ML19249B072
| ML19249B072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Flint J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290532 | |
| Download: ML19249B072 (45) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
1 In the Matter of:
2:
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTEsVIEW 31 of I
4j Mr. John H. Flint l
Physics Tests Coordinator, Unit 2 Si 6l 1
7 81 Trailer #203 9l NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11l April 23, 1979 12 (Date or Interview)
I 13l June 19, 1979 l
(Date Transcript Typea) 14; 58 and 59 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17:
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NRC PERSONNEL:
22l j
James S. Creswell, Reactor Inspector 23!
Donald C. Kirkpatrick, Nuclear Engineer 2f i
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1; SHACKLETON: lhe time is now 6:08 p.m., April 23, 1979. This is an f
2l interview of Mr. John H. Flint. Mr. Flint is presently assigned as the Physics Tests Coordinator, Unit 2, at the Three Mile Island Nuclear 4l Power Plant operated by the Metropolitan Edison Company.
This interview ci is being conducted in Trailer 203 just outside the south gate at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant.
Present to conduct this interview 7l are:
Mr. James S. Creswell. Mr. Creswell is a reactor inspector for 8
Region III of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm',sion.
Also present is i
9l Mr. Donald C. Kirkpatrick. Mr. Kirkpatrick is a nuclear engineer assigned 10 to Inspection and Enforcement headquarters of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ll!
Commission in Washington, D.C. Also present at the request of Mr. Flint 12!
is Mr. William H. Behrle.
Mr. Behrle is project engineer for the 13 Metropolitan Edison Company.
14; 15i SHACKLETON:
Prior to starting this taped interview, I preseaced to Mr.
16:
Flint a two page document prepared by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 17!
Commission which explains..le purpose, the scope and the rights of the 18l individual regarding giving a signed statement and explaining this 19h investigation.
At this time, Mr. Flint signed the three questions 20l "yes" that I'm going to repeat here for the record.
21;l 22 SHACKLETON:
Mr. Flint did you understand both pages cf the document?
23 24 FLINT:
Yes, I did.
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SHACKLETON:
And do we have your permission to tape t:lis interview?
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3 FLINT:
Yes, you do.
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l A l SHACKLETON:
And, would you like a copy of this tape or a transcript?
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FLINT:
I would prefer a transcript.
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SHACKLETON:
All right, sir. Mr. Flint, for those persons who are 10I listening to this tape, would you please give us some background in-11l formation on yourse'lf as to your credentials and being involved in your 12!
present job assignment.
l 131 14!
FLINT:
I am presently an engineer with Babcock and Wilcox Company.
My 15i prior experience includes approximately 5 years in the United Sta es 16!
Naval Nuclear Power Program.
I have 615 years as a Fenior Reactor 17l Uperator licensed on three reactors with the General Atomic Company and 181 have been with Babcock and Wilcox almost seven years.
During the 19!
period of time I've been with Babcock and Wilcox I was a physics test 20l engineer on the startup Oconee units 1 and 2 for Duke Power Company in 21 South Carolina; ihree Mile Island Unit 1 at Metropolitan Edison Company, 22 was approximately 1 year in the preoperational and initial criticality 23l testing at the Toledo Edison Company, Toledo, Ohio; and was assigned as l
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a phycics test coordinator Unit 2, Three Mile Island, for GPU Service Corporation, was in charge of the physics program startup operational 3t j
testing and prior to this transient was in process of writing st. ' tup report for Unit 2.
Si 6
SHACKLETON:
Thank you.
And now gentlemen, we vill begin our questioning, 7
and for the purposes of those listening to the tape, Mr. Flint was i
8!
present on March 23, 1979, some hours after the problem at Three Mile 9!
Island was identified.
Mr. Flint, could you give the listening audience 10 the best details that you can recall as to your actions and activities 11:
on that day?
12l 13I FLINT:
At approximately 0830 on the 20th of March, I arrived at the 14!
North gate to the Island only to be stopped due to security personnel 15; restricting anyone from coming on the Isl :nd.
It took me approximately 16i 20 niinutes to a half hour to have the security guards call in and 17!
contact the control room to find out if my services were required. At 18!
approximately 0900 I was granted permission to go on the Island; im-19!
mediately went to the Unit 2 turbine area where we have the entrance 20j for Unit 2 and went directly to the control room.
On entering the 21j control room, I noticed that the normal alarms were lit aid that the 22{
typers were printing out as normally occurs following a turbine / reactor 23!
trip.
Ah, I also noticed that the Emergency Team for radiation type 24l emergency was in attendance in the control room at this time.
I talked 25j with the Control Room personnel and this is primarily with Bill Zewe, I
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1l the Shift Supervisor, Ed Fredricks, the Control Room Operator, and Lee 2:
j Rogers, Babcock and Wilcox Site Representative, and learned that the 3l l
conditions were abnormal for this type of a transient.
In talking with 4!'
these personnel and looking at the console indications and the computer c
printouts, I noted that the hat leg temperaturas for the primary system were in excess of 620 F, cold leg temperatures were significantly lower 7I than this, which would be unusual in this condition, pressure was low 8'I in the reactor coolant system, all control rods were on the bottom.
01 Indications for the source and intermediate range appeared to be normal, l
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for this period of time following a shutdown condition. I did notice, l' ;'
however, that there were several blips on the records
'or sourcefintermediate
^
12 range and in conversation with Ed Fredricks he informed me that they 13!
thought at the time that they.were going critical and that they had 14!
added additional boron to the system.
At this time, I infcrmed them 15:
that in all probability this was not the case, that there had been a 16; change in leakage flux path from the reactor core to the detectors and 17!
it was not in fact the case the reactor going critical again.
Look:nc 18{
at the recorder that prints out the steam generator and reactor coolant 19l temperatures on wide range which runs from approximately 0 to 800 F, 20, there were 2 temperatures that were printing up scale on the hot leg 21!
temperatures; one approximately 770 degress, the other apprcximately 22!
800 degrees.
Now these thermocouples are not normally used in this 23 range so I was not certain that they would give an accurate temperature, 24!
only indications cf approximate ranges.
Ivan Porter, Metropolitan 25i Edison I&C engineer, showed me a setup where he had set up a bridge and 891 027
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was reading out a temperature in the back or the control room that was 2!
l converting instances was above the normal Rosemont Calibration scale, 31 came out to be approximately 725 F, which tended to back up the indications 4l we'd seen on the other recorder.
Talked to various personnel in the 5l Control Room, Gary Miller, the rest of the Operations personnel such as George Kunder, informed me of sequence of events that led up to this 71 position.
At this time I again talked with Ed Fredricks and both he 8l i
and I were convinced that we had in fact a solid steam bubble in both b
loops of the hot legs.
At the time, I attempted to initiate the filling 10f of the steam generator to induce natural circulation or at least remove llf enough heat to collapse steam bubbles sufficient to run a reactor 12 coolant pump.
At this time I had been informed that they had tried to 13!
bump the pumps earlier and that they had seen little or no flow indication 14!
and had therefore secured the pumps.
At that time, to the best of my 15!
knowledge, natural circulation had not been started they were just in 16i the process of filling the generators.
Shortly after this, they tried 17l to attempt to pressurize the system and collapse the bubbles by using 18i pressure.
I had at that time informed them that they could not do it 19i this way in all probability Lecause of the high temperatures, the 20!
pressure would exceed the allowable pressure we could go to in the RCS 21 and that the Code safetys would lift long before we got there.
- However, 22 the attemot was made in the in tne possibility that thermocouples were 23 not indicating properly and that just was a chance that it uay in fact 2
collapse the bubble.
It did not n rk, and they then brought the pressure 25I back down.
During this period of time they were dumping steam out of I
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l' the atmospheric dumps, this was approximately 1100 to 1230.
This was i
2f the mode that they were using to get rid of decay heat.
They had lost 31 the auxiliary boilers from Unit 1, (not have condenser vacuum, this was 4!
the reason they were using this mode); the "B" generator was bottled up Sij a': this time because tnere had been a reported primary to secondary U
leak.
They had taken another set of samples and confirmed the fact t
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that there was activity in the "B" generator.
About this time, Gary 8
Miller was preparing to go with George Kunder and Jack Herbein to see 9I the Governor.
We received a call that indicated that the Governor c:d 10l not want us dumping radioactive steam out.
He was under the impression 11j that's what we were dumping, although we had an individual on top of 12l the turbine building monitoring, we had people around the site; we had i
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no contamination with dumping.
However, the governor wanted the atmos-14:
pheric dump valve shut and it was shut at approximately 12:30. At this 15:
period of time they were essentially removing decayed heat by either 16i opening the block valve for the electromatic relief valve, which is 17!
RCV2, and dumping down into the reactor building, or dumping down into ISI the condensor on the bypass valves. In this range of time, heard'a 19i double thump, and at the time we had been in and out of respirators.
I 20 assumed that the sound I heard was just a ventilation cycling at this 21; time.
There appears to be a correlation with this and the reported i
22l hydrogen detonation in the building at that time.
Shortly af* ?rward; 23j we received our alarms for high building pressure, ECCS, building 24!
spray, and so forth.
But, as I say, at that time, I just thought the 2Si noise was associated with the building dampers. Spent several hours i
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feeding with the high pressure injection pun.ps.
Finally succeeded in bringing the hot leg temperature on the "A" side down on scale.
At 3
this point in time, the operator attempted to switch the inlet piping 4l that was sending the high pressure injection in to try to collapse the
]N (ah) "B" side also.
At that time he lost the "A" side, went back up off scale above 620. It was requested that we once again attempt to l
collapse the bubble. We took the pressure back to approximately 2300 O!
pounds; held it there for approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (I again explain, I did 9!
not believe we could collapse it because of the temperatures we were 10 at).
It did not work and we were unable to ollapse it this way. There ll{
was then some concern about whether or not we actually had the core IN!
covered.
We felt that we did, but elected to reduce pressure in an 13!
attempt to bring the core flood tanks on.
Through the injection nozzles 1*
of the core flood tanks, and coming right into the downcomer, it was 15:
felt that if the core was not covered that there should be a significant 16j level and pressure change in there when they actuated.
Pressure was 17!
slowly brought down, core flood tanks actuated, level came down slowly, 18!
ve did not see any significant changes during this portion of time to 19:
indicate that we were, in fact, not covering the core.
There was no 20j noticeable change in the count rate for the source range instrumentation, 21 which would also indicate that we had not significantly changed anything 22l in there. We found thai,we were steaming again in going down on the i
23 bypass valve and so forth, had filled the steam generators up, removed 24!
enough heat that the "A" loop temperature came back on scale, the cold 25i i
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l leg temperatures started coming up and we felt that we had collapsed 2!
l the bubble to some degree in the "A" side.
During this portion of time 3!
l we were periodically printing out the RTD's of the incare themoccuples 4 '
and following the temperatures in the core.
When we first started dumping them out many of them had question marks, which indicated they 6l were above their normal scale of 700 not prirting out " bad" which 7l l
would indicate that they had failed. Over the next few hours these 81 thermocouples gradually came back on scale we were recovered more and 9
more of them and towards late afternoon I believe we had most of them 10!
indicating on scale. We then elected to run a reactor coolant pump.
We 11; chose the "A" loop since we have spray on this side and this would be 12 therefore, the best side to get a pump on if possible.
Additionally 3,i since the "B" side was bottled up, we had a better chance of dropping 14 heat across the "A" side.
In order to be prudent, we only bumped the 15 "lA" pump for approximately 10 seconds.
We tried the "2A" pump, it did 16' not start so we went to the "lA".
During the approximately 10 to 11 17!
seconds we ran the "1A" pump, reactor coolant pump, we had good flow 18i indications and a normal indication of pump current.
We did not tnerefore, 19!
have any reasons to believe that seals had failed, all the seal pressures 20l and leakages were normal and so fortt We then waited approximately 15 21 minutes.
This is a normal mode since can draw a large amount of 22f surge current on it we do not want to start the pump any more often l
23 than we have to.
Since we felt that we had moved water, the temper-24!
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atures appeared to be good, we did not feel that we had a two phased 2'
i, blowdown there. We then turned on the "1A" pump again, approximately 31 15 to 18 minutes later, and left it on.
The temperatures did in fact 4j come down on the "A" side and later slowly started coming down on the "B" side.
Late in the evening, approximately 2200 to 2218, in that 6i range, we had the temperatures down and we did reestablish a bubble in 7I the pressurizer. I believe that pretty well covers a general overview 0
of what I observed that day and what I participated in.
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10 CRESWELL:
OK John, thank you. I'd like to go back to the previous day.
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Ah, John having looked at the security logs, I note that that you were 12l in from the time period of 1445 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00239 weeks <br />5.498225e-4 months <br /> to 1555 hours0.018 days <br />0.432 hours <br />0.00257 weeks <br />5.916775e-4 months <br />.
Could you briefly 131 describe what you did during that time period?
14t 15' FLINT:
Since that time period would be the time period that I normally 16; go up to the Control Room, talk to the Control Room Operators, find out 17' if conditions were normal, which I did at least once a day.
We had the 18!
Reactimeter, which is B&W's name for a data logging system, data acqui-19!
sition system 24-channel capability.
Its on an automatic 3-second 20:
logging frequency, at least once a day change the magnetic tape in it.
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This is the period of time when I went in and I always try to stop at 22 the Control Room before I go in to change the tape.
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So you did change a tape out?,
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FLINT:
That is correct.
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- 9 CRESWELL:
And a tape would last for how long?
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FLINT:
Tape on a 3-second logging frequency will last for approximately 8l 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br />.
9!
10l CRESWELL:
OK.
Were there any particular points that you were monitoring 11; at that time?
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FLINT:
Do Ju have any problem there?
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15 BEHRLE:
No.
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17 FLINT:
Ah, OK.
During a normal r 1de in which we might experience a 181 transient of some type, we normally monitor reactor coolant system 19i pressure, the hot leg on the primary side, the cold legs on the primary 20l side, pressurizer level, the spray valve position, steam generator i
21l operate and startup levels, steam generator pressures, turbine header 22l pressure, makeup tank level, drain tank pressure.
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24 CRESWELL:
That's reactor coclant drain tank pressure?
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FLINT:
Reactor coolant drain tank pressure.
(eedwater flows on ti,a i
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"A" and "B" loop on the secondary side, feedwater temperature; pretty 31 IL -
the parameters that we normally would look at.
t 4l CRESWELL:
Ah, the reactor coolant drain tank pretsure - why was it of 0
interest?
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8I FLINT:
If for some reason you had lifted the safety valve, you can get 9f an inference from the changes in the drain tank pressure.
This is s;rt 10l of a backup system to incur on a transient to see how long you had 11l blown down.
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CRESV"LL:
OK.
Have you had scme previous experience tha; indicated 14i that you needed to monitar that particular parameter?
15-l 16i FLINT:
I don't know as I'd use the term "needed to" It's more that 17!
We felt its a nice parcmeter to have.
There had been one or two ocassions 1S{
down at Oconee where we had a rupture disk go on the tank and therefore 191 we were trying to follow what was the occurring during the transient 20!
and as I say, it is a backup in case one of the other systems didn't 21l
- ell me the information, this was another way of gaining it.
Sort of i
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like on the steam generator, you're normally on the operate level, but 23 we monitor both the startup and the operate for overlapoing redundancy, 24 if you will.
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12 If' CRESWELL:
OK, So you were the one that selected the data points that 2';
would be put in the Reactimeter?
31 4!
FLINT:
That is correct.
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UI CRESWELL:
Oh.
So, I think you mentioned that you arrived at the gate.
7 What, the north gate or the south?
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9f FLINT:
North Gate.
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CRESWELL:
North Gate.
About 7:30 a.m.?
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0 13l FLINT:
Approximately 0830.
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CRESWELL:
0830.
I'm sorry. Ah, and you were there for what - about 30 16i minutes?
17!
lSi FLINT:
20 to 30 minutes.
I'd say closer to 30 minutes.
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CRESWELL:
Ah, could you expand on that time period.
Did you initially i
21:
walk up to the guard, or could you develop that time period for us?
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, FLINT:
No.
The first several minutes, I just sat there debating 24 whether to go up to the observation center, which is the rarmal col-25j
{lectionpointforthistypeof,anisolationofthesite,mostpeople l
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will go up there.
However, I noticed that Unit 1 had not come up and I 2!
l knew that that morning was scheduled to come back up line; and about 31 i
that period of time before I decided to go up.to the observation center, 4!'
personnel started coming down.
Most of them appeared to be instrumentation t
e technicians to go on the Island.
I therefore felt that there was no 6i reason why at least some people could not go on and therefore at that 7l time approached the security personnel.
Took a few minutes to convince I
him that he should ccatact the Control Room and find out if my assistance was required.
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llI CRESWELL:
OK. What did you observe while you were waiting there that
' 2 'I 25-30 minute period?
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If FLIN3 ' rimarily that both units were down and, that traffic was being 15i sent up to the observation center, there were several security personnel 16i in the area.
There were only (I believe) 2 or 3 cars there when I was 17:
t h e rr..
It was just a normal atmosphere, just possibly overrunnir.g a 18!
security drill except for the fact that I noticed that the cooling, 191 there was nothing coming out of the cooling towers on Unit 2.
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21l CRESWELL:
OK.
And you noticed the same on Unit 1 and that's how you 22!
derived that Unit 1 wasn't back on line.
I 23l 241 FLINT:
That is correct.
2s:
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i*t CRESWELL:
OK.
Ah, did someone call you at home to come in or is the 2
normal time for you to come in?
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FLINT:
This is approximately the normal time I would have come in in c;
-l the morning.
I received no phone call at home.
But I have a very Gi selective phone system.
I can call out at any time but only approxi-7f mately 40% of the messages come in.
I spent about a year fighting with 8!
the phone company on this but no success yet.
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10i CRESWELL:
OK.
Getting back with TMI.
Ah, You finally gained access.
11 The guard, well what, the guard told you you could go in?
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FLINT:
He contacted the Unit 2 Control Room; I believe spoke to Gary 14; Miller or George Kunder and they said to send me in.
15:
16; CRESWELL:
OK.
So could you ah, briefly describe how you got up to the 17!
control room?
18; 19i FLINT:
Went down to the normal access we use to go into Unit 2, which 20l is through the security access gate down the Unit 2 turbine building, 21' went in through the turbine building, and up to the control tower.
22' 23 CRESWELL:
What did you notice walking from the security gate until,
24j got to the control rocm?
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FLINT:
Essentially that the unit was either cooling dcwn or in a 2l relativel.
..d de.
There was not the normal sounds that you hear 3t fr.m uhe steam piping and so forth when you're operating.
At that time i
4' tht "
ere no safety valves lifting I just walked thru the lower levels so I couldn't tell whether or not the turbine was s
l rolling or 1
0 anything of this nature.
But it was coviously a case where the unit 71 had been shut down for several hours.
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CRESWELL:
O K.
Did you see any personnel on your way in?
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11I FLINT:
The only personnel were the two personnel that I met at the 12l security station t.'at passed me thru the gate and allowed me to go in.
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141 CRESWELL:
OK. What, ah, as I recollect walking down the hall there in 15!
the control room, there's some glass windows.
16:
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FLINT:
There's a window outside of the Shift Supervisor's office.
18l 19!
CRESWELL:
What did you see as you walked dow. the hall through the 20!
window?
21 22:
FLINT:
Saw a large nunber of people in the C qtrol Room that were 23j appeared to be in conference.
And I could glance in, I could see the 2 41 annunciators were on.
It would appear to be a recovery from a trip.
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CRESWELL:
Do you recollect who was in the Shift Engineer's office when 2
you passed it?
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f FLINT:
I could not say for certain at this time.
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6i CRESWELL:
O K.
So then you entered the Control Room.
And what were 7!
your first impressions as you entered the Control Room?
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FLINT:
Well, except for the fact that there were some auxiliary operatnrs 101 and the radiation monitoring team or the emergency radiation team in 11l there, it appeared to be, as you would expect after a turbine reactor 12l trip, normal lines, normal annunciators lit, station personnel, such as 13k Gary Miller, Joe Logan, George Kunder, Seelinger, were all in the 14 Control Room.
The operators were there.
The only unusual portion was 15:
apppeared that the previous shift was on.
Had essentially double shift 161 in the Control Room.
Plus some personnel that are normaily up in 17!
Unit 1 were down there.
13l 19; CRESWELL.
OK.
How many people would you estimate were in the Control 20!
Room at that time?
21l 22i FLINT:
Perhaps 25, 28.
23 24i CRESWELL:
OK.
Did you happen to notice the radiation alarms on the 25 panel?
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FLINT:
I noticed that there were some radiation alarms on the panels.
2 I did not walk over though to look at that time at the relative indi-f cation to find out how far up it was.
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CRESWELL:
Do you happen to remember approximately how many would have 61 been?
7l 8
FLINT:
No, I was just doing a quick scan at that time.
Looking at the 9f computer outp t and getting a quick idea of what the conditions were 10 ant' not specifics.
11; 12l CRESWELL:
I have here a set of photographs that I have obtained from 13I the TMI Training staff. Color photographs of the Control Room. That I 14!
am showing John now and to give us some perspective about where he is 15i in the control room and where some of the other people are.
Could you 16 briefly describe as you walk in the Control Room what the situation is?
17!
18i FLINT:
Entered on the left side of the Control Room through the normal 19!
access door.
Looked at the back annunciator panels, primarily towards i
20:
the reactor coolant portion of it the emergency cooling system, radiation 1
21l alarms, went to the plant computer, which is on the left hand side, saw
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228 that the printouts appeared to be standard printouts at that time 23 following a turbine reactor trip.
Then, verified of course at the same 24l 2sj g91 J40 i
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time that all the control rods were on the bottom (this is one of the 2!
first things I noticed entering tha Control Room) and started talking i
3 with Lee Rogers, Ed Fredricks, Bill Zewe at this time.
4!
Sf CRESWELL:
Could you briefly describe what you discussed with them or 6i what their statements were to you?
7\\
L FLINT:
At the time 7 had asked them what had occurred.
They told me 9l that they had had a turbine reactor trip.
That they had eventually saw 10!
an indication of loss of flow on the reactor coolant pumps and secured i
11:
the pumps, had seen an unusual indication on the source in the immediate 12; range, which I had verified by looking at the strip chart and when they i
13!
told me that the pressure had been low earlier I went over and checked a few of the charts quickly and told them at that time, that my impression 1.-
15l was not.that the reactor started to go critical again, but that it was 16; just a change in leakage path.
I asked them about the alarms for the 17!
radiation.
They said that they had a large number of alarms in the aux 18i building, in the reactor building and that they had cottled up the "B" 19i generator because they thought that they had a p'imary secondary leak 20j n that side.
Shortly after this peri'd of time, Dick Dubiel had 21l btained an additional sample and verified that in fact that the "B"
22 generator did have activity.
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SHACKLETON:
Gentlemen:
Hold off just for a moment while we change the 2'
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tape.
We'll use the second tape.
This is Owen C. Shackleton speaking.
3l I've been present since the beginning of the interview acting as moderator 4i' and I am an investigator for Region V U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Si i
6 The time is now 6:38 p.m., April 23, 1979.
7l 0
SHACKLETON:
The time is now 6:40 p.m., April 23, 1979, and this is a 9!
continuation of the interview of Mr. John H. Flint.
Please continue 10l gentlemen.
t 11!
12 CRESWELL-John, we were just discussing what you had the discussion 13) that you have had with the operator when you came in ah, into the 14!
control room.
Now what time did you, ah, realize that there was ah, an 15:
abnormal situation?
16i t
17i FLINT:
I would say that I realized it pernaps, this is only an estimate, 181 20 minutes perhaps a half hour after I had come into the control room.
19i By this time I had talked with several people and had learned of the 20!
securing of the pumps the unusual flow indication, the source and 1
21!
immediate range was coming up scale, had looked at the thermocouple i
22 readings that were reading, one was reading 770 the other one was 23l reading up around 800 F indicated as I mentioned I didn't know whether 24 25i 891 J42 i
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to exactly believe these because they normally don't operate in this i
2!
range.
I had also looked at the computer printout, called up a few of 1
3l the incores I believe at that time, and felt that at that time that we 4i did have a fairly serious problem.
i; 1
6 CRESWELL:
OK.
Uh, you mentioned a flow problem.
Could you elaborate 7
on that a bit?
81 I
9l FLINT:
The operators that ah, indicatea that although the pumps were l
10, running, the indication on the current appeared to be going down, and l
11) the flow continued to exhibit a slow decrease in indicated flow.
At i
12l this time their pic3sure was somewhere around a thousand pounds to the t
13{
best of their knowledge.
They stated that because of the pressure they 14l had shut off the "B" loop pumps and then later shut off the "A" loop 15i pumps in order not to fail the reactor coolant pump :eals.
This is a 16i normal operating procedure.
17!
18; CRESWELL:
Do you feel that that was a reasonable thing for them to do?
19!
20l FLINT:
Here you are asking for an opinion from me and I would have to I
21; say that my answer would be probably different from their's as an 22 engineer as cpposed to a control room operator.
I 23 CRESWELL:
OK.
24l 25!
891 J43 i
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FLINT:
And I would say at that point and time, I would probably have 2'
j continued to run the pumps.
3l I
CRESWELL:
Based on what sort of judgement in your mind?
5l OI FLINT:
As long as my seal cavity pressures and flow to the pumps was 7
maintained and I did not see any unusual indications other than the 8!
dropping of the current, did not see any large oscillatiers indicating 9f that I was flashing the reference legs to the Gentilly tubes and just i
101 that it was going down, I would feel that from my indicated temperatures 11!
and and my pressure, I was ah, had low quality water and was therefore 12l pumping low quality water and that the pumps i.n fact, were still per-13!
forming utisfactorily.
14' 15i CRESWELL:
OK.
To what do you attribute the drop in current required 16 by the reactor coolant pumps?
17!
18!
FLINT:
If the pumps are, the pumps are designed as constant mass.
19i Therefore, if they are pumping lower quality, they require less current 20l in order to function and turn at a certain RPr1, they are not working as 21;l hard.
i 22l 23 CRESWELL: What if one were receiving vibration alarms?
24l l
25:
891 J44
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22 i
I FLINT:
If the alarms were high enough to indicate that there was 2'
l potential failure of the pump or the seals, then in that case, I would 3
shut the pump down.
4i k;
CRESWELL:
OK.
We recognize that you, as you prefaced your remarkt 6
these are your opinions as an engineer.
7l i
81 FLINT:
As an engineer not as an operator and of course, I'm talking 9!
ah, coming into the control room five hours approximately after it 10!
occurred.
11l 12!
CRESWELL:
Right, right.
OK.
One of the other things that you dis-(
13!
cussed with them ws the isolation of the "B" steam generator.
Could 14!
you go into some detail about what you discussed with them about that?
15 15i FLINT:
They had mentioned at the time when I was talking with them, 17:
that they had isolated the "B" steam generator because they felt that 1Sj there was a primary to secondary leak based on some activity, later and 19!
additionally when they thought they should be maintaining a constant 20 level, they had seen a level change in the generator.
As opposed to i
21 the "A" generator which it was not varying in level at that time.
I 221 asked if they had taken an additional sample to verify that, they said I
23 they were in a process of doing so, and shortly after that, as I men-24j tioned earlier, Dick Dubiel presented the results of the sample which 25l did indicate they had activity in the "B" generator.
i 891
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CRESWELL:
OK.
Did you look at any data regardi"g levels, pressures 2{'
whatever, any temperatures in the steam generator ah, to, to research 31 i
that on your own?
4j Si l
FLINT:. Essentially, all I did was go over and look at the existing 6i level and the trend prior to that, they were on the strip chart re-corders on the console.
8!
9f CRESWELL:
What did that indicate to you?
10l 11j FLINT:
I would say, at that time, just merely that in all probability 12l the "B" generator was bottled.
Cause I was just looking at it and had 13i not been told that, and that they were, at that time, steaming off of 11 the "A" generator.
Ah, other than that, I, I really couldn't have 15 drawn much of a conclusion.
16; 17!
CRESWELL:
OK.
What happens next? After you've discussed these items 18!
with the (ah) operators?
19!
20:
FLINT:
Ah, that was the period of time that ah, they'd come to the i
2 11 conclusion that the reason they probably were not transferring heat 22!
across very well was the fact that they did not have the level high 23 enough in the generators to induce natural circulation and that they 24i had a steam bubble in the two loops and till they collapsed steam i
25j bubble they could not establish natural circulation.
89!
')46 1
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24 1!
j CRESWELL:
Where in the ah, physically located in the reactor coolant 2t system do you feel the blockage was, flow blockage?
3l l
4l j
FLINT:
At that time I felt it was at the top of the hot legs, which we refer to as the "J" legs where they come up and just before they go down into the top of the steam generators.
7l l
8!
CRESWELL:
When do you figure that that flow blockage occurred in those 9!
hot legs? At what point in time?
101 i
11j FLINT:
Looking at the data that was available there, I would estimate 12 that it had occurred shortly after or about the time that the two re-131 "A" loop reactor coolant pumps were secured.
14!
15; CRESWELL:
That's when all forced flow was lost in the system?
16:
17l FLINT:
That's when all four reactor coolant pumps were off at that 18i time.
19!
20!
CRESWELL:
OK. Ah, what happens next in time?
21!
22l FLINT:
Approximately in that period of time we are bringing the ah, i
23 generator level up on the "A" side to induce natural circulation.
24l There was a period for approximately an hour when the pressure was 25l increased to approximately 2000 pounds in an attempt to collapse that l
891 247
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If bubble.
We were also reading out the incore thermocouples and following 2'
l the ah, setup that Ivan Perter had put up to look at the temperature 3l l
over there on the special bridge, and, following the temperatures that 4'
were printing out on the recorder.
Si Gi CRESWELL:
OK.
Ah, we have received from the licensee certain charts that were prepared there, ah, 20 of these charts if I remember correctly.
8 And ah, its my understanding that these were plotted in the control 9
room.
Could you relate in time when this plotting went on?
10f 11; FLINT:
These charts were actually plotted down in the process control 12!
center in one of the ah, rooms there on the 29th and the 30th.
A day I
131 and 2 days following the transient.
14!
15!
CRESWELL:
OK.
So no data was plotted in i.he, in the control room 16!
area?
17i 13[
FLINT:
None of the 20 charts you're referring to were plotted in the 19l control room.
20j i
21 CRESWELL:
OK.
Was there other data that you di
- plot in the control 22l room?
I 23 24 FLINT:
At that time, no, we were merely ah, trending data output on 25; the ccmputer, watching the strip chart recorders and occasionally l
bringing out ah, utility printer groups looking at various parameters r
I' in the system.
891 148
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26 i
If CRESWELL:
OK. Would you classify your participation in the control room after you got there as mainly as an advisory capacity?
31 FLINT:
That is correct.
Since I do not have, ah a reactor operator's
" I, license, I can only suggest or recommend certain operations to the O!
personnel there since they have the licenses ah, they can accept or 7
ignore my advice.
8!
9l CRESWELL:
Ok.
Could you briefly ah, describe those recommendations 10!
that you made and who you made 'em to?
11l 12!
FLINT:
One recommendation was to fill the generators to cool down and 13 collapse the bubble.
When we got some indication that we had flow 14i across there to run a reactor coolant pump for a short period of time 15; to induce flow; to monitor the incora thermocouples to tell us what the 16:
core was doing; to, at that time they had already taken steps although 17l I did not know it when I first mentioned about taking those sanples to 19{
verify that we did in fact have activity on the "B" generator because 191 if we could open up both generators, this would make it a little easier 20[
to cool the unit; ah, to maintain the pressure as much as possible and 21t not go down any lower.
At that time or shortly after I had gotten 22 there, I learned that the electrnmatic relief valve had been opened for 23 several hours and that they had finally shut the block valve to isolate 24 it, and on occasion when I was there, they were using the block valve 25 as a control valve during this portion of time.
Ah, 891 149 I
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CRESWELL:
When you say control valve, that's to vary the flow out?
2l
]9 FLINT:
Vary the flow out.
They had ah, letdown flow during this time, 4!
normal letdown flow and they were also using that as they were putting Si the high pressure injection water in from the inakeup. pumps they were j
using thac to control their level on their pressurizer.
7!
CRESWELL:
You had indications that they were doing this prior to the 9
time that you were there?
10j 11 FLINT:
Ah, I had verbal indications that they were doing this prior to 12!
my being there.
i 13i 14!
CRESWELL:
Now please go on with your recommendations that you made.
15; 16' FLINT:
Ah, when we finally got the levels up high enough in the gen-17!
erators that we could see, in fact, some pressure drop across it, 11 recommend the running of the pump to try to remove heat, anyway.
At l
19' this time, they were still working here to get the auxiliary boilers 20!
back so we could draw a vacutm down the condensor and steam it.
he 21 were in constant communication with Lynchburg, Virginia, with Babcock 22 and Wilcox, there was an open line to them; ah, NRC personnel, approxi-23 mately, I would say 10 to 11, but that's only a guess because time has 24j no meaning when you're in this type of a situation.
Had arrived in the 25!
891
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control room they had an open line and were talking with other NRC 2
personnel on the incident and of course the Met-Ed people were conferring 31 with outside personnel in their organization regarding this.
4I
~j CRESWELL:
Who did you make these recommendations to?
Si 71 FLINT:
Made them to Lee Rogers, George Kunder, and Gary Miller, who 8!
are the top people at the site and talked with, on occasion, Joe Logan.
9i 10f CRESWELL:
Did you spend most of the, your time with those people, that vl is Miller, er, Rogers and Kunder?
12l t
1.31 FLPIT:
No. Lee Rogers spent most of the time with them, I was primarily l#
out in the control room with ah, Bill Zewe or Ed Fredricks, ah, or some 15' of the other operators out there.
I was more or less following what 16; was occuring in the plant and occasional!y going in and listening to 17' the discussions.
ISl 19!
CRESWELL:
Ah, you mentioned, ah, that you were monitoring the incore 20!
thermocouples.
Ah, did you have indications that ah, personnel in the 21f control room had been monitoring that data bef.v you got there?
l 22l 23l FLINT:
No, to the best of my knowledge they had not been.
1 24j 2Si 891
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lt CRESWELL:
Did you recommend that they pay closer attention to that 2
i information?
3l 4:'
FLINT:
I recommended at the time that we look at what, they.were in-c, ;
1 dicating to try to get some idea of what the core conditions might be.
O Periodically, after that I called up the indications to follow what was I
7' going on in the core.
8l 9
CRESWELL:
Did you have any indications that af ter you'd been there and 10 studied the ah, plant history and the event, that the core had been 11!
uncovered before you got there?
12!
13!
FLINT:
My early remark to them about the fact that it'd been in all l#
probability change in the leakage path from the core was my feeling 15!
that at that time either there had been partial uncovering of the core, 16i or that there had been enough vJid formation or low quality enough 17!
water there, that the ah, leakage path had changed enough that probably 18i the core had been uncovered.
There were at least 2 instances where 191 this probably occurred.
20l 21l CRESWELL:
Does this plant contain ah, what is called, the device is 22l called ' internal vent valves'?
23 24j FLINT:
Yes.
There are internal vent valves.
25!
891 J52 m
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30 l!
CRESWELL:
To your knowledge did these devices play any part in the 2'
l event?
31 4'
FLINT:
To the best of my knowledge, no.
Si Gi CRESWELL:
O K.
Ah, what time did you leave that day?
7\\
8t FLINT:
Approximately 2300.
9!
' Ol EESWELL:
OK.
That'd be 11:00 at night?
11'
~~;
FLINT:
Yes.
131 CRESWELL:
Ah, so were you doing any other things besides, ah, looking at data, just having discussions with the operators, or discussions 16; with Lee Rogers?
17t 13 FLINT:
No, that was primarily my function at the time.
19:
20!
CRESWELL:
At the end of the day, what types of data had you looked at, 21' beyond what you've already mentioned?
i 22l 23 FLINT:
I'd taken a quick scan through the alarm printer, ah, and also 24 looked at the other recorders on the back of the console in a little 25 more detail, had looked at the backup recorders, seen some of the i
891 J53 s
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ili levels that were being indicated on the radiation monitors.
Primarily 2l j
that was it.
I wasn't too interested in the secondary sides cause we 3l were essen3ially shut down and weren't many parameters over there to 4l look at.
5!
l 61 CRESWELL:
OK.
It's my understanding that since the event ah, you have 7i been involved in reviewing quite a bit of the data.
8!
4
FLINT:
That is correct.
10i CRESWELL:
And at this time I would like to ask Don Kirkpatrick ah, ah, 1"? '
to address that particular aspect of what you've been doing.
13l 14; KIRKPATRICK:
Allright.
First of all, I would like to go back to ah, I 15' have a two, couple of questions on some of the comments you made earlier.
16 Ah, you mentioned the fact that you tried to raise the pressure in the 17' system in order to collapse the voids.
What method were you using to 18!
try to arrange that?
19i 20i FLINT:
The makeup pumps or high pressure injection pumps.
21!
22l KIRKPATRICK:
In other words, you turned on more than one valve?
t 23 24 FLINT:
Pump.
25; 891
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32 11 KIRKPATRICK:
Pump.
21 i
3t FLINT:
To bring it up.
Or if, since we were using RCV2 as a block 4!
valve on the electromatic, you only, if that is shut, you pnly have Si j
letdown flow at that time Essentially and a makeup pump can more tha'n 6i overcome thi.s.
So you can pressurize the sytem that way also, just 7!
with one pump.
91 01
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KIRKPATRICK:
I see.
Ah, But there were, the pressure went up in spite 10i of the fact that ah, the electromatic relief valve was open?
11!
1'9 '
FLINT:
In spite of the fact? Could you clarify that?
13!
14!
KIRKPATRICK:
Well, I understood you to say that ah, the ah, high 15i pressure injection pump raised the pressure without reducing the temper-16i ature.
Is that right?
17!
1S{
FLINT:
We increased the pressure ah, the hot leg temperatures were 19!
offscale above 620, we did change the cold leg temperatures some 20!
amount during th'is period of time.
21l l
22l KIRKPATRICK:
I :,ee.
Well at the time that you were trying to raise 2-the pressure, ah, I take it the block valve was closed?
24l 25; 891 J55 i
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l!
FLINT:
Ye, that is true.
During a portion it was closed.
2' 3!
KIRKPATRICK:
I see.
Let's see.
You said at one time earlier, that 4j you had a question of whether the core was ah, uncovered, ah, can you 5:
i comment on why according 'o the charts that the pressurizer level 6i appeared to be hign at this time?
7' i
8i FLINT:
Well, I felt that the core was covered at this
.;d of time.
9!
There were some individuals that had doubt as to whether it was and it 101 seemed prudent to verify whether or not it was.
Ah, the pressurizer 11!
level would be high if you had transferred your bubble from the pressurizer 12:
into the hot leg loops, or if you have a bubble and you continually
' 35
~
cycle your hydromatic relief. valve or your back block valve to it or if
.y the Code Safetys left, obviously your level in the pressurizer is going
,c.
~~
to increase.
You're going to bring ite level up there if you collapse
'6
^
the bubble.
17; ISI KIRKPATRICK:
I see.
Let's see referring to some of these prints.
19' 20{
CRESWELL:
Excuse me, would you iun that, run over that description 9,:
again.
Ah, if the bubble collapses the pressurizer level wil ncrease?
22!
23 FLINT:
The pressurizer level will increase if you're feeding through 2
the high pressure injection pumps and you're feeding water in then the 25!
level would tend to go up.
If you reduce pressure in the system and 1
891 156 l
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sl!
you have steam bubbles up in the loop, they are going to tend to expand 2:
j and act as a pressurizer ah, steam space up there.
Ah, they would tend 31 j
to force water up into the pressurizer and out through the electromagnetic 41 relief valve.
Si 6i KIRKPATRICK:
That's under the assumption that the water level was Il above the inlet to the surge line to the pressurizer?
8l 91 FLINT:
We17, if, if it wasn't then you wouldn't have a level indication 101 in the pressurizer.
So you had to have water in there, which said I
there had to be above the surge line to get in there.
1 12!
131 (IRKPATRICK:
I see.
Well, ah, you mentioned also earlier, that you 14!
felt that the change in the ah, flux indication was due to the fact 15i that ah, there was increased leakage path, or a change in leakage path.
16' Ah, could you comment more, er, or e!aaorate on what form this change 17!
in the leakage path was, or what you felt caused the change in leakage 18!
path?
19$
20f FLINT 1 Well, after the fact that they told me the pressure, that they 1
21j had come down to approxir.tately 1000 pounds or so, the fact that the 22!
temperatures were still fairly high meant that you either had very low 2 31 quality water and/or steam in there.
And this of course, would reduce l
24ld a normal density and increase your leakage flux out of the core.
25!
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891 157 1
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1
l 35 t
1!
CRESWELL:
When, when do you feel significant fuel damage first occurred?
2:
3!
l FLINT:
This is only a supposition on my part, I'd like to stress that, 41 j
and I feel that it did not occur until approximately a hundred minutes Sj into the transient when it first started occurring.
6i l
71 CRESWELL:
That's when all the pumps were off?
s!
91' FLINT:
All the pumps were off.
10!
' 1;'
CRESWELL:
Do you feel that that damaged could occur with low quality,
,m let me put it this way, with a mixture of gas and liquid phase, water 13j and gas in liquid phase in the core?
1M 15' FLINT:
If there was still flow through the core and considering we 16; only had approximately 90 EFPD on the core and we shut down at that 17:
time, I would say no.
I would say that the core would still be receiving 181 adequate cooling, and that ah, no significant damage would occur to it.
19!
20!
CRESWELL:
OK.
21!
i 22l KIRKPATRICK:
Now from your review of the data, ah, of these charts, 23 ah, do you have any feeling for how much water was in the reactor, at 24l what percentage of the primary system was filled at the time the pumps 25!
were shut down?
i l
891 158 i
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FLINT:
I have no idea.
2 3
l CRESWELL:
Going to the first minute or two in the transient, ah, after 4:'
the power operation release valve, or the EMOV failed the pressure did 5
drop in the system.
High pressure injection was initiated.
And while 6!
pressure was dropping, the pressurizer level was increasing.
Do you 7!
l have an explanation for why that would occur?
8!
91 FLINT:
If you're charging into the system and you have a leakage path 10l out, with the electromagnetic relief valve open there would be a tendency for the water level in the pressurizer to increase you have nothing
' 2'l you' re compressing against, essentially, its just restricted back 13j
^
pressure there.
So there would be, you would expect that the level in 7*
the pressurizer would go up.
15:
16i CRESWELL:
Due to what?
17l i
a, 4
FLINT:
The fact that ah, you no longer have a steam bubble there to i
19!
hold it down, to cushion it.
You're relieving everything out of the 20' pressurizer.
21, i
22' CRESWELL:
Well, doesn't the pressurizer level indicate the water level 23 inside the pressurizer?
i 24!
1 25; i
891 159 i
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37 I
li FLINT:
That is correct.
2!
31 l
CRESWELL:
And it didn't actually go solid or go to 400 inches?
4j
~
i 51 FLINT:
It went to 400 inches 6i 7l CRESWELL:
It didn't actually do that though, until minutes into the i
8I I
9l 10!
FLINT:
You initially see your level in your pressurizer dropping and 11;:
you would ah, expect that this would in effect occur.
You have tripped 12' l
the reactor, you' re cooling down, you're adding a minimum of additional i
131 heat, during this portion of. time you're taking energy out of the steam 14 generators and you have relieved some through the electromagnetic
'S' relief valve.
You would therefore, expect some contraction and therefore 16i the level to initially drop.
17!
18!
CRESWELL:
OK, but how do you explain the pressurizer level increase 19!
after that period of time when the pressure is dropping in the reactor 20:
coolant system?
t 21l 22!
FLINT:
There could be 2 mechanisms for this.
One mechanism would be 1
23 that if you're not removing as much heat and the water is starting to 24 expand then obviously its gonna add some volume tc the system, and if 25 you're charging in with a high pressure injection pumps, you're also adding water to the system.
Oh$
b
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38 lli i
CRESWELL:
So you'd describe two physical effects? Effects that could 2!
l occur. Ah, one is that as pressure drops the water in the pressurizer 3\\
expands?
i 4l Si FLINT:
Well in the, in the reactor coolant system will expand simply 6l by the energy it picks up from the core and the heat that it already 7f has in it.
If the pressure drops, the water is gonna tend to expand.
8 9!
CRESWELL:
Looking at the charts of "B" hot and "B" cold.
It appears 10f that the average temperature cf the reactor coolant system remains 11l fairly constant during this time.
12l l
13!
FLINT:
Right.
"T" average time is fairly constant.
14i 15!
CRESWELL:
So that the expanding, expansion effect of the reactor 16 coolant system would not be a major contributor to?
171 18!
FLINT:
No.
It would only be a small factor.
Primary factor would be 19i the fact that you have makeup pumps on and adding to the system.
20!
i 1
21l CRESWELL:
OK, But the additional effect that you feel could affect the 22l increase in pressure level would be the expansion of water in the 23 pressurizer?
24l 25l 89l ]bf i,
[
i a
I l
I i
l 39 l!
FLINT:
Well, when you initially ah, have a transient your heater banks 2'
l shut off and then come back on.
Depencing on how much heat they are 3l adding at the time the water in the pressurizer can expand from these 3
4:
also.
I do not have ah, an indication of the energy that the heaters il were putting in therefore, I cannot qualify how much was due to their input.
7l 8
KIRKPATRICK:
Have you considered the possibility that there may have 9
been some veidi.ig in the primary system that escaped flashing?
10l l
11 FLINT:
At this period of time?
12!
13i KIRKPATRICK:
At this period of time?
li 15i FLINT:
Yes.
Ah, particularly at about 6 mintues there was that pos-16i sibility.
I felt, however, that since we take our pressure tap very 17 high up on the hot leg and considering the temperatures are in a hot 18!
leg at a very high point, that if there were any flashing it would be 19l minimal, and since the reactor coolant pumps were still circulating ah, i
i 20j you could get low quality water perhaps, but I did not feel that there I
i 21l would be any significant flashing at this time.
And if it was it would 22l only be at the very top of the hot leg.
I
?.3 l 24; CRESWELL:
Do you feel that as the reactor coolant flow was dropping 25!
off, this was prior to the time of any reactor coolant pumps were i
tripped.
Ah, that there was any significant cavitation in the ab, b)
]b
I l
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40 i
11 reactor coolant pump suction? That would be the lowest pressure point 2:
in the system?
3!
4t FLINT:
Or the suction.
Si 6
CRESWELL:
Would that to your knowledge, be most likely point for 7'l flashing? The water there of course, is cooled more than it is on a hot i
O!
leg, ah, and I feel that because we did not see more.
91 10!
SHACKLETON:
This.is a continuation of the interview of Mr. John H. Flint.
11!
The time is now 7:15 p.m., April 23, 1979.
The first tape ended at I
12!
6:38 p.m. Jim, would you review again what the question was so that we 13) can complete, if you can recall, where you got cut off.
John, maybe 11!
you can recall, you were here yesterday.
15!
16i FLINT:
it was whether or not we had a single phase or two phase flow 17!
in the reactor coolant pump.
As I mentioned, the fact that the recorder 18i strip chart did not indicate more oscillation than what it did, would 19i to me say that it was single phase at that period of time or tend to 20!
indicate single phase.
21 22I C_ ESWELL:
I have one brief question.
Have you seen these oscillations; 23 have you experienced these oscillations before to see what they looked 24!
l We?
i 25' 891 J63 I
I O
(
I 41 i
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l FLINT:
Yes, we normally see them whenever we do reactor coolant pump 2!
l flow coast down tests.
This is a standard test that you do preopera-31 tionally?
i 41 1
CRESWELL:
You would do that at low enough pressure so that you can'see cavitation?
I 7l 8l FLINT:
Its not a case of seeing cavitation, its a normal fact that the
- t pump being discreet individual pumping mechanisms as it were, buckets t
1 01
^
turning down there, sends out the water, not in a continugus stream, but you do get these pressure pulsations. And you do see this oscillation.
12l i
13!
CRESWELL:
Due to cavitation?
14!
15l FLINT:
Ah, not to cavitation, its just that even when you're running 16i at normal temperatures and pressures you can see these oscillations in 17l the, in the flow.
18ll 19!
CRESWELL:
OK, John.
That's fine.
Owen, do you want to close out the 20!
interview?
i 21{
22l SHACKLETON:
Yes.
Mr. Flint, would it be possible in the future time i
23j to conduct further interviews regarding what took place if we have i
24l additional questic'ns?
25l 891 M4-I
I f
42 1
FLINT:
Yes.
There'd be no problem.
2!
3 i
SHACKLETON:
We thank you very much for the time you've given to the 4!
Commission this evening and we'll bring this interview to a close.
The Si time is now 7:17 p.m., April 23, 1979.
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9l Ohl
)bb 101 11l 12l 131 14!
15i 16:
173 181 19!
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21l 22 1
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