ML19247A105
| ML19247A105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 04/26/1979 |
| From: | Hayes D, Julie Hughes, Naidu K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19247A103 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-373-79-13, 50-374-79-10, NUDOCS 7907300046 | |
| Download: ML19247A105 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000373/1979013
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-373/79-13; 50-374/79-10
Docket No. 50-373; 50-374
License No. CI?? 99; CPPR-100
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
P. O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name: La Salle County Station, Units 1 and 2
Inspection At: La Salle Site, Seneca, Illinois
Inspection Conducted: March 22-23 and April 3-6, 1979
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Inspectors:
P. A. Barrett
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G. F. Maxwell
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J. Hughes
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K. R. Naidu
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Approved Sy:
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Engineering Support Section 1
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Inscection Summarv
Inspection en March 22-23 and Antil 3-6, 1979 (Report No. 50-373/79-13:
50-374/79-10)
Areas Inspected:
Installation of Unit 1 instrumentation components,
31ectrical cables, electrical penetrations, HVAC panels, HVAC duct
hangers, batteries, and motor-operated valves; Unit 1 instrumentation
.and penetration procurement and design documentation; Unit 1 instru-
mentation and electrical component installation records ,md audits;
40
025
790730004
s
.
Units 1 and 2 pre-operational QA turnover; and, licensee actions on
previous findings. This inspection involved a total of 157 inspector-
hours by four NRC inspectors.
Results: Of the five areas inspected, four items of noncompli'nce
were identified in t' tree areas (infractions; design - postaccident
monitoring, electrical terminations and hTAC components; procadures -
cable terminations; inspection - panels; and, audits - instrumentation
installation.
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026
DETAILS
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Personnel
- L.
J . Burke, Site Project Superintendent
- T.
E. Quaka, Site QA Supervisor
- E. Wendorf, Field Engineer
- J.
R. Kodrick, QA Mechanical Coordinator
- L. Tappella, QA Engineer
- D. J. Skoza, QA Engineer
- R.
T. Rose, Project Structural Engineer
- J. W. Gieseker, QA Engineer
- T.
Socnerfield, QA Electrical Coordinator
K. W.
Steele, Station Construction
- B. Reidy, QA Engineer
- J.
E. Steinmetz, Station Construction
- S.
P. Johnson, f :ation Constructior
Contractor and Other Personnel
- M. R. Dougherty, QA Supervisor, Walsh Construction Company
- 3. Hirst, QA Director, H. P. Foley Company
- R. Ouzts, QA Manager
H. P. Foley Company
- T. L. Peavler, Construction Engineer, General Electric Company
- C. T. Brinson, QA Engineer, General Electric Company
- R. Wilson QC, Zack Company
- R. M. Lundgren, H. P. Foley Company
- Denotes personnel attending exit interview.
Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items
(Closed) Noncompliance (373/79-11-02): Failure to take adecuate
corrective action to keep cables in raceways from being exposed to
b,zardous debris.
The licensee stated that a massive cleanup of all
raceways was performed on February 24-25, 1979, and verified by CECO.
During this inspection, the RIII inspectors observed various trays
which were free of hazardous debris.
Surveillance reports were reviewed
which documented daily inspecticns of raceways by two CECO representatives.
(Closed) honcompliance (373/79-11-04): Failure to identify and control
a disassembled cable raceway hanger.
H. P. Foley Company Nonconformance
~
Report No. 126 has been written to identify and control the disassem-
bled hanger. The hanger has been tagged with a Hold Tag.
Daily
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surveillances are being made to
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y any other such nonconforr.ances.
.
Instructions and controls to preclade dismantling of persanently
installed equipment were given to all site contractors and subcontractors
as documented in the Site Project Superintendent's letter No. 1816
dated March 6, 1979. Acknowledgements of these instructions were
received.
(0 pen) Noncompliance (373/79-11-05):
Failure to maintain cable bend
radius as specified in instruction HPFCo-WI-409, Rev. 4.
A complete
walkdown was made by H. P. Foley QC personnel to identity all cable
bend radius violations. The results were documented on NCR No. 122
dated March 9,1979.
The violations are being evaluated. Disposi-
tions have not been made.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (373/79-11-08):
Failure to accomplish a
scheduled site audit of cable installation activities. During this
inspearion, the RIII inspector reviewed the su= mary of Audit Report
No. 1-79-13, concerning cable pulling. The su= nary indicated the
audit had been performed in accordance with written checklists.
The
results were documented and reviewed by management.
The deficient
areas were being controlled.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item (373/78-24-01; 374/78-15-01): Review of nonseis-
mically installed equipment and etaponents installed over safety related
equipment and ccmponents. During this inspection, the RIII inspectors
observed additicnal subject locations (i.e., fire piping over cable
tray, nonsafety elated table tray over safety related HVAC ducts, a
drain pipe insta. led through an instrument rack, and the control room
lighting over ccr. trol panels). A letter from the CECO Manager of Station
Nuclear Engineering, dated October 24, 1978, indicated that a study by
Sargent and Lundy Engineering was made which showed that ".
inadvertent
. .
damage to safety related items was unlikely .
." by the nonsafety
.
related floor drain system. The licensee is accuculating the seismic
analysis and related information for the floor drains and all other
nonsafety related components located above safety related components.
This documentation will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
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A 10
02B
1
Section I
Pr pared by G. F.
Maxwell
P. A.
Barrett
J. Hughes
Reviewed by D. W. Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support
Section 1
1.
Electrical Terminations - Unit 1
a.
The inspector selected ten Class 1E electrical cables which
have been terminated at either one or both ends.
Six of the
selected cables were power cables and the remaining four were
control cables. The cables were inspected at their termina-
tion points to ascertain that they were terminated as
required by the applicable installation drawings, specif.ca-
tions and Foley procedure HPFCo-Wl-500, Rev. 4.
Cables which
were inspected specifically for the division code identification
and applicable termination drawings are as follows:
(1) Power cable for RHR heat exchanger motor operated inlet
valve; cable number 1RH044-1BP; drawing 1E-1-4391AA,
Rev. B - inspected the terminations at the Motor Control
Center (MCC) .
(2) Power cable for RHR heat exchanger motor operated inlet
valve; cable number 1RH040-1YP; drawing 1E-1-4389AA,
Rev. B - inspected the terminations at both ends.
(3) Power cable for RHR heat exchangar bypass mctor operated
valve; cable number 1RH052-1HP; drawing 1E-1-4391AA,
Rev. 3 - inspected the terminations at the MCC.
(4 ) Power cable for RER heat exchanger bypass motor operated
valve; cable number 1RH048-1YP; drawing IE-1-4389AA,
Rev. 3 - inspected the terminations at both ends.
(5) Power cable for RER pump motor 1A; cable number 1RH010-1YP;
drawing IE-1-4343AF, Rev. D - inspected the terminations -
at the MCC.
(6) Power cable for RER pump motor 13; cable number
1RH016-13P; drawing IE-1-4345AD, Rev. D - inspected the
terminations at the MCC.
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(7) Control cable for the RHR heat exchanger motor operated
inlet valve (associated with power cable numbered
IRH040); cable number 1RH041-1YC; drawing IE-1-4389AA;
Rev. B - inspec:ed the terminations at both ends.
(8) Control cable for the RHR heat exchanger motor operated
bypass valve (associated with power cable numbered
1RH048); cable number 1RH049-lYC; drawing IE-1-4389AA,
Rev. B - inspected the terminations at both ends.
(9) Control cable for the RHR heat exchanger motor operated
bypass valve (associated with power cable numbered
IRH052); cable number 1RH053-1BC; drawing IE-1-4391AA,
Rev. B - inspected the terminations at the MCC.
(10) Control cable for the RHR heat exchanger motor operated
inlet valve (associated with power cable numbered
IRH044); cable number 1RH045; drawing IE-1-4391AA,
Rev. B - inspected the terminations at the MCC.
b.
During the inspection, the following items were observed:
(1) A loose hold down fastener was found at both ends of
cable numbered IRH041. The fasteners were subsequently
tightened by a site electrician who accompanied the
inspector. The inspector also observed that the cable
had a piece of tape wrapped around the cable jacket
which bore the letters OAD.
The inspector was informed
that when the OAD group (Operations Analysis Department)
has tests or activities which they are performing on an
electrical cable or equipment they identify the cable
or equipment with the aforementioned tape.
(2) The flexible conduits, at the end of routing for both
cables IRH016 and IRHG41, were found to be dislocated
from their motor terminal boxes. The acccmpanying Foley
inspection personnel informed the inspector that action
would be taken to secure these flexible conduits to
their respective motor terminal boxes.
The inspector inquired as to how Foley and CECO quality
c.
assurance personnel have assured that medium voltage stress
cones have been applied to their termination points, for the
RHR pump motors and other safety-related medium voltage
motors, as required by Sargent and Lundy drawing IE-0-3089,
Rev. 3.
The inspector was informed, by the Foley QC Manager,
that he had observed about two or three stress cones intalled
on Unit 1 equipment, however, there was no documented
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evidence to show the inspection results. Stress cones have
been installed on at least 20 pieces of Unit 1 Class 1E
equipment. At the exit meeting on March 23, 1979, the Foley
QC Manager indicated that he has recently required his
inspectors to observe the inprocess installation of a stress
cone for one piece of Unit 2 Class IE equipment. On April 4,
1979, the inspector observed that since the NRC exit meeting
of March 23, 1979, Foley has documented the results of an
inspection conducted by them on March 26, 1979.
The results
indicate that Foley QC inspection personnel observed the
installation of an Unit 1 electrical stress cone kit on a
500 MCM cable numbered 1AS013.
The inspector reviewed the Foley procedure for cable
te rminations (HPFCo-WI-500, Rev. 4) and was informed by the
Foley QC Manager that there are no procedural requirements
for Foley inspection personnel to observe the inprocess
installation of electrical stress cones.
This lack of an inspection procedure is considered contrary
to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion
V, and CECO Topical Report CE-1-A, Revision 5, Section 5,
as identified in Appendix A of the report transimittal
letter.
(373/79-13-01)
d.
On March 22, 1979, the inspector observed that RRR pump
motor 1-B has been terminated at the motor end.
The inspector
noted that the power cable, numbered 1RH016, appeared to
be fastened to the motor terminal leads with some sort of
bolting materials. Neither the inspector nor the Foley
QC personnel could determine what type of bolting materials
were used in making the connections between the motor terminals
and the power cable; as the medium-voltage stress cones had
already been applied over the terminal connections. The
inspector was subsequently informed by the Foley QC Manager
that hexagon head cap screws, ASTM A307, conforming to ASTM
A164 and ASTM A591, are being used to fasten such terminal
connectors as those used on RER pump motor 1-3.
The inspector
asked the Foley QC Manager for the documented instructions,
procedures or drawings that specify the type of bolting
materials which are to be used.
The inspector was informed
that there are no documented instructions, procedures or
drawings which specify the type of bolting materials, bolt
washer configurations or the torque values of such terminal
connections.
Failure to specify bolting =atett _
7 be used for terminations
is considered contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50,
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Appendix B, Criterion III, and CECO Topical Report CE-1-A,
Revision 5, Section 3, as identified in Appendix A of the
report transmittal letter.
(373/79-13-02)
Except as noted, no items of noncompliance were identified.
2.
System Pre-Ocerational Testing - Unit I
a.
The inspector reviewed two system pre-operational turnovet
packages which are =aintained by CECO site construction
Quality Assurance. One of the packages, Low Pressure Core
Spray (release No. 27), has not been accepted by CECO
operations department. The other package, Fuel Pool Cooling
(release No. 36), was accepted by operations department on
February 5, 1979.
The following was observed:
(1)
The CECO QA Documentation Coordinator is maintaining
an action tracking system to help assure that deficiencies
which were identified, relative to the pre-operational
packages, are corrected.
(2) Deficiency reports were distributed to departments
and/or personnel responsible for resolving conditions,
relative to the pre-operational packages, which the
CECO Documentation Coordinator or Station Construction
personnel noted.
(3) CECO Station Construction and Operations are applying
status indicators on the electrical control switches
and valves as required by CECO procedure LSU 100-5,
Rev. 1, Paragraphs 2.a. 2.b and 2.c (1) .
b.
The inspector interviewed representatives from Ceco Station
Construction, CECO Site QA, Foley QC, Foley Construction,
Morrison Construction and from the CECO Operational Analysis
Department.
The inspector could not determine if adequate
interface exists between these various groups to assure that
electrical and mechanical systems have been properly
installed and inspected prior to their being turned over
for testing. The inspector discussed this condition with
the CECO Site QA Supervisor and was informed that CECO QA
plans to conduct an indeptb audit this month of the site
.
turnover program. Further, CECO has plans to =ake some
revisions to the starcup manual; this manual contains :he
procedures which are being used during system turnovers,
i.e. procedures LSU 100-2 and LSU 100-5.
This =atter is
unresolved (50-373/ 79-13-03) .
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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032
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3.
Observation of Work Activities
a.
The RIII inspector observed the following installed
electrical penetrations:
1LV96E, IC11-S304, 1C11-5303,
ILV-99E, ILV-98E, IAP-96E, IAP-98E and 1B33-S301. No damage
was observed and the length of the flange bolts vere as
specified. The penetrations were located as specified on
the drawings or applicable design change notice. With one
exception (No. 1C51-S303), the penetrations were all properly
pressurized.
The licensee is obtaining instructions from
the manufacturer concerning corrective action required
for the depressurized penetration. The specified corrective
action will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.
(373/79-13-04)
b.
On April 5,1979, the RIII inspectors observed two redundant
Reactor Building HVAC panels (No. 1FL27JA and No. IPL27JB)
and associated conduits / cables installed on a block wali.
The panels and conduits were installed in accordance with S&L
drawing No. 1E-1-3485 at workline L and between colu=ns 14
and 15.
Structural drawing No. A-194, Rev. G identifies
the wall as being nonsafety-related (nonselmic) and therefore
not constructed to withstand the design basis accident.
This condition is contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion III, and CECO Topical Report CE-1-A,
Rev. 5, Section 3, and is an item of noncompliance as identi'ied
in Appendix A of the repor- *ransmittal letter.
(373/79-13-05)
Except as noted, no items of noncompliance were identified.
Review of Procurement Documentation
4
a.
The RIII inspector reviewed procurement documentation for
the following Unit 1 elsetrical penetrations and safety related
inst rumentation:
Electrical penetrations - 1B33-5301, IB33-S02, IAP96E,
IAP97E, IAP98E, IAP99E, ILV96E, ILV97E ILV98E, ILV99E,
ILV94E, ILV95E, IC51-S301, IC51-5302, IC51-S303,
IC51-S304, IC11-S301, IC11-S302, IC11-S303 and IC11-S304.
The penetrations were supplied by the Cenax Corporation.
Instruments - 1HS-APO41, 1HS-AP042, 1HS-IN034, 10Z-VC111A,
1EI-AP038A and 1RS-VP003.
The electrical penetration purchase specification included
the appropriate design parameters, test requirements, docu-
mentation requirements end QA requirements, however, most
of the seism'e and environmental documentation was not
available '2r review.
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In regard to the review of the instrument documentation
that had been supplied, the following areas were addressed.
Some of the control room panels were shipped without all
of the instruments. No instructions were 1.ncluded to
mount those instruments shipped separate. A General
Electric letter indicated that some selector and push button
switches may have been manufactured without an approved
QA program. Apparently, no measures were taken to evaluate
the impact of the absence of the QA program. Seismic test
documentation was supplied for instruments (including No.
1El-AP038A) but the documentation could not be substan-
tiated as applying to the supplied instruments.
The status of the equipment was identified and controlled
by the interim release program in accordance with the CECO
QA Manual, Quality Procedure No. 7-1.
The licensee stated that the Architect Engineer was verifying
the status of procurement documentation for all safety
related components (electrical, mechanical, etc.).
Also, the
licensee is reviewing the status of the receipt documentation
currently at the site.
Further review is planned during
a subsequent inspection.
(373/79-13-06)
b.
The RIII inspector reviewed documentation pertaining to
electrical cable splices and splice kits. The findings are
as follows:
(1) Okonite test report " Qualification of Okoguard Ethylene-
Propyline Rubber Insulation for Nuclear Plant Service
(SKU Cable and Field Splice)" dated September 7, 1977.
The test repcrt includes test results for vertical
flare, pressure, temperature, steam, radiation, aging,
humidity and moisture resistance.
The splice material
consists of Okonite T95 insulating tape and Okonite No.
35 tape.
The inspector determined that the test results
were satisfactory.
(2) During review of the Kerite document package for splicing
and terminating kits, the licensee was unable to. provide
the inspector with proto type test results for environmental
testing of the splice saterial.
The licensee did
produce a certificate of conformance from Kerite dated
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August 14, 1979, and accepted by the A/E Jn January 26,
1979. This matter is unresolved pending the inspector's
review of the actual Kerite
proto type test results
for the splicing material.
(373/79-13-07)
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(3) Raychem splice kits test results are included in
The mofit Report 71100, Rev. 1.
The RIII inspector
has no further questions on this matter.
No items of nonce =pliance were identified.
5.
Review of the Electrical Penetration Installation Records
The RIII inspector reviewed the subject records and f&_ad them
to be incomplete. Deficiencies concerning the fler3e bolt size
and the corresponding torque requirements had not been verified.
Ver ?ication by the licensee was initiated during this inspection
and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspec tion.
(373/79-13-08)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
6.
Review of Design Documents
On April 5, 1979, the RIII inspector identified that the following
cables and component- comprising one of the redundant post
accident tracking cir.uits for the reactor pressure / level, were
incorrectly classifiec as nonsa'aty relatec:
Cables INB-358 and tNB-356, components SRU1B located on
panel 1H13-P613 and Level / Pressure Recorder No. IB21-R6233
located on panel 1H13-P601.
The cables and components are shown on S&L drawing No. 1E-1-4203AK
and are discussed in the FSAR Section 7.5.1.2.
This condition is
contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion
III and CECO Topical Report CE-1-A, Rev. 5, Section 3 and is an
item of ncncompliance as identified in Appendix A of the
Report Transmittal letter.
(373/79-13-09; 374/79-10-01)
One item of noncompliance was identified in the above area.
7.
Other Areas Inspected - Unit I
The inspector compared NSSS instrumentation panels numbered
a.
H13-P609 and H22-P005 with their respective vendor drawings;
General Electric (GE) drawings numbered 828E187TD,
Rev. 7,
and 127D1815TD, Rev. 2.
The comparison established the
,
indicating devices to be of the same ranges as those shown
on the drawing for panel H22-P005 and the relays located
in panel H13-P609 to be the same as these described on
its GE drawing.
Both relays, indicating devices and other
instrumentation devices were found to be installed in
their respective locations, as shown on the GE drawings.
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b.
The inspector observed that the motor for RER motor operated
valve numbered E12-F048A was not installed. The inspector
was informed by the licensee that the valve was received
with its motor attached; however, during a test which required
the motor to be operated the motor bearings were found to
be defective.
Subsequently, the valve's control switch was
tagged "out of service" and the motor has been removed from
the valve. The inspector was informed on April 6, 1979,
by the CECO Site QA Supervisor, that CECO Site QA will track
the events which followed the removal of the valve's motor;
to determi-c if the proper procedure (s) had been followed in
repairing the motor or in purchasing a replacement motor.
On April 17, 1979, the inspector was informed, by the CECO
Site QA Supervisor, that this condition has been identified
and documented as a nonconforming condition. This matter
is unresolved.
(373/79-13-10)
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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Section II
Prepared by J. Hughes
K. R. Naidu
Reviewed by D. W.
Hayes, Chief
Engineering Support
Section 1
1.
Instrumentation Cables - Observation of Jork Activities
a.
The RIII inspector selected seventeen Class IE instrumentation
cables which have been terminated at either the origin
end (f rom end), or the destination end (to end).
The cables
were inspected at their termination points to ascertain
that they were being properly terminated,
i.e. , proper lugs
used, calibrated crimping tools used, minimum bending radius
not exceeded, cable identification tags installed, and
separation criteria inside control panels properly maintained.
Cables included:
HP095, DG062, DG095, DG094, DG093, DG092,
DG061, LPO42, LPO4 0, HP054, HP090, VY080, VY081, VY082, VYO32,
VYO33 and VYO34
The cables w"
terminated as required by
the applicable drawings, specifications and H. C. Foley
procedure HPFCo '4I-500, Rev. 4, and documented on cable
termination cards.
Note: During the inspection, the inspector asked the licensee
how the grounded shield wires were going to be separated from
each other. The inspector was presented a Corrective Action
Report (CAR) No. 760 dated November 20, 1978, for the diesel
generator instrument cables.
The CAR referenced S&L Standard
EA-216.
The licensee informed the RIII inspector that they
would evaluate all instrument panels and determine if the
shielded ground wires needed to be separated on a case by case
basis.
This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent
inspection.
(373/79-13-11)
5.
For instrument cables referred to in Section 1(a), the Rill
inspector verified the following:
(1) proper cable tray and
conduit routing, (2) Quality Control Inspection procadures
_
were being used to assure raceways were electrically and
physically separa:ed in accordance with applicable specifi-
cations and drawings, and (3) proper size and type of cable
were installed.
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c The RIII inspector observed that cable trays were properly apported with sr.ismic Class 1 hangers and installed in accordance with the applicable drawings and S&L standards. Seismic supports (hangers) are inspected by H. P. Foley QC department personnel and documented on drawings, log status book and checklist for '.nstallation of cable trays. No items of noncompliance were identified. 2. Instrumentation - Review of Quality Records The RIII inspector reviewed installation records of the above instrument cables and cable trays. Installations were being properly docu=ented on HPFCo inspection checklist. No items of noncompliance were identified. 3. Instrumentation - Review of Calibration Records The RIII inspector reviewed calibration data sheets for the following instruments: E12-N016A, RHR pump discharge pressure; E12-N009A, RHR differential pressure switch; E12-N019B, pressure indicator switch; E12-R600, flow meter; Heise gauge and instrument digital multimeter. Instrument calibration procedures LIP-GM04 and LIP-GMll were approved and were being properly implemented. Calibration due dates were current and all instruments were cali- brated to updated standards. No items of noncompliance were identified. 4. Review of Electrical Ecuipment Records a. The RIII inspector reviewed records pertaining to the 125V batteries and determined them to be in accordance with manufacture's requirements and procedures. b. The inspector reviewed the electrical testing records for the swing Emergency Diesel Generator, including insulation resistance, continuity and high potential testing of the generator and voltage regulaters. No dicerepancies were identified. No items of noncompliance were identified. 5. Other Areas Inspected During a tour of the plant, the inspector observed several work areas where safety-related equipment is installed Withou protec- tive coverings to prevent damage or deterioration from construction - 14 - n i90 O' " b
activities such as water, etc. The items that were pointed out to the licensee, were corrected during the inspection period. The licensee stated that they would start a daily surveillance of all installed safety-related equipment to prevent recurrence of this problem. This matter is unresolved and will be reviewed during a follow-up inspection. (373/79-13-12) To items of r.ancompliance were identified. 6. Observation of Installed Instrument Lines The RIII inspector observed the installation of the safety related instrument lines and panels. Morrison Construction Co=pany (MCC) installed the instrument lines, associated hangers and instrument panels including welding activities; Walsh Construction Company (Walsh) grouted the anchors of the instrument panels. a. The inspector verified the installation of the following lines: Line Drawines Instrument HP-03AB 1/2" HP9, 10, 11 1E22-N009 NB-03AB 1/2" NB6, 7, 8 1E22-N009 1NB-49AA 3/4" NB54, 55, 56 IB21-NO34S INB-41AA 3/4" NB107, 108, 109 IB21-NO33C The inspector determined the following from observation of work and review of associated procedures and documents: (1) Records indicate that Welding Procedure Specification (WPS) P8-18LS, Rev. 3 was specified and used for the welding performed; Gas Tungsten Arc Process (GTAW) process is specified; the WPS was qualified to ASME Section IX; Weld rod Type ER 308 was used. The WPS permits either vibro-etching the welder's symbol or recording it on the applicable drawing; the latter was used. Socket veld-retract 1/16" is specified for fit- up; MCC QC inspector stated that although this aspect is checked it is not expressly docu=ented. The welds received a final visual inspection and Liquid Penetrant examination. . (2) The physical appearance of all but one of the welds was acceptable. The weld identified as W-NB-360 on line HP-03A3 1/2" at approximate elevation 697' hac an area with questionable concavity which was not accessible for visual examination. On March 23, 1979, - 13 - g()g 0 7 O>
the RIII inspector requested the licensee to re-er. amine the weld. On April 3, 1979, the licensee informed the inspector that the weld was reinspected, ground, rewelded, subjected to liquid penetrant examination utilizing procedure NDE/L2 and determined acceptable. This action is documented in Nonconformance and Disposition Request No. 382 dated April 3, 1979. No further action is planned since this is considered an isolated instance. b. The as-installed condition of panels identified as 1HP22P024, 1HP22P074, lHP22P018, 1HP22001, 1H22P009 and H22P006 was compared with the specified drawings. Information elicited from Sargent and Lundy (S&L) 'rawings MI550, M1551 and MI590, sheet 9 indicate that the panel frame should be 1 1/2" above the floor, the projection of the embedded foundation 5/8" diameter bolts should be 3" from the floor. General Electric, the panel supplier, in their drawing 163C1043TD require the bottom most valve to be 6" above the floor. No tolerances were specified on the drawings. The following items were observed: (1) The projected lengths of the embedded bolts were less than the specified 3" for panels IHP22P024, lHP22P018, 1H22P009 and 1HP22P006. (2) The clearance between the panel frame and the floor was less than 1 1/2" below panels IHP22P001 and 1HP22P006, and was 2" below panels 1HP22P018 and 1H22P009. (3) 5/8" diameter foundation bolts were used in all cases. (4) In addition to the above, several other discrepancies were observed; instruments with missing screws; a drain line was routed through instrument panel IRP22P074; the cleanliness around all panels was less than desirable. (3) A program for inspecting the installatica of the panels had not been established and therefore not implemented. Pour Check Out Cards, used to document preplacement inspections, for the four sections of the reactor basemat - namely pours IR4A, IR43, IR4C and 1R4D - should have verified the placement of the embedded panel foundation bolts; however, these records identify no adverse lindings on the embedded items. In - 16 -
The inspector informed the licensee that failure co establish an inspection plan outlining the attributes to be inspected in a timely manner at various stages of work performed by the civil and mechanical contractors including the drawings to be used with the relevant acceptance / rejection criteria, was contrary to the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion X. This is an item of noncompliance as identified in Appendix A of the report transmittal letter. (373/79-13-13) c. The inspector otserved that temporary hangers were installed to support the instrument lines outside the drywell. The licensee ackuowledged that many hangers have to be designed and fabricated onsite from material supplied by ITT-Grinnel, then installed and inspected. To expedite the selection and design of hangers, the contractor utilized an isometric drawing which shows the location of the hanger and the design loads. S&L, in a specification titled " Design Assembly and Erection Guidelines for Supports of Miscellaneous 2-inch and Smaller Seismic Piping and Seismic Instru=ent Piping," provided guidelines to select an appropriate hanger. Final NRC inspections can be made only after the hanger installation is completed and inspected by the licensee. The NRC inspector plans to follow the progress on this matter. This is an unresolved item. (373/79-13-14) d. The inspector reviewed hydrostatic test reports on tests Nv. HY649, HY650 and HY651. The reports indicate that Morrison test procedure PC6 was used to subject the installed instrument lines to the specified hydrostatic pressure. The values of the test pressure, the duration and the serial number of the gauges are documented in the report. From the serial number of the gauge used, the inspector was able to trace the instruments and determine that the requirements of the range and calibration met ASME Code Section III. One item of noncompliance was identified in the above areas. 7. Observation of HVAC Duct Hancers The inspector observed the installed hangers supporting r' Heating Ventillation and Air Conditioning system " Return . for the Auxiliary Building" office room at elevation 786. The cognizant contractor is Zack; welding is performed to Arerican - Welding Society (AWS) Code. The inspector selected hangers No. 601 and No. 119, verified the installation with the applicable drawings and determined the following: . 49.0 041 - 1,. _
, a. The 3/16" size welds on hanger No. 601 had undercut in several areas and do not fully meet AWS requirements, b. The 3/16" size weld of the hanger No. 119 to the base plate was incomplete on one side; in another araa, the weld was undersized. The welds on the hangers had been inspected by Zack QC and determined acceptable; the acceptance was indicated by a streak of red paint. The contractor co=mer.ced weld repairs on the hangers i=nediately. As a result of discussions with the CECO Site Project Superintendent, it was agreed that Zack would provide indoctrination to their QC inspectors on inspecting welds on hangers; in addition to this, CECO QA Supervisor agreed to conduct an audit on work perfor=ed by Zack relative to hangers. The licensee will provide additional information on the results of the audit. Pending review of this information, this matter is considered unresolved. (373/79-13-15) No itemr of noncompliance were identified in the above areas. 8. Review of CECO Audits The inspector inquired whether audits were performed by CECO on instrument panel installation and Product Quality Certificates provided by General Electric on the NSSS instrument panels. The Site QA Supervisor could not recall any audits performed on the instrument panel installation; CECO performs audits on implementa- tion of procedures - since a procedure did not exist, an audit was not performed. CECO provided a QA report covering the audit performed at GE San Jose during May 9-13, 1978. Four findings relative to Criteria XIII, XVI, XVIII and BWR QA manual including two observations were identified. The inspector attempted to obtain additional infor ation over the telephone from the CECO Corporate QA Manager. He stated that the actual audit was voluminous and could not be sent to the site and he thus read applicable portions to the inspector over the telephone. From the information supplied over the phone, the RIII inspector determined that there was no objective evidence that CECO verified GE's compliance to the Product Quality certification program. - Subsequent to the inspection, the CECO site QA supervisor infor=ed the inspector that some additional documentation relative to the audit performed at GE San Jose would be made available for NRC review at the La Salle construction site. The inspector stated that this aspect of the audit review was considered unresolved per. ding review of this docu=entation. (373/79-13-16) - 13 - 4 0 C42
. In regard to site audits, the inspector informed the licensee that contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Criterion XVIII, it appeared CECO did not perform a comprehensive system of planned audits to verify that the inst _llTtion of the NSSS instrument panels complied with all respects of the quality assurance program. This condition is an item of noncompliance as identified in Appendix A of the Report Transmittal letter. (373/79-13-17) One item of noncompliance was identified in the above area. Unresc1ved Matters Unresolved matters are matters about which mora information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during this incpection are discussed in Section I, Paragraphs 2b and 7b, and Section II, Paragrapb= 5, 6c, 7 and 8. Exit Int e rview The inspectors met with licensee representatives on March 23 and April 6, 1979. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings as reported. - 19 - A90 043 t }}