ML19246B940
| ML19246B940 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden, Quad Cities, Zion  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Brian Lee COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907190230 | |
| Download: ML19246B940 (1) | |
Text
710 i%*4 p* *8 CO UNITED ST ATES f$
NL'O LE A R REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 111
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cLEN ELLYN, SLLINOIS 60137 n., '"
- JUN 6 m9 Docket Nos. 50-295, 50-304, 50-249, 50-254 and 50-265 Commonwealth Edison Company ATTN:
Mr. Byron Lee, Jr.
Vice President P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is supplement IE Bulletin No.79-01A.
It requires action by you with regard to power reactor facilities with an operating license except for the 11 SEP plants which are listed in Enclosure 3.
This Bulletin is also being sent for information to the 11 SEP plants and all power reactor facilities with a construction permit.
No action or written response is required for construction permit facilities or the 11 SEP plants.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the ections required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely,
/J.
Jame G. Kepple Director
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No.79-01A cc w/ encl:
Mr. B. B. Stephenson, PDR Station Superintendent Local PDR Mr. N. Kalivianakis, NSIC Station Superintendent TIC Mr. N. Wandke, Station Anthony Roisman, Esq.,
Superintendent Attorney Central Files Mr. Dean Hansell, Office Director, NRR/DPM of Assistant Attorney Director, NRR/ DOR Genera' 79J7199gj0
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMEST
" REGION III June 6, 1979 IE Bulletin No.79-01A SUPPLEMEhT NO.79-01A TO IE BULLETIN 79 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF CLiSS 1E EQUIPMENT (DEFICIENCIES IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ASCO SOLENGID VALVES)
Description of Circumstances:
Recently, a noncompliance report under 10 CFR Part 21 was received by the NRC from the Henry Pratt Co=pany, manufacturer of butterfly valves which are instal 3ed in the primary containment at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Station. These butterfly valves are used for purge and exhaust purpcses and are required to operate during accident conditions.
The report discusses the use of an unqualified solenoid valve fcr a safety-related valve function which requires operation under accident con /.itions.
The solenoid valve in question is Catalogue No. HT-8331A45, manufact tred by the Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) of Florham Park, New Jersey. This pilot valve is used to pilot control the pneumatic valve actuators which are installed on the containment ventila-tion butterf2y valves at this facility.
The deficiency in these solenoid valves identified in the Part 2 F Report concerns the parts made of acntal plastic material.
The acetal dise holder assembly and bottom plug in the pilot valve assembly are stated by "O to h e a maximum cervice limit of 400,000 Rad integrated dosage and 200 /
temperature.
According to ASCO, exposure of these acetal plastic specified maximum environmental conditions may render the solenoid
.ve i
inoperable which would cause the associated butterfly valve to malfv Further investigation at ASCO by the NRC staff has revealed that the valve seals in most ASCO solenoid valves contain Buna "N" elastomer material, which reportedly has a maximum service limit of 7,000,000 Rad integrated dosage and 180 degrees f tempe:ature. The investigation further revealed that ASCO has availab]e a line of qualified solenoid operated pilot valves (ASCO Catalogue No. NP-1) which have no plastic parts, utilize ethylene propylene or viton elastomers and have a continuously energized operating life of four years, under normal ambient conditions up to 140 degrees F.
According to the manu-facturer, at the end of this period, the coil, uanual operator (optional fea-ture) and all resilient parts must be replaced. These preventive maintenance instructions are specified in the installation and instruction bulletins which are provided to the purchaser with each shipment of solenoid valves.
The final items cf concern identified during this investigation deals with the application of Class "A",
"B",
or "F",
solenoid coils which are exposed to an accident environment.
In this regard, ASCO representatives stated that the 02 "*
0 29o2 343 097
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 high temperature coils identified as Class "HT" or "HB" are the only coils con-sidereo suitable for service under accident conditions; whereas, Class "A",
"B",
and "F" coils are not.
With respect to the corrective measures to be taken to resolve the above concerns, ASCO recoc= ends the followin-1.
The parts ot' ine solenoid valve made of acetal plastic material should be replaced with similar parts made of metal which can be provided by ASCO.
2.
ve seals and gaskets which are made of Buna "N" material should be re. aced with either ethylene propylene or viton elastomers, considered e
by ASCO as suitable for the service intended.
3.
Review and determine that the coils of the solenoid valves installed inside containment are Class "HT" or "HB" as required for high temperature environ = ental conditions.
4.
Review and determine that the solenoid enclosures installed inside contain-ment have at least a NEMA 4 enclosure rating.
5.
Establish a preventive maintenance program to assure replacement of those valve parts identified above in the time period recommended in the appro-priate ASCO valve bulletin.
6.
ASCO also stated that all unqualified solenoid valves inside containment be retrofitted to qualified ASCO No. NP-1 valves in lieu of the above.
7.
Questions from licensees to ASCO concerning corrective measures should reference both catalogue and serial numbers of each valve in question.
These numbers are stamped on the metal nameplate on each solenoid valve.
Action to be Taken by Licensees of all Power Reactor Facilities (except those 11 SEP Plants listed en Enclosure 3) with an Operating License:
1.
Determine whether or not ASCO solenoid valves are used or planned for use in safety-related systems at your facilit;(ies).
2.
If such valves are used or planned i r use, identify the safety system ir.volved and determine that:
(a) valves which could be subjected to a LOCA environment are qualified to that environment.
Specifically that no parts made of acetal plastic or Buna "N" materials or Class "A", "B",
ci "F" solenoid coils are used in such valves; (b) a preventive main-tenance program is being conducted such that the solenoid coil, the manual operator (if applicable), and the resilient parts of the valve are being replaced in accordance with the time period established by the manufacturer and documented as the qualified life of the assembled component.
/
343 098
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 3.
All hollars of operating licenses cf power reactor facilities are obligated so meet the review and reporting requirements established in previously issued IE Bulletin 79-01, regarding environmental qualifica-tion of electrical equipment installed in their plants.
No additioni. written response to this Supplement lE Bulletin is required other than those responses described above. NRC inspector will continue to monitor the licensees' progress in completing the requested action described above.
If additional information is required, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
Enclosures:
1.
List of IE Bulletins Issued in the past 12 conths 2.
List of SEP Plants (11) 343 099
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979
^
LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
79-f2 Short Period Scrats at 5/31/79 All GE BWR Facilities BWR Facilities with an OL 79-11 Faulty overcurrent Trip 5/22/79 All Power Reactor Device in Circuit Breakers Facilities with an for Engineered Safety OL or a CP Systems 79-10 Requalification Training 5/11/79 All Power Reactor Program Statistics Facilities with an OL 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 4/17/79 All Power Reactor Circuit Breaker in Safety Facilities with an OL or CP Related Syste=s 79-08 Events Relevant to BWR 4/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Reactors Identified During Facilities with an OL Three Mile Island Incident 79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis 4/14/79 All Power Reactor of Safety-Related Piping Facilities with an OL or CP 79-06B Review of Operational 4/14/79 All Combustion Engineer-Errors and System Mis-ing Designed Pressurized aligncents Identified Water Power Reactor During the Three Mile Facilities with an Island Incident Operating Licensee 79-06A Review of Operational 4/18/79 All Pressurized Water (Rev 1)
Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities aligncents Identified of Westinghouse Design During the Three Mile with an OL Island Incident 79-06A Review of Operational 4/14/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facilities alignments Identified of Westinghouse Design During the Three Mile with an OL Island Incident Enclosure p,,
Page 1 of 3
)lj 3
,J
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 I
LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
79-06 Review of Operational 4/11/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Mis-Power Reactors with an alignments Identified OL except B6W facilities During the Three Mile Island Incident 79-05A Nuclear Incident at 4/5/'9 All B6W Power Reactcr Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL 79-05 Nuclear Incident at 4/2/79 All Power Reactor Three Mile Island Facilities with an OL and CP 79-C4 Incorrect Weights for 3/30/79 All Power Reactor Swing Check Valves Facilities with an Manufactured by Velan OL or CP Engineering Corporation 79-03 Longitudinal Welds Defects 3/12/79 All Power Reactor In ASME SA-312 Type 304 Facilities with an Stainless Steel Pipe Spools OL or CP Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.
79-02 Pipe Support Base Plate 3/2/70 All Power Reactor Designs Using Concrete Facilities with an Expansion Anchor Bolts OL or CP 79-01 Environmental Qualification 2/8/79 All Power Peactor of Class IE Equipment Facilities with an OL or CP 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-N 12/19/78 All GE BWR facilities Component In ASCO with an OL or CP Solenoids 78-13 Failures in Source Heads 10/27/78 All general and of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges specific licensees Bodels 7050, 7050B, 7051, with the subject 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 Kay-Ray, Inc.
and 7061B gauges Enclosure Page 2 of 3 343 101
IE Bulletin No.79-01A June 6, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
78-L2B Atypical Weld Material 3/19/79 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12A Atypical Weld Material 11/24/78 All Power Peactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds OL or CP 78-12 Atypical Weld Material 9/29/78 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an Teseel Welds OL or CP 78-11 Examination of Mark I 7/21/78 BWR Power Reactor Containment Torus Welds Facilities for action:
Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee 78-10 Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic 6/27/78 All BWR Power Reactor Shock Suppressor Accumulator Facilities with an Spring Coils OL or CP 78-09 BWR Drywell Leakage Paths 6/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Associated with Inadequate Facilities with an Drywell Closures OL or CP 78-08 Radiation Levels from Fuel 6/12/78 All Power and Research Element Transfer Tubes Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element transfer tube and an OL 78-07 Protection afforded by 6/12/78 All Power Reactor Air-Line Respirators and Facilities with an OL, Supplied-Air Hoods all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees Enclosure i.
'l Page 3 of 3
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< SEP Plants Plant Region Dresden 1 III Yankee Rowe I
Big Rock Point III San Onofre 1 V
Haddam Neck I
Lacrosse III Oyster Creek I
R. E. Ginna I
Dresden 2 III Millstone I
Palisades III Enclosure Page 1 of I