ML19247A904
| ML19247A904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/27/1979 |
| From: | Buchholz R GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Ross D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| MFN-190-79, NUDOCS 7908030393 | |
| Download: ML19247A904 (17) | |
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l NUCLEAR ENERGY PROJECTS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,17s CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE CALIFORNIA 95125 MC 682, (408) 925-5722 MFN-190/79 July 27, 1979 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Wasnington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
D. F. Ross, Deputy Director Gertlemen:
SUBJECT:
ACRS THREE MILE ISLAND-2 RECOMMENDATIONS (SET #2 -
May 16, 1979), GE RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
Reference:
Letter, D. F. Ross to Dr. G. G. Sherwood, "ACRS Recommendations Set #2 - Relating to TMI-2 Accident,"
dated May 24, 1979.
The reference requested that General Electric provide the NRC Staff with a concise discussion and positio1 on eacn of the specified ACRS recommenda-tions (May 16, 1979) relating to the TMI-2 incident.
The information provided would be used as a basis for Staff discussions in ACRS Sub-committee and Full Committee meetings on TMI-2.
The attachment is the General Electric resconse and is provided for your information and use.
Based on discussions with your Staff, the General Electric response is provided in a format similar to tnat used in the comprehensive submittal to the Staff relating to the first set of ACRS recommendations - April 7, 18 and 20, 1979.
General Electric considers that the concerns and recommendations speci-ficially identified as a result of the TMI-2 incident should not be ralated directly to the BWR design.
Careful examination and/or dialogue should t.:ke place prior to the release any recommendations applicable to the BWR.
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G E.'l E A A L $3 E L E C T 31 C D. F. Ross U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 July 27, 1979
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It is noted that many of the subject recommendations relate to areas outside the NSSS scope.
Consequently, the NRC-Staff should consider soliciting observatione r,id plant unique insights from other parties.
General Electric believes that the enclosed information, supplemented by recent and past GE/NRC-Staff discussions and previous SAR docket submittals and responses provide sufficient basis for agreement with the General Electric conclusions.
Please contact me if any clarification is required.
Very truly yours, 121143u.<_lvkdZ R. H. Buchholz, Manager BWR Systems Licensing Safety and Licensing Operation RHB:bjr/848-849
Attachment:
General Electric - Responses to ACRS Recommendations (Set
- 2 - May 16,.979).
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ATTACHMENT 1 a
GENERAL ELECTRIC CCM?ANY CCFlENTS RELATIVE TO ACRS NI-2 INCIDENT RECC:CENDATIONS CITED IN MAY 16, 1979 LETTERS
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1 OPERATOR TRAINING AND QUALIFICATIONS ACRS COMMENT EXAMINE Obr:RATOR CUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING AND LICENSING, AND REQUALIFI-CATION TRAINING AND TESTING GE OBSERVATIONS e Ih'R COMPARABLY SIMPLE MACHINE TO START UP, MANEUVER OR SHUT DCWN RELATIVE TO OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Inherently Self-Regulating; Basically Single Directional
- Automatic, Redundant, Diverse Protective Features
- Minimum Operator Involve =ent:
Transient and Accidents e GE INVOLVEMENT IS LIMITED TO SIMULATOR OPERATOR TRAINING
- Licensee is Responsible for Operator Selection, Integral Training, etc.
- GE Simulators [ Morris (1970) and Tulsa (1980)] are Valuable Training Tools
- Periedic Operator Requalification Training:
Also Available GE Cption e GE-BWR TRAINING PROGRAM IS CONTINUALLY UPDATED AND UPGRADED WITH FEEDBACK
- EWR Operator / Designer Experienced Training Staff
- SWR Simulators Realiatically Portray:
Normal, Transient, Accident Events
- Preeran Trains Operators to Develnp Logical Actiens:
Observe, Undoratand, Thir.k and Act Cautiously
- Plant Opersting Experience Feedback Centinuously Incorpcrated GE CCNCLUSIONS OPERATCR TR AINING PROGRAMS HAVE LONG BEEN RECOGNIZED AS AN IMPORTANT INTEGR AL PART CF SAFE REACTOR CPERATION. THE CCNTINUAL UPDATING AND LTGRADI.'!G OF THE IR AINING PRCCRAMS HAS EEEN UNIVE3SALLT ENDGRSED IN T:iE INDUSTRY.
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2 FORMAL LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) PROGRAM ACRS COMMENT ESTABLISH FORMAL PROCEDURE.' FOR THE USE OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORT INFCRMATION CE OBSERVATIONS e A REACTOR OPERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK NET 40RK IS INIPLACC
- Licensee's are Required to Report Off-Normal Operations
- Public Tabulation of Incidents, Abner =al Events, etc., is Corprehensive
- NRC IE Bulletin Releases Advise Other Licensees of Experiences and Request Considerations
- CP, OP, and Reload Licensee's Reviews Factor in LER
- Plant Special Incident Reviews are Expected
- 10 CFR 21 Assures Henest and Response Action e GE CPERATING AND CONSTRUCTION FEEDBACK SYSTEMS ARE ACTIVE AND ALERT
- Plant and Project Service Organizations:
Identify and Resolve Problems through Licensees
- GE Personnel at Site Provide Daily Ce==unications
- GE Designers are Always Involved in Feedback Process
- GE Recc==endations are Provided to Licensee (e.g., SIL's) for I=ple-eentatien
- GE Plant Reliability / Availability Program is Intensely Being Pursued GE CCNCLUSICNS VARICUS PLANT OPERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK PROGRAMS ARE IN-PLACE AND WORKING WELL.
INDUSTRY-WIDE PARTICIPATION IN THE CRGANIZATION AND LTLEMENTATICN OF A FORMAL PROGRAM (IF REQUIRED) IS SUGGESTED. FURTHER CCMPLICATIONS BY SUCH A PRCGRAM TO ALREADY OVER-BURDENED LICENSING PROCESS SHCULD BE AVOIDED.
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3 FORMAL REVIEW OF OPERrgNG PROCEDUREf ACRS COM: DENT CONSIDER FOR:dAL RSVIIV 0F OPERATING PROCEDURES RELATIVE TO SEVERE CPERATIONAL TR ANSIESTS GE OBSERVATIONS e OPER ATING PROCEDURES ARE CURRENTLY REVIEWED AND CONTROLLED
- Nor=al, Transi ent and Accident Operations are All Considered
- Safety Evaluatiens (Include all Operating Modes) are Bases of Operating Procedures and Technical Specifications
- Start-up and Preoperatienal Test Programs Debug Procedures
- Technical Specifications Define Operating Procedure Limits, Criteria, Objectives e GE INVOLVEMENT IS LIMITED TO ASSISTING THE LICENSEE'S CPERATING STAFF IN FORMULATING PLANT UNICUE OPERATING PROCEDURES
- Licensee is Respcnsible for Operating Procedure Documentation, Integrating Total Plant Aspects, etc.
- GE Start-up and Preoperational Services Are Available to Licensee
- GE Assistance Takes Advantage of Plant to Plant Operating Pr&-
cedures Improvements GE Design, Analysis, and Perfernance Expectation Rele.tive to Operatine Procedures are Evaluated in SAR's.
( e.g., Chapter 15 and NSOA Examinations)
GE CCNCLUSIONS FORMULATION OF PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES IS A WELL REVIEWED AND CONTROLLED PROCESS.
INDUSTRY -WIDE PARTICIPATION IN THE CRC 3 ;I2ATIO'l AND D'?LEMENTATIC:i CF A FORMAL PROGRAM RELATIVE TO THE REVIEW OF OPERATING PROCEDURES (IF RECUIRED)
IS SUGGESTED.
FURTHER CCMPLICATIONS EY SUCH A PROGRAM TO ALREADY CVERBURDENED LICENSING PROCESS SHCULD BE AVOIDED.
REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT TECH SPECS WITH DETAILED FORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND IS DISCOURAGED.
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4 RE-EXAMINATION CF PO* DER SYSTEMS SUPPLY ADECUACY ACRS CCMMENT RE-EXAMINE CCMPREHENSIVELY THE ADECUACY OF DESIGN, TESTING, AND MAIN *ENANCE CF OFFSITE AND ONSITE AC AND DC PO'4ER SUPPLIES.
GE CBSERVATIONS e CURRENT REGULATICNS AND REVIE*4 INTE'ISELY SCRUTINIZE PC'4ER SYSTEvS
- GDC's, RG's, SRP's and Industry Standards Already Assure Detailed Review and Reliable Performance
- Long Been Major Safety Review Area
- Did Not Acpear to be TMI Concarn/ Issue e BWR DESIG:3 IN FULL CCMPLIANCE SITH REGULATIONS
- Self Centained, Independent, Redundant On-site /Off-Site AC/DC Power Sources Demanded
- Cceprehensive Enviren= ental and Seismic, Electrical, and Mechanical Standards are Required and Are Being Shown Adequate by Operating Experience
- Strict Tech Spec Monitoring for On-Site E=ergency Sources Are In-Place e GE INVOLVEMENT IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO HPCS CN RECENT PLANTS
- Licensee / AE Are Respc.sible for On-Site /Off-Site AC/DC Power Syste=3 GE Reliability and Prototype Test Program on HPCS:
Cc=pleted and Exceeds Requirements GE Design, Analysis, and Perfermance Expectations Relative to Plant Power Systems are Evaluated in SAR's.
(e.g., Chapter 15 and NSO A Examinations)
CE CCNCLUSIONS CURRE?.T REVIEW LEVEL AND REQUIREMENTS APPEAR TO BE MORE THAN ADECUATE AND HAVE BEEN FURTHER DEMCNSTR ATED BY OPERATING EXPERIENCE. CREDIT AND BENEFIT FCR RELIABLE OFF-SITE PC'4ER SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED. THIS COMMENT COESN'T APPEAR TO BE RELATED TO IMI COMPLICATIONS.
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5 STATION BLACK-0UT CAPABILITY ACRS COMMENT MAKE A DETAILED EVALUATICN OF CURRENT CAPABILITY TO WITHSTAND STATION BLACKOUT GE OBSERVATIONS o CURRENTLY A PLANT CAPABILITY; NOT A REGULATORY REQUIREMENT
- Previously Unidentified TMI Incident Concern
- Less of Both Onsite and Offsite AC Power:
Father Severe Demand
- Involves Loss of Both Redundant, Independent Onsite and Offsite Sources:
Highly Unlikely
- Instant Degradation:
Highly Unlikely
- Continued Loss:
Highly Speculative
- Only Short Term Event Impacts are Appropriate for Consideration e EWR DESIGN - CAPABILITY TO ACCOMMODATE:
INHERENT FEATURE
- At Least 4 Hr; Probably 20 Hr; Total Plant Acco==odation
- Mininum 8+ He Core Cooling Protection
- EWR Internal Natural Circulation Feature Invaluable i
- HPCIS/RCIS/ICS Will Provide Automatic Core Cooling Make-Up Withott AC Power o CZ INVOLVEMFl T IS LIMITED TO DESIGN BASIS EVE'TTS AND SELECTIV SECRT TERM CAPABILITY CCNSIDERATIONS
- Licensee is Response for Blackout Plant Operation
- BWR Capability Studies for AC Blackouts, Black Startup, DC Blackouts, etc., Have Been Made Previously GE CONCLUSIONS CURRENT PLANT PCWER SYSTEMS REGULAT03Y DESIGN REOUIREMENTS ARE DEMANDIN
?LANT PERFORMANCE EXPERIENCE HAVE DC4CNSTRATED THEIR ADEOUACY.
EWR DESIGN HAS ALWAYS FEATURED ABILITY TO RIDE THROUGH SEVERE BLACKOUT SITUATIC HUS, NEED TO ELABORATE OR EXPAND THIS EVENT TO PLANT DESIGN BASIS, kATHER THA'l INHERENT CAPABILITY, IS U'iNECESSARY.
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6 TRANSIENT AND DEGRADED ACCIDENT EFFECTS ACRS COMMENT EXAMINE A WIDE RANGE OF ANCMALOUS TRANSIENTS AND DEGRADED ACCIDENTS RELATIVE TO WATER HAMMER EFFECTS GE OBSERVATIONS e CURRENT REGULATIONS REQUIRE CONSIDER ATICN OF EVENT EFFECTS
- DBA... Break / Blowdown Effects... Jet Impinge =ents, Pipe Whips, Missiles
- Transients... RCPB Internal Effects... Hydrodynamic, Pressure Differential, Phenomena (e.g., Steam Line Dyna =ics)
- Static and Dynamic Effects... Separate and Combinations e EWR TECHNOLOGY IS VERY FAMILIAR WITH WATER DYNAMIC EFFECTS
- Applicant /GE Containment - Pool Dyna =le Prograts
- GE Internals Monitoring Program
- Applicant /CE RPV - Support Program o EWR DESIGN ACCIDENT ' EVALUATICN AND PROTECTION ADDRESSES A FULL SPECTRUM OF EREAKS AND DYNA 4IC EFFECTS
- Full Break Spectrum Analysis
- Inside and Outside Containment Break Locations team and Liquid Breaks
- Dynanic Accident Effects Accc =odation (e.g., Pipe Restraint)
- Dynamic Accident Effects Prevention (e.g., ECCS Pipe Fill Syste )
e GE INVOLVMENT IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO DEFINITION OF NSSS FAILURE EFFECTS
- Licensee / AE are Responsible for Accemmodate of Loads, Forcing Functions, etc.
- GE and Licensee Spensored Progra=3 Relative to NSSS Transient and Accident Water Dynamic Effects Have Investigated and Ecunded tne Phenamena.
(e.g., Pool Dynamic Programs)
At Site Confirmation Programs are Being Administrated by the Licensees GE CCNCLUSIONS THE EXISTING EWR TR ANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES PROVIDE A CCMPREHENSIVE 3XAMINATION OF THE CCMPLKE SPECTRUM OF BREAK TYPE, SIZE, AND LOCATION.
DYNAMIC AS WELL AS STATIC EFFECTS ARE EVALUATED AND ACCOMMOD ATED. WATER HA WER EFFECTS ARE CONSIDERED BY BWR DESIGNER AND ARE GIVEN SPECIAL ATIENT ION.
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7 NRC ROLE IN C4ERGENCY SITUATIONS ACRS COMMDIT PLAN AND DEFINE NRC ROLE IN D4ERGENCY SITUATIONS GE OBSERVATIONS e LICENSEE /0WNER/ APPLICANT EMERGENCY PLANS ARE COMPILED, REVIE'4ED, AND IN-PLACE AS REQUIRED BY REGULATIONS e SPECIFIC DEFINITION OF NRC ROLE IN DERGENCY SITUATIONS IS DESIRAELE e NRC ACTIVITIES SHOULD COMPLIMENT EXISTING LICENSEE PROGR AMS e ASSIGNMENT OF NRC-STAFF TECHNICAL ADVISORY TEAMS WITH A COORDINATED INTERFACE WITH PLANT LICENSEE PERSON'IEL IS APPROPRIATE e NEED FCR ADDITIONAL INVENTORY OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS BEYOND CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AT PLANT FACILITY IS A NRC RESPONSIBILTY AREA GE CCNCLUSIONS GE ENCOURAGES THE FORMAL DCCUMENTATICN CF NRC INVOLVEENT IN DERGENCY SITUATIONS. THE IMMEDIATE DEFINITICN AND IMPLDENTATION OF THE NRC ROLE IS EXPECTED. THE CCORDINATED INTER ATION OF LICE';SEE Ad NRC PRCCR A.S IS IMPORTANT.
INDUSTRY-WIDE PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANIZATION AND IMPLE-MENTATICN OF A FORMAL NRC ROLE IN DERGENCY EVENTS IS SUGGESTED.
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8 LICENSEE D'ERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES ACRS CCMMENT REVIEW AND V"/ISE LICENSEE E:4ERGENCY PLANS AND PROCEDURES GE OBSERVATIONS e A PLAN TO CALL UPON INDUSTRY-WIDE EXPERTISE DURING Ad EdERGENCY SITUATICN WOULD BE DESIRABLE.
e TMI INCIDENT DD10NSTRATED THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY'S CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE COOPERATIVE, RAPID, COMPREHENTIVE ASSESSMENT AND RECCMMENDATIONS
- PWR Vender Assistance
- CE EWR Expertise Inputs e THE CONCEPT OF A NUCLEAR INDUSTRY-WIDE "SPECIAL NUCLEAR INCIDENT ASSIS-TANCE TEAM" MIGHT WELL BE EXAMINED e REEXAMINATION OF SPECIFIC PPOCEDURES OR CRITERIA RELATIVE TO EARLY INCIDENT REPORTING MAY BE APPROPRIATE CE CONCLUSICNS CE ENCOUR AGES THE PARTICIPATION CF INDUSTRY-WIDE PARTIES IN NE'i PLANS AND PROCEDURES RELATIVE TO LICENSEE ASSISTANCE DURING SERICUS INCIDEN~S.
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9 DECONTAMINATION AND RECOVERY LESSONS ACRS CCMMENT EXAMINE LESSONS LEAR"ED 7 ELATIVE TO DECONTAMINAfION, SURVIVABILITY, FAILURE MODES AND LONG-TERM iLri. RECOVERY.
GE OBSERVATIONS e GE HAS BEEN INTENSELY REVIEWING DiI-INCIDENT IMPLICATIONS
- Site Assistance and Support
- San Jose BWR Design Parallel TMI Event Study
- Actively Supporting EPRI - NUSAC Study Group
- Provided BWR Respcnses to Utilities to Support NRC Reviews
- ACRS Presentation and Reco==endations Review
- Evaluati"g All Appropriate TMI Related Documentation e GE WILL BE EVALUATING " LESSONS LEARNED" OVER NEXT 6 MONTHS
- Preliminary Findings Are Being Explored Relative BWR Design
- GE Will Compile a "Recctmendations Report" Later This Year GE CCNCLUSIONS GE WILL JOIN WITH THE INDUSTRY AND THE NRC IN SHARINC " ' SON LEARNED" DIALOGUE FRCM TMI INCIDENT. iiUCH AN ACTIC.N WILL DWONanATE AGAIN TO THE PUBLIC CUR SELF-POLICING AND CPEN MINDEDNESS ATTITUDE AND CCNCERN FCR SAFE AND EFFICIENT NUCLEAR PO'nTR.
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10 NRC SAFETY REVIEW PDOCEDURES ACRS CCMvENT_
EXPEDITE RESOLUTION OF UNRESCLVED SAFETY ISSUES UTILIZING LIC ISEE, CONSULTANT, AUGMENTED STAFF AND CONTRACTORS SUPPORT.
GE OBSERVATIONS e CE ENDORSES THE SPEEDY AND EFFECTIVE IDENTIFICATION 0F NEW D:I-RELATED REGULATORY CONCERNS.
e GE IS CELF-AUDITING ITSELF RELATIVE TO LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FRCM THE TMI INC7 DENT. GE WILL PARTICIPATE IN INDUSTRY-WIDE STUDY GROUPS (e.g.,
EPRI-NUSAC) e CE WILL ENDEAVOR TO SUPPORT THE NRC-STAFF, ACRS, AND THE LICENSEE / APPLICANT IN THEIR TIMELY DISCUSSIONS AND RESCLUTIONS OF D1I RELATED INQUIRIES OR ISSUES.
e GE BELIEVES THAT THE APPLICANT / DOCKET RESPONSES SHOULD BE DIRECT AT COMPLIANCE WITH CURRENT OR NEW TMI-RELATED REGULATORY REQUIRD'ENTS e CE CCNSIDERS EXAMINATION OF NEW/ ALTERNATE / POTENTIAL CRITERICN CR REOUIRE-MENTS AND NEW SAFETY RESEARCH PROJECTS OR STU'.ES TO BE PRC RELATED ACTIVITIFS.
THESE SHOULD BE SPCNSCRED, FUNDED AND POSSIBLY ADMINISTRATED BY NRC AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPLICANT OR HIS AGENTS BURDEN OR RESPONSIBILITY.
e CE IS STILL HEAVILY INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION AND IMPLEMENTATICN OF NCN-UtI RELATED ISSUES.
GE CONCLUSIONS GE WILL SUPPORT SPEEDY RESOLUTICN CF TiI-RELATED NRC CCNCERNS. GE WILL CCNTI"UE TO SUPPORT CUR CLIENT (LICENSEES, CW';ERS, APPLICANTS) INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE NEEDS. SINCE THE RESOURCES OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ARE FINITE, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THEY EE UTILIZED EY ALL PARTIES IN THE INTEREST AND BENEFIT TO ALL PARTIES.
THE EF7ECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE CF RESCU3CES IN THE IDENTIFICATICN AND RESOLUTICN OF T'il CONCERNS IS CRITICAL.
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11 CAPABILITY OF THE NRC STAFF ACRS COMMENT AUGMENT EXPEDITIOUSLY THE NRC STAFF CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH FnwLEMS IN REACTOR AND FUEL CYCLE CHC4ISTRY GE OBSERVATIONS e CURRENT RECULATORY RECUIREMENTS AND REVIE'4 HAVE PREVf0USLY EXAMINED THESE AREAS
- Regulations, RG's, SRP's... Ccnfornances are Addressed in SAR's
- No Major Unresolved Safety Issue are Presently Listed e GE INVOLVEMENT IN THESE AREAS IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO THE CHCdICAL AND RADIATION EFFECTS OF NSSS BOUIMiENT
- Censiderations of Spray Additions, Radwaste Processing and Disposal, etc., are the Responsibility of Licensee /AE
- GE Cualifies its NSSS Envirennent Specifications Which Include Singular and Ccnbined Event Phenenena Impacts
- CE Has Investigated and Reported Fuel / Coolant Chenistry Aspects e APPLICATION OF TMI INCIDL 9' RELATED EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THESE DISCIPLINES SHOULD TAKE Ith: ACCOUNT BWR FEATURES WHICH PRECLUDE THE DEGR ADATICNS EXPERIENCED AT Thi-2.
- Assured Autenated EWR Core Cooling Protection
- BWR Multiple Radiological Barrier Integrity Always Maintained
- Coolant / Radiation Effects are Mininal on BWR GE CCNCLUSIONS PREVIOUS REVIE'E IN THESE AREAS HAVE BEEN CCMPREHENS1/E AND CCMPLETE.
GE ENDORSES THE NRC-STAFF'S EXPEDITIQUS RESOLUTICN OF ANY CONCERNS IN THESE AREAS.
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12 SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION ADECUACY ACRS CCMMENT RECONSIDER WHETHER SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION (SCF) ESTABLISHES AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL CF RELIABILITY FOR REACTOR SAFE 1Y SYSTEMS GE OBSERVATIONS e SFC HAS PROVIDED ADECUACY SAFETY PROTECTION
Specf fled by Regulations, PG, etc.
~ SCF: Old DBA Recuirement: Now New Transient Analyses Requirement
- Recognized Engineering / Industry-Wide Safety Apprcach
- Efficient Qualitative / Envelope Evaluation Tool e SFC IS ACCOMrANIED BY OTHER DEMANDING, SUF LEMENTAL RECUIREMINTS
" Worst Case" Initial Ccnditions
- Conservative Perfor ance Assumptiens
- Low Protability Event Combinations
- Safety Equipment Utilization Only Credit e TMI INCIDENT SFC ADECUACY STILL PENDING
- Initiati ng Event + SCF + Out-of-Service + ^ sign Shorteccing
- Five Initial Failures
_ Three Presently
? Future e CCMMON-MCDE-FAILURE APPROACH HAS BEEN STUDIED BY GE RELATIVE EWR SAFETY SYSTEMS
- Cualitative, Semi-Quantitative Evaluation
- Variations oi ?arameter.
Operation, Maintenance, Diverse Design
- EWE Profile.
cocked Cecd; Reported in CE-LTR (1970) e PROBAEILISTIC, CUANTITATIVE APPROACH HAS BEEN STUDIED BY GE ON SELECTIVE BWR SYSTEMS
- RPS, ECCS, RPV (Early 1970's)
- ATWS, Control Rod Systems (Late 1970's) e INDUSTRY-WIDE PROBABILISTIC ASSESSMENT STANDARD IS PRESENTLY BEING FORMULATED
- WASH - 1400 Original Total P.'. ant Study (Mid-1970's)
- ANS Efforts... NRR Preposals (Late 1970's)
... Multiple and Commen-Mode Failures Criterions (MFC, CMFC)
Fluid Synt. and Total Pl ant Failure Criteria
- Correlation of Appropriate Data Limita Apprcach Attractiveness GE CCNCLUSIONS
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CONSIDERiBLE AMOUN~ OF INDEPE'iDENT EFFCRT HAS BEEN APPLIED TO SFC.
IUALITATIVE EVALUATIONS.
DEVELOPMENT OF PRCBABILISTIC CUANTITATIVE (CFC, TC, CMFC, etc. ) EVALUATICN METHODS AND CRITERICN HAVE BEEN EXAMINED.
APPLICATION CF TOTAL PRCBABILISTIC SAFETY APPROACH SHOULD EVOLVE FROM INDUSTRY-WIDE PARTICIPATICN PROGRAM.
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13 NRC SPONSORED SAFETY RESEARCH ACRS COMMENT CONSIDERATION SHCULD BE GIVEN TO AUGMENTATING CURRENT SAFETY RESEARCH BUDGET WITH NEW EMPHASIS ON EXPLORATORY ASPECTS. RATHER THAN CONFIRMATORY RESEARCH.
GE OBSERVATIONS e GE HAS ALWAYS VIGOROUSLY PURSUED BOTH EXPLORATORY RESEARCH AND CONFIRMATORY TESTING RELATIVE TO THE F4R.
Confirmatory - MSIV; HPCS; CRDS; MARK I; PIPE RESTRAINTS E
Exploratory - ECCS; AITAS; MARK II and III; BLOWDOWN HT 8
e GE IS CONTINUING TO SUPPORT OLD AND NEW SAFETY RESEARCH FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS
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- New High Flow Test Facility.
. (San Jose) 1 Fr,. - Mark III Test Apparatus.
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- Core Spray Distributien (Steam Envircnment)... (Lynn, Mass.)
e GE ENCOUR ACES NRC SPONSORED AND FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH e GE WILL SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATE IN INDUSTRY-WIDE, NRC SPONSORED SAFETY RESEARCH PRCGRAMS GE CCNCLUSIGNS GE F(4 TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT PHENOME'IA SAFETY RESEARCH IS CONTINUING.
GE ENCCURAGES NRC SPONSORED AND FUNDED SAFETY RESEARCH. A BALANCE SETWEEN EXPLORATORY AND CONFIRMATORY TESTING IS SUGGESTED.
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14 NEW CONTAINMENT VENTING / PURGING DESIGN STUDIES ACRS COMMENT FERFORM DESIGN STUDIES OF A FILTERED-VENTING OR PURGING OPTION FOR CCNTAINMENTS UNDER SEVERE ACCIDENT CONDITIONS GE OBSERVATIONS e CURRENT CONTAINMENT REGULATORY REQUIREENTS ARE COMPREHENSIVE AND CONSERVATIVE
- Containment " Mitigates" Consequences of Serious Accident Threat Spectrum.
. By Preventatien or Accommodation
- 25% of All Regulations Directed at Containment Acco nodation Via Integrity Maintain Requirement
- Evaluations and Design Scrutinized by Conservative Requirements
- Centainment Performance Assured by Testing, Monitoring, Attentien e GE INVOLVEMENT IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO DESIGN BASIS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ASPECTS OF CONTAINMENT DESIGNS
- Licensees /AE's Ara Primary Responsible Agency for Containment Systems
- GE Does Provide Containment Static and Dynamic DBA Pressure, Temperature, Radiological, and Leakage Analysis for Licensees
- Ventilation, Atmospheric Control, Filtering Systems Are Supplied by Others e BWR CONTAINMENT S? STEMS:
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH AND MULTIPLE BARRIER PHILOSOPHY
- Primary Containment - Pressure Suppressien... Self-Centained, Self-Servicing
- Secondary Containment - Reactor Building... Leakage Centrol, Filtering, Decay
- Elsvated, Controlled Release - Vents... Off-Site Dilution / Reduced Effects
- Cualified For All Site Enviren=ents and Implications (e.g., seismic flooding, wind)
- Performance De=enstrated By Test and Monitoring e BWR PRESSURE SUPPRESSION CCNTAINMENT SYSTEMS PROVIDE EXTENDED CAPABILITY
- Autecatic Pressure, Temperature Reduction
- Fissien Product Treatment and Compartmentization
- Engineered for Purge, F'.ltering Decay, Cptimized Release
- Designed with Substantial Failure Mode Margin (A Capability)
GE CONCLUSIONS GE 3ELIEVES THAT THE CURRENT EWR CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS' DESIGN BACES AND EVALUATIONS PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE, CCNSERVATIVE PROTECTICN TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF FUBLIC UNDER ALL DESIGN BASE EVENTS.
THESE SYSTEMS ALSO PROVIDE CCNTINUED PROTECTION EVEN UNDER FURTHER DEGRADATED SITUATIONS.
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