ML19249A990
| ML19249A990 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/1979 |
| From: | Dubiel R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280666 | |
| Download: ML19249A990 (63) | |
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j UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
In the Matter of:
i 2!
IE TPI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
3 of Richard W. Dubiel, Supervisor, Radiation Protection and Chemistry, i
Metropolitan Edison Company 41 I
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6i 7!
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l Trailer #203 9i NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletown, Pennsylvania lli May 8, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13i July 2, 1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14i 175 & 176 ISI (Tape Numoer(s))
16l 17i 18i 1.9 '
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21; NRC PERSONNEL:
'22' Mark E. Resner Thomas Essig 23 Larry Jackson Dale E. Donaldson 24/
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RESNER:
The following is an interview of Mr. Richard W. Dubiel.
Mr.
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j Dubiel is employed by the Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile 31 l
Island site and he is a Supervisor of Radiation Protection and Chemistry.
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The present time is 4:23 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time and today's date is
]9 May 8, 1979.
This interview is being conducted in Trailer 203 which is
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61 located just outside of the South Gate to the Three Mile Island facility.
7I j
Individuals present for this interview are Mr. Thomas Essig.
Mr. Essig l
is the Chief, Environmental and Special Projects Section with the U. S.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Region III.
Also present is Mr. Larry 10t Jackson.
Mr. Jackson is a Radiation Specialist with Region II of the U.
11 S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Also present, Mr. Dale E. Donaldson.
12 Mr. Donaldson is a Radiation Specialist with the Nuclear Regulatory 13!
Commission in Region I.
Moderator for this interview is Mark E. Resner.
II Mr. Resner is an Investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, 15:
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at Headquarters.
Prior to taping 16!
this interview, Mr. Dubiel was provided with a two page document which li!
apprised him of the authorities, scope and purpose of this ir.vestigation.
18!
In addition, it apprised him of that he is entitled to representative of 19!
his choosing should he desire to have one present and also he is not 20j compelled to taik to us.
The second page of this document, there are
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2b three questions which Mr. Dubiel has answered and I will state these for 22 the record.
23l 24j 25!
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RESNER:
Number one, do you understand the above? Mr. Dubiel has checked 2!
yes, is that correct?
3t 4!
DUBIEL:
That's correct.
5l 6i RESNER:
Number two, do we have your permission to tape the interview?
7 Mr. Dubiel also checked yes, is that correct?
8!
9!
DUBIEL:
That's correct.
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lli RESNER:
Number three, do you want a copy of the tape?
Mr. Dubiel has 12I checked yes, is that correct?
13 14f DUBIEL:
Yes I do.
15!
16 RESMER:
Okay you will receive a copy of the tape.
At this time I ask 17!
you to provide a brief resume of your experience, educational and job 18i experience in the nuclear industry.
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20 DONALDSON:
I think you already did that.
21l 22!
DUBIEL:
Yes, that was prcvided on an earlier interview.
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3 RESNER:
Fine, we'll forego that for this tape then and at this point 2!
j I'll turn the questioning over to Mr. Jackson.
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l JACKSON:
On the morning of the 28th, there was water accumulated in the
]9 floor of the Auxiliary Building early and I have heard it stated that at 6l least one and possibly more individuals walked in this water and did not 1
7l get contaminated.
Now, do you know if this water was cleaned up and put i
8i into tanks and subsequently came back up in the floor contaminated?
9t 10(
DUBIEL:
Lar y I can only give you an cpinion on that.
First of all I 11
can confirm that there were individuals that did go through the water 12 actually got 1. heir feet wet, their shoes wet and subsequent monitoring I
13j showed them to be not contaminated indicating that that water which was 10 apparently backing up through the floor drains was of low level activity 15:
if any.
My opinion on what the early stages, what the water we were 16; seeing could have been, I know very well prior to the incident the 17!
radiation levels or activity levels in the Primary Coolant in Unit 2 18!
were very low.
Other than some Sodium 24 of about a 10 to the minus 2 19' magnitude, no other isotopes were showing up above approximately 1 x 10 20i to the minus 4, 2 x 10 to the minus 4; relatively clean water.
That 21I being further diluted as it got through or combined with other leakage 22 in the Auxiliary Building through pump seal water leakage and things of 23j that nature.
I feel the activity was pretty low in all of our was+-
24 tanks in Unit 2 meaning the Miscellaneous Waste Tank, the Aux Building 25[
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l Sump Tank, things of that nature.
And I feel, it's my opinion that in 2!
the early stages, what water we did start adding to the Auxiliary Building 31 l
was in fact still low level and that the water that was being forced 4;
back up into the, onto the floor through the floor drains was low enough Si l
activity level where it would not even end up contaminating a shoe Si should one walk through it.
I don't remember the specific time, but i
i 7l very early prior to 7:30 I believe, one of the technicians and I believe 8!
I it was Michael Janouski, ran through the Auxiliary Building, and as a CI
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matter of fact it was much earlier than that now that I think about it, 10!
it was back prior to 7 o' clock; went through the Auxiliary Building and 11 had the operators the'. were in the Building evacuate, he was going 1
through to assure that everyone was out of the building.
At that time 13 he did in fact go right through the water.
And ha has stated to me lh since that when he checked himself at the with the hand and foot monitor 15' and with a portal monitor it did not alarm either instrument.
So I feel 16 that water was old water, combination possible of some reactor coolant 17l but primarily clean water that had been accumulated on the Auxiliary 18!
Building side prior to the event.
19i 20 JACKSON:
Okay.
Do you know if any time that morning that an effort was 2b made to pump the sumps down and get that water in the tanks?
22i l
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DUBIEL:
Well the problem really was that we didn't have much capacity 2
in any of our tanks.
I don't recall whether I mentioned this earlier 25 r
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5 1l but just a little background, we were coming out of the Unit 1 outage, 2:
coming out of an outage that had liquid waste problems associated with 3
them, by that I mean first of all we had a fairly sizeable crud burst in 4!
Unit i giving us relatively high crud levels in our liquid and secondly 5!
l we had a vent occur where approximately 200, excuse me 20,000 gallons of 61 fuel transfer canal water was spilled into the basement of the Reactor 7{i Building and subsecuently pumped into the Liquid Waste Systems via the Reactor Building sump.
With all if these vents going on plus the oj
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typical water that is generated dur qg an outage and the fact that Unit 10 1 and Unit 2 shared a common miscella-eous waste and RC waste system, 11 Unit 2 water was not being processed and discharged at a rate that would 12 have allowed it to have sufficient amount of volume available.
So when 13 the water started backing up I really believe at that time, it was due i
14 to the fact that all of our tanks were full and it just had no place 15i left to go.
The Aux Building sump on level automatically pumps to the 16i sump tank, the sump tanks should it overflow overflows right back to the li!
floor into the Aux Building sump.
It's essentially a closed loop and 18!
when you get into that situation, you' re in a point where you' re gonna 13!
start backing up through floor drains.
e did make an o'rort and I 20:
really can't recall exactly what time it was bd some',ime dt ring the 21(
first day and continued through the next couple of days t establish 22!
which tanks in Unit 2 contained pre-accident water, water thau did not 2bj include the extremely high levels of iodine and dissolved gases from the 2kl event such that we could start sending those tanks to Unit 1 without 25l I
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F lt jeopardizing Unit l's Auxiliary Building from both the radiation and 2t i
contamination airborne activity standpoint.
So it was a process that 31 took place starting on the 28th, my memory is that is was something that 4!
j really started towards the early afternoon maybe a little bit sooner at Si j
12 noon,1, 2 o' clock something in that ball park we had people starting 6l to look and take tank level readings, we were ;rying to get dose rate 7l information in the vicinity of the tanks as ttat was a pretty quick 8!
indicator of which tanks had what.
It was vary easy to tell which ones 91 got, had any liquid that was post event 1iquid.
10 11 JACKSON:
Do you recall if this kind of information is written down in 12!
any log?
i 13l 1
14 RESNER:
inat's Jackson asking that question.
15:
16 DUBIEL:
I don't know for certain I believe that the operators' logs 1Yf might or should possibly show any transfers that were made, such as, I 18' recall a Neutralizing Tank going over.
I recall a portion of a N!:cellaneous 19!
Waste Stcrage Tank going over, things of that nature.
I think they are 20 logged in the operators' logs.
21l 2$'
JACKSON:
Okay.
Part of the question was directed at our process of 23 looking at tank levels on the morning of the incident and trying t, 24j determine from tank levels and such and possibly subsequent analysis, 25!
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11 what the path was from containment or frcm reactor coolant system into
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these various tanks.
So it had been stated by an individual that, in 3{'
our organization, that he heard that there's been an effort to clean 4!
i that water up off the floor early on the 28th, which matter of fact cl
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tanks levels and...
6i 7!
l DUBIEL:
I think the, when the wording clean it up might be misconstrued, 8'!
I believe the effort was to lower of at least one tank level somewhere, oi
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such that we cculd actually just let the floor drain down through the i
10 drains and I think that was the only effort I don't know of any other 11f attempts to remove water from the building.
It was strictly to lower 12!
the level by providing space for it in the Aux Building sump by making i
131 room in the subsequent tanks.
141 15 JACKSON:
Okay, I think that's en q h on that one.
I'll ask you to 16!
switch your thinking now to the Aux Building HVAC or heating and ventil-17l ation system.
Had there been any major modifications to this system 18!
since the Pre-Op Testing was completed?
19i 20i DUBIEL.
I am not aware of any major modifications to the HVAC system 21;l since startup, I recall a couple during tne startup program ariJ also 22!
plans but no actual modifications during that period of time, t
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0 lt JACKSON:
What modifications were made during the startup?
2.
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DUBIEL:
The single modification that sticks in my mind is the bypass 4'
line around the Auxiliary Building filters, the original design was to cl
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have a bypass line such that under normal conditions we would not be 61 flowing through our system and that particular line, the dampers them-
,1 7
selves were louver dampers and I don't recall exactly what their leakage 8!
was but it was significant and it could not be reduced to an acceptable 9!
level and the line was blanked.
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11l JACKSON:
So these systems operate in service, normally right, the 12 filters?
I 13!
14i DUBIEL:
Tha filters would normally operate in service, yes.
15' 16l JACKSON:
With the filters normally in service what criteria do you use 17l for testing the filters?
ISl 19!
DUBIEL:
For those particular filters there is no tech spec criteria for 20!
testing them for the Auxiliary Building filters.
21f i
i 22l JACKSON:
But are they tested?
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OUBIEL:
They were tested during startup with a DOP and freon plus the, 2'
j I'm not sure I'm fairly certain that the charcoal was bought to Reg 31 Guide 1.52 Specs, I can't be sure that I know it was on the other systems 4
and I think they're all provided together.
51 i
0 JACKSON:
So to your knowledge then, there is no test requirement on 7
these systems like every 730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> this type?
8 9l DUBIEL:
No sir, there's no requirement.
10j ll:
JACKSON:
What's then the plant's experience with the waste gas system, 12!
I'm jumping around a little bit here but I'm trying to pick up loose i
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ends 14 15i DUBIEL:
Okay.
16i II JACKSON:
Has there been any problems with a leak tank or the waste gas 18j system in previcus, during previous operations?
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20j DUBIEL:
I think, I don't think that we can say that there's been any 21 problems or that there hasn't been any problems, I think the one thing 22 we can say is that, well I can say from a radiological star.dpoint that 23l if we had any leakage it was non-radioactive.
The operations personnel 24 might know that we had problems due to the excess nitrogen leakage or 25!
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usage in the system I can tell you that we looked at a couple of waste 2:
l gas decay tanks to release to the environment through normal release 31 permits and found nothing, no activity whatsoever meaning that the tanks were pumped up with nitrogen through the vent header system rather than Si j
with any waste gas, I think this relates back to the fact that we were a 61 brand new plant it looks like we had a pretty good tight core and that 7I the gas, dissolved gas activity in the coolant really had not begun to 8;
build yet so I wouldn't expect to see radioactive gases in the system 9!
that could give you a indication very quickly of a problem I wouldn't 10' expect to see them at that point in the plant life.
11!
12 JACKSON:
Okay.
So you ne/er had any kind of burps in the builoing?
13!
14!
OUBIEL:
No sir. We have had no problems whatsoever on Unit 2 from 15' radiological standpoint.
16; 17 JACKSON:
Okay.
To your knowledge has there been any problem with 18!
balancing the ventilation system between Unit 2 and Unit ' as far as, 19' did you ever have any problem I guess what you just told me was you 20!
didn't have any activity levels probably, that were significant enough 21!
to pick up as problems but say from Unit 1 to 2 or vice versa?
22l 23l DUBIEL:
Yes we, there we have had problems.
We've had on a couple of 24 occasions run into small releases in Unit 1 that would very quickly 25!
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11 1 4 start showing up in some of the Unit 2 exhaust systems primarily the 2
Fuel Handling Building exhaust systems where we'd see it.
The Unit 2 31 i
systems to my knowledge, ventilation HVAC systems, have not been balanced.
4ll There was an effort that was ongoing at the time, particular situation SI j
of not having design flows established was identified and was picked up 6l as one of the work items and was in progress at the time.
We had a 7I j
couple cf engineers assigned I don't know specifically the engineer, but i
8!
it was from Ron Warren's group which is the Unit 2 Mechanical Engineering h
group.
They were assigned I think they were still in the early stages 10!
of going through and taking flow measurements in the various cubicles at 11 that time of the accident.
l 12!
13 JACKSON:
I'm skipping around again.
During the first three days we had 14 various sketchy information on some of the gaseous releases and also 15:
liquid releases, I say liquid, I mean IWTS, Industrial Waste Treatment 16 System and there was some reports generated cor this period that gave 17 numbers based on certain concentrations and certain flows of dilution 18!
waters.
Did you become involved in generating those reports?
19!
20l DUBIEL:
Not in generating the reports, I was involved in the front end i
21l of that, which was actually the taking of samples and identifying what 22 isotopes existed in what sumps and what, by what means we could discharge 23j the sumps so as to provide assurance that we would not exceed MPC at the 24!
final discharge.
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JACKSON:
On the some of the reports that were after the fact that said 2l' we released this many curies of Iodine-131 were you involved in making 3
the assumptions on what concentrations you had at certain periods?
DUBIEL:
Well, you saying assumptions, une concertrations that we had were identified by c % sampling and subsequent co2nting on a GeLi MCA 7I j
system.
O!
JACKSON:
Okay but I've seen a statement or two that said, I think this i
10 related specifically to the Industrial Waste Treatment System tnat said 11f we didn't have enough, essentially it was said we didn't have enough 12 data available for this period and therefore we assumed the average 13l concentration from 3/28 until 4/1 or something like this.
f 14!
15:
OUBIEL:
No.
I was not involved in any of the tail end work which was f
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to put the whole picture together if there were periods where there 17!
might of been data missing it could be due to two factors, one we could 18!
of had data and misplaced it or it could of been that for a period of 19[
time there was no data taken I really couldn't answer that.
20j l
21l JACKSON:
Okay fire.
I believe that's all the questions I have.
23 RESNER:
We're having a short delay here on deciding on a line of ques-24l tions.
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j DONALDSON:
Okay.
I'll pick it up.
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i JACKSON:
Dale I have only about 4 or 5 questions, if you want to go go i
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ahead.
St 1
6l RESNER:
For the record note that Mr. Jackson is no longer present 7 I during the interview and that....
8 i
9 00NALDSON:
Donaldson, hit it Tom.
10 11.
RESNER:
How much time do we have left on this side?
12, 13 NOT IDENTIFIED:
At least 20 minutes.
14!
i 15' ESSIG:
Dick this is Essig speaking, like Larry Jackson I'm probably 16]
gonna, I got a bunch of loose ends here that I kind of want to tie 17!
together I've been in on both of the discussions with you before and so 18!
I think I pretty much understand the extent to which you involved in a 19!
1ot of areas but there is still a couple of tail end questions which I'm 20l certainly asking several people that I'm trying to piece it together and 21f I'm not asking you because I think that you necessarily have the entire 22 answer but just because you were there and you may have been involved.
23l The questions are this.
Your Meteorological Contractor, by the way I'm 24i switching now to the offsite dose calculations.
Picture your side of i
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1; tne things.
Your Meteorological Contractor, Pickard, Lowell and Garrett 2'
l became involved on Wednesday and were estimating atmospheric dispersion 31 1
values during the day and as I understand that these were provided to 4f l
the corporate office, Mr. Dave Karl, the corporate meteorologist late in SIj the day like around 5 o' clock or so.
And at some time they were later made available to the site, I think they went to the ECS.
Are you aware I
7l of any attempt by either yourself or by any of the others that were 8i either in Unit 2 with you or in Unit 1, of an attempt to reassess the h
releases that had gone on in light of the more realistic Chi /Q values 10f which had been provided by the actual on line met data as opposed to the 11 previous ones which had been estimated using the Isoflex.
12f 13 DUBIEL:
The only thing I'm aware of Tom is that late in the afternoon 14!
on Wednesday the 28th there was an effort being made in Unit 1 Control 15; Room which was ECS at that time to use the X/Q and I'm now assuming 16i because I don't know for a fact that it was a Pickard and Lowell updated lY X/Q's, I Know that they were trying to go back and re-establish a Q 18i factor or a release rate curie per second.
At that time there's a 19!
fairly major effort to try to do that by calculating, back calculating 20l from field survey data to an actual release rate. I myself was not 21 involved in that end.
I do not know that the updated X/Q's for a fact, 2d!
now that you mentioned that it seems to make sense but I can't be sure L
23i on that.
24!
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ESSIG:
I have a related question and early in the day on the 28th in 2l discussions with Mr. Crawford and Senson, the nuclear engineers who were 3!
involved in some of tte offsite dose calculations tney had indicated 4l that I think it was Mr. Crawford that had said he had made the initial c!]
prediction of the offsite, dose rate in Goldsboro which he had discussed
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with you and he seemed to recall that the initial prediction was something 7l on the order of either 10 R per hour or 49 R per hour, it was a 10 R 0
intergrated dose or something like that but I wasn't holding him to that 9!
because we'll check the records on that but the point was that it was a 10 fairly significant dose rate predicted for Goldsboro.
And then sometime 11 later I think the record bears out the fact that it was about an hour 12l and a half later it was subsequently verified that it was in fact less i
13l than 1 mR per hour in other words the prediction was conservative by 14 about 4 orders of magnitude.
Now Mr. Crawford indicated that he subse-15!
quently, then using the Procedure 1670.4, The Offsite Case Calculation 16I Procedure, he proceeded to iterrate to home in on the true source term 17!
using the method outlined therein where you take the ratio of the offsite IS!
measured to the offsite predicted or it maybe the other way around and 19:
apply it to he source term and attempt to hcme in what the source term 20l really is.
And as I understand what he told me that there were about 21 threc attempts made to do this, making the calculation using the dome 22!
monitor reading, the extrapolated dome monitor reading and then making i
23l the calculation, shall we say, in the forward direction which is from 24l source term through atmospheric dispersion to offsite dose rate and 25!
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there were about three or four iterations and I think it was indicated 2
j to me that the last iteration they were predicting for whatever sector 3l it was, something on order of 2 mR per hour and it was measured to be 4j something less than 1.
It might of been measured with a PIC-6 which doesn't indicate below 1.
61 l
I DUBIEL:
That's correct.
8 O!
ESSIG:
But then it was indicated to me that the actual estimation of l
10f source term by the methods outlined in 1670.4 was discontinued, that is 11 the calculation in that particular forward direction was discontinued 12l and instead calculations were now being made at a backward direction, i
13!
that is they were taking the measured dose rate, the atmospherl dispersion 14' value and getting it back to an apparent source term which would give 15l you that.
Okay with that preamble, then do you know what use was being 16, made of the source terms that were generated in that manner? They were 17l being given to somebody and I have reason I think that somebody might of 18!
been either you or Mulleavy and I'm not sure of what was being done with 19 them.
20!
2h DUBIEL:
Those source terms, first of all I don't recall any of the 22l calculated source terms so I feel fairly confident in saying they were i
23!
not being fed back to me.
The field data itself was about the only cata 1
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l that I was actually going on as far what the levels were offsite whether 2l or not they are being fed to the ECS within Tom Mulleevy I really don't 3) know.
There was sometime early in that afternoon that those people that 4l you mentioned Howy Crawford and Mike Benson and Tom Mulleavy and all the Si j
people at ECS established themselves in Unit 1 including the nuclear 61 engineers Crawford and Benson, who'd previously been in the Unit 2 7i Control Room with me.
At that point I essentially became kind of a 8
I outsider as far as the offsite doses were concerned.
I was monitorir.g 9I the radio messages, what we were taking notes to see, what levels were 10f being recorded so that we would have a handle on it but we were not in 11 fact doing any cs sculations or back calculations in the Unit 2 Control 12 Room.
13l 14!
E5SIG:
Okay.
Do you know that at any time that I should preference 15i this question by a comment, that I may have asked you this in the most 16!
recent interview that we conducted of you but the copy of the tape that 17!
we made, we have the original but the copy of the tape was bad and I was 18!
gonna listen to it again to see how you responded but I don't have it so 19I I think I maybe asking you something that I asked you previously so I'll 20 ask you to bear with me on this one.
Tne procedure 1670.6 for Offsite 21' Surveys, one of the items in there to be considered is the placement of 22l TLD's at special locations, TLD's which could be removed on a very 1
23l frequent basis like every four hours, these would be in addition to the 1
24l TLD's that are out as part of the normal routine, radiological environmental 25!
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l 18 lt monitoring program which I think we hwe established by interv' ewing 2'
various people that those TLD's were pulled in the afternoon of the i
3l 29th.
Now my question is, co jou, were you aware while you were involved 4l j
with the offsite survey helper, if any consideration was given to placemerit i
Si of TLD's in additional locations for the purcose of attempting to intergrate i
6i over a number of these so to speak hills a.1d valleys which we're having 7
in dose rate as the wind was shifting the dose rate seeted to be going 8!
_up and down rather rapidly, were you aware of any were those considered 9I at all and if so what was the result of that consideration?
10j 11!
DUBIEL:
Thinking back, I know for a fact that we did not put any additional 12!
TLD's out.
The itera was addressed and the results war that the TLD's 1
13l would be, ex. sting TLD's, part of the existing radiation monitoring 14j program, the offsite monitoring program.
Those TLD's would bc changed 15:
at a increase in frequency, increased frequency, but no additional TLD's 16 would be put out.
17 i
18t ESSIG:
Did you in fact even have any TLD's of sufficient sensitivity, 19i the environment calcium sulfate TLD's to, did you have them on hand even 20j to put out at the?
l 21l.
i 22 DUBIEL:
We did not.
No.
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l'j ESSIG:
Did you have to get those from y3ur contractor, from RMC or 2f teledyne?
3!
4!'
OUBIEL:
That's correct.
5!
6' ESSIG:
Okay.
My next question and I think I have maybe oh perhaps one or two more and it concerns any guidance or instructions, oral instructions 8[
which may have been given to the offsite survey teams initially.
First 9!
of all, it was, I think it was re established reasonably early that the 10!
radioactivity that was being measured offsite was in fact 80 Kev gamma, 11 well it was Xenon 133 which then we know it emits a 81 Kev gamma.
And 12 I'm just wondering if any precautionay statements, such as. measuring 13) that icw energy gamma with a closed window GM might not be advisable 14' because of the fact that that GM might grossly under respond to the 81 15:
Kev gamma, do you know if any precautionary notes were given or were 16; they instructed to take all open window readings or what kind of instruc-lYl tions might of been given?
18!
19i DUBIEL:
I don't recall that any specific instructions relative to open 20!
or close window readings were given initially.
I don't recall specifically 21; when we started going to a dual reading, in other words, an open window, t
22l an closed window reading.
The initial surveys I believe were done with 23l PIC-6's which hms does have a window but it's a relatively small area.
l 24i And I think that alac i' the reason why a lot of the numbers were less i
25i than 1 mR since that is the minimum sensitivity.
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- y.. p
i i
i i
l 20 l!
ESSIG:
Yes.
2!
l 3i DUBIEL:
Or minimum scale reading that you could actually see.
Again I 4l can't tell you when we gave the instruction nor can I tell you exactly ci
- l how the instruction was transmitted but at some point in time during the 6l first day it started coming back as both open and closed window readings for each dose rate that was taken.
I can't tell you who gave that 0
instruction or when.
9{
10 ESSIG:
Were most of the instruments ust.o osring that first day? Were 11!
they either the Eberline PIC-6 c. the Eberline R02? Were there in fact i
12' any GM's even used the first day?
I 131 14!
OUBIEL:
There were some GM tuoes used.
I think the teams themselves 15; and I don't have a real acod handle on exactly which teams had what 16 problems but I do recall several of the PIC-6's failing, they're not a 17!
very rugid instrument and being replaced by the E-520, the Eberline ld E-520 which is a GM tube.
I think from readings it was pretty obvious 19!
which instruments were being used since we did at some point in time get 20i down to a.01 mR per hour scale reading and I think that is indicative i
21 of switching over to a GM tube in a E-520.
But I think predominantly 22l first of all the PIC-6's were used initially and I think that the R02's i
23li which are probably the most abundant source of dose rate instrum;nts in 24l plant at the time were probably the first replacements put out in the 25; field and subsequently some E-520's were involved.
jug o
(.) O 1
U'
I I
I i
{
21 l
l!
ESSIG:
Okay.
Another follow on question of that, with regard to the 2;
l use of well in particularly the R02 in the helicopter surveys, I think 3;
j you're perhaps aware of the Mylar window and any pressures you ever 4!
pushed on one with your fingers and you can get a scale that fluctuates c;
]
because you're affecting the volume and were you aware of any precautionary 6!
notes given to the teams that were, the individual that would be in the 7
helicopter hanging the R02 out the window which might be subjected to 8
some pretty stiff air currents from the helicopter blades?
91 10l' DUBIEL:
I am not aware, I did not even know what type of instrument was l
in the helicopter, to be honest with you.
12l 13[
ESSIG:
Okay.
14:
15:
RESNER:
At this point we'll break the tape to chance it.
The time is 16!
now 5:04 PM.
17' 18i RESNER:
The time now is 5:05 PM and this is a continuation of the 19!
interview Mr. Ricnard W. Dubiel.
Mr. Donaldson, or exuse me, Mr. Essig 20{
will continue questioning.
21,I 22{
ESSIG:
Dick, there's one other point that Larry Jackson I think touched 23!
on a little bit and it's a point of that I'm a little confused about is I
2 ?. !
exactly how it was handled.
One time during the first three days following 25!
l D
U
- i 1
i
[
22 l!
the event and I obtained this information from talking with one of the 2l j
fellows that was in the ECS and his recollection of it was a little 3r fuzzy and so I wanted to see if I could ask you while it was a little 4!'
fuzzy in that he later amended that to indicate like he thought it was c;
indicated but the question is, at scme time during the first three days 6;
there might have been an indication that there were releases occurring 7l via Unit 1, via the Unit i vent, the plant vent, I guess there, are 8i there enough, I'm not this familiar with the actual system itself as i
Cl some of our other fellows are, but are there enough ventilation cross 10f connects between fuel either fuel handling building or Aux building that 11' i
is conceivable well I know your sample, your sample lines for Unit 2 is 12 in Unit 1.
13l 14l DUBIEL:
Right.
15 16-ESSIG:
Were you aware of any releases occuring, these would presumably 17!
be Unit 2 releases that were occurring from the Unit i vent?
18I 19!
DUBIEL:
I can not recall that we did in fact have releases in Unit 1 20i ether than those associated with the actual drawing of letdown samples 21,l in Unit 1.
Ar a matter of fact, we were expecting to see fairly signi-22!
ficant levels of gas going out the Unit 1 Stack while we drew the Unit 2 23ll letdown sample.
But I don't recall and I don' t believe that Unit I had 24j a major problem of releasing, I image that they probably saw some upscale 25; t
U
i i
t I
23 i
l!
deflection in gases and subsequently you did that, that would also 2:
l indicate on iodine whether or not the charcoals actually showed iodine 3f or not, I don't know.
I don't think that the vcatilation system cross connects are all that significant.
There're significant in one specific w
~
area and that is the where fuel pool to fuel pool is wide open.
But the 6i rest of the building is relatively tight and with relatively small 71 j
openings were either connected througn door ways where it's not very 81 difficult to establish a flow or a positive flow in one direction.
I 4
oi don't believe that there was a significant amount of activity going i
1 over, although I'd imagine there'd be some indications in U7it 1.
11:
l 12!
ESSIG:
Okay.
With regard to the letdown s.mple that was collected, you 13!
indicated that there would be a, that was anticipated that there'd be 14!
some releases associated with it.
Was this to your knowledge factored 15-in tc the source term calculation procedure that we were just discussing 16 a little bit ago, the Procedure 1670.4 for Offsite Dose Assessment?
17:
18!
DUBIEL:
No, I don't believe it was.
When I said that there'd be some 19' increase level or some, we were concerned about it.
I don't think our 20j ccncern was that it Nculd make very large difference in what the total 21; station effluent was showirg at the time but it would be different, t
22!
considerably higher than what Unit I was putting out at the time.
23l 24 25i
? on
?) L; O
.)
l e
i
l
(
24 i
i l!
ESSIG:
Okay.
That maybe was the source of the confusion that it was 2:
small relative to the total station releases were.
3; 4!
00BIEL:
That's correct.
4 5!
6i ESSIG:
But that it was large compared to what Unit I was putting out.
7l 0
DUBIEL:
Right.
9(
10l ESSIG:
Okay.
And one other question, this has to do with the position 11!
I'm not sure exactly what its proper name is, but we talked with a 12 couple individuals who or one individual who stated that he was called 13!
the ECS Coordinator and then we heard also the position called ECS 14' Director and I guess I would just like to establish for the record, to 15l your knowledge do you know which is the proper name or are they two 10 positions, or are they in fact one position.
I talked with Mr. Tsaggaris 17l earlier today and he indicated to me that he was the ECS Coordinator for 18' the period from noon cn Friday till about midnight on Friday night the 19t 30th and he had relieved Mr. William Potts, who had served in that 20' position.
Do you know if there's any disti..ction between these two 21l positions or are they just one position that goes by a couple of different 22' names?
23l i
24:
2$'
i o s)
- ,* s C i) U
[
25 i
l' DUBIEL:
I think the confusion is that under our Emergency Plan the 2
i individual in charge of the emergency control station was Tom Mulleavy and at the time of the 9 vent, his duties included not only getting the 4!'
offsite and onsite monitoring teams but also to be concerned about the
~I*
personnel onsite, dose rates and airborne activity, problems that might UI arrive at various assembly areas, and things of that nature.
Also to k
provide health physics control over the, any saiergency maintenance that i
8l might be necessary.
The position that the two gentlemen, Bill Potts and 9!
Alexis Tsaggaris were assuming essentially was a position that developed i
10 several days downstream of the actual event.
It became rather than what 11 we'd expect the ECS Director to do in the 6-10 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> immediately 12 following the accident.
It became a position more of just coordinating 131 the on and offsite well, first of all the offsite monitoring which is 14 airborne and dose rate but also the onsite monitoring and sampling for 15l IWT sewage and things of that nature.
Essentially it evolved into a 16l coordinator's job rather than a directors job, if you will, I don't 17!
believe that there were ever two people in charge of the ECS at any 18i given time.
I think they'll all the same thing, it's more.
19i 20!
ESSIG:
So what I understand, let me just give it back to you assorted 21 in my own words and so that I can see if I have a picture of what was 22!
going on.
Initially, on the 28th you and Mulleavy, were after the ECS 23 had been relocated up to the Unit 2 Control Room.
You and Mulleavy were 24l there together essentially, and then you were split apart when he went, 25l l
o/ b i i 7,,,;
s 3
I l
{
26 l
1:
when the ECS was relocated from the Unit 1 Control Room or the Unit 2 to i
2.'
the Unit 1 Control Rcom.
31 4l CUBIEL:
That's correct.
i Si 6
ESSIG:
He was in the, he was functioning in a sort of a combined ECS 7
Director and the position of tr en which later scat of revolved to a 8l Coordinator.
9l i
10 f
CUBIEL:
That's correct.
lli 12 ESSIG:
He was sort of hciding down all of that during t.3 first day.
i 13i i
14!
DUBIEL:
That's correct.
15 16; ESSIG:
Ckay.
Then at some time, ckay I can pick up the other end with 17!
from the interview of Alexis T3aggaris by knowing that he was functionir.g 18l as the ECS Coordinator for the period from Friday, noon to Friday aidnight 19 and Potts was functioning in that capacity sometime before him but could 20l you fill in as best you recall whom, when that, when the need was foresee-21!
ing to develop that and who might of been functioning in that capacity 22l because Tsaggaris didn't come onsite until noon Friday.
23l 24!
f 1
25 l
3 4
f i
[
27 e
l i 7
DUBIEL:
That's correct.
2; l
3t ESSIG:
Potts had it sometime before that, the shift immediately before 4I l
that and I'm just trying to establish who might of had it from say Si
{
Wednesday between Wednesday you perhaps foresaw a need for it, either 6i Wednesday or Thursday.
7l 8l!
DUBIEL:
I'm kind of at a loss for a period of time in there.
The, it 9!
look, I think that the situation essentially involved with Tom was there 10!
until sometime after midnight cn the 29th into the early morning hou s 11 of the 29th, I'm not exactly sure when he finally left.
I know he left 12j pric to my leaving.
And when he left, I believe that the entire offsite 13) dose or monitoring coordination effort was being done by perstonal at 14' the Observation Center and whose those personnel were is, the orly 15; individual I can remember over there was Earl Gee and he was thers. at 8 16 o' clock in the evening but I believe that that group had taken over Earl 17l Gee and I'm just trying to think and for the life of me I can't think of 18l who else was there.
I stopped over about 8 o' clock in the ev9ning to 19i grab a sandwich over there and I recall Earl at that time.
I 20' I
21!
RESNER:
We'll take a short break.
I 22l l
23 CUBIEL:
Earl Gee was on the phone, I believe Sandy Larra was there.
I 24j don't remember who else, there's several people around a table, the map 25j
i 28 i
l' was laid out on the table and they were calling, radioing into the 2}'
helicopter to the offsite monitoring teams.
So they essentially had 3l l
assumed all the responsibilities of the offsite nonitoring program.
4!'
The, their function eventually moved back in olant.
I don't believe i
]j that occurred for a day or two, it may have been with Alexis coming in.
Gi i
7)
ESSIG:
I'm wondering if it didn't occur with Potts coming in.
8!
4l)
DUBIEL:
It could have.
Excuse me, you're right.
Potts was there V
10l before Alexis and I don't remember when that actually occurred.
11!
i 12l ESSIG:
Did you have any contact with Potts when he came on board? Were 1
13l you aware that he had sort of taken over as a ECS, what became an ECS 14!
Coordinator or would this of been done under Mulleavy?
15t 1F DUBIEL:
I didn't have any contact with him that I can rememcer.
I 17 think though the problem on, I had very little recollection of what 15!
tt<.nspired in the early morning hours of the 29th.
I think I left the 19' site sometime around 6 o' clock and I really have, I can recall that Tom 20j and I did some discussions about how we could get people to relieve us 21{
and i recall the foreman, we sent some foreman home early so that they 22l could come back in at a set time to relieve us.
I believe there were i
23l some foreman scheduled to come in at 7 o' clock in the morning and I I
24i think I left at 6.
I was about ready to fall on my face at that time l
25{
I
(,,
,41 3
i t
{
29 l
and I think there might have been an hour there where there was no one 2:
l in the Unit 1, Unit 2 Control Room from the health physics supervision 31 group.
Whether Tom was relieved on station cv whether it was turned 4!
over to a, possibly a Unit 1 Supervisor, a Superintendent or something 5'
of that, I really don't know.
I just can't remember for that period of 61
.time.
7'l t
81 ESSIG:
We have another interview scheduled with Mr. Mulleavy so I'll 9;'
ask him what his recollection was.
6 10j 11l RESNER:
(Says something but can not hear because of ai-' lane going 12 overhead).
13; 14!
ESSIG:
I think with that, that pretty much concludes the immediate list 15:
of questions that I have, notes that I've made and Dale, if you want to 16:
pursue the questions that you have there, the floor is yours.
17j 18!
DONALDSON:
At this point let us go back and review one th'"g real 19' quick.
We talked briefly about the emergency organization and on looking 20-it over I don't see where the responsibility for Emergency Health Physics 21, coverage on that and I feel you had a comment that you could make that 22]
once cre.
23!
24!
I 25; l
(180 Di" 1
I
d I
30 DUBIEL:
Well the actual reponsibility for what we've termed our Emergency 2'
l Repair Party, has rested with the individual in charge of the Emergency 3
Control Station, however, I think in, that particular responsibility was 4l based on past experiences and what we had anticipated as far as where we 5
i would actually be directing our personnel from.
I think we felt that 9
following any accident, that the Unit 1 Health Physics Lab would be the plant a which we would be e spatching all of our Emergency Repair 8!
Maintenance personnel.
During the event, however, it was pretty cbvious 9
that we wanted to try to isolate the two units.
We shut the door between 10 the two units, such that any entries had to be made from Unit 2 and the 11l responsibility really, I came to the Unit 2 Control Room, I assumed that 12!
responsibility, although I think you'll find in the plan it's designed 13 to be with the ECS.
14!
15 RESNER:
Another short break.
16' 17!
(There is an airplane going overhead and they are talking amongst them-ISI selves).
19:
20 DONALD $0N:
Okay.
Under emergency conditions, what criteria do you use 21f to establish exposure limits?
Specifically, who can authorize an individual i
226 to take emergency exposures?
231 24!
25l l
m bUU
- l /
l
[
31 i
i l{'
DUBIEL:
Dale, the, I'm trying to recall the wording in our Emergency 2:
l Plan, the authorization I celieve as it's wording in our Plan is that 31 the Superintendent or I should, let me rephrase that, the Emergency 4!
{
Director can, in fact, authorize and I believe the wording requires that 51 the individual be infortied of the expected or anticipated exposure at 6;
the time or prior t.o tne entry and it must be on a voluntary basis.
7!
i I
p0NALDSON:
Did you and Gary Miller have a discussion at any time on the
- l 28th regarding who would authorize various exposures and what proct:dures 10 would be followed in granting access or directing that certain actions 11f be taken in radiologically contaminated or wherever radiation was located?
12il 13 DUBIEL:
I don't recall Gary Miller and I having that type of discussion.
14!
I believe that on the 28th, the entries that we were making and the 15.'
levels t. hat we were seeing allowed us to feel relatively confident that 16 we could stay close to the 3 rem per quarter guideline.
So I don't 17!
believe it became an issue on the 28th.
18; 19' DONALDSON:
Prior to the entry of individuals for the various activities, 20!
pulling chemistry samples, building tours for assessing conditions or 21j performing maintenance work, did you yourself personnally provide any 22f direction or briefing as to protective clothing requirements, stay times 25 and the expected exposures?
i 24; 25i l
[ U'!
UUV
l
{
32 i
l!
DUBIEL:
I gau, I filled almost every individual that went in.
I feel 2{
confident I got every individual that went in, I had a chance to talk 3
with them.
There were not altogether that many entries made.
Essentially, 4!
wn=.t I was giving as direction was we were, first of all I was, we were Si j
going in full protective clothing, scott air packs, the main thrust of the exposure control from my standpoint, I was first of all concerned at the individuals would in fact enter all areas with a teletector into O
those areas with a teletector extended in front of them as such that 9I they what levels they were getting into pria to getting into the areas.
10!
Also, I was trying to give them some quick things to think about in the t
11 area of dose rate that they could convert R per hour to R per minute it 12 was my real, was what I was trying to get them to think abcut rather 13I than try to worry about R per hour versus how long there're in there.
I 14 though if they could convert the dose rate to an R per minute, they'd 15 have a pretty good handle on how much time they had to stay in an area.
16; I was using one and half rem as a guideline to shot for and my purpose 17!
in doing that was that I felt that we had to give ourselves about a 1 18!
1/2 rem margin of error, both from, primarily from the standpoint that 19i if they went up to 1 1/2 rem in an area, it took them some period of 20l time to get out of the building and that typically would run them through 21l some fairly high levels.
I also at that time, did not have a real good 22l up to date exposure document on all individuals and I was using the 23j individuals knowledge of their own exposure to date and what information 2$j we had from the printout.. 'iat we had available to us.
To try to control 25!
i m-3 JL
l l
[
33 l
5 1'
that, I felt that there was a definite possibility of an individual or i
2' i
an individual not being sure in underestimating what he had already 3 ',
received for the quarter, or in our documents possibly not being, and I 4l knew they were not up to the minute.
They typically lag by well at c/
]
lea <.t to the previous Monday, so we probably a couple of days behind on 6l aur printouts.
So I was using i 1/2 rem as the guideline.
As far at, 7!
dose rates in areas, I don't think initially that we really had a good I
8j handle and I was using the individuals who were going in as essentially 9!
the monitoring team also.
And they came back the first thing we would 10 do was to debrief them on dose rates.
lli 1
DONALDSON:
Were the dose rates written down?
13i 14:
DUBIEL:
The dose rates were written down.
I had theJ, in a single text 15:
on both the first day and the second day xeroxed layout drawings.
I had 16!
to cut and paste them together to make them into one single drawing and 17l started recording dose rates on them.
I do recall very vividly though 18:
that the, all of the dose rates that we had en day onc are, I should day 19' that were available to us at about 5 o' clock in tne mt ning on the 29th, d
which is just prior to me leaving.
When I came back in about 1:30 or 2 21i o' clock that afternoon, those drawings, those layouts with the cose 22!
rates on them were nowhere to be found.
I reinitiated the same type of I
23!
an effort.
i 24i 25!
fO 731 U U (1V J c_ t_
6
[
34 l
i l!
DONALDSON: Would you say that from your standpoint in the Emergency 2:
j Organization, that the Emergency Director and that the Organization as a 31 whole exerted every reasonable effort to maintain or min' aire exposures?
41
]l DUBIEL:
Well I th'nk at the time, that there was a conscience effort to 6i minimize exposures.
I think that each individual entry was throughly 7l reviewed to assure tlat it was a necessity and that we could things in 81 the quickest possib'a manner.
I think in retrospect, we probably could ol
~
go back and find thintls that we did, that we could have gotten away 10f without doing but hind sight is a lot easier.
I think at the time, it I
was a, definitely a caricience effort to minimize exposures.
i 12!
13!
DONALDSON:
There's a criteria in the Emergency Plan that states that 14
" Site evacuation of all non-essential personnel is to be initiated if 15' gas in the station vent exceeds high alarm setpoint and 2 ARMS exceed 10 16' R per hour" Evacuation at the site occurred at 11:10, somewhat after 17!
these conditions occurred.
Did you have a discussion with anyone or did 18i you consciously evaluate this criterion and decide not to perform an 19' evacuation on these 16.?ls that had been reached?
20+
21!
DUBIEL:
Yes we did.
First of all we had the personnel assemble at 22!
various assembly areas.
Thsre were than efforts made to monitor both 23l the, first, primarily the dose retes in those areas to determine whether 24f or not it was necessary to move people.
I can specifically rememoer the 25l n~
(on j
s.
I s
f f
35 i
1:
Catalytic personnel at the South Assembly Area, actually they were moved 2:
down to the South Gate, right outside the trailer here and that area 31 being evaluated.
At the time, we had decided that since the wind was 4!
actually blowing in the other direction at that time, that there would Si j
be no need to move those people and that there might be source of manpower 6i that could be utilized.
7 81 l
RESNER:
Having a short break, be right back.
91 10 DUBIEL:
A similiar evaluation were made at the North Assembly Area 11f which is in the auditorium and also at the warehouse.
When it became 12 apparent, I believe the north assembly and the warehouse was actually 13l those areas evacuated at seme time prior to 11:10, I don't remember 14' exactly when but I believe it was earlier than the actual full site 15:
evacuation.
16' i
1/
DONALDSON:
What you're saying is that rather than using this criterion 18i based on the station vent, you were using more realistic or more actual 19!
radiation levels in the area where people were assembled.
20:
21l DUBIEL:
That's correct.
That's correct.
And as tre wind shifted from 22 west to around to north, north being downwind, that 's when we started I
23 running into problems with dose rates at the north assembly area and at 1
24j the warehouse and I don't recall the time but I believe it was earlier 25j 6
I l i
l I
[
36 I
1:
i than 11:00 o' clock that those people were moved on.
The people at the 2
south assembly essentially had no indication of any i.1 creased dose rates 31 l
above background.
And it wasn't until probably the 11:10 time that 4:
you're referring to that those people were finally allowed to leave and 1
"l C
j it was not so much an evacuation due to reaching evacuation criteria, f
but just the realization that we probably wouldn't have or had very low 7
j probability of having any need for those people.
8!
i 9f CONALDSON:
I believe now, I'm gonna have you give me the date because I 10I don't at this point I don't remember the date.
I'm not sure about the 11 date I have written here.
Mr. Velez and Mr. Houser took a primary 12!
sample and I believe it was early in the morning o. the 29th, or was it 13i the 28th?
14' 15i DUBIEL:
Well I'm gonna disagree with both of those.
I believe it was 16 in the afternoon of the 29th.
17!
18!
DONALDSON:
Okay.
19; 20l DUBIEL:
My recollection is 1600 on the 29th.
I 21,l 22!
DONALDSON:
Okay.
Tnat sounds sits in with another time I heard.
23; 24 25;
() Y t J L. )
~
f'-
t F
l
[
37 l'
{
DUBIEL:
Okay.
That is the time I believe that that sample was taken.
2:
i 3i 00NALD50N:
I know I've got it written down.
Allright.
I'd like to 4;
talk about that one for a little bit.
Were you on station?
5 0
00BIEL:
Yes I was.
7l 0
DONALDSON:
Prior to the taking of that sample, did you in fact meet with Mr. Velez and Mr. Houser and brief them and discuss the operation?
10f 11l DUBIEL:
I spoke with Mr. Velez.
I did not speak with, to my, as far as 12 I can remember I don't remember talking to Ed Houser.
13; 14!
CONALDSON:
Could you give me the text of the discussion with Mr. Velez?
15-16:
DUBIEL:
Essentially, well first of all, Pete Velez is a Radiation 17i Protection Foreman.
He's also a, in my opinion, a extremely good Radiation 18; Protection Foreman.
He was a former Rad Chem Tech, he's very knowledgeable 19' in drawing of letdown samples, although I don't believe he's specifically 20l knowledgeable in the valve lineup for Unit 2 as in scoe ways differs 21:
from Unit 1 and he's only been trained with the technician on the Unit 1 l
22l system.
My, as I remember the conversation, it was relatively short.
I 23) did mention to Pete that the sample should be drawn by dividing up the 24l routine as much as practicable so that one person didn't take the entire, 25-o
(> O O
'LO 1
I r
(
38 l!
do the entire valve lineup and drawing of the sample due to the 2.
j anticipated dose rates.
3i l
4I DONALOSON:
Now let me just back up a second and touch on this point.
5!
j You mentioned that you knew that Mr. Velez might not be that familiar 61 with the valve lineups on Unit 2.
Would you also discuss the differences i
7{
or the similiarities between adjusting the drag valves and the actual 8:'
manipulation to ope, the sample line? Compari ons, are they the same in 91 Unit 1 and Unit 2 or are they different?
10 11 DUBIEL:
Okay.
As far as the actual sample line, the sample lines them-12f selves that you would open to purge or to draw a sample from the Recirc, n
13 it's essentially the same and it's on the front of the panel in the 14!
sample sink.
I think that there Pete would be fully aware.
He may not 15; know the valve numbering, nomenclature on the valve, the Unit 2 sample 16-valves but they're essentially the same as the Unit i valves.
It's a 17!
very simple thing to do.
As far as manipulating the drag valve, there 131 again I don't believe that the system itself is altogether that different.
19:
There are some variations between Unit 1 and Unit 2.
I guess the point 20!
in fact though is that letdown sampling, although it looks sim a on e
i 21' prints, is not easy and it takes somebody who has experience in adjusting 22 the system to rapidly establish good letdown flow without popping relief 23!
valves and that type of thing.
I 24l 25!
, q '7 I
1 L. I I
l I
t l
39 i
1!
DONALDSON:
I guess that I'm saying is do ycu have, did you sit down and 2'
figure out, or mentally figure out how long it would take for the lineup 3i l
of the valves and figure out how long it would take to manipulate with 4!
the system on Recirc, purge the line, pull the sample and determine whether two individuals would be sufficient or whether more would be 6l needed?
7l l.
8 DUBIEL:
For that particular evolution, no we did not.
I think at that ot
~'
point I pretty much left the evolution in the hands of both Pete Velez 10 and Ed Houser.
Ed Houser's background also is strong in health physics lif and I felt relatively confident that those two individuals could do as 12f good a job in obtaining the sample and at minimizing exposures as any 13I other, anybody including myself.
That could of been associated with 14 that.
15 16-DONALDSON:
Let me back up to put this whole discussion in perspective 17l and let me ask one question.
How important was this satple?
Previously 18l during this interview you had stated that after the morning of the 28th 19!
or in the early afternoon of the 28th there were no manipulations or 20l entries that were absolutely critical to maintaining the plant in a safe 21{
condition.
What I'm concerned about here is, who requested this sample, 22!
what was the purpose of the sample and how important was it to continue i
23f to safe operation of the plant?
24j 25!
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OUBIEL:
The dri !ng force behind the obtaining of the sample was to 2:
determine the boron concentration of the coolant.
3!
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DONALDSON:
You've had emergency borated at this time, is that not c
~l correct?
61 i
7:
j DUBIEL:
That's correct.
8!
9f DONALDSON:
What led someone or whoever it was that requested to think 10 that the baron concentration would be anything other than approximately 11 21, 2150 which I think was the last previous sample taken after emergency 12!
boration or there about, or have you calculated that yet?
13!
14!
DUBIEL:
Well, I think the main concern was that we had had the boron 15 samples prior to the core damage after the actual trip but prior to any 16:
damag, showing levels of 700 and 400 ppm.
17,'
18f DONALDSON:
Those were taken prior to emergency baration, was it not?
19' 20:
DUBIEL:
That's correct.
21l 22 CONALD50N:
Were there any indications in the IRMs or SRMs to indicate 23i that emergency boration had not been successful?
I 24l 25:
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DUBIEL:
Dale, on thinking back I'm having a tough time right now recalling.
2'
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I do believe that there were many individuals and by many individuals 31 it's kind of hard to put names or even companies.
I think they spar.d i
4}
B&'d, the NRC and Met Eo and GPU but there's probably somebody from every c,*
organization.
That on the second day felt that were still, as a potential 6i of us still being critical in the core.
That was a constant topic of discussion.
I 81 9f DONALDSON:
Then in, did you as the Senior Health Physics individual in i
10, being involved in these discussions determine that from a risk benefit 11 analysis that this sample should be taken?
12!
l~;
DUBIEL:
I felt that that time that it was necessary.
14:
15:
DONALDSON:
Fine.
Okay, let's go with the iteration.
I believe that we 16 were talking about what has been told to Mr. Velez and we covered the 17!
manipulation of the sample lines.
Do you recall whether or not you 18!
discussed the use of remote handling tools for handling of the sample 19' once it had been taken?
20' 21!
DUBIEL:
At that time Dale we did not.
Okay, also I'd like to point out 22' right here that I don't think even at that time we had any feel for the 23l i
241 25!
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!lt' levels of radiation that the letdown was gonna give and it wasn't until 2
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the sample was drawn that we got our first real piece of eye opening 3
data that put the whole taing in perspective.
4!
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DONALDSON:
I understand that now.
I just want to make one thing clear 6i now.
You did talk with Mr. Velez, you did not talk to Mr. Houser.
Did you either hear through, from Mr. Houser over the telepho'le or through 3
contacting him directly, did you inform them of the fact that you didn't 9I have any idea of what the dose rates might be and did you ascertain that 10 both individuals, Mr. Velez and Mr. Houser were in fact volunteers?
11; i
12 DUBIEL:
Thinking back, it was never put to them straight forward are i
13!
you volunteering.
However, neither of them hesitated.
When asked for 14 the sample, the two of them were.
15; 16i CONALDSON:
Did the thought cross your mind to ask them if they were 17!
willing to take it and put into the contexts of are you a volunteer.
18f The reason that I ask this, is that your Plan is very specific in stating 19' that all operations of this nature, the individuals will be volunteers.
20!
And I think for the record it's important that we go through the thought 21l process in your mind.
22f 23{
DUBIEL:
In my mind, well first of all, no these people were not speci-24) fically or the question was never specifically brought to their attention, 25!
g j j i i I
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"are you a volunteer?" However, I think that I could read into their 2l minds at the time.
Looking at the reaction of tne individuals and the 31 j
willingness to do whatever had to be done, to work towards safe shutdown 4'
of the plant, there was no question in my mind that the two inlividuals 5'
were willing to do whatever was necessary within reason to assist the 6i overall emergency effort.
I think their attitude is what kept me from 7l; even thinking whether or not these people were in fact volunteering.
I 8'l think they were, my opinion is they were.
Although it was never asked 9f of them.
Also, I think on part of that question you asked about whether 10 or not we spoke of not knowing the exact dose rates.
My recollection is 11l that it was, Pete and I discussed it at least to the extent of saying, 12 when we start recircing that sample, we're not gonna know, we don't know 13f what were gonna get and it's got to be appr a.hed that way.
That we got 14I to look to see what the levels are before we ga juraping in and that we 15' got to have some feeling that we can accomplish the objective and still 16' stay within our 3 rem guideline.
17l 18!
RESNER:
When we speak of Pete, this is Pete Velez?
19' 20:
DUBIEL:
Pete Velez, yes sir.21-22j DONALDSON:
Allright.
Now, under these conditions, did you discuss the 23l type of dosimetry to be used?
Specifically, let me just take a question 24l in time.
Do you have extremity badges or TLDs, specifically finger l
25!
rings or wrist badges?
[8L? }b$
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44 i
II.
DUBIEL:
We do have extremity TLDs.
We did not discuss it.
I do not j
2 '
i believe the individuals were wearing them.
31 4!
DONALDSON:
Did you give them a dose limit, a turn back dose so to speak 9
through the operation?
6i 7l DUBIEL:
I Again Dale, the operation, the turn back limit was that we had to have reasonable assurance that we could do the operation and stay 9!j within the 3 rem quarterly limit.
In this particular case, I was not 10 too concerned about excessive dose in trying to vacate the area because II it was just a matter of five steps to be (tape cuts off).
12!
13i RESNER:
This is the continuation interview of Mr. Richard W. Dubiel.
14 The last tape cut off partially 5: 40 p.m., the time now is 5:45 p.m. and 15 Mr. Donaldson will continue to questioning.
16:
17!
DONALDSON:
Since you were not present when the sample I'd like to pick 18i up now after the sample was taken.
What was the first call you received 19f from either Mr. Houser or Mr. Velez in reporting back on the results of 20 the operation? Was it shortly after the sample had been taken?
21:
22 DUBIEL:
Dale, I don't recall the timing of it and nor do I recall who i
23 first notified me.
I was notified that some period, some point in time 24l within I would say probably within an hour after the samp'e was drawn.
25!
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DONALDSON:
What was the text of that notification?
i 2:
3!
DUBIEL:
The text of the notification was that we did in fact have the 4
sample, it was being analyzed, Gary Reed was doing the boron analyes and 5!
that indications were that Ed Houser may have in fact received slightly I
more than 3 rem based on occket dosimeter.
7 8
CONALDSON:
Did you receive any indication that your Mr. Houser, Mr.
9 Velez had been contaminated during the operation?
10f 11 CUBIEL:
I was told that both of them f.ad been contaminated and that 12l they were in fact on there way to take showers and to try to get decon-i 13l taminated.
14 15:
DONALDSON:
Did you issue any instruction to the individual on the other 16 end of tre line either to have Mr. Velez or Mr. Houser contact you or 17!
did you appoint someone and give direction for followur fo.' these two 18{
individuals?
19!
20:
DUBIEL:
No I did not and I think for the reasoning behind that was that 21 I felt first of all Pete Velez was the radiation protection foreman and 22l I felt like if any one was to be sent to assist it would have been -
a 23 raciation protection foreman and since we already had him there that's 24l the best guy in the world to do the assisting and I think that was my 25l rational on reasoning for not following up any further.
i 680 334 l
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46 1
1:
DONALOSON:
What procedures do you normally follow and what procedures 2f are intended to be followed for individuals during emergencies whc are l
3i found to have contamination?
Let me be more specific, you have a procedure 4l 1612, I believe it is on decontamination, is it the intent to follow the 5l basic guidelines of that procedure?
I 6i 7l DUBIEL:
Well I think the intent was to follow the guidelines of that 8{
procedure I think, well my personal feeling was that we were in a different, gf in a different ball game here I think and it wasn't really at that point 10l in time that I, that I recognized it, we've had many contamination ll{
problems in the five years that I've been here, four and a half years i
12{
that I've been here, primarily involving t'1e crud products and people 13 w rking in Unit 1, I don't think we've ever faced an iodine contamination 14 problem whicn I think is what we really ran into the iodine and some 15; gases and personally I don't think that I really, once I knew what the 16 situation was I don't think that I had the off the cuff knowledge to 77; haridle that, it took some time and some talking with people to start yg getting to a point where I felt comfortable with prcblems associating with iodine contamination and external contamination.
,g; 20 DONALDSON:
g You mentioned it took some time, by what time did you have a grasp on this?
2 c,,;;
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l DUBIEL:
Well I think my, to try to put it in a little bit of a prospective 2!
in the time frame I did not hear back f"om Pete Velez or Ed Houser at t
3 the time they, from the time that they left to shower and to decontaminate h
themselves until I left the site which approximately or I should've left 5'
l the island was about 11:00 and at that time I went over to the observation 6i center to check in and that's when I first met Ed Houser and found out that Ed in fact couldn't had attempted to decontaminate himself with 8
Pete Velez and was unsuccessful on one spot which either the tip e7 his 9l forefinger or the tip of his thumb, I don't remember which it was the 10l tip of a finger was the only place that he still showed signs of contamin-11 ation.
12:
13I CONALOSON:
Now at, on 11:00 on the 28th, Mr. Houser told you that he 14 only showed contamination in one area?
15 16:
DUBTEL:
11:00 on the 29th.
17 18:
00NALDSON:
We have indications frcm Mr. Houser or someone else that his 19 hair, portions of his leg, his thigh and a few other areas also remained 20:
contaminated.
21l r
22;:
DUBIEL:
Okay.
23!
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DONALDSON:
In fact for period of days after the...
2!
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DUBIEL:
You're right, I'd forgotten about that, the, if I'm correct I thinK it was the thumb and the thumb was in fact the hottest spot where C
the bulk of t.he coatamination was.
At that time I do recall now that you mentioned it that he did mention the problems with the hair, problems 7
with the, I think your right on the left thigh and possibly on the arms 0
that were contaminated, but to a much smaller degree.
9I 10 DONALDSON:
la meeting Mr. Houser and discussing with him, did at all 11 assess the precautions that had been taken or discuss what normally 12l would be done to follow up on an individual who had been contaminated l
13!
and remained contaminated?
14' 15:
DUBIEL: We talked for a period of time then, at that time in past 16i practice has been once the individuals has become contaminated to a 17l degree that we could not reasonably remove the contamination it has been 18i our policy that once we establish that the contamination was in fact 19I fixed in the skin and that's furthcr decontamination might in fact 20' dehrade the skin or in someway actually be detrimental to the individual l
21{
rather than re.,oving the contamination, it's been our practice to release 22j those individuals with.. depending on the area some possible precautions t
23!
or followup type methods and then follow the individual for a period l
24 days.
An example might be if an individuals hands were contaminated, 25!
I i
77 hb "b U l F
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j we've had individuals in Unit 1 that we've sent home and given instruction 2!
j to the individual to put on a pair of surgeons gioves when he was eating 3i or smoking a cigarette or something of that nature as a precaution and i
4!
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during the night to put a surge]ns glove on and actually tape it firm to Si l
the wrist to try sluff some of the contamination off and to come in in the morning with that glove still intact, things of that nature and 7
that's pretty much what we discussed with Ed.
We also at that time I l
8 started talking to a few of the other people that were there about the 9I potential of using, for instances, potassium permanganate... mild potassium i
1 permanganate solution, but unfortunately I was not at the time to familiar 11 with any of those types of procedures I was a little bit reluctant or 12 sceptical of using potassium permanganate without having someone who has I
13l gone through the evolution before and is knowledgeable in what concentra-14' tions and things of that nature.
i 15l 16l DONALDSON:
Did you consider the contact of one of your medical consultants 1Y to answer this question? Did you discuss it with Mr. Houser or did you 18!
just i Ise him with..after your discussion?
19!
20l DUBIEL:
Dale, I don't believe at thau time it was discussed..,I'm i
21{
not....I'm sure it was not discussed with any of our medical consultants 22l and I believe that Mr. Houser was allowed to go essentially as I have i
23l indicated earlier with the idea that it would be followed over the 24l period of days and also I recall the thumb being..being wrapped.
25' v u v:
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DONALDSON:
Who would normally follow this?
2h i
3 DUBIEL: Well under normal circumstances if something....
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Le' 's...not who would normally under these kind of conditions, c
6l under your plans and procedures, who should've followed this?
7 4
8l DUBIEL:
Dale, I.. I really.... I'm having a tough time answering that.
9!
I don't know...
i 10!
11 DONALDSON:
Aright let's..let's 12!
13 DUBIEL:
.. 0ther than it would ciafininately fall into the situation 141 where the Health Physics group which is divided between myself in the 15; control room and Tom Mulleavy in the ECS that type of an individual.
I 16 think though that as far as the emergency plan is concerned I don't feel 17!
like at that point in time we were still operating under the structure 18!
of the emergency plan.
19i 20 DONALDSCN:
Then you would operating under normal Health Physics procedures?
21l 22 DUBIEL:
I would feel yeah...at that point in time we were returning to 23' the normal health physics procedures.
24 2Ej i
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DONALDSON:
Although there're norral health physics procedures now that 2!
j we have your HP foreman and yourself engaged in duties that really are 31 not normal in nature, is that correct?
4i i
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DUBIEL:
That's correct.
61 7l DONALDSON:
Did you assign a foreman, either Mr. McCann or Mr. Velez or Mr. Mulleavy or Mr. Huwe or any of the other HP group to assess and followup on Mr. Houser's difficulties?
10j l
11 DUBIEL:
At that time no.
12',
13l DONALDSON:
Did you request that he leave a urine sample for counting?
14t That he have a whole body count for that no swipes be taken?
15 16!
DUBIEL:
I did not request that, although at 11:00 when I..or it's 2300 17' when I got over to the observation center.
I was informed that the..that 18!
that particular procedure at already been followed.
It was my understanding 19!
that a whole body count had already been taken and that he was alreac'y 20 in contact with the RMC people and that urine samples were tu be collected 21!
and that I beliece.
.I'm drawing a blank here on the nose swipes.
22l 23j DONALDSON:
Do you know whether anyone did a dose assessment and sat 2di down with Mr. Houser and discussed the <.ignificances of that contamination 25i and his exposure during the letdown sample?
fn-
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DUBIEL:
I don't...I do not know of anyone that did.
2:
t DONALDSON: What was Mr. Houser's state of mind when you were speaking 4!
with him at 11:00 that evening?
5l l
O!
OUBIEL:
At 11:00 I felt personnally that Ed was..Ed Houser was not overly upset.
I felt that Ed was calm that he understood..Ed being 8
involved in health physics for several years prior to becoming a chemistry 9f supervisor.
I did not detect any anxiety on his part, I didn't feel 10' ti.A he showea any grave... great concern I...I really felt that he was ll{
considerab.y...very calm under the circumstances.
12!
i 13l DONALDSON:
The follcwing day or two did either Mr. McCann or Mr. Mulleavy 14 mention to you that Mr. Houser had contacted them and discussed the 15; situation with them and was somewhat apprehensive?
16i II DUBIEL:
Kerrr Harner who is a chemist, Unit 2 chemist approached me, I 18; believe on Frit'ay.
Again the time may not be accurate, but I believe it 19!
was on Friday ani indicated to me that Ed was in fact very concerned and 20j was..had the feeling that I guess the..the way he put it was that the 21!
people didn't care at that time and that kinda concerned me because...you i
221 know..quite honestly at that time up until that time I did not feel or 23 didn't have any indication that Ed was in fact so concerned over it and i
2dl a matter of fact I felt just the opposite based on my spr.aking with him 25f jT b i
I
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53 i
ly on the 23rd.
At that time I called his home I believe... I believe that j
2' was approximately 5:00, 1700 on the 30th, it may have been on the 31st, but I believe it was on the 30th.
I called his home and found that his 41 number had been changed and that it was an unlisted number which again
- l:
c concerned me quite a bit that that would happen, so I made a point of I
h sticking around he was scheduled to come on at 7:00 that evening so I 7
stuck around until I had a chance to talk with him that night both he Ol and Gary Reed.
Gary Reed who had done the chemistry an that sample had h
shown significant iodine levels on a whole body count which was subse-10 quently determined to be primarily in the back of his head and the 11f hairline contamination, so I stuck around.
i 12l I
13l DONALDSON:
That would be at about the thyroid level?
14 15!
DUBIEL:
It would..slightly above the thyroid level.
16; 17!
DONALDSON:
Do you know how RMC or your..or whoever did this whole body 18i count determines that in fact it's.,it is surface contamination?
19:
20; DUBIEL:
No I do not.
I 21{
22 CONALDSON:
Did you check to verify or make sure that that was the case?
l 23\\
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25!
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54 I
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l DUBIEL:
I did not follow it through personally to RMC.
I followed 2'
l through the internal channels and talked to some of the HP people that 31 had been familiar with the situation and I was given indication that i
they determine it to be on the back of his hair through both frisking ci
]
and I'm not positive although for some reason it sticks in my mind that 6l they clippad same hair off and found the hair to be..you know...quite i
l hot.
8 9
DONALDSON:
Has he spoke with both Gary Reed and..
10 11 DUBIEL:
That's correct.
12f
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13j DONALDSON:
.and Houser that.
I 14!
O DUBIEL:
I spoke with them and again when I approached them my main 16' concern at that time was to try to..to find out exactly how concerned 17{
they were and to try to put their minds at ease as much as I possibly 18!
could especially in...I've had some considerably experience with Myroid 19l doses and based on my experiences in nuclear medicine laboratory in a 20!
hospital.
I tried to put it in prospective of establishinc millirem, or 21i millirad exposures to the thyroid and based on their...the levels that 22j they had seen and also talked to Ed specifically about his external 23j exposure about 3 rem and at that time I.
.I.
.I don't know whether my I
24!
talk with them was that effective or whether they had already started to 25; i
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55 i
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calm down and I spoke with them for probably on the order of an hour and a half and when I left I felt that.. and I tried to make sure that they 3l weren't holding anything back and I felt that they were again or at that j
4!
j time not showing any grave concern.
S' 6I DONALDSON:
At any time did they..did Mr. Houser or anyone else request 7
an evaluation by a medical consultant or doctor?
I 8l 9l DUBIEL:
To my knowledge, No.
10l l
11 DONALDSON:
How did you control Mr. Houser's future exposure?
121 13!
DUBIEL:
Okay,.
14!
t 15 DONALDSON:
I believe this occurred just on the switch over of a quarter 16; of course?
17l 18l DUBIEL:
Well it occurred a couple of days before but at that time the 19l overexposure occurred on the 29th so we had a couple of days and we did 20 have a significant problem of coordinating samples getting samples over 21 to the right Ge(Li) detector, multichannel analyzer system so Ed was 22 essentially put in charge of sample coordinating over at the observation 23 center.
24!
25!
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DONALDSON:
At what point in time or...have you yet computed the skin i
2 i
dose to the individuals who were contaminated or extremity doses.
Have 3
you gone back and considered the evolution indications are the individuals did handle the sample with their hands and did not use remote handling c;
tools?
Have you tried to reconstruct or fit any extremity exposures?
61 i
I 7l DUBIEL:
That to my knowledge has not been done.
8l 9!
DONALDSON:
To your knowledge are there..are..at this point in time i
10f were there anyather medical symptoms from either of the individuals?
11:
i 12 DUBIEL:
No.
13l 14l DONALDSON:
This is somewhat of a conclusion on your part now, in looking 15:
at again the emergency organization I'd like you to..to just think of 16; the way you were constituted and do you feel that the..the control and 17!
the followup of these kinds of activities could be better handled if a 18!
subgroup within the emergency organization were designated with the 19!
responsibility for lets..lets call them routine health physics type 20t functions for lack of a better word?
21 22l DUBIEL:
Again you're asking for opinions and I'll be free glad to give 23l those to you.
I.
.in retrospect I think that.
.I may have already i
24i 25:
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57 1.
mentioned that first of all I think that the emergency planning organi-f
~
j zation...the organization as defined the emergency plans is a well 3I established organization for the first 6, 8 maybe 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
I think 4!
i there is a need to have a..a post accident if you will... organization 5
defined prior to an event and I think that one of those areas that has Gi j
got to be established following an accident is the if you will dose 7'
assessment group for individuals.
The additionally...in thinking oack 8l on the chain of events of the firrt zouple of days I felt that if I...if there's one single point that I..where I needed or type of individual I
that I needed to have with me in the ccatrol room to better handle the 11!
health physics in the plant it wouid've been to have one of my foreman, 12 Joe Deman or Pete Velez available inside the control room, I think that i
13l some of the point...or questions that you've asked relative to dose 14!
rates being documented, logs being maintained things of that nature 15-which I feel we were very very weak on and it was weak because there was 16:
just no time to do that type of thing effectively with the number of...the 17!
number of personnel... qualified personnel that were available in the 18I control room, okay, I think if I.. it took me several days and which day 19!
I #inally won the battle I don't know but it took me a couple of days to 20:
get the point across to the people offsite that were so concerned about i
21l the offsite doses that the HP foreman were desperately needed in the 2b plant and I know that the people off.. that were handling the of fsite 23 doses from the observation center felt that those same foreman were
't 24!
desperately needed over at the observation certer and coordinating I.
25; efforts over there ard I think it was a..it was that type of a situation
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58 1!
that...that could be alleviated if we could in fact...did in fact have i
i 2'
j an emergency organization that was defined and would be in place even 24 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> after the event would be acceptable.
Some period of time after 4:
that initial organization has responded to the emergency and the emergency
-i 9
for practical purposes is 1., ;ome type of a semi-controlled state, we've i
6l got a little bit more time to react in...it was..
it was a rude awakening 7
I guess when we were about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> into it and we couldn't secure from 0l the drill, you know, and it was...you know what I mean it's.. it's...at oi that point in time you feel like you're going to be there till June, I 9
i 101 really dia, I felt 1.ke I'd never get out of that control room and I i
11 didn't have the peopis to do...or the types of people sith the qualifi-12!
cations necessary an HP foreman level person to dc the things that I 13 think coula be such a benefit right now to..you know..the questions 14 you' re asking.
15!
16i DONALDSON:
Let me ask you another question now.
Your plan procedures 17!
make provisions for north and south washdown t.reas which are to t,e used 18[
for decontamination not only for vehicles but for personnel I assume as 19' far as coming offsite your bound to be contaminated.
What logic p. ace 20!
caused you to use the 50GKV switchyard as apposed to your designated and 21!
planned north and south washdown areas?
22l 23l DUBIEL:
Well first of all I don't think we were into a situatien where 24 we had significant amounts of vehicle contamination also we still had 25i l
) l '-
i l
f 59 l
l' the capability of decontaminating personnel inside and I don't think the i
24 i
number of personnel that were contaminated required us to go to anything i
more than the 8 or 10 showers that we have available in the service 4}i l
building.
ci 6i DONALDSON:
There are st.owers available in the service building?
7 l
8f O'JBIEL:
Yes there are...
9!
10l DONALDSON: What about the individuals who were evacuated from the site i
11!
and surveyed at the 500KV sub?
1 12!
13l DUBIEL:
Okay, essentially it is my understanding that the..those A4!
personnel showed very 1ittle contamination as a matter of fact what I 15~
mean by very little is I believe they did find occasionally a shoe 16:
especially a nice crepe soled shoe that might show some signs of contam-17l ination but I don't.
I'm not aware of any personnel contamination 18!
being determined at the 500KV sub other than.
19!
20 00NALOSON:
You didn't know that before hand though, correct?
21l 22I DUBIEL:
That's..that's correct.
I also did not feel that we would I
23l have that type of contamination problem I honestly believe that that 24l!
time that our major problem was a gaseous release and that also I was 25l r
f
60 It; not completely ignnrin the fact that there might be iodines being 3
i f
released I felt that the levels...the indications that we've gotten 3
offsite and onsite indicated a gaseous problem I was more concerned with the typical type of problems you can run into with the inert gases
]"I adhereing to polyesters and double knits and things of that nat.'re.
6l l
7f DONALDSON:
Okay Dick, I've just got a couple more questions and then I 8
believe we've got another interview waiting.
Let me try to get what I 9
can here.
And again I...a simp'e yes or no on this is sufficient if you 10 have yes then of course we'll get some more.
At anytime on the period 11l of the 28th through the 30th were you aware that either your location 12!
that you either heard or made any recommendations to the State regarding 13!
the need to implement protective actions in offsite areas?
14' i
15:
DUBIEL:
No, I was not aware that I also can state that we to my knowledge 16!
did not make any recommendations of that nature.
17 18!
DONALDSON:
Okay, one final question regarding the training program.
I 19l realize that the responsit 'lity for training, emergency organization are 20l spread in the number of areas.
To your kncwledge is the emergency plan 21l training program, that is the program that is presented to the individuals, 22 documented in the form of schedules and lessons plans?
23 24j 25 o
h, s
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[
61 i
I.
Ill DUBIEL:
It is I also know that there were som.
.some of the paper work 2I j
documantation was shall we say slow in getting there.
I personally did 31 not have a concarn in that the...in fact the training had been done 4I since I in fact was a part of that training.
Being trained myself in 5
several of the drills but it was a matter of paper work being...you f
know... assembled and you know, following up on putting together ah i
7l documentation that I knew had been somewhat delinquent and I'm also 8
aw=tre at least a couple of items that are still delinquent.
9l 10~
DONALDSON:
Had you ever been approached either formally or informally 11 by anyone claiming or stating that the..the adequacy of the training 12!
that they receiveo was in question.
Did they feel uncomfortable with 13l that training?
14!
15-DUBIEL:
I've been approached on severrl..at 'averal times by cur 16:
technicians..
t 17!
i 18:
DONALDSON:
Could you give some specific names?
19i 20;l The one that I remember most vividly I guess was Ron Evans also DUBIEL.
2' !j Ken durkeholder.
This was..what..what I'm really referring to is II 22l incidents that occurred during our emergency drills where they would in i
23; fact be assigned to offsite teams and indicate to us that they did not 24j know exactly what they were supposed to be doing and maybe I ought to 25l l
h 000 JJb
i e
i
{
62 l
li clarify that I think that the biggest sing;e paint of contention was the operation of the SAM II equipment.
In fact though that we were able to 31
)
go back and show that the individuals had been instructed and on at 4!
least one occasion I know a group of individuals were reinstructed.
I 5
think that the.. that there's a definite need for more than annual 6i training on a piece of equipment such as a SAM II.
7 8
DONALDSON:
Does the current training program allow hands on operation 9
by each individual going through the training?
10f l
11{
DUBIEL:
Well your...your choice of the word ' allow' it does not ' disallow' 121 1
13l DONALDSON:
Let me put it this way is it part of tne normal program?
14i 15 DUBIEl By every individual I'm not exactly sure that every t.cividual 16 wouiu get hands on.
I do feel that every group and a group could be 17!
more..
no more than 3 or 4 individuals would in fact operate the equip-18l ment, now one person might in fact push the bottons while the others sat 19; and looked over that individuals shoulder.
20\\
21l DONALDSCN:
Is there any test or evaluation of t' individual's proficiency 2
before he leaves the training situation?
23l 24l 25 i
)'
j
4
(
63 i
1!
l DUBIEL:
There's an evaluation in that particular area I do not know for 2!
j a fact that there's an actual test.
31 4!
DONALDSON:
Okay, I guess that for the present time finishes the questions that I have.
I believe Mr. Yuhas sometime in thr. future would like to 61 get a hold of you and he as a couple of questions he'd like to ask and i
7l if anything comes up I'11... I'11 try to pick them up at that time.
I 8i!
think what 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> 6 hours you've given us, we appreciate it.
9i 10 DUBIEL:
Right.
Thank you very much.
11; i
12!
INVESTIGATOR:
Thank you Mr. Dubiel.
The time now is 6:15 p.m. and this 13l concludes the interview with Mr. Dubiel.
14' 15!
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