience wi th BWR Fuel Trhough December 1976,"
NED0-21660, July 1977.
(5)
G. A. Sofer and K. N. Woods, "Non-Destructive Examiniation of EXXON Nuclear Fuel in LWRs," ANS Topical Meeting on LWR Fuel Experiences, April 29 - May 3,1979.
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(6)
M. Andrews, H. Freeburn and W. Wohlsen, "The Performance of Combustion Engineering Fuel in Operating PWRs," ANS Topical Meeting on LWR Feel Experience, April 29 - May 3,1979.
4 C.
Note objection.
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References S and 6 are given for various vendors of LWR fuel.
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(1) EPRI/ General Electric Cooperative Program on BWR Fuel Performance, EPRI Contract RPS10.
(2) EPRI/ Combustion Engineering Cooperative Program on PWR Fuel Performance, EPRI Contract RP586.
(3) EPRI/ Westinghouse Cooperative Program on PWR Fuel Pe rformance, EPRI Contract 611.
(4) EPRI/ Babcock & Wilcox Cooperative Program on PWR Fuel Performance, EPRI Contract RP711.
E.
M. D. Houston.
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Interrogatory 12 i
Based upon your experience with and knowledge of zircaloy clad fuel, describe all types of cladding defects that have been observed to occur.
(a)
For each defect type, describe the causative conditions.
(b) Far each defect type, state the probable release rate of radio-active matter, in mass and activity units.
Answer A.
(a)
In the past, defects have occurred in Zircaloy cladding due to one of the following mechanisms:
hydride impurities, halide impurities, pellet / cladding interaction, corrosion, fretting and fuel densifica-tion with cladding collapse. Most instances of cladding defects have been observed with fuel manufactured prior to 1975.
Each mechanism has been studied in-depth and corrective measures have been implemented to eliminate or reduce such failures in current operating cycles. Because of the statistical nature of some of the failure mechanisms, and the presence of some old fuel in operating plants, cladding failures are still observed but in significantly smaller numbers.
(1) Hydriding.
Hydride failures can be genera'ly characterized as occurring early in a fuel rod's life, usually in the zero to 11 GWD/MTV range. The failures tend to occur somewhat randomly.
b The problem is due to hydrogenous impurities sealed in the fuel rod, e.g., moisture or oil.
Failures are caused by the wF formation in the cladding of massive zirconium hydride zones, which initiate at defects or discontinuities. This leads to a blister that is sometimes visible on the outside cladding su rface.
Eventually, the hydride zone cracks (either from the phase change volume expansion or from operational stresses) leading to a thru-wall penetration.
(ii) Halide Impurities.
Cladding failures similar to hydriding have also been observed if chlorine or fluorine impurities are present in sufficient quantity.
The sources of these impurities can be from the chemical precursors in the fuel manufacturing cycle (i.e., UF ), from the pickling solutions 6
used to clean the Zircaloy cladding (i.e., HF), or from other chemical agents used in manufacturing.
(iii) Pellet /Claddina Interaction.
Pellet / cladding interaction (PCI) has some probability of leading to fuel rod failure.
It is caused by the fuel pellet having a greater thermal expansion than the cladding. As the fuel temperature in-creases, the pellets expand, filling the radial pellet-to-cladding gap, physically locking with the cladding as the gap closes and stretching the cladding as the pellet continues to expand.
Pellet / cladding interaction can be manifested as C 3 ?.
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cladding elongation, ridging of the cladding at pellet inter-faces or longitudinal splits in the cladding.
The degree of
- interaction depends upon the fuel pellet and rod design, absolute fuel rod power, rate of power change, differential power change, and irradiation exposure.
PCI failures (cladding splits) tend to occur later in reactor exposure, in the range of 6 to 35 GWD/MTU.
In this burnup range, the pellet-to-cladding gap has been closed due to pellet cracking and relocation, cladding creepdown and fission product swe.lling.
Therefore, pellet / cladding lockup occurs at lower absolute power and at smaller power differentials.
In addition, the Zircaloy cladding ductility decreases as a function of exposure, making it more susceptible to fracture.
These two factors, gap closure and cladding embrittlement, contribute greatly to the failures attributed to PCI.
(iv) Corrosion. Corrosion of Zircaloy is an oxidation of the surface due to the metal-water chemical reaction. The process is complex and depends upon temperature, oxygen pressure and time.
Corrosion usually results in a thin (~.001") adherent coating on the fuel rod exterior. Corrosior, per g has not been a defect mechanism unless accelerated by surface impuri-ties, i.e_., fluorine, or by fretting wear abraiding away the adherent coating.
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. (v) Fretting.
Fretting wear of Zircaloy cladding can cause defects if vibratory motion between the fuel rods and contact points, such as in a spacer grid, is excessive.
Such vibra-tion and wear was observed in certain PWR's where water jets came through the core barrel baffles.
(vi) Fuel Densification with Cladding Collapse.
Fuel densifica-tion first appeared as a problem in 1972 and was caused mainly by the use of unstable lower density fuel in unpres-surized Zircaloy cladding in PWR's.
The effects of fuel densification on the fuel rod may increase the stored energy, will increase the linear thennal output and will increase the probability of cladding collapse and local power spikes from axial gaps.
Cladding collapse can be postulated under cer-tain conditions of high compressive pressure differential and a sufficient length of axial gap in the fuel column.
Fuel rods with fully collapsed sections of cladding have usually ir.dicated failures in these same regions.
(b) Probable release rates of radioactive material as a function of defect type have not been established. While operating in the core, a cladding failure is expected to give an initial puff of gaseous fission products into the coolant when the cladding is first breached. After this puff, a steady state escape of gas would follow.
Herein, the escape rate coefficient (i.e., the
'26 2l5
. fraction of the generated products which are released) is generally assumed _/ to be 10-6 to 10-8
-1 2
sec Westinghouse has applied the 10-8 value in their general equation to equate coolant activities to fuel defect levels.1/ Additional puffs of fission product activity will occur on start-up after shutdown and during power cycling.
For fuel handling accidents, fuel defects are b o instantaneously release all of the fission product assumed t
inventory of the fuel rod plenum and gap into the surrounding coolant, either in the core or the spent fuel pool. The mass and unit activities will vary with burnup and decay.
B.
(a)(i)
(1)
M. F. Lyons, R. F. Boyle, J. H. Davis, V. E. Hazel and T. C. Rowland, "UO Properties Affecting Performance,"
2 Nuclear Engineerina and Desian, Vol. 21 (1972).
(2)
K. Joon, " Primary Hydride Failure of Zircaloy-Clad Fuel Rods," Transaction American Nuclear Society, Vol.15 (1972).
(3)
D. H. Locke, n. 2, infra.
-2/
D. H. Locke, "The Behavior of Defective Reactor Fuel," Nucl.
Engr. and Desian, Vol. 21 (1972).
3/
" Source Tem Data for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors,"
WCAP-8253 (May,1974).
y Regulatory Guide 1.25, " Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident in the Fuel Handling and Storage Facility for Boiling and Pressurized Water Reactors," (March 23,1972).
t
,4
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t t i (ii) (4) it. D. Freshley, "UO - Pu0 :
A Demonstrated Fuel for l
2 2
Plutonium Utilization in Thermal Reactors," BNWL-SA-4327, June 1972.
(iii) (3)
S. Aas, "Mechnical Interaction Between Fuel and Cladding,"
Nuclear Engineering and Desian, Vol. 21 (1972).
(6)
R. Holzer, D. Knodler and H. Stehl (KWU), " Pellet Clad Interaction:
Experience, Testing and Evaluation. A KWU Review," p. 207 in Proceedings of the ANS Topical Meeting on Water Reactor Fuel Performance, May 9-11, 1977, St.
Charles, Illinois.
(7)
E. Smith, C. V. Ranjan and R. C. Cipolla (Failure Analysis)," Fracture of Zircaloy Cladding by Inter-actions with Uranium Dioxide Pellets in LUR Fuel Rods,"
EPRI Report EPRI NP-330, November 1976.
(8)
J. H. Gittus, D. A. Howl and H. Hughes, " Theoretical Analysis of Cladding Stresses and Strains Produced by Expansion of Cracked Fuel Pellets," fluclear Acolications and Technoloay, Vol. 9,40-46(1970).
(iv) (9)
D. L. Douglass, "The Metallurgy of Zirconium," IAEA Publication, Supplement 1971.
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(10)
J. Belle, " Uranium Dioxide:
Properties and Nuclear Applications," TID-7546,1961.
u (v) (11)
R. E. Schreiber and J. A. Iorii, " Operational Experience with Westinghouse Corps (up to December 31,1976),"
WCAP-8183, Rev. 6, June 1977.
(12)
L. Lunde, "Special Fratures of External Corrosion of Fuel Cladding in Boiling Water Reactors," Advanced Course on In-Reactor Behavior of Water Reactor Fuels, Ha' an, Norway, August 1974.
(vi)(13)
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, " Technical Report on Densification of Light Water Reactor Fuels," WASH-1236, November 1972.
(14)
R. O. Meyer, "The Analysis of Fuel Densification," USNRC Report NUREG-0085, July 1976.
(15)
"EEI/EPRI Fuel Dersification Project," EPRI-131, March 1975.
B.
(b) See n. 2, 3 and 4 supra.
C.
Note objection.
(, i.
ri bhO
t D.
(i), (ii), (v) None.
I i
T (iii) (1) Halden Reactor Project, funded studies by NRC, EPRI and I
fuel vendors.
l (2) Studsvik BWR Inter Ramp Project, EPRI Contract RP507.
(3) A Power Shape Monitoring System (PSMS) to Evaluate the Effects of Core Power fianeuvers on Fuel Rod Reliability, EPRI Contract RP895.
(4)
International Studsvik PWR Over Ramp Project, EPRI Coritract RP1026.
(iv) (1) Unifom Waterside Corrosion of Zircaloy Clad Fuel Rods, EPRI Contract RP1250.
(vi) (1) Zircaloy Cladding Defomation and Fracture Analysis, EPRI Contract RP971.
(2)
EPRI/ Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering, Babcock &
Wilcox Cooperation Programs, EPRI Contracts RP611, RP586 and RP711, respectively.
E.
M. D. Houston.
9)/
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5 Interrogatory 13 Describe all infomation in your possession, including personal knowledge, concerning the adverse effects (including corrosion and stress-related 7
effects) upon:
(a) fuel rod cladding; (b) fuel assembly materials other than fuel rod cladding; (c) fuel storage racks; and (d) the pool liner as a result of exposure to environments similar to that which will exist in the SFP. The response to this question should discuss, but not be limited to, all nuclear reactors.
Answer A.
(a) See answer to Interrogatory 11 which addresses fuel cladding integrity and corrosion in the spent fuel pool and references cited therein.
(b) Other than Zircaloy, the fuel assembly contains component parts of UO, 304 stainless steel and Inconel-718. These materials are 2
equally as stable toward pool conditions as Zircaloy so should not ba affected.
(c)(d) The racks and liner are made entirely of 304 stainless steel.
See response to (b) above.
B.
(1)
A. B. Johnson, Jr., " Behavior of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Water Pool Storage," PNL Report BNWL-2256, September 1977.
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(2)
J. Belle, " Uranium Dioxide:
Properties and Nuclear Applications," TID-7546,1961.
(3)
J. R. Weeks, " Corrosion of Materials in Spent Fuel Storage Pools," BNL-NUREG-23021, July 1977.
C.
Note objection.
D.
(1) Uniform Waterside Corrosion of Zircaloy Clad Fuel Rods, EPRI Contract RP1250, t
(2) Follow-On to EPRI/ NASA Cooperative Program on Stress Corrosion Cracking of Zircaloy EPRI Contract RP455.
E.
M. D. Houston (a,b); G. Georgiev (c,d).
A copy of the latter's profes-sional qualifications accompanied the NRC Staff's response to VEPCO's summary disposition motion.
).
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Interrocatory 14 Describe all adverse effects mentioned in Question 13 as they may be expected to occur over the following time periods:
(a) five years;
('b) fifteen years; (c) forty ycars.
If such infomation is not in your possession, is it in existence?
If so, identify it.
If not, why not?
Answer A.
Our answer to Interrogatory 11 on fuel cladding integrity and corrosion 1
stated that the calculated oxide layer from corrosion would be 0.05 to 0.07% of the cladding thickness after 100 years at 194 F in pool water.
No other adverse effects from the chemical, nuclear or thermal environ-ment were identified as concerns.
Spent fuel, currently part of a DOE study, has been in domestic storage for 20 years and the results through 18 years have been reported.b Foreign spent fuel experience has been reported fcr periods of five, seven, nine, ten and fifteen yearsN without instances of adverse effects.
Actual experience for storage of Zircaloy clad fuel for periods over 20 years does not exist. Calcula-I tions as described above have been perfomed for extended storage.
y A. B. Johnson, Jr., " Behavior of Spent Nuclear Fuel in Water Pool Storage," t3fML-2256 (September,1977).
6f A. B. Johnson, Jr., " Spent Fuel Storage Experience," Nucl. Tech., Vol. 43, (1979).
92/i 222
36 -
I Based on corrosion data published for stainless steel in more aggres-sive environments than in spent fuel storage pools, the corrosion rate of the stainless steel storage racks and liner should not exceed
~
5.90 x 10 inches per year during expected plant life.
B.
See n. 5 and n. 6, supra.
C.
BHL-NUREG-23021, Corrosion of Materials in Soent Fuel Storage Pools; BNL-NUREG-25582, Corrosion Considerations in the Use of Boral in i
Spent Fuel Storace Pools.
D.
(1) DOE funded program at Savannah River Laboratory, sub-contract to A. B. Johnson, Jr., Battelle Northwest Laboratories.
(2) Studies at Windscale, United Kingdom.
(3) Studies at Karlsruha, Federal Republic of Germany.
E.
M. D. Houson, G. Georgiev.
l i
r.
. interrocatory 15 (a) Have there been any changes in the flRC safety requirements relating to spent fuel pool storage since the expansion was proposed?
(b) Describe all such changes.
What are the projected costs of compliance with any such requirements?
Answer This request is objectionable.
It is overbroad, unduly burdensome, and irrelevant to a contention at issue in this proceeding.
/
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. Interrocatory 16 (a) Do you know of any proposed or pending modifications to the NRC requirements regarding spent fuel storage?
(b) Describe these modifications fully and project the cost of compliance with such requirements.
Answer I
Same objection as expressed in answer to Interrogatory 15 above.
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Interrogatory 17 Assume that the proposed modification of the SFP is not permitted, and that the SFP is filled to its capacity of 400 fuel assemblies.
(a) Describe all employee activities within the fuel building which involve a risk of radiation exposu.e, including but not limited to:
(i) changing filters and resi cartridges (ii) Other maintenance. including equipment maintenance (iii) cleaning operations (iv) surveillance (v) fuel loading and unloading (vi) preparing spent fuel for shipment offsite.
(b)
Describe the magnitude of the radiation exposures, in personrems, involved in these activities, including the radiation levels at all relevant locations and the person-hours of activity at those locations.
Answer A.
(a) The activities that take place in the fuel building and around equipment directly servicing the spent fuel pool are as follows:
(i) changing filters (twice per year), and changing resin demineralizer (ii) building maintenance, such as instrument calibration (iii) cleaning the edge of the spent fuel pool (weekly)
Q 7 /1 22b
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i I (iv) once a day an operator makes an inspection tour of the building (v) fuel movement for refueling (vi) loading of spent fuel shipping casks for offsite shipment of spent fuel.
(b) Based on experience at Surry, the projected personnel exposure would be:
(i) filter changes--Approximately 150 mR.
Demineralizer resin changes--Approximately 55 mR.
(ii) Maintenance--Exposures varies according to task.
(iii) Cleaning the edge of the spent fuel pool--Requires approxi-mately 16 man-hours in a field of approximately 1-3 mR/hr.
(iv) Operator's inspection tour--This inspection tour takes approxi-mately 30 minutes.
The average field on the operating level of the fuel building is approximately 1.5 mR/hr and the field in the basement of the fuel building is approximately 25-50 mR/hr. The operacor spends approximately equal time on each floor of the fuel building.
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(v) Fuel movement (refueling)--Requires a crew of 3 workers who work in a field of approxima:ely 1.5 mR/hr.
It takes 180
}
man-hours of work in the fuel building to accomplish a j
f refueling.
i i
i (vi) Loading spent fuel casks--This has never been done at Surry, but VEPC0 estimates that it would require 100 man-hours to load a cask.
The field for this operation would be approxi-5 mately 1.5 mR/hr.
B.
(1) VEPC0 Summary of Proposed Modification, @ 9.5, dated May 1, 1979.
(2) NRC Staff Safety Evaluation, 9 2.6, dated January 29, 1979.
(3) Specific information on exposure rates and estimated occupational doses provided separately by VEPCO.
C.
None.
D.
None.
E.
Thomas D. Murphy.
A copy of his professional qualifications accompanied the NRC Staff response to VEPC0's summary disposition
- motion, l' 7 '
)'j)Ib
. Interrogatory 18 Assume that the proposed modification of the SFP is permitted, and that the SFP is filled to its capacity of 966 fuel assemblies.
(a) Describe all employee activities within the fuel building which involve a risk of radiation exposure, including but not limited to:
(i) changing filters and resin cartridges (ii) other maintenance, including equipment maintenance (iii) cleaning operations (iv) surveillance (v) fuel loading and unloading (vi) preparing spent fuel for shipment offsite (b) Describe the magnitude of the radiation exposures, in person-rems, involved in these activities, including the radiation levels at all relevant locations and the person-hours of activity at those locations.
Answer (a) The activities to be performed would be the same as described in the response to Interrogatory 17 above.
(b)
It is not expected that the exposures for 966 fuel assemblies will differ significantly from the estimates given in that response.
There will be some radiation exposure to the plant personnel who replace the racks that have been exposed to radioactivity contami-nated coolant.
Based on information that we have on exposures to personnel from pressurized water reactors which already have
' / 'i ll()
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, modified their spent fuel storage pools, we would expect this exposure at the North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, to be less than 20 man-rems.
This operation is expected to be performed only once during the lifetime of the station and, therefore, any resultant exposure would represent only a small fraction of the total man-rem burden from expected occupational exposure.
Although it is expected that the additional spent fuel in the pool will increase the amount of corrosion and fission products intro-duced into the cooling water to some extent, the existing purifica-tion system will. provide adequate removal of those nuclides to assure that the radiation fields will not exceed 1.5 to 3.0 milli-rems per hour at waist level at the edge of the pool. We consider these radiation fields and resultant exposures during fuel handling operations to be as low as reasonably achievable and acceptable.
Based on operating experience at the Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2, the exposure of personnel to airborne radioactivity will be within the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.
B.
See response to Interrogatory 17(B) above.
C.
None.
G
(?4 230
. D.
lio ne.
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E.
T. D. Mu rphy.
t Respectfully submitted, l$sw d\\LL Steven C. Goldberg Counsel for f1RC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 13th day of July, 1979.
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45 AFFIRMATI0ft 0F PREPARATI0tl I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 1-1, 3, and 4(in part).
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Q LA N Paul H. Leech Subscribed and sworn to before me this/3% day of
/ f 7f W t.b> Ov&o4.O matary Puotic pn and for tne State of Maryland, Montgomery County
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tiy Commission expires:
/
I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 1-2(1).
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
4%, lJ ames Wilson Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ?
- day of
//77
- .c
,rl s t i /,...) A /,,,6O
/
140tary Public in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County l
My Commission expires:
/ 'Eb
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232 t
. I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 1-2(2), and 1-3.
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
F i
Howard McLain
- Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of Notary Public in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County My Commission expires:
I I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 2-3, and 2-4.
They are true
.and correct to the best of my knowledge-and belief, l
s I \\ at,~+ L Harry Krug j
Subscribed and swarn to before me this /c7* day of -a4d' /c/Jp
/
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O:v'/.;. M -
Notary Public in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County My Commission expires:
2
. / /7
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- Unavailable at this writing 0 7 /,
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. I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 5-1, 11,12,13/14 (in part)
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
W >c ?.
3..:.;., &
M. D. Houston Subscribed and sworn to before me this /3^ day of 4 /f7f fin ^ il,
L/Ju h, u Notary Public/in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County Ot4 //
My Commission expires :/
.f
/
I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 5 ~
5-4, and 4(in part).
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
hbbA=-~db* l?bk 'n:c6L<ej@
Aleunrier W. Dromerick Subscribed and sworn to before me this /y^ day ofW7 /, 9 y,L
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'llotary Public in and for the State of Maryland,' Montgomery County My Commission expires:
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I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 1, 2, and 5.
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
l hv
' J. Clark D
l Subscribed and sworn to before me l
this /3/6 day of
/f 7 f i
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.GU <, wkV llotary Public in and for the State of Maryland, frontgomery County My Commission expires:
/j/fO I prepared the answer to Interrogatory 13/14 (in part). They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
.m C
- w:, J,'y Gegrge B. Georgiev.
Subscribed and sw rn to before me this /Mday of
/1?f p
?t'ubino c } !v.g& >
ifotary Publice,in and for the State of 11aryland,-Montgomery County j
fiy Commission expires:
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I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 17, and 18.
They are true and j
correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
ut d /
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' ' Thomas D. Murphy Subscribed and sw rn to before me thisJ3kday of
.e(<,t977 W AN
~Y? fab 4 flotary Public.in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County My Commission expires:
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Modified Staff response,dtd June 29,1979 Interrogatory 8 (p.6):
Describe the most destructive (1) tornado and (2) turbir.e missiles which could conceivably be expected to enter the SFP.
Answer:
(A).(1). The utility pole would represent the most destructive tornado missile which could conceivably be expected to enter the SFP.
Its assumed weight and dimensions are 1490 pounds, and 131/2 inch diameter by 35 feet in length, respectively.
j (2). A quadrant of the largest low pressure turbine wheel is the most 1
destructive turbine missile which could conceivably be expected to enter the SFP.
Tha quadrant would weigh 3960 pounds and have over-3 all dimensions of about 21/2, 3, and 4 feet along the three i
principal axes of the quadrant.
j i
I (B).l.
Same as reference 2 in answer to Interrogatory 6(B) above.
2.
Westinghouse " Report Covering the Effects of a High Pressure Turbine Rotor Fracture and low Pressure Turbine Disc Fracture at Design Over-speed," pp. 7 and 8 (April 1974).
(C).
Note objection.
(D).
None (E).
K. Campe, C. Ferrell.
I2
'237
P.A. Question No. 9 (p.6)
(a) What is the probability that such missiles would be expected to enter the SFP over the life of the plant?
(b) What would be the radiological consequences of such missiles?
7 (c) Assuming that the proposed modification is not permitted, what is the probability that such missiles would strike directly more than one fuel assembly?
(d) Assuming that the proposed modification is permitted, what is the probability that such missiles would strike more than one assembly?.
Staff Response (a)
The probability th' t a utility pole would enter the SFP over the a
life of the plant is no more than 2 x 10-3 if it is assumed that the probability of striking and entering the spent fuel pool building at 21 feet above grade or higher is one.
The probability that a turbine missile egter the SFP over the life-time of the plant is on the order of 10~
(b)
If a utility pole were to enter the SFP while the pool contained 1/3 of a freshly discharged reactor core, and if it is assumed arbitrarily that the pole damages all of these assemblies, the dose consequence would be 52 x 5.3 or 275.5 rem to the thyroid at the site boundary.
If a turbine missile were to enter the SFP, it may strike the spent fuel racks and damage a number of assemblies.
An upper limit on the number of assemblies that could be damaged can be estimated by considering that the missile strikes a fuel rack with the largest projected missile cross sectional area, and that all spent fuel assemblies within the area, plus those that are adjacent to the area, are damaged.
The principal maximum dimensions with respect to the largest projected missile area are about six feet by two and a half feet.
Thus for the proposed fuel storage configuration, a maximum of about 24 assemblies could be damaged.
Significantly fewer assemblies would be damaged if the missile strikes the fuel racks in most of the other possible orientations.
The consequences due to a single damaged fuel assembly are estimated as 30 rem to the thyroid and 2 rem to the whole body at the site boundary (North Anna SER Chapter 15).
Thus a conservative estimate of the radiological consequences due to a turbine missile entering:
the SFP may be as high as 720 rem to the thyroid and 48 rem to the.
whole body at the site boundary.
However, the probability for such an event is extremely low.
Taking into account the missile generation probability (10-4 per turbine year), the high trajectory turbine missile strike probability (10-7 per square foot of horizontal area per missile), the maximum stored fuel area (about 2500 square feet), the probability of missile orientation having a maximum projected area (about 0.3), the number of turbine units which are assumed to be operating at the time that recently discharged fuel c 7,r 73Un is being stored in the SFP (3 Units), the fraction of the year
~
during which freshly dircharged fuel is expected to be stored in the SFP (about 20 days cut of 365), and the assumed plant lifetime (40 years), the probability is:
(10~4) (10-7) (2500) (0.3) (3) (20/365) (40)
-8 or 4.8 x 10 for the life of the plant that the above dose consequence i
could be produced.
t (c) About the same as with the proposed modification.
(d)' If either of these missiles enters the SFP, the probability of striking more than one assembly is close to one.
This is true for
~
either the present or the proposed fuel storage configuration.
(B).l.
Same as reference 1 in answer to Interrogatory 6(B) above.
2.
North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Final Safety Analysis Report, Figs.1.2-17 and 1.2-18, (May 6,1977).
3.
Same as reference 2 in answer. to Interrogatory 8(p.6)(B) above.
4.
" Amendment to operating license North Anna Power Station, Unit 1, proposed Technical Specification change No.10;" Letter from C. M.
Stallings, VEPC0, to E. G. Case, NRC, dated May 1, 1978, at pp. 26 and 28 of Attachment B.
5.
Standard Review Plan, " Turbine Missiles," Section 3.5.1.3, Revision 1.
(C).
Note objection.
(D),
None.
(E).
K. Campe.
- =.
- AFFIPMATION OF PREPAPATI0tl*
i I prepared the answers.to Interrogatories 2-2, 8, and 8(p.6)(in part). They are true and correct to the best of my knowle%e and belief.
A, Z W w C F Charles M. Ferrell l
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of June,1979.
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-[: :. v.Adbh tiotary Puolic in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County My Cc nmission expires: July 1, 1982 I prepared the answers to Interrogatories 6, 7, 9, 8(p.67* 9'p.67*and 10.
They are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
r'a's'C.'- A we M. Campe/
Kazim Subscribed and sworn to before me this /43 day of.,'
_*<
- 1979.
- / "h*.?
d.
0 s
_a flotary Public in and for the State of Maryland, Montgomery County My Conmission expires: July 1,1982 I prepared the answer to Interrogatory 22.
It is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
d /L U
Jared S. Wermiel Subscribed and sworn to before me this 2nd day of July,1979.
- Messrs. Campe and Wenniel are i
M[
a9 unavailable at this writing, b /.','d. bC /l~
/cu u \\/t /2.t /t.
Their sworn affidavits will flotary Public in and for the State be provided later, of Maryland, Montgomery County 0j/
'40 2
My Conmission expires: July 1, 1982
- Modified.
~.
RICHARD J. CLARK PROFESSIONAL OUALIFICATIONS DIVISION OF OPERATIMG REACTORS For the past 2 years I have been employed as a Project Manager with the Division of Operating Reactors, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, responsible for preparation of Safety Evaluations and Environmental Assessments of modifications to reactor facilities.
For the previous 18 months, I was a nuclear and environmental engineer with the Environ-mental Evaluation Branch, Division of Operating Reactors; as part of my duties I coordinated the preparation of environmental assessments on all applications to increase the storage capacity of spent fuel pools.
For the previous four years ' was employed as an Environmental Project Manager with the Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis, USNRC, responsible for managing and coordinating the review of applicant's environmental reports, analysis and evaluation of environmental impacts of nuclear power plant construction and operation and the preparation of NRC Environmentai Statements in accordance with the Commission's regulation, 10 CFR Part 51, which implements the requirements of the National Environ-mental Policy Act of 1969.
I was the Environmental Project Manager for the Vogtle, Tyrone, Barton, Connecticut Yankee, Fort St. Vrain, Big Rock Point, Hartsville..Quanicassee, Browns Ferry, Oconee, Wood, Haven, Erie and Sundesert Nuclear Stations.
Since graduation from lensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1951 with a B. S.
in Bio-Chemical Engineering, my 26 years of experience has been entirely
([) /}
- 2. 0
_2 in the nuclear field, primarily in the design, engineering and operation of nuclear power plants.
~~
From 1952 to 1956 I was a Works Technical Engineer at the AEC's (now DOE's) Savannah River Plant. My principal assignments were as a Health Physics Supervisor, evaluating the radiation exposure and toxicity problems associated.with fuel reprocessing, heavy water production, fuel fabrication and reactor operation as well as startup of the first reprocessing facility.
I was also involved in pilot plant studies for fuel separation.and corrosion studies for the reactor and the fuel reprocessing facilit'ies.
From 1956 to 1960, I was Chief of Chemical Technology for Alco Products, Inc.
During this period, I help ~ed design, construct, startup and operate.___
the Army Package Power Reactor which achieved criticality in April 1957 and was the first nuclear power reactor in this country to feed electricity into a commercial utility system grid.
Subsequently, I also had a major role in the design, engineering, construction and startup of nuclear power plants in Alaska and Greenland, as well as participating in the design of a pebble-bed gas cooled reactor and commercial, low-enricher, light water reactors. The R&D programs I directed during this period developed some of the basic technology on activity transport and deposition, coolant purification, corrosion control and decontamination.
I was responsible for extensive R&D test programs on the corrosion behavior of materials, development of decontamination solutions and techniques and water chemistry studies using autoclaves, dynamic loops with model boilers and in-reactor test loops.
e?4 242
. From 1960 to 1971 I was employed by the Army Nuclear Power Program as Chief, Chemical Technology and Mechanical Engineering Sections; Chief, Power Systems Branch, and as the agency's environmental protection and preservation officer.
In these assignments I was respcnsible for the design, development and engineering associated with operation of six of the military land-based nuclear power plants and several test reactors, including the areas of water chemistry, water treatment, radiochemistry, chemical control, radwaste treatment, and mechanical design.
I personally directed in-house and contractor R&D ~ programs on the corrosion of steam generator materials, decontamination, water chemistry control irradiation 3
behavior of materials and chemical cleaning.
I supervised the out-of-service chemical cleaning of a nuclear steam generator (twice) and the in-service chemical cleaning of a nuclear steam generator using chelating agents.
During my eleven years with the Program, I redesigned and supervised the operation of purification systems for three spent fuel pools and asnsted in the physical transfer of new and spent fuel assemblies in both reactor vessels and spent fuel pools.
I have helped clan for and carry out the decommissioning of five nuclear power plants.
Since 1956, I have been a member of the ASME Research Committee on Water in Thermal Power Systems (formerly Research Committee on Boiler Feedwater Studies).
In April 1977, I was elected to a five-year term on the Executive Committee and as Task Chairman for Contamination / Decontamination.
This committee is the principal technical committee concerned with water treatment, chemical treatment, aqueous corrosion, chemical cleaning, 074
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- deposition and carryover in nuclear and conventional power plants.
I am also a member of ANS and a former section chairman and regional director for the National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) and a member of the NACE T-llA Committee (High Purity and Power Plant Waters).
During the past 22 years I have authored a number of reports and articles on nuclear power plant design and operation.
I have testified at the hearings associated with expansion of the spent fuel storage capacity for Prairie Island, Vermont Yankee and Trojan and assisted in the preparation of testimony for the hearings for Beaver Valley, Salem, Zion and Kewaunee.
During the past 15 years, I have had considerable experience with land o
use planning, zoning, sociaeconomic appraisals and planning for local governmental services.
I have served four years as president of my.
local citizen's association, I was co-founder and co-chairman for three years of the Mt. Vernon Council of Citizens' Associations (representing l
42 community associations) and a director and committee chairman of the Federation of Citizens' Associations representing 140 communities in an area of over one-hal f million population.
I have been elected or appointed to six local or regional boards and commissions concerned with planning, transportation, public works, public safety, parks and recreation i
and finance.
I am currently an assistant Scoutmaster, Troop 654, BSA, as well as a Commissioner et al.
During the past 15 years, I have served Scouting in various capacities on the local, District and Council levels.
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PROFESSI0flAL QUALIFICATI0tlS James H. Wilson U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0tl WASHINGT0fl, D.C.
I am currently employed as Environmental Scientist in the Environmental Specialists Branch, Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis, Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
As a member of the Aquatic Resources Section of this branch, I have respon-sibility to review and evaluate the operation of nuclear power plants to assure protection of the aquatic environment.
In this capacity I:
perform license amendment reviews and prepare environmental impact appraisals in support of license amendment actions; perfom studies of technical issues and problems within the section's area of responsibility and prepare reports containing technical bases and recommended positions; provide assistance to the technical staffs of the Division of Operating Reactors and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement on significant environmental matters that affect operating power plants; and interact with other State and Federal agencies charged with environmental protection and monitoring and impact assessment and mitigation. My other duties include: participation in research review groups to provide licensing input, monitor the progress of research programs and recommend changes in research programs to meet licensing neede.; and review of progress reports and technical results of technical assistance programs in support of the licensing effort under contract with the flational Labort. tories, other Government agencies, and academic and private institu-tions to assure contractor compliance with contract requirements.
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i Since 1976 I have: worked on license amendments requiring Environmental i
Impact Appraisals at 34 operating nuclear power plants - ten of these have j
involved either major revisions or complete reissue of the Environmental I
Technical Specifications; served as lead reviewer in the investigation and evaluation of the impact of pesticide contamination on the fisheries at Arkansas Nuclear One; served as technical coordinator / project manager for the review and evaluation of a waste treatment system not previously licensed for use at nuclear power plants; and served on working committees to review 316(a) and (b) guidance manuals, standard review plans and standard environ-mental technical specifications.
I have a Bachelor of Science in Biology from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1971) and a Master of Science in Zoology from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1973), which was funded by a Training Grant from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
While at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, I undertook research in a variety of areas, specializing in aquatic ecology and inverte-brate physiology.
Other areas of research which resulted in published papers include thermal studies of macroinvertebrates and fishes, recovery of i
damaged aquatic ecosystems, and studies on the distribution of freshwater fishes and macroinvertebrates.
I have authored or co-authored some 14 publications on the above areas of research. My fonnal education program has encompassed and emphasized studies in Zoology, Ecology, Aquatic Entomology, Physiology, Toxicoloy and statistical methods for data handling and analysis.
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I I have served as a consultant, through Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, to American Electric Power Company, IMC Corporation, 1
Department of Entomology - Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State i
i University, and Department of Microbiology - Clemson University.
During the summer of 1970 I was employed as a research assistant by the U.S.
Department of the Interior at the U.S. Sport Fisheries and Wildlife Fisheries Research Lab of the flational Fisheries Center and Aquarium.
I am currently a member of the American Fisheries Society, Virginia Herpeto-logical Society, Association of Southeastern Biologists, Society of Sigma X1, and the Virginia Academy of Science.
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liosard ?. Mc L.l i n Professioral Qualtfications Energ/ Di v i t.i on Oak iticge.ht iar.al L abora ton y.
Mr. P.cLain has been a staf f n;ed:se of the Oak Ridge iblional Laoaratory I
s i r.c e 195o.
lie is presently the leader of the group at Gik Ridge fiatior.al L4,uratory tnat prepares the thermal-hydrualic portions of the DrafI and Final Environc: ental Statec.ents for the nuclear Regulatory Conunission and i
e otner Feueral agencies.
tse has been a me:acer of tht s secup tir,ce July 1973.
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Price to u.at t hne, na has. spent trost of ni s time at the Lacoratcry doing i
.I heat transrer and fluia flos studies for experimental and research nuclear l
reactvrs.
Mr f'r.L4in 's forraal eJocation is in enemical engineering.
He received a L. S. descue f ro.c ',layne s ta te 'Jn ivers i ty in 1950, a M. $. degree from Uni versny c,f ".tunesc,ta in 1952, and a t'hD degree tro:a Purdca Universi ty in 1956.
de also attend,M /td. Ridge Scrical of ReacNr Tecnnology in 1958.
Mr. ftcLain helped to prepare the solar energy portion of the accument 0;ue. - 50Bt t i tl ed " An As se-s!.a.en t of the Envi ron.nenta l la;:act of Al ternativa Energ y Sources" publi snea in Sept,tntr,er 1974.
Tnis portion of the docwnent inc)udes wind energy and t.e has done an extensiva re de of this field recently.
He is & atencer of the ic.erican Institute of Cheo.ical Engineers, American
.Wr. t uur Sac i.: ty, n'werican As sociation for the Advancevent of Science Tau Beth P i, a nd Si r,, na X i.
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