ML19246B945
| ML19246B945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Howell S CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907190244 | |
| Download: ML19246B945 (1) | |
Text
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POR pm asco, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i eir( i S REGION 111 f
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JUN 6 1979 Docket No. 50-329 Docket No. 50-330 Consumers Power Company
~
ATTN:
Mr. Stephen H. Howell Vice President 1945 West Parnall Road Jackson, MI 49201 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is supplement IE Bulletin No.79-01A.
It requires action by you with regard to power reacter facilities with an operating license except for the 11 SEP plants which are listed in Enclosure 3.
This Bulletin is also being sent for information to the 11 SEP plants and all power reactor facilities with a construction permit.
No action or written response is required for coastruction permit facilities or the 11 SEP plants.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, b.
f,,.JamesG.Keppler Director
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No.79-01A cc w/ enc 1:
Central Files Director, NRR/DPM Director, NRR/ DOR PDR Local PDR NSIC TIC Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Dr. Wayne E. North Myron M. Cherry, Chic go 79071 Dos 44 343 129
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
~~ RECION III June 6, 1979 IE Bulletin No.79-01A SUPPLEMENT No.79-01A TO IE BULLETIN 79 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION ]F CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT (DEFICIENCIES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF.*sSCO SOLENOID VALVES)
Description of Circumstances:
Recently, a noncompliance report under 10 CFR Part 21 was received by the NRC from the Henry Pratt Ccmpany, manufacturer of butterfly valves which are installed in the primary containment at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Station. These butterfly valves are used for purge and exhaust purposes and are required to operate during accident conditions. The rcport discusses the use of an unqualified solenoid valve for a safety-related valve function which requires operation under accident conditions.
The solenoid valve in question is Catalogue No. HT-8331A45, manufactured by the Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) of Florham Park, New Jersey. This pilot valve is used to pilot control the pneu=atic valve actuators which are installed on the containment ventila-tion butterfly valves at this facility.
The deficiency in these solenoid valves identified in the Part 21 Report concerns the parts made of acetal plastic material. The acetal disc holder asse=bly and bottom plug in the pilot valve assembly are stated by ASCO to have a maximum service limit of 400,000 Rad integrated dosage and 200 degrees F t e=p erature. According to ASCO, exposure of these acetal plastic parts to specified max 1=um environmental conditions may render the solenoid pilot valve inoperable which would cause the associated butterfly valve to malfunction.
Further investigation at ASCO by the NRC staff has revealed that the valve seals in most ASCO solenoid valves contain Buna "N" elastomer material, which reportedly has a maximum service limit of 7,000,000 Rad integrated dosage and 120 degrees F teaporature. The investigation further revealed that ASCO has available a line of qualified solenoid operated pilot valves (ASCO Catalogue No. NP-l) which have no plastic parts, utilize ethylene propylene or viton elastomers and have a continuously energized operating life of four years, under nors_1 ambient conditions up to 140 degrees F.
According to the manu-facturer, at the end of this period, the coil, manual operator (optional fea-ture) and all resilient parts must be replaced.
These preventive maintenance instructions are specified in the installation and instruction bulletins which are provided te the purchaser with each shipment of solenoid valves.
The final items of concern identified during this investigation deals with the application of Claes "A",
"B",
or "F", solenoid coils which are exposed to an accident environment.
In this regard, ASCO representatives stated that the 2007020173 343 i30
IE Bulletin No. 79-OlA
_2_
June 6, 1979 high te=perature coils identified as Class "HT" or "HE" are the only coils con-sidered suitable for service under accident conditions; whereas, Class "A",
"B",
and "F" coils are not.
With respect to the corrective measures to be taken to resolve the above concerns, ASCO recommends the following:
1.
The parts of the solenoid valve made of acetal plastic caterial should be replaced virh similar parts made of metal which can be provided by ASCO.
2.
The valve seals and gaskets which are made of Buna "N" caterial should be replaced with either ethylene propylene or viten elasteners, considered by ASCO as suitable for the service intended.
3.
Review and determine that the coils of the solenoid valves installed inside containment are Class "HT" or "HB" as required for high temperature environ = ental conditions.
4.
Review and deter =ine that the solenoid enclosures installed inside contain-ment have at least a NEMA 4 enclosure rating.
5.
Establish a preventive maintenance program to assure replacement of those valve parts identified above in the time period reconmended in the appro-priate ASCO valve bulletin.
6.
ASCO also stated that all unqualified solenoid valves inside contain=ent be retrofitted to qualified ASCO No. NP-1 valves in lieu of the above.
7.
Qucstions from licensees to ASCO concerning corrective measures should reference both catalogue and serial numbers of each valve in question.
These numbers are sta= ped on the metal nameplate on each solenoid valve.
Action to be Taken by Licensees of all Power Reactor Facilities (except those 11 SEP Plants listed on Enclosure 3) with an operating License:
1.
Determine whether or not ASCO solenoid valves are used or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facility (ies).
2.
If such valves are used or planned for use, identify the safety system involved and detetmine that:
(a) valves which could be subjected to a LOCA environment are qualified to that environ =ent.
Specifically that no parts made of acetal plastic or Buna "N" =aterials or Class "A",
"3",
or "7" solenoid coils are used in such valves; (b) a preventive main-tenance program is being conducted such that the solenoid coil, the manual operator (if applicable), and the resilient parts of the valve are being replaced in accordance with the time period established by the manufacturer and documented as the qualified life of the assembled ccepenent.
545 i
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 3.
All holders of operating licenses of power reactor facilities are obligated to meet the review and reportin requirements established in previously issued IE Bulletin 79-01, regarding environmental qualifica-tion of electrical equipment installed in their plants.
No additicnal written response to this Supplement IE Bulletin is required other than those responses described above. NRC inspectors will continue to monitor the licensees' progress in completing the requested action described above.
If additional information is required, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in the past 12 onths 2.
List of SEP Plants (11)
(
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSL'ED IN LAST IVELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
7 9-f'2 Short Period Scra=s at 5/31/79 All GE BWR Facilities BWR Facilities with an OL 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent Trip 5/22/79 All Power Reacter Device in Circuit Breakers Facilities with an OL or a CP for Engineered Safety Systems 79-10 Requalification Training 5/11/79 All Pcwer Reactor Facilities with an OL Program Statistics 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 4/17/79 All Power Reactor Circuit Ernaker in Safety Facilities with an OL or CP Related Systems 79-08 Events Relevac.: to BWR 4/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Reactcrs Identified During Facilities with an OL Three Mila Island Incident 79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis 4/14/79 All Power Reactor of Saf ety-Related Piping Facilities with an OL or CP 79-06B Review of Operational 4/14/79 All Combustion Engineer-Errors and System Mis-ing Designed Pressurized alignments Identified Water Power Reactor During the Three Mile Facilities with an Island Incident Operating Licensee 79-06A Review of Operational 4/13/79 All Pressurized Water (Rev 1)
Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities align =ents Identified of Westinghouse Design During the Three Mile with an OL Island Incident 79-06A Review of Operational 4/14/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities align =ents Identified of Westinghcuse Design During the Three Mile with an CL Island Incident Enclosure
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Page 1 of 3
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISfING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To ho.
79-06 Review of Operational 4/11/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactors with an alignments Identified OL except E6W facilities During the Three Mile Island Incident 79-05A Nuclear Incident at 4/5/79 All B&W Power Rezetor Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL 79-05 Nuclear Incident at 4/2/79 All Power Reactor Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL and CP 79-04 Incorrect Weights for 3/30/79 All Power Reactor Swing Check Valves Facilities with an Manufactured by Velan OL or CP Engineering Corporation 79-03 Longitudinal Welds Defects 3/12/79 All Power Reactor In ASMI SA-312 Type 304 Facilities with an Stainless Steel Pipe Spools OL or CP Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.
79-02 Pipe Support Base Plate 3/2/70 All Power Reactor Designs Using Concrete Facilities with an Expansion Anchor Bolts OL or CP 79-01 Envirormental Qualification 2/8/79 All Power Reactor of Class IE Equipment Facilities with an OL or CP 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-N 12/19/78 All GE BWR facilities Component In ASCO with an OL or CP Solenoids 78-13 Failures in Source Heads 10/27/78 All general and of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges specific licensees Bodels 7050, 7050B, 7051, with the subject 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 Kay-Ray, Inc.
and 7061B gauges Enclosure Page 2 of 3 k.
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IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
78-L2B Atypical Weld Material 3/19/79 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12A Atypical Weld Material 11/24/78 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12 Atypical Weld Material 9/29/78 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Tessel Welds OL er CP 78-11 Examination of Mark I 7/21/78 BWR Power Reactor Containment Torus Welds Facilities for action:
Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee 78-10 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic 6/27/78 All BWR Power Reactor Shock Suppressor Accu =ulator Facilities with an Spring Coils OL or CP 78-09 BWR Drywell Leakage Paths 6/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Associated with Inadequate Facilities with an Drywell Closures OL or CP 78-08 Radiation Levels from Fuel 6/12/78 All Power and Research Element Transfer Tubes Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element transfer tube and an OL 78-07 Protection afforded by 6/12/78 All Power Reactor Air-Line Respirators and Facilities with an OL, Supplied-Air Hoods all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees Enclosure
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SEP Plants Plant Region Dresden 1 III Yankee Rowe I
Big Rock Point III San Onofre 1 V
Eaddas Neck I
Lacrosse III Oyster Creek I
R. E. Ginna I
Dresden 2 III Millstone I
Palisades III Enclosure Page 1 of I
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