ML19246B963

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Suppl IE Bulletin 79-01A, Environ Qualification of Class IE Equipment (Deficiencies in Environ Qualification of Asco Solenoid Valves). Action Required
ML19246B963
Person / Time
Site: 05000484
Issue date: 06/06/1979
From: James Keppler
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To: Dienhart A
NORTHERN STATES POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 7907190280
Download: ML19246B963 (1)


Text

6 DC ID p* *f Gg\\

UNITED STATES I

+

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[( T T ([ E REGION til y" #'

l 7s, acosEvrty no Ao 9.

a c LE N E L LVPW, ILUNOIS WH f

  • e*

JUN 6 1979 Docket No. 50-484 Nortiern States Power Company ATTN:

Mr. A. V. Dienhart Vice President - Tyrone Energy Park 100 North Barstow Street Eau Claire, WI 54701 Gentlemen:

Enclosed is supplement IE Bulletin No.79-01A.

It requires action by you with regard to power reactor facilities with an operating license except for the 11 SEP plants which are listed in Enclosure 3.

This Bulletin is also being sent for information to the 11 SEP plants and all power reactor facilities with a construction permit. No action or written response is required for construction permit facilities or the 11 SEP plants.

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.

Sincerely, u b.

GL James G. Keppler Director

Enclosure:

IE Bulletin No.79-01A cc w/ encl:

Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Regions I & IV 79071 DON 80

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

" REGION III June 6, 1979 IE Bulletin No.79-01A SUPPLEMENT NO.79-01A TO IE BULLETIN 79 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT (DEFICIENCIES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ASCO SOLENOID VALVES)

Description of Circumstances:

Recently, a noncompliance report under 10 CFR Part 21 was rece ved by the NRC from the Henry Pratt Company, manufacturer of butterfly valves which are installed in the primary containment at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Station.

These butterfly valves are used for purge and exhaust purposes and are required to operate during accident conditions. The report discusses the use of an unqualified solenoid valve for a safety-re2ated valve function which requires operation under accident conditions.

The solenoid valve in question is Catalogue No. HT-8331A45, manufactured by the Automatic Switch Co=pany (ASCO) of Florham Park, New Jersey.

This pilot valve is used to pilot control the pneumatic valve actuators which are installed on the concainment ventila-tion butterfly valves at this facility.

The deficiency in these solenoid valves identified in the Part 21 Report concerns the parts made of acetal plastic material. The ccetal disc holder assembly and botto= plug in the pilot valve assembly are stated by ASCO to have a maximum service limit of 400,000 Rad integrated dosage and 200 degrees F temperature. According to ASCO, exposure of these acetal plastic parts to specified maximum environmental conditions may render the solenoid pilot valve inoperable which would cause the associated butterfly valve to malfunction.

Further investigation at ASCO by the NRC staff has revealed that the valve seals in most ASCO solenoid valves contain Buna "N" elastomer material, which reportedly has a maximum service limit of 7,000,000 Rad integrated dosage and 180 degrees F temperature. The investigation further revealed that ASCO has available a line of qualified solenoid operated pilot valves (ACCO Catalogue No. NF-1) which have no plastic parts, utilize ethylene propylene or viton elastomers and have a continuously energized operating life of four years, under normal ambient conditions up to 140 degrees F.

According to the manu-facturer, at the end of this period, the coil, manual operator (optional fea-ture) and all resilient parts must be replaced.

These preventive maintenance instructions are specified in the installation and instruction bulletins which are provided to the purchaser with each shipment of solenoid valves.

The final items of concern identified auring this investigation deals with the application of Class "A",

"B",

or "F", solenoid coils which are exposed to an accident environment.

In this rederd, ASCO representatives stated that the

}'k) 7907g20178

IE Bulletin No. 79-OlA June 6, 1979 high temperature coils identified as Class "HT" or "HB" are the only coils con-sidered suitable for service under accident conditions; whereas, Class "A",

"B",

and "F" coils are not.

With_ respect to the corrective measures to be taken to resolve the above concerns, ASC6 recommends the following:

1.

The parts of the solenoid valve made of acetal plastic material should be replaced with similar parts made of metal which can be provided by ASCO.

2.

The valve seals and gaskets which are made of Buna "N" material should be replaced with either ethylene propylene or viton elastomers, considered by ASCO as suitable for the service intended.

3.

Review and determine that the coils of the solenoid valves installed inside e.cntainment are Class "HT" or "HE" as required for high temperature environmental conditions.

4.

Review rnd determine that the solenoid enclosures installed inside contain~

ment have at least a NEMA 4 enclosure rating.

5.

Establish a preventive maintenance program to assure replacement of those valve parts identified above in the time period recommended in the appro-priate ASCO valve bulletin.

6.

ASCO also stated that all unqualified solenoid valves inside containment be retrofitted to qualified ASCO No. NP-1 valves in lieu of the above.

7.

Questions from licensees to ASCO concerning corrective measures should reference both catalogue and serial numbers of each valve in question.

These numbers are stamped on the metal nameplate on each solenoid valve.

Action to be Taken by Licenseer of all Power Reactor Facilities (except those 11 SEP Plants listed on Enclosure 3) with an operating License:

1.

Determine whether or not ASCO solenoid valves are used or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility (ies).

2.

If such valves are used er planned for use, identify the safety system involved and determine titat:

(a) valves which could be subjected to a LOCA environment are qualified to that environment.

Specifically that no parts made of acetal plastic or Buna "N" materials or Class "A", "B",

or

f" solenoid coils are used in such valves; (b) a preventive main-tenance program is being conducted such that the solenoid coil, the manual operator (if applicable), and the resilient parts of the valve are being replaced in accordance with the time period established by the manufacturer and documented as the qualified life of the assembled component.

AT

)

'n>

a

IE Bulletin No.79-01A

, June 6, 1979 3.

All holders of operating licenses of power reactor facilities are obligated to 22et the review and reporting requirecents established in previously issued IE Bulletin 79-01, regarding environmental qualifica-tion of electrice.1 equipment installed in their plants.

No additional written response to this Supplement IE Bulletin is required other than those responses described above.

NRC inspectors will continue to monitor the licensees' progress in cor,. ting the requested action described above.

If additional information is required, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance exp.res 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for ider:ified generic problems.

Enclosures:

1.

List of IE Bulletins Issued in the past 12 conths 2.

List of SEP Plants (11) 3a3 246

IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.

7 9-f'2 Short Period Scrams at 5/31/79 All GE BWR Facilities BWR Facilities with an OL 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent Trip 5/22/79 All Power Recctor Device in Circuit Breakers Facilities with an for Engineered Safety OL or a CP Systems 79-10 Requalification Training 5/11/79 All Power Reactor Program Statistics Facilities with an OL 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 4/17/79 All Power Reactor Circuit Breaker in Safety Facilities with an Related Systems OL or CP 79-08 Events Relevant to BWR 4/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Reactors Identified During Facflities with an OL Three Mile Island Incident 79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis 4/14/79 All Power Reaccc of Safety-Related Piping Facilities with an OL or CP 79-06B Review of Operational 4/14/79 All Combustion Engineer-Errors and System Mis-ing Designed Pressurized alignments Identified Water Powe Reactor During the Three Mile Facilities with an Island Incident Operating Licensee 79-06A Review of Operational 4/18/79 All Pressurized Water (Rev 1)

Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities alignments Identified of Westinghouse Design During the Three Mile with an OL Island Incident 79-06A Review of Op2 rational 4/14/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities alignments Identified of Westinghouse Design During the Three Mile with an OL Island Incident 7

n

?

..l g. _,

Enclosure Page 1 of 3

IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.

79- 06 Review of Operational 4/11/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactors with an alignments Identified OL except B&W facilities During the Three Mile Islcnd Incident 79-05A Nuclear Incident at 4/5/79 All B&W Power Reactor Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL 79-05 Nuclear Incident at 4/2/79 All Power Reacter Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL and CP 79-04 Incorrect Weights for 3/30/79 All Power Reactor Swing Check Valves Facilities with an Manufactured by Velan OL or CP Engineering Corporation 79-03 Longitudinal Welds Defects 3/12/79 All Power Reactor In ASME SA-312 Type 304 Facilities with an Stainless Steel Pipe Spools OL or CP Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.

79-02 Pipe Support Base Plate 3/2/70 All Power Reactar Designs Using Concrete Facilities with an Expansion Anchor Bolts OL or CP 79-01 Environmental Qualification 2/8/79 All Power Reactor of Class IE Equipment Facilities with an OL or CP 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-N 12/19/78 All GE BWR fr.cilities Component In ASCO with an OL or CP Folenoids 78-13 Failures in Source Heads 10/27/78 All general and of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges specific licensees Models 7050, 7050B, 7051, with the subject 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 Kay-Ray, Inc.

and 7061B gauges 9t b 9

} l( )

Enclosure Page 2 of 3

IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.

78-L2B Atypical Weld Material 3/19/79 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12A Atypical Weld Material 11/24/78 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12 Atypical Weld Material 9/29/78 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Tessel Welds OL or CP 78-11 Examination of Mark I 7/21/78 BWR Power Reactor Containment Torus Welds Facilities for action:

Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee 78-10 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic 6/27/78 All BWR Power Reactor Shock Suppressor Accumulator Facilities with an Spring Coils OL or CP 78-09 BWR Drywell Leakage Paths 6/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Associated with Inadeauate Facilities with an Drywell Closures OL or CP 78-08 Radiation Levels from Fuel 6/12/78 All Power and Resetrch Element Transfer Tubes Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element transfer tube and an OL 76-07 Protection afforded by 6/12/78 All Power Reactor Air-Line Respirators and Facilities with an OL, Supplied-Air Hoods all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees 7 ', O

-) -b LNI Enclosure Page 3 of 3

- SEP Plants Plant Region Dresden 1 III Yankee Rowe I

Big Rock Point III San Onofre 1 V

Haddam Neck I

Lacrosse III Oyster Creek I

R. E. Ginna I

Dresden 2 III Millstone I

Palisadus III

} d '_h

'i Enclosure Page 1 of 1