ML19247A268

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{{#Wiki_filter:.___.. __ _.. f6f70 ^ f CC EADDAM NZCK PMNT j ws ar.4 m. 30-213 gUPTT.DfENTARY RESPONSES TO ME WLLETIN 79-06A, REY. 1 During the course of our continuing evaluation of the are.ma identifi.4 in Ir. C~ Dulletin 79-06 and, based on our discussions with the FUtc Stsf f, addition = L pertinent information has been developed by CTAPCO. The following informatice is submitted, with the otambers corresponding to the Bull e t in i t ee s, to supp le-- ment oc earlier responses, dated April 24, 1979 and May 18, 1979. ,i Item 2a f Jf.r The applicable esmergency procedures hive been reviewed thorought y in light of the TMI incident to include steps that specificall y wurn of the po t encial for void formation and the instrumentation available for recognizing or identif ying the izz11 cations for potential or actual voiding, that is, the possibility for void formation exists in the Reactor Coolant Systeme whenaver pressure ia equal to or less than saturation pressure. An. example of the procedural verding is given below. 7erify that the reactorr and turbine have tripped. Core cooling cas initiated and thet all core cooling equipment is operating properly. Operating reactor coolant pumps can remain in service until RCS pressure is J25 psig. If all reactor coolant pumpg must be secured, monitor the degree of subcooling in the core by compering core outlet tanparature with saturation temperature for pressurizer pressure. Use the saturation curve (Attachnent A to this procedure) and maintain pressure in the rasetor core equal to or greater t ha n " saturation curve + SO*F sa fety band". Establish a flav producing a core AT rrester than lO*F by steam dunp/ataowpheric vent oper. scion in conjunction with auxiliary feedvater flow. Monitor the potentini for voiding by verif ying a sc.able or dwcreasing core 4T of less than 50*7. Otber instrumentation which can be used to monitor coro conditions both during natural er forced circulation are listed in Ac t.sc hw en t M. If voiding occura, reest.ablish pressurizer pressura semi invel using pressurizer heaters, charging pumps, and/cr EPSI, as needed and isolate break if possible." Itast 2h The applicable susargency prxedures have been further revieved and reviaed to specifically address operator actions bened upon the indications described in Ic. 2a, for terminating conditions leading to void formation. An example of the procedural wording is given below. " Regulate feedwater additions to the steam generators an necessary to maintain heat sink. Maintain wa ter Icvel betwe*et 50% soi 95% on the vide range level indicaelon.

f normal station p"g power has been lost, opera te the st e==

driven aux iliary f eed pa=rp=. Dump steam to condenser until overriden by low conf enner (if loss of ca offsita power). 7"@ 576092 Caution: 3e car etf ul no t to over feed the steac pnerator and cause a further RCS pressure reduction." m, 7 907300 f68 W,

It as. 8 Applicabla maintecaoce and operating procedures have born ravfeved and r evis ed to provide for proper positions and alignment checks of nafer.y related valves following maintenance activities associated with sa f ety rela ted components and/or systems. Periodic surveillance of all saf e ty related valves, exc ep t those included on the " Loc ked 7alve List", will be performad conthly. The "Lockmi Talve List" has been formalized as a plant proced*:re and which requires

c. check of all lockmi valves prior to any starttrp froe a cold shutdown (bode 5) condition.

Item 9 CTAPCD bas reevaluated the capability for inadvertently tranaf erring radio ac tiv e materials from inside to outside containment through variou= sy s t -is s. As noted in the May 18, 1979 response, four penetration (lines) are normally isola t ed by clo sed manu.a1 stu to f f valves. They would be open only for en=pling operations involving sampling ef fluent from their particular ecurceg. Bec a u s e they are normal.ly isolat ed, they are fitted with single trip valvee for redun-dant isolation during high contairneent pressure conditions. Ionerucelona hav e been included in the applicable emergency procedure s to place the control evitche for these four trip valves T7-950, 955, 960, and 965 in the cloaa po sitio n to preclude automatic opening if resetting of high containment p r e s su re (DCP) r-lays were to occur. All other penetrations have been reviewed and f all within the ca tegories o f line s in use, lines essential for supporting services, ten-essential lines mod those that are isolated during power operation. Thoes lines which are isolated by high contairument preware other than the four above are fitted with two redundant trip valves, one of which aust be raset annually follovies reset of the high contaiment preasure relaya. To prevent inadvertent relea ses following reset o f BCP, a s t ep ha s been ivluded in the applicable energency procedures to preclud e resetting of the individual trip valves which have been automatically or marns=Lly isolated. Prio r to r es et, it must be verified that the line could per form its in c end ed function anl that it would cot constitute a significant r el ea se pa t h to t he envirotusent, yor av==ple, S tep 1.4 o f ZDF J.1-4, Loo s o f Coo te nt, s ta t e s "Before opening any valves that have been closed by KF initiation, verify by available instrumentation that the IIoes have incegrity; venid per for:n its intended function or would not cause a significant r el ea s e pa t h." i Contaiment sump pumps are covered additionally by placing the control switche s _~ in the trip pullout position. This maintains the discharge valves in closed i position. ? Itas loa Operations Depart:nent Instruction CDI-39 has been revised to include testing of saf ety rela t ed sv s t ana prior to removal and followint the return to servic e of redund.anc systeam. ?Of}R DR@ Nill 57cc:sa ~...:...--.. .._..:3_. .;..,,. -... - ~

~ phases (i.e., injection to recirculation) of an incident, the following steps have been incladad in the applicahis procedures 3afety injection can be secured only vben Both low pressure saf ety injectics pumps or a combination of low pressure saf ety injection pumps and residual hast removal pumps are in overseion and flowing for eventy (20) minutes or longer; ' at a race which would ensure stable pimat behavior; or The HPSI' pumps or a combination of HFSI pumps and charging pumps bare been in operation for eventy (20) nicutes, and all hot and cold lair, temperatures are at laaet fifty (30) degree, below the saturation temperature for the existing RC3 preewure. If fif ty (50) degrees subcooling cannot be maintained af ter RPSI and/or charging cutoff, ebe EPSI and/or charging shall be r eac tivis t ad. The degree of subcooling beyond fifty (50) degrees and the length of time HPSI and/or charging is in operation shall be limited by the pressure / temperature considerations for the vessel integrity." Dnff JJ}.!f))a,}y u y 57GO94 w9 h [ k =_...;. .. -.... _... =. -.. ^ }:f--- --._.....:..... =.. = ~~~ ^ [_ _ ='".."_ _ _.;..~. ~'~ ~'. ; :. ;_'."._['. _.._=__.T. ~" E:;... __-T o-"' .L.

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9 I Itest 2r: g The applicable procadures have been revised to provide guidance to the operatcrrs for enhancing core cooling should void formation in the prima ry sys ters ac tua ll y occur, as xxsted in the above responses. ~ Item & A method has been developed which enables an operator to manually initiate I. contaitzmant isolation from the Control Roca upon automatic initiation of safety injection. Detailed steps have been incitafed in the applicable [ cuarzency procaiures for implementing this method. s I The reactor coolant pumpo could be operated under a containment isolation condition for a sbort period of time. For periods of operation longer ~i than just a few minutes, cooling water must be reestablished for bearing coolirm otherwise, this could result in severe damage to the pamp. If cooling unt er is j reestablished, bearings could fail resulting in excessive vibration lend try; no t } to esal failure and ascessive reactor coolant leakage to the containment. This condition would require isolation of the affected loop and loan of that part icu-lar sesam generator as a heat sink for decay heat r *=o va l. Conl in g un t e r flow to the reactor coolant punps bearing coolers could be reestablinhad by reaettin; and blocking open the trip relay for the containment isolation trip vs17e I (T7-1411) on this system. This function would be perferned by the auxiltary operator locally in the primary auxiliary building, upon instniction from the Control Room. 4 I %s I Iters 7a 4 ; gg { Steps bare been included in the applicable procedures instructing th; 5t8r's o to override automatic actions of engineered safety featuren unlena in iti.a c io-not is, in fact, spurieus or continued operatien of those features would result in unsaf e plant coniittons. An example of the procedural wording is as follova: i "Do not j override automatic actions of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features vill result in unsaf e plant conditions." Licensed operators havet been instructed to comply with the above direction. Training on all ruvised assegency procedures will be cospleted by June 30, 1979. The above direction will also be included in the Licensed Operator Training and Requalification Program by June 30, 1979. '*-* 7" 57CO@ In reviewing this IAE Bulletin iters. CTAPCC r ec ogniz ed the NRC S ta f f po s i t io n yet needed to factor into the response the fact that the charging and rea tdu.m 1 base removal pumps at the Raddan Beck Plant function as part of the tcC5. Therefore, in recognition of this function and previous discussions uith the EC Staff regarding the ability to provide core cooling during the t ra n s 1:1o n 7n. 5760 /6 t

Items 12 Existing plant procedure 10P 2.13-4, Venting of Rydrogen free the Centainment Tollowing A Ioss of Coolant Accident, has been reviewed and found adequate for control of hydrogen concentrations in the contairument. Existing plant procedu're NOP 2.14-9. Degassing of Reactor Coolant System, as well as supporting proc edures, have been reviewed. A new proceirare for controlling hydrogen gas secumulation in the reac tor cooLint systeca during of f-normal sicuations will be implemented by August 1, 1979. n j i l I i ir, 1 57GCgy ,a : P S OZ BIN A .}}

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