ML19249B024
| ML19249B024 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/23/1979 |
| From: | Wilson H METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290210 | |
| Download: ML19249B024 (21) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d
In the Matter of:
l 2!
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW l
2 of Harold L. Wilson Maintenance Foreman, Nuclear 9
Si I
6i 7
1 8
Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10!
Middletown, Pennsylvania 11 May 23, 1979 12' (0 ate of Interview) 13 July 4, 1979 (Date Transcript Typed) 14 260 15 (Tape Number (s))
16l l
17,!
18 19 h
20' 21' NRC PERSONNEL:
'22, Anthony N. Fasano on9 201 23 James S. Creswell i
Owen C. S.*;ackleton 24i 25 f
i
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SHACKLETON:
This is Shackleton speaking.
This is an interview of Mr. Harold l
2!
L. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson is a maintenance foreman nuclear with the Metropolitan 3
Edison Company assigned to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station 4
primarily working in Unit 1 Instruments Department.
This interview is 5
takin place at 3:02 pm eastern daylight time, May 23, 1979.
The place of 6
the interview is Trailer #203 which is located just outside the south 7
security gate of The Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Station.
Present to 8
conduct this interview from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr.
g!
Anthony N. Fasano.
Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, Inspection and Enforcement Reactor Construction Inspection.
10, Also present is Mr. Jam 9s S. Creswell.
Mr. Creswell is a Reactor Inspector assigned to Region III.
My name is Owen C. Shackleton.
I'm am a Investi-gator assigned to Region V, just prior to placing this interview on tape, I 14l gave Mr. Wilson a two page document from the US :4uclear Regulatory Commission f
to read which advises him of the purpose and scope of this investigation 15!,
j and the authority and regulatory authority of the US Nuclear Regulatory 16i Commission as granted by Congress to conduct this type of an investigation.
~
This document further advise Mr. Wilson of rights to refuse to be interviewed and have someone of his choice present during the course of the interview.
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In addition, it advises him of his rights to refuse to give any form of a 20j signed statement.
On the second page of this document there are three 21 questions and Mr. Wilson answered all three of these questions in the 22 affirmative, at this time to make it a matter of record on this tape recording 23 I'm going to ask Mr. Wilson these three questions orally and if you will 24 sir, please respond.
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SHACKLETON:
Did you understand the document that I am referring to?
2 3
WILSON:
Yes.
4 5
SHACKLETON:
And to we have your permission to tape the interview?
6 WILSON:
Yes.
7 8
SHACKLETON:
And would you like a copy of the tape.
g 10 WILSON:
Yes.
12 13 g
, sir.
They will provide it to you at the completion of this interview.
Now Mr. Wilson if you would please fcr the benefit of the record would you briefly give us your work experience and the nuclear 5
field from when you started until the present date?
17 WILSON:
I was in the Nuclear Navy, in the Navy from 1962-1969 and the Nuclear Field of the Navy from 1964-1969, after I got out of the Navy in 19l 1969, I worked for about two years at a research facility in North Carolina 20 State University.
There was a small research reactor there.
There, I was in charge of operation and maintenance of the whole reactor facility.
At 22 the end of my work period for NC State University I came to work for Med 23 Ed, as instrumentation technican as first class and I worked in that capacity 24 for about three years and I was promoted instrum3ntation foreman.
That was 25
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in 1974.
I've been working in the capacity of instrumentation foreman from gj 1974 till the present time.
I 31 4
SHACKLETON:
Thank you very much Mr. Wilson and now I'll turn the interview 5
over to Mr. Creswell.
6 CRESWELL:
Tony, I believe you have some introductary questions?
7 8
FASANO:
g Yes, I have some questions that I'll jump in on, because I may not be here throughout this whole interview.
The reactor coolant bleed tank, 10 g
when you were on shift did you do any maintenance work on the bent for, g
what work were you doing, first of all, you're Unit 1, when the event occurred where were you and what were you assigned?
g 14 l
WILSON:
Well when the event occurred, it happened in the early morning 15!
16l hours and by the time I came in the' Security people were holding everybody at the entrance to the Unit 1 part of the complex, and I didn't actually work in the plant for at least a couple of days after the event occurred.
I worked primary out of the observation center and at Med Ed's plant up in Crawford and a repair shop up there.
We had a repair shop set-up to do 20t I
some temporary repairs to some radiation monitoring instrumentation, portable 21 radiation monitoring instruments.
Myfirst active involvement with any of the systems in Unit 2 after the event, was and I don't remember which day 23 it was, it was Friday or Saturday I came over from the observation center, 24 I don't even know what time it was, right.
I assisted Doug Weaver in 2St f
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making up some tubing to run a vent line and I believe it was from the 2,
make up tank to the, not the make up tanks but from the bleed tank to the l
3l reactor building, I believe he had installed, he had already installed or 4
was working on installation of a vent line from the make-up tank to the 5
reactor building and there were additional lines to be run from the bleed 6
tanks, and that's what I was working on at the time.
7 FASANO:
This was after the 28th then?
8 i
9 WILSON:
Yeah.
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11 FASAN0:
y So the day of the event you worked you weren't onsite?
13 WILSON:
No, I wasn't onsite the day of the event, I worked out of the observation Center for a Couple of days.
I 16 CRESWELL:
You mentioned that Mr. Weaver had connected a plastic line or was involved in the connection of a plastic line from the make-up tank to the reactor building.
When was that installation made.
20 WILSON:
Must have been the 29th or 30th.
I'm not sure of the date.
He was over here all those days.
Him primarily, rather than me, because he was more familiar with Unit 2.
He has worked in Unit 2 primarily for the last couple of years and he was intimately familiar with physical locations 24 and operations of the Unit 2 systems moreso than I am.
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1, CRESWELL:
Okay, I'd like to discuss the operation that you were involved l
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in, and that was I believe you mentioned, the running of the plastic tubing 3
fr m the bleed tanks back to the reactor building.
Is that correct?
4 5
WILSON:
The tubing that we were running when I was here was not plastic.
6 It was hard tubing.
We had to get some hard tubing, copper, stainless 7
whatever we could get at the time, and we were running hard tubing.
My 8
inv lvesant in it was more one of procurement and assembly rtther than actual installation.'
I didn't do any of the actual installation.
Doug g
10 Weaver and a couple of his men, or one of his men, I don't know who it was right now, was involved in the installation of the thing and I'm not quite sure, but I don't think at that time, it got installed.
We were putting pieces together.
Someone had gone to the location the tubing was to be terminated at, it must have been at the reactor building, and had come up with some rough measurements and how the tubing would have to run.
We preassembled some of the things that would have to go up in the air, you know off the floor that a guy would have to get to from a ladder or something.
We preassembled some of that material in the shop.
Other than procurement, the preassembly of the material was what I was involved in.
l 20 CRESWELL:
Did anyone tell you why the tubing had been run?
22 WILSON:
It is my understanding that the water from some place or another 23 was getting into the makeup tank I guess from let down or something, it had 24 got into the make up tank.
The level increases had lifted the relief valve 25
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and that's why the tubing had been run from the makeup tank and basically t
2 the same sort of thing was happening in the bleed tanks.
I don't know if 3
there was any concern with hydrogen at that time or not.
[
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CRESWELL:
Okay, and this was you believe Friday that it happened?
Si i
WILSON:
Either Friday or Saturday it would have been done.
The 30th or 7
the 31st.
8 9
CRESWELL:
I see.
Where would you make the connection into the reactor 10:
building?
g 12' WILSON:
Again, I don't know exactly.
There was a prechosen by someone else, who I don't know, operations, Weaver, a place to make a connection.
Maybe some test-fitting on a building penetration of some sort, I don't 151 16l know.
Maybe building ventilation or something.
I'm not sure.
1 17 l
CRESWELL:
Who gave you your assignment to do this?
18l 191 WILSON:
20 The job was being worked when I got here and I just kind of picked up on it.
I'd had instructions to come over here and help dnd that's what l
I did when I come over here to help.
That was the primary job be;ng done 22' at the time or one of the primary jobs.
A job that needed help in procure-23 ment and assembly and that's just kind of where I fell in.
So I don't know 24 where the instruction came from.
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1.
FASANO:
Old you know of any job with the reactor, the hydrogen recombiner?
2, Did you get involved in that at all?
31 4
WILSON:
A couple of days after that I got involved in a job with the 5
hydrogen recombiner.
There was a, I was involved in the installation, 6
again from a procurement end, installation of a spare recombiner or the 7
spare recombiner as a second unit.
Either a second unit or a backup unit.
8 Procurement of tubing to hook the thing up with, procurement of some cable g
to run a thermocouple to read the temperature of the recombiner.
10 FASANO:
g Were you involved at all with the Install hydrogen recombiner.
12 WILSON:
No.
14!
FASAN0:
How about any work on the seal injection fixtures?
16' WILSON:
No, I wasn't involved in that at all.
18 CRESWELL:
I'd like to go back to the day of the event, you said you were at a fossil plant near here.
What was the name of that facility?
21, WILSON:
It was Crawford station.
The day of the event, most people who showed up at the Island after the incident happened, I guess they probably started getting in here around maybe 6:30 or 7 o' clock, held at the entrance 24 l
to Unit 1, monitored by HP or somebody to get off the Island and were sent 25l l
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to the substation across the road just south of the observation center.
2; Most of us were held there waiting to be monitored, waiting to be checked 3
out until sometime in the early afternoon and at that time, then after I 4
got cleared out of there, I went up to the observation center and I was 5
there all day.
The next day when I came in there were logistics problems 6
to say the least, in trying to operate everybody out of that place and 7
sometime during that day, either then or very early the next day, the g
maintenanc'e people who weren't on the Island doing jobs were sent up the g'
river to Middletown to an old plant that Med Ed owns, was operational up to 10 about three years ago, called Crawford Station.
The instrument people set 11 it up, a repair facility for...
12, SHACKLETON:
Excuse me.
For the record the time is now 3:19 p.m. and 13 Mr. Fasano is having to leaze the interview.
Sorry, Mr. Wilson, continue g
please.
15 16i WILSON:
The instrument personnel set up a temporary repair facility to do repairs on portable radiation monitoring equipment.
We drew what spare 18l parts that we had that we knew we would most likely need out of cur warehouse 19l here.
We took those up, we took batteries up, we took cleaning agents, drying agents, and repaired some instrumentation that was broken down.
We would repair it, send it to the observation center, from there it would go off some place down in Maryland and be calibrated and sent back to be put into service.
Our equipment was in pretty heavy usage during that time.
We had to keep it operational.
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CRESWELL:
Approximately how many instruments did you repair that day?
2, i
3 WILSON:
I have no idea.
We would, most of the repairs, a lot of the 4
repairs were simply changing batteries and things like this.
Things were 5
in very heavy use.
A group of instruments would go out with a radiation 6
survey team and they would be used ratner heavily, they'd come back, some 7
would be operational, some wouldn't.
Most of them were battery problems, 8
either the battery came out of it holder, dirty contacts, batteries low, g
maybe a GN-2 from Milar, had a hole punched in the Milar or something like that.
We did those type of repairs primarily.
How many instruments I have 10 no idea.
The shop was only in operation maybe two or three days and then there was a problem with, the calibration facility from Maryland or somewhere I
came in and took over the repair of these things.
And we became more actively involved in work at Unit 2.
I 15i CRESWELL:
Mr. Wilson, who directed you to perform this task?
17 WILSON:
It came about more out of necessity rather than any direction 19{l from anyone.
There were a lot of instruments broken and either broken or not operational and we knew something had to be done, so we just did it.
20 21, i
CRESWELL:
Of your own volition you set up the shop?
22 23 O^'9 2lQ WILSON:
Yeah.
25'
10 1;
CRESWELL:
Did you report to the Unit 1 EC?
I'm not familiar with the I
2!
proper term, the emergency...
I 31 i
4.
WILSON:
ECCS.
Emergency Control Station?
S CRESWELL:
That's the correct one, yes.
Did you report there when you came 6
onsite?
7 8
WILSON:
Yes, we did.
For the most part, our directions to come onsite g
came fr m the ECS.
How they got the word, I suppose, was from people in 10 the control room, not only Unit 2 but occasionally Unit 1.
Our policy at the time in order to minimize confusion and keep as many people out as we could and only send in those necessary to do jobs we would send people in to do specific jobs.
Whether or not they picked up another job or two 15li while they were here, you know, that was all right.
Generally, we had at least two or three people here at the facility all the time.
Most of the time they were working on a specific job.
Like running the tubing from the I
makeup tank, bleed tank, hydrogen recombiner, whatever.
During that time 18l period also some work got done in Unit 1.
Some work on radiation monitoring was done, I don't know maybe the evaporator, water evaporators and 20 things like that.
We didn't really get back into actively doing things on 21 full time assignment, reporting into the island until sometime around the 22 middle of the next week.
I think it may have been Tuesday, Wednesday or 23 Thursday of the following week, I am not really sure.
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CRESWELL:
About what time would you have been in the emergency control 2
station?
3 4
WILSON:
Well we weren't actually in the emergency control station.
We 5
w uld receive instructions over the radio or telephone from the ECS that 6
they had called over to the observation center.
If we were at the observation 7
center or at the Crawford Station, we would get the call in from the ECS or 8
from the observation center on two way radio.
We would work in conjunction g
with the observation center ECS, we would let the ECS know we were coming, who was coming so that the could be cleared in through the north gate, 10, where they were going, what they were going to do, and that sort of thing.
Like I said most of the jobs ended up in the Unit 2 control room or through Unit 2 control room.
A few jobs through Unit 1.
14; CRESWELL:
Do you know approximately what time you came onsite through the north gate?
17, WILSON:
No, I don't.
You are talking about the day I was involved with a 18l bleed tank job? Or any other particular time?
19l l
20' CRESWELL:
I was speaking of March 28th.
21 22 WILSON:
Oh, March 28th.
It must have been somewhere maybe between 6:30 23 and quarter to seven in the morning.
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CRESWELL:
So that's about the time the site emergency was declared?
2' l
3 WILSON:
That's right.
I was coming in through the processing center.
I i
4 heard the word passed that there was a site emergency.
I forget exactly 5
what it was, but there was the word passed to the effect that there was an 6
emergency, radiation type.
I talked to a couple of guys on their way out, 7
I guess probably before I got to the processing center.
I talked to them g
and they had said something happened, not incoherent or anything like that g
and they weren't panicky or anything like that.
But at the time, I didn't pursue it.
They just said they had problems in Unit 2.
They wern't real 10 g
familiar with what the problems were and I figured, well, when I get in Ig there, I'll talk to the people in Unit 2 and find out what happened.
I did n tice when I came in that morning that a plume came out of the cooling 13 tower was nothing, almost nothing.
15l 16l CRESWELL:
Did you pick up your TLD and dosimeter on the way in?
17 WILSON:
18[!
I had picked up my TLD, dosimeters are'not normally issued except on a purge out basis type thing, but I had picked up my TLD, yes.
19l 20 CRESWELL:
Did you proceed up to the Unit 2 control room after leaving the processing center?
22
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23 WILSON:
No, I was held at the north muster area which is the auditorium in 24 the TMI service building.
They were holding everybody there when I came in.
g r.
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CRESWELL:
Who was in charge there?
2.
3 WILSON:
Some security person had muster sheets as other people came in, 4l other people took charge.
I really don't know who it was, several people 5
senior to myself.
We mustered on around, I think we may have even sent a 6
couple of guys out to Unit 2 during the time I was held there on a request 7
from Unit 2 control room.
8 i
CRESWELL:
Do you remember who those people were?
g 10' WILSON:
No, I don't.
Gordy Lawrence, I believe was in there, one of the other instrument foreman and I got the word from, I don't know who it was right anymore, maybe Pete Snyder, Dan Sheldon, or somebody.
I don't know 3
where all these people were at the time.
It was pretty hectic, I guess.
I I
do know Gordy Lawrence and Mike Tool were there and either Gordy and Mike, 15j or Gordy or Mike, one of the two of them.
I told them when I got the word that they needed a couple of guys up in Unit 2 or Unit 1 control room to I
take care of some problem.
At the time, I knew what it was, now I don't.
18j 19f SHACKLETON:
At this time, we will stop the interview just for a moment while we change the tape.
The time is now 3:31 p.m.
22 SHACKLETON:
This is a continuation of the i,erview of Mr. Harold R.
23 Wilson.
The time is now 3:32 p.m., EDT, May 23, 1979.
Mr. Creswell, 24 please continue.
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CRESWELL:
Mr. Wilson at this point, I would like to ask you if you have 2,i any comments that you would like to make.
Perhaps suggestions or recommen-i 3
dations that other people might consider in a similar type of occurrence 4
involves them.
These comments can be very broad in nature, include NRC 5
involvement, any comment at all that you would like to make.
6l WILSON:
Boy, that question opens up Pandora's box.
One of the big problems 7
g that I see resulted from this, other than the problem with the facility, g
was the concern of I guess what I would classify an uneducated public.
It didn't reach panic proportions, maybe close to it in some cases.
I think 10 3
one of the big, it would be a big help in the future if the public were g
educated in aspects of nuclear power pertaining to power generation.
How involved this education would have to be, I don't know.
I think sometime that they would have to be almost as educated or as educated as I am.
My nuclear education came from the Navy.
I was a reactor operator.
I had 15 rather extensive education in things nuclear, not only from a radiation standpoint, but from a standpoint of operation of a reactor.
Intimate details of construction, design, things like that.
I suppose education that deep would be kind of gilding the lily.
It's not necessary.
Some education is necessary though, I think, at least to the point that the 20l people know and understand radiation and radiation protection.
The possible consequences of similar types of accidents that might happen in a nuclear power plant.
The lack of public education is probably a little bit every-i body's fault.
I don't know where it would start.
The logical place to be, 24 I suppose, would be in the school systems.
It would probably have to be 25
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nationwide though, not just around here.
Or not just in localities where 2
auclear plants are located because people are very mobile and they move 3
around a lot.
I know in my case, my family wasn't afraid.
We don't live 4j too far from here, but we are out of the immediate area.
We are about 15 5
miles away.
I think if we had lived right across the street, the situation 6
w uld have been the same.
I've been in the business for 15 years, my 7
family isn't educated in nuclear power, so I've got a problem too.
I did a 8
1 t of educating my wife, over about a 2-3 day period.
I think primarily, g
my family didn't have any problem cJt of faith, more than anything else.
10 They knew I had been around, I knew what I was doing, if I said it was okay, it must be good.
Alright.
If I said they had no problems, it must g
be alright.
As far as other things, other than public education, I really g
can't say.
I don't know if I am in any position to make a qualified recom-g mendation.
My training was in three fields, actually.
First, it was in electronics; had training in nuclear power generation; nuclear reactors, the type the Navy has; then I had training in operations and maintenance of 16; the instrumentation associated with a navy nuclear reactor; and had training associated operation of the reactor itself.
After that, I worked in a facility, I worked at a couple of facilities, I was at one land based 19j prototype in the navy and on ship.
Navy operators are also navy maintenance people.
The operators know the instrumentation, they know the equipment in I'
detail, not only locations but failure modes.
They know design policies, 22 design reasons, and things like that.
After I got out of the navy, the 23 next place that I worked was the same thing.
It was a very small place, a 24 low power research facility, low budget, I guess.
The maintenance people 25l i
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for the most part were also operators.
We knew the operation of the facility.
I 2!
We knew the maintenanca of the facility.
We knew the locations.
We knew l
31 how the instruments worked as operators we knew this, ok?
For the most l
4f part, the primary operators at least.
Not only knew them from an operations 5l standpoint but knew them how they worked.
What's going to happen it this l
61 valve fails or gets something wedged in it, or how you can tell that valve 7
is not open when the indicator says its open.
Quite frankly, when I came 8:
to Med Ed, it was my fi'rst experience with a commercial nuclear power g
generation.
I had some problems with it.
My problems were this facility 10, g t built and put into operation.
My problems were the fact that the 11 person who operated the plant, who had the prime responsibility for operating 12 the plant, I'm not talking about as a boss, I'm talking about as an operator 13 was the guy with his hand on the handle.
He's got a hell of a lot stuff to 1
k at.
14!
He's got the control room that must be about 50 X 50 feet of 15 panel that goes for maybe 20 or 30, 40 feet long, 8 foot high.
Even though we got an automatic system and I'm the first one to agree that an automatic p
system will control a plant either a very complex plant or a very simple plant much better than an operator at every station or at every component 19{
could ever do, but that guy with his hand on the handle has got a lot to look at.
What I've seen of the power plants that I've been at, there's not that much, the centralization and location of controls and indicating devices that are associated with the different parts of the plant like the reactor controls or the turbine controls.
They are all over the place.
Okay, they are sort of centralized, but not as much as it could be, I don't i
think.
I also got a problem with the fact that operations people aren't 25{
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maintenance people.
They don't know the plant to the degree, I guess, that 2
I was trained and I was made to know it when I was an operations person.
I 3
don't know if its even feasible.
You know, we are talking about union 4!
things, we are talking about money, we are talking about lots of money.
I 5
don't know maybe nuclear power generation is not economically feasible.
I d n't know.
I know it costs a lot of money to do what I' think ought to be 6
7 done in the field of operations and training and maintenance and things like that.
You know train everybody to know everything and to be able to 8
i do everything.
In a facility of this size, I don't even know if one person g
c uld learn all that.
I'm not even sure.
I doubt it sometimes.
I don't 10, know if I could.
It would probably take years.
I don't know intimately the training program of the operations department.
Its extensive, they do have training on instrumentation, they have training in mechanical and electrical but not to the point that they know every intimate detail.
And I think some
.he things that happened and some of the indications that 15!
happened in Unit 2, the instrumentation and things, indicating devices that indicated one thing and the operators for one reason or another made a l
judgment call to do something.
I think if they had been also good maircenance 18l l
people, they might have known what those indicators really tell them.
191 Maybe.
I don't know.
20' 21!
SHACKLETON:
Mr. Wilson, with your experience in maintaining instrumentation 22 of the plant, do you feel that the maintenance program here was adequate?
23 Or is adequate, on the instrumentation?
24 25
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WILSON:
Again, I guess I would have to say Unit 1 or Unit 2.
Unit 1 has 2
been operating for 5 years, 4h years, almost 5.
A pretty good track record.
3 We've had some problems, still got some problems.
Adequate maintenance 4,
program, we look at things from a functional standpoint and from s calibra-5 tion standpoint that are directly related to protection of the facility.
6 The primary system, primary support systems.
We do, like I said, calibration 7
and checks, functional checks and things of that nature.
The balance of 8
the plant, we do calibration, check, and functional checks of things that gl can shut you down in a hurry if something goes wrong with it, or things that can give you a problem in a hurry if something goes wrong with it.
I 10 would say that things we look at are probably maybe 50% of the equipment of the plant, instrumentation in the plant, that is operational at any one time.
Other things we look at on the as fail basis.
Some of them could affect the safety of the plant, if you look at them in the light of multiple failures, this piece of gear in this system and this other piece of gear in 15 16; another system, totally unrelated, not doing the same thing, yet ok, if i
}
they both failed the same way or they both failed a certain way at the same 17{1 time, you know, you are going to have a problem.
Some of these things we 18l l
don't look at.
Some of these things we do.
We are looking at more and more, the more we learn.
We don't, for one reason or another either manpower 20 or utilization of our manpower, we are not in a position to do all we want 21, to do to everything in the plant.
I don't think we're unique.
That's 22 Unit 1.
Unit 2, from a plant safety standpoint, auxiliary safety standpoint, they do all the calibrations, all the functional tests that we do.
They 24 25l havn't been around long enough to set up a PM program, what we call a PM t
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program, look at instruments every couple of years, every few months, l
2+
whatever.
Whatever you feel the PM requirements should be.
l.
3 4
CRESWELL:
You're speaking of preventative maintenance programs, PM programs?
5 WILSON:
That's right.
Unit l's preventative maintenance program is off to 6l 7
a good start.
Its not near where we want to put it yet.
I don't, from a 8
standpoint of a professional, I guess I would like to see everything done.
g From an economic standpoint, I don't know if it could ever be justified.
10 From a safety standpoint, I don't know if you could ever justify it because yy all the gages, all the little indicators, redundant indicators, this place, that place, all over the place.
Some things that are not associated with the plant at all, with the plant proper at all.
I don't see how the could 13 in any remote way affect the safety of a plant.
But like I said, from a professional standpoint, I'd like to see them all operational.
I'd like to 15 16l see them all operated.
I'd like to see them all calibrated perfectly.
No mechanical problems with them.
No electrical problems with them.
Nothing like that.
We pick them up from time to time as they fail.
19l SHACKLETON:
Mr. Wilson, in your comments you referred to some of, made the inference at least, as I understood it, to the problems that possibly in 21; cost and in unions.
And I am going back to the incident that transpired 22 here at Unit 2 on March 28th, when the plant went through a turbine trip 23 and then a reactor trip and the resulting investigations have ensued since 24 then and information that has been developed and made public, do you feel 25i
""9 220 l
t
l f
20 1!
that there is any chance that there could have been any labor problem or i
2 any sabotage on the part of any employees?
l 3
4 WILSON:
No, I don't, not in this, not that would cause this incident.
I 5
can't even envision something like that.
And maybe, when I made my statement 6
awhile ago about unions and money, I should have explained that a little more.
When I was talking about unions, I was talking about one guy does 7
g one job, and he can't do somebody's else's job because that': scross the union line.
We're not so much that way here as they are in the trades.
I g
10, think there is too much of it though, but its getting better.
We are getting away from it.
Its taking time, but we are learning a lot.
We are h
getting more and more a multi-craft organization.
One of the places I 13 think is going to be awful hard to, one of the gaps that is going to be awful hard to bridge will be the gap between operations and maintenance.
As far as sabotage causing the incident, no, I don't think so.
I think it 15!
16:l was a case of multiple failure, undesigned for, unlooked at, and unthought of.
Probably TMI 1 and 2 comes close to being a package power plant as anyone builds these days.
Again, I look at the difference between a commer-l cial power generation and a navy nuclear power.
I see navy nuclear warships, 19!
ships, submarines, aircraft carriers, whatever, a power plant.
If you would ever take the power plants out and line them up side by side, they would look like rows of corn.
They are all the same.
Its an old design tried and true and it works fine.
But it cost a lot of money to get there.
Dollars per power unit, watts or whatever, they cost a bunch.
I really i
24 don't think commercial nuclear power generation will ever get there.
I 25 I
" 9 221
(
21 lj think its too expensive.
I don't know.
Now, I'm not saying that they have i
2!
to be that good.
Again, I don't know.
But I figure, the way I figure it, 3
its pretty heavy responsibility, I suppose, to have a nuclear power plant I
41 and it should be as good as it possibly can be.
5 6
SHACKLETON:
Okay, Mr. Wilson.
We thank you very much for your appearance 7
here today on behalf of the Commission, giving us your time, your candid 8
comments and we'll bring this interview to a close.
The time is now 3:55 gf p.m., EDT.
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