ML19249C043
| ML19249C043 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Burstein S WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909070233 | |
| Download: ML19249C043 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES I
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 Docket No. 50-266 Docket No. 50-301 Wisconsin Electric Power Company ATTN:
Mr. Sol Burstein Executive Vice President Power Plants 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-02, Revision 1, Supplement No.
1, which clarifies NRC positions on actions requested with regard to your power reactor facilities with an operating license.
Should you have any questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, b
James G. Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-02 Revision No. 1 (Supplement No. 1) cc w/ encl:
Mr. G. A. Reed, Plant Manager Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR C. M. Trammell, ORB /NRR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Sandra A. Bast, Lakeshore Citizens for Safe Energy ID000?c233 s !! 2
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6820 Accession No:
7908150164 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 August 20, 1979 U
IE Bulletin No. 79-02 Revision No. 1 (Supplement No. 1)
PIPE SUPPORT BASE PLATE DESIGNS USING CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR BOLTS Description of Circumstances:
The supplement to IE Bulletin No. 79-02 is intended to establish criteria for the evaluation of interim acceptability of plant operation with less than the design factors of safety for piping supports due to as-built problems, under design, base plate flexibility, or anchor bolt deficiencies.
In the reviews for system operability of the Duane Arnold and Crystal River facilities, criteria have been developed by the NRC staff that defines pipe support operability. The criteria has been applied in lieu of other analysis or evalua-tion. Specifically, the licensees identified problems with pipe supports in which the original design factors of safety were not met but some lesser margin was available. The design margins of four or five are intended to be final design and installation objectives but systems may be classed as operable on an interim basis with some lesser margin providing a program of restoration to at least the Bulletin factors of safety has been developed. Facilities which fall outside the operability criteria are considered to probably require a Technical Specifica-tion exception and will require review on a case by case basis.
Action to be Taken by Licensees:
For the following two cases, plant operation may continue or may begin:
For the support as a unit, the factor of safety compared to ulti-a.
mate strengths is less than the original design but equal to or g'reater than two.
b.
For the anchor bolts the factor of safety is equal to or greater than two and for the support steel the original design factor of safety com-pared to ulitmate strengths is met.
The above criteria may be applied provided that the affected systems are up-graded to design margins of safety expeditiously for normally accessibile supports and by the next refueling for nonaccessible supports. Accessibility is as de-fined in Bulletin No. 79-14 where "normally accessible" refers to those accas of the plant which can be entered during reactor operation.
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IE Bulletin No. 19-02, Revision No. 1 Page 2 of 2 Supplement No. 1 August 20, 1979 1.
Any support not satistying the criteria should be classed as inoperable and the Technical Specification action statement met unless it can be shown that the system can function in a design basis seismic event without the support.
s32 Repairs to supports should result in return to the design factor of safety.
3.
Operations may be continued while repairs to upgrade the system from a factor of safety equal to or greater than two with respect to design loads are performed.
Consideration must be given to the effect of the repait process on support function and system operability.
In o'Aer words the tiac the support is not functional should be limited to T.. action statement times or the support must be determined not to cause the system to be unable to perform its function in a seismic event. The licensee should also exercise care not to take several supports on a given system out of service at the same time or cause both trains of one safeguards system to be made inoper-able at the same time.
Control over workmen on safety related systems during plant operation requires a high degree of control by the licensee.
4.
There are no special reporting requirements for this supplement to the Bulletin; however, the reporting requirements as set forth in the regula-tions and licenses must be met.
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