ML19246B818
| ML19246B818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/28/1979 |
| From: | Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Panetta L HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19246B819 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907180651 | |
| Download: ML19246B818 (2) | |
Text
- %
[,
UNITED STATES 4
j TKEf 1 y NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t1bn WASHIN G TO N, D.CJ20SES q ! Rex 3'..w... "el June 28,1979 OFFICE OF THE CH Af RMAN The Honorable Leon E. Panetta Unite <i States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Panetta:
Thank you for your mailgram dated March 30, 1979, requesting an immediate investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident at Three Mile Island, assurance that steps are being taken to prevent a similar occurrence at other nuclear facilities, and a comparison of the designs of the Three Mile Island and Diablo Canyon Units to detemine if there are any similarities.
Our Office of Inspection and Enforcemen't is conducting a datailed investigation to de+9rmine all pertinent facts associated with the Three Mile :sland accident itself.
The results of this investigcn. ion, which should be completed early this fall, will be made publicly available.
Oc Office of tiuclear Reactor Regulation has been temporarily reorganized into a number of Task Forces to facilitate a comprehensive review of the technical and operational implications.of the Three Mile Island accident, not only for operating reactors but also for plants currently under licensing review.
Our other major staff Offices are providing support to fiRR in these efforts, as well as evaluating the changes which may be necessary in their own programs as a resuit of the accident.
In addition, the Commission's own special inquiry into the Three Mile Island accident is now established.
Trv publid' announcement (Enclosure
- 1) of the appointr.ent of Mr. Rogovin as director describes the scope of the inquiry.
A copy of the report of the inquiry will be provided to you, per you request, when the report is completed.
There are some 50 t;RC. senior staff members involved full-time, organized into eight task groups, and additional support is being provided by other I;RC staff, and the services of contractors and consultants, where possible. This inquiry has been in progress under the direction of an interim director prior to the appointment of Mr. Rogovin.
As you may be aware, there are other groups investigating the Three Mile Island accident, including two Congressional committees and the special Presidential Commission, tiRC is cooperating extensively with these outside investigations.
The Commission i.s also working to take every step necessa'ry to ensure that the chances of a TMI-type incident occurring at another plant are minimized.
We'have underway a comprehensive review of the safety-related regulations and standards for nuclear power plants, the training and licensing standards for reactor operations, and the inspection and enforcemerit program for operating plants.
We already have put those
}44
}{g a
4 790718ps\\
O
elements of the staff who are not immediately involved in dealing with the situation at TM1 to work on this essential and major effort.
The Diablo Canyon plants are FWR units designed by Westinghouse.
As you know, Three Mile Island is also a PWR plant but was designed by Babcock ahd Wilcox.
The NRC is reviewing Westinghouse PWR designs to assess the relative reactor system dynamic behavior that these designs would be subjected ' o as a result of an accident similar to the type which occurred t
at Three Mile Island, that is, a complete loss of main feedwater.
The NRC L,itiated action in this area with the issuance of two bulletins which requested that licensees operating Westinghouse plants take certain specific action.
Copies of these bulletins are enclosed for your information.
In addition, the staff is meeting with representatives of Westinghouse to discuss related analyses, tests, and plant features dealing with small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), anticipated transients, operator training and procedures, and reliability of the auxiliary feedwater systems including associated controls and natural circulation capability.
With regard to licensing reviews, the NRC staff is initially focusing its efforts on plants that are in the final stages of operating license review like Diablo Canyon.
At a minimum, these plants will be reviewed in the same manner as plants already operating with regard to recedial actions. As the TMI-2 studies and investigations proceed, it is likely that additional actions that must be implemented in the short term prior to issuance of an operating license will be identified.
The staff will complete the necessary reviews and report its findings related to whether such short term actions must also be implemented prior to a decision to issue an operating license for each plant.
Although no formal moratorium has been declared, it is anticipated that it will take at least three months for such reviews to be completed and for. the necessary pre-licensing changes to be implemented.
The results of these staff reviews will be summarized in reports which will be available to the public.
I hope that the above preliminary information will be helpful to you.
\\\\ Sincerely,
\\
A L 4-M x
--Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman
Enclosures:
Public Announcement Investigation and Enforcement Bulletins (k
s
e
%c
- f.,,
37 %
Uf;lTED STATES a N ^ In E,
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION s- -ji
-t '5 NIV ' i W ASHIN GTON, D.C. 2035 5 5 W-f G
s' p
June 28,1979 OF FICE OF THE c H Am r. 4N The Honorabic Leon E. Panetta United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Panetta:
Thank you for your mailgram dated March 30, 1979, requesting an immediate investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident at Three Mile Island, assurance that steps are being taken to prevent a similar occurrence at other nuclear facilities, and a comparison of the designs
]f the Three Mile Island and Diablo Canyon Units to determine if there tre any similarities.
Our Office of Inspection and Enforcenent is conducting a detailed investigation to determine all pertinent facts associated with the Three Mile Island accident itself.
The results of this investigation, which should be completed early this fall, will be made publicly available.
Our Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has been temporarily reorganized into a number of Task Forces to facilitate a comprehensive review of the technical and operational implications of the Three Mile
- Island accident, not only for operating reactors but also for plants currently under licensing review.
Our other major s taff Offices are providing, support to NRR in these efforts, as well as evaluating the changes which may be necessary in their own programs as a result of the accident.
In addition, the Commission's own special incuiry into the Three Mile Island accident is now established.
The public announcement (Enclosure
- 1) of the appointment of Mr. Rogevin as director describes tne scope of the inquiry.
A copy of the raport of the incairy will be provided to ycu, per your request, when the report is corpleted.
There are some 50 NR:. senior staff members involved full-t.ime, organized into eight task groups, and additional support is taiag provided by other NRC staff, and the. services of contractors and consultants, wnere possible. This inquiry has been in progress under the direction of an interim director prior to the appointment of Mr. Rogovin.
As you may be aware, there are other groups investigating the Tnree Mile Island accioent, including two Ccngressional committees and the special Dresicential Commission.
NRC is cooperating extensively with these 3 4 4 27 }
outsice investigations.
The Cormission i.s also working to take every step necessiry to ensure that the chances of a TMI-type incident cccurring at another plant are We' have underway a ccrore' ensive review of the safety-minimized.
r related regulations and stancarcs for nuclear power plants, the training and licensing standards for reactor operations, and the inspection'and enforcement program for oDerating plants.
We already have put those 79D71180613L g
elements of the staff who are not ima.ediately involved in dealing vith the situation at TMI to work on this essential and major effort.
The Diablo Canyon plants are PWR units designed by Westinghouse.
As you know, Three Mile Island is also a PWR plant but was designed by Babcock and Wilcox.
The NRC is reviewing Westinghouse PWR designs to assess the relative reactor system dynamic behavior that these designs would be subjected to as a result of an accident similar to the type which occurred at Three Mile Island, that is, a complete loss of main feedwater.
The NRC initiated action in this area witn the issuance of tvlo bulletins which requested that licensees operating Westinghouse plants take certain specific action.
Copies of these bulletins are enclosed for your ini'oncation.
In addition, the staff is meeting with representatives of' Westinghouse to discuss related analyses, tests, and plant features dealing with small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), anticipated transients, operator training and procedures, and reliability of the auxiliary feedwater systems including associated controls and natural circulation capa bil i ty.
With regard to licensing reviews, the NRC staff is initially focusing i ts efforts on plants that are in the final stages of cperating license review like Diablo Canyon.
At a minimum, these plants will be reviewed in the same manner as plants already operating with recard to remediel actions. 's the TMI-2 studies and investigations proceed, it is likely that additional actions that must be implemented in the short term prior to issuance cf an operating license will be identified.
The staff will complete the necessary reviews and report its findings related. to whether such short term actions must also be implemented prior to a clecision to issue an operating license for each niant.
Although no formal moratorium has been declared, it is anticipated that it will take at least three months for such reviews to be corpleted and for the necessary pre-licensing changes to be italemented.
The resuits cf these staff reviews will be summarized in reports which will be available to the public.
I hope that the above preliminary information will b9 helpfu'l to ~you.
i
' Sincerely, 3\\
Q W
~
' H oseph ".. Hendrie Chairman
Enclosures:
public Announcement Investigation and Enforcement Bulletins 344 272 Y
e
.7
UN[TED S6.TES f.
Itm W i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMIVHSSION
. m _.~,.,-,-
w.
. wa,;e 3
. mce or -ub.ic canirs
<%.w... /
Washington, D.C. 20555 No.
7i-104 FOR.'MMEDIATE RELEASE Tel. 301/.492-7715 (Thurs d ay, June 14, 1979)
ATTORI!EY MITCHELL ROGOVIN NA'iED TO DIRECT NRC'S SPECIAL IliOUIKI INTO THREE MILE ISIJ.ND ACCIDENT Mitchell Rogovin, senior partner in the Washington law f.tra of Rogovin, Stern and Huge, has been appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory Cort.icsion,to direct a special independent inquiry into the March 2 8 a6cident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Pennsylvania.
Mr. Rogovin and F.ts law firm will direct the inquiry to determine actual even ts which occurred at Three Mile Island and their causes, and tha actions of the licensee, Metropolitan Edison Compan, and NhC personnel before and af ter the accident.
f The inouiry will also identify areas of deficiemcy rev aaled by the accident and areas in which further investigation is warranted.
It is e;cpected that the special inquiry will take about six months.
During the period that the Cc=is sion has been seeking a director for the special ingniry, a staf f of NRC personnel and consultants headed by Dr. Kevin Cornell, Depuri D:e cutive Direc-tor for Operations, has begun the initial phases of the inquiry.
In addition, the NRC Office of Inspectio- '" * ~ - ament has been carryinc out its staf f-level investigation of ne a c ciden t, and
~
the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has fomed a task force which is studying the lessons learned frca the accident.
In announcing the appointment, NRC Chairmam Joseph M.
Hendrie said:
344 273 "The Special Inquiry represents a major phase of the Commis-sion's evaluation of the Three Mile Island accident and its impli-cations.
It is not intended to duplicate the efforts of the.
President's Corission on the Accident at Three Mile Island.
Rather, it.is designed so that the Nuclear Regulatory Conmission, in order to fulfill its own regulatory responsibilities, will have the fullest pcs.sible understand 1ag of the events at Three Mile Island, both from the tecnnical standpoint and frot the standpoint ci how our regulatcry processes funcrioned.
The pur-pose of that evaluation is to permit the Co=ission to take whatever further steps may be necessag to preven: 'any similar accident in the future, and to improve the ';RC 's ability to respond to accidents."
O
. It. Rogovin will have authority to des igna t e a suaff of his own choosing, including NRC personnel and consultants currently engaged in the interim inquiry, and staff and consultants front outside the Cornission.
Mr. Rogovin will have full independence in directing the inqviry.
Mr. Rogovin, both as Chief Counsel to the Internal Revenue Service and then as 'ssistant U. S. Attorney Gene _ral, has had en*ensive experience ~ n supervising large-sca3n vestigations.
~-
Subsequently, while in private practice, he se: vud as Special Counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency during investigations into activities of the intelligence CC=munity.
Mr. Rogovin's partner, George T.
Frampton, Jr., served for two years on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, where he wa.s one of a five-nenber tean that copducted the grand jury investigc. tion and the trial of the Watergate case.
In 1977-78, the Rogovin,' Stern and Huge fi= was retained by the U.S.
Civil Service Conrission to conduct an outside, inde-nendent, investigation of allegations concerninc-the ecual crolo.v-nent opportunity and merit systems.
The law fi = also served as special outside counsel to a large bank holdinc company in conduct-ing an extensive investigation of prior activities by the con 9any's officers and enplcrees.
The specific areas which the soecial inc.ui n_ will enamine include the follcwing:
--the secuence of events during the accident, what was happening to the reactor and the plant,' including, where feasible, an assessment of important alternative secuencec ; the response of the operating personnel; radioactive releaser and exposures ;
events at the plant before the accident th a t ni g=:t be related to the accident.
--the history of the NRC review of the utility 's application for a license to operate Three Mile Island No. 2 7 NRC license conditions on TMI-2 operations, including technical specifica-tions; the ope; Iting and inspection his to' y at TMI-2 ; the operat-ing and inspection histories of other Babcock & Wilecx plants,
focused on any indications of the types of problems that arose in tne TMI-2 accident; a cutmary of SRC pa.3: consideration of such problems; the extent to which financial cr tax considerations influenced conditions in the plant in an; way that might have C 7 n t '. ibu te d to the accident; any other preUrsor events or an lyses rel.e.vant to the accident.
e 4
344 274 e
. --the susceptibility of Babcock & Wilcox plants to accidents; anique features of TMI-2 th a t-may have increase:i or decreacc.d rhe severity of the accident; other design effects relatecl to the TMI-2 accident.
--TMI-2 operations, including training and cualifications of pers on nel, operating procedures and management overview; tech-nical support to operating personnel and canage acnt.
--emergency responce to TMI-2 accident by the utility, other u tilities and u H lity groups, and industrial organisaticna, in-cluding coordination with NRC and other Federal,, State, and local officials, and assessnent and dissemination of info:nnation.
--energencv olanninc. b.v, and emer ency response plans u
ano. roved by# the NRp; actual c.mergency response to the accident u
by I'EC, including staff, ACRS and Comnissionerc,- on site and at h ead quarters ; NRC coordination with Federal, S t.2 t e, and local o f ficials, the utility, industry sources, and -ie national labora-terics; NRC assessment and dissemination of indcr=ation; commun-ications and chain of connand within NRC.
The special inquiry will also z.ssess the possible implica-tions of the accident at TMI-2 (including design of the f acility, operations, regulatory actions, emergency preparedness) for other nuclear power nlants and identify areas where further study e
is reco=nended.
Based on these assessments and recommendations,
the Commission wi,1 unc,erta.xe sucn ac...tr.ona3 ci 4
7 est:.gations, analyses and actions as it considers appropriate in the discharge of its responsibilities.
Mr. RogcVin will keep the Cc: =is s ion infor=___d on a periodic basis of the progress of the inquiry.
Isny 1_nf ccrution of ir.no-diate public health or safety significance will.be reported prc ptly to the Cornission.
The Commission emph sised that it will take whatever regulatory action it deems necessarv. at anv the, based on information available to i t' at th a t time.
By ins tituting the special inquiry, the Cornis sion :naid it intends no suggestion that it vill withhold rec.ulator.v ac-tion with ra-spect to identified deficiencies until the inquiry is comp let ed.
/
'b Y
a G
9 r
e O
4
?P* 4 U?ilTED STATES liUCLEAR HEGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECT 10t; AND EtFORCEMENT WAS.HIi;GTON, D.C.
20555 IE Bulletin No.79-05A Date: April 14, 1979 Page 1 of 5 REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT Description of Circumstances:
--~
IE Culletin 79-06 identified acticas to be tak?n by the licensees of all pressurized water power reactors (except Babcock & Wilcox reactors) as a result of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident.
This Eulletin clarifies the actions of Bulletin 79-CS for reactors designed by Westinghouse, and the response to this bulietin will eliminate the need to respond to Bulletin 79-05.
Actions to be taken by Licensees:
For all Westinghouse pressurized _ water reactor facilities with an operating license (the ac.tions specified below replace those identified in IE Bulletin 79-05 cn an item by item basis):
1.
Review the description of circumstances dascribed in Enc 1csure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and' the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/2S/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
a.
This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the extreme seriousness and consecuences of the simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core damage; (3) that the potential.
er.ists, under certain accident or transient conditions, to have a water level in the pressurizer sic.ultaneously with the reactor vessel not full of water; and (4) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
), h Operaticnal personnel should be instructed to.-(1) not overrice b.
autcmatic action of encineered safety features unless continued operation of.engineere3 safety features will result i,n unsafe
~
~
}) k('
plant conditions (see Section 7a.); and (2) not make opera-tional dacisions based solely on a single pl n: parameter indication when one or core ccnfirmatory indicaticns are available.
... w.. %.
April 14,1979 Page 2 of 5 c.
All licensed operators and plant. management and supervisors with operational responsibilities shall participate in this review and such participation shall be documented in plant records.
2.
Review the actions required by yuur operating procedures for coping with transients and accidents, with particular attention to:
a.
Recognition,of the possibility of forming vcids in the primary coolant system large enough to ccmprcaise the core cooling capability, especially, natural circulation capability.
b.
Operation action required to prevent the formation of such
- voids, c.
Operator actica required to enhance core cooling in the event such voids are formed (e.g., remote venting).
3.
For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level set point bistablas such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low set point, safety injectica wcyld be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level.
In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the prer.surizer pressure indication reaches the actuation set point whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuatica setpoint.
4.
Review the contair$ ment isolaticn initiation design and procedures, and prepare and implement all changes necessary to permit -contain-ment isolatica whether manual or autcmatic, of all lines whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capability, upon automatic initiation of safety injection.
5.
For facilities for which the auxiliary feedwater system is not automatically initiated, prepare and inplement immediately procc-dures which require the stationing of'an individual (with no other
~-~
assigned. concurrent duties and in direct and continuous cc munica-tion.with the control roca) to prcmotly initiate adequate auxiliary feedwat'er to the steam generatcr(s) for those transients or acci-s dents the consequences of which can be limited by such action.
344 277
April 14, 1979 Page 3 of 5 6.
For your facilities, prepare and imple. ment immediately procedures which:
Identify those plant indications (such as valve discharge a.
piping temperature, valve positicn indicatica, or valve discharge relief tank temperature or pressure indication) which plant operators may utilize to determine that pres-surizer pcwer operated relief valve (s) are cpen, and b.
Direct the plant operators to manually close the power operated relief block valve (s) when reactor coolant systea pressure is reduced to.below the se' point for normal auta-matic cicsure of the power operated elief valve (s) and the valve (s) remain stuck open.
. :t 7.
Review the a'ction directed by the operating procedures and training instructions to ensure that:
a.
Operators do not override cutcm=. tic actions of engineered
- 2fety feetures, unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions.
For exar:ple, if continued operatica of engineered safety features would threaten reactor vessel integrity then the HPI shculd be secured (as noted in b(2) belcu).
b.
Operating procedureh currently, or are revised to, specify that if the high pressure injection (HPI) systcm has.been autcratically actuated because of lcw pressure condition, it must rcmain in operation until ei.ther:
~~
(1)
Both lcw pressure injection (LPI) pumps are in operatica
~,
and flowing for 20 minutes or lcager; at a rate which would assure stable plant behavicr; or (2)
The HPI system has been in operation for 20 minutes, and all hot and cold leg temaeratures are at least 50 degrees' belcw the saturation temperature for the existing RCS pressure.
If 50 degress sub' cooling cannot be raintained
~~
after HPI cutoff, the HPI shall be rea~ctivated.
The degree of subccoling beyond 50 degrees F and the length (f time HPI is in operation shall be limited by the m
pressure / tempers:ure ccacideraticns for the ves:el integrity.
9 k 4
e
-s E2te:
April 14, 1979 t i j e ',, o f 3 a
Operating procedures currently, or are revised to, specify c.
that in the event.of HPI initiatica with reactor coolant pumps (RCP) cperating, at least one RCP'shall, remain operating for two loop plants and at least two RC?s shall remain operating for 3 or 4 locp plants as long as the pump (s) is provicing forced ficw.
d.
Operators are provided additional information and instructions to not rely upon pressurizer level indication alone, but to a'so examine pr>essurizer pressure and other plant parameter indications in evaluating plant conditicns, e.g., water, inventory in'the reactcr primary system.
~
8.
Review all safety-related v'alve positions, positioning requirements and positive controls to assure that valves remain positioned (open or c'.osed) in a manner to ensure the proper operation of enginnered safety features.
Also review related procedures, such as those for maintenance, testing, plant and system startup, and supervisory periodic (e.g., daily / shift checks,) surveillance to ensure that such valves ai e returned to their correct pnsiticas folicwing necessary manipulations and are maintained in their prc' u-posi-tions durino all operational modes.
9.
' Review your operating modes and procedures for all systems designed
'2 to transfer potentially radicactive gas,es ar.d-liquids cut of the primary contair, ment to assure that undesirec pumping, venting or other release of radioac'tive liquids and gases will not occur inadvertently.
In particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engineered' safety ' features instrumentation.
List all such systems and indicate:
a.
Whether interlocks exist to prevent transfer when.high rediation indicaticn exists, and b.
Whether such systems are isolated by the containment isolatica.
signal.
c.
The basis on unich continuec cperability of Lhe above features is assured.
a
~
10..
Review and modify as necessary your maintenance and test prccedurcs to ensure that they rec.uire:
a.
Verification, by test or inspection, of.the c.oerabilit,v of redundant safety-related systems pricr to the removal of any safety-related system from service.
344 27T e
I"
+
April 14,1979 Page 5 of 5 b.
Verification of the operability of all safety-related systems when they are returned to scrvice following maintenance or testing.
Explicit notification of involved reactor operational personnel c.
whenever a safety-related system is removed frca and returned to servica.
11.
Review your prcmp't reporting procedures for NRC notification to assure that NRC is notified within one hour of the time the reactor
~
is not in a controlled or e'xpected conriition of operation.
- Further, at that time an open continuous ccmmunication channel shall be jj established and maintained with NRC.
12.
Review operating codes and precedures to deal wi;h significant amounts of hydrogen gas th;t mey be generated during a transient or other accident that would either remain insida the primary system or be released to the containment.
13.
Propose chances, ac required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above e
items.
For all light water reactor facilities designed by Westinghouse with an operating license, respond to Items 1-12 within 10 days of the. receipt of this Bulletin.
Respond to item 13 (Technical Specification Change
.prapo;als) in 30 days.
Reports should be submitted to the Director of the apprcpriate NRC Regicnal Office and a copy shculd be fsraarded to tha NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C.
20555.
For $11 other pcwer reactors with an operating license or construction pennit, this Bulletin is for informati n purposes and no written respcase is required.
Approved by GA, B150225 (R0072), clearcnce expires 7/31/EO.
Approval was given uncer a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic s
problems.
344 280 e
e
9
~~4 IE Eulletin No.79-05A April lo, 1979 LISTING OF IE EULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWEL',E MONTHS Bulletin Subject Date Issued Iss.ied To No.
78-05 Malfunctioning of 4/14/78 All Pcwer Reactor Circuit Breaker Facilities with an
~
Auxil ia ry. Ccn' tact Cperating L,uense Mechanism - General (OL). or Construc-Electric Model tica Permit (CP)
.CR105X 78-05 Defective Cutler-5/31/78 All Pcwer Reactor IA Hammer, Type M Relays Facilities with an With DC Coils Operating License (OL) or Ccnstruc-tion Permit (CP) 78-07 Protection Afforded 6/1E/78 All Pcwer Reactor
~
by Air-Line Facilities with an
~~
Respirators and Ocerating License (OL) and Supplied-Air all class E and F Hoods Resea.rch Reactcrs with an OL, a'i Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees
~
78-C3 Radiation Levels frca 6/12/78 All Power and Fuel Element Transfer Research Reactor Tubas Facilities with a Fuel Element Trans-fer Tube and an
~
Operating License (OL) 78-03 BUR Drvwell Leakage 6/14/73 All EWR Power Pa.ths Ass;ciated witn neactor Facilities "4
Inadequate Drywell with an C erating Closurec i icente (OL.) cr Construction Fer-mit (CP)
Enclosure Page 1 of 3 e
,g IE Bulletin "o.79-05A April 14,1979 78-10 Becgen-Paterson 6/27/78 All BWR Power
?
Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Reactor Faci.lities Spring Coil with an Operating License (OL) cr Construction Per-mit (CP)
.2 78-11 Examination of Mark I 7/21/78 EUR Pcwer Reactor 7A Containment Torus Welds Facilities for action: Peach Bottcm 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monti-cello and Vennant Yanke.
78-12 Atypical Weld Material 9/25/78 All Pcwer Reactor in Reactor Pressure Vessel Weids Facilities with an Oporating Lice nse (OL) or Ccastruc-tion Permit (CP)78-12A Atypical deld Materi.al 11/24/78 All Pcwer Reactor in Reactor Pressure
-Vessel Welds
' Facilities with an 1
Operating License (OL) or Construc-tion Permit (CP)78-123 Atypical Weld Material 3/19/79 All Power Reactor in Reactor Pressure Vessel..~ elds Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc-tion Pennit (CP) 78-13 Failures in Source" 10/27/78 All General and Heads of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges l'.odels Specific Licensees 7050, 70503, 7051, with Kay-Ray Gauges
~
70518, 7050, 70503, 7051 and 70513
..y 78-14 Deterioration of 12/19/78 Ali GE EW? facilities Buna-N Ccmp;nents in ASCO Salenoids with an Operating License (OL-) or Ccastructica Permit (CP) 344 282
~
Enclosure Page 2 of 2
IEBulletinNo.7d-05A 3
April 14,1979 79-01 Environmental Quali-2/8/79 Al'.et,ter Reactor i cation or Class It
-rac111 ties with an
- quipment Operating Ltcense j
(OL) or Construction Pen',it (CP) 79-02 Pipe Support Base 3/S/79 All P~ier React;r Plate Dasigns Using racilities with an
~
Concrete Expansica Operating License Anchor Eclts (CL) or Construction Permit (CP) 79-03 Longitudinal Weld 3/12/79 All Pcwer Reactor Defects
. ASME SA-312 Facilities with an Type 304 Stainless Operating License Steel Pipe Spools (GL) or Construction
,d ManufactureJ by Permit (CP)
Youngstown Welding and Encineering Cc.gpany 79-04 Incorrect Ueights 3/30/79 All Pcwer Reactor for Swing Check Facilities with an Valves Manufactured Operating License by Velan Engineering (OL) cr Ccnstruction Lo: pcration Fermit (CF) 79-C5 Muclear Incident at 4/1/79 All Pcwer Reactor Three Mile Island Facilities with an Operating License (CL) cr Construction Permit (CP)
~!9-05A Nuclear Inciden; at 4/5/79 All Pcwer Reactor a
Three Mile Island Facilities with an Operating License-(GL) or Ccastructica Permit (CP) 79-05 Review of Operational 4/11/79 All Pressurized Water Errors and System Pcwer Reactsr Facilities Misalignments Identified Exce'pt ESW Facilicies During The Three Mile Island Incident Enclosure Pace 3 of 3 344 283
~
L..b._
D S...-
S it ini:
N Ur L C ' R t e r. ULn l b.,Y rr.". "i i. _ S '1 C "1 ND M
.n e
v Or--.
g-
.,, c., C T. C.' ' n*
- w' n
~ ' ' r~ u"n " ~ r' '. :~.'i i
'~
i a : r t.
rit; ur ta tt n,aahlhm C.iI, L.p.
dVD;D ca n
na---
ul n.
, lle"..
n g
n,,o.
/ -Can cu
.i it H
(Revisica 'a.
1) n=
s. -
_1 c,, i c. / a.
n p. r. i l
.ms..
Page 1 cf 2 RE'/IEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT IE Sulletin 79-CEA ic ntified actions to ce taken by the licensees of all pressurized water reactors designed oy Llestinghouse.
Item "o. 3 of t'he actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:
a "3.
For your facilities that use pressurizer water fevel coincident with pressurizer pressure T'r automatic initia-ticn of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the lcw pressurizer level setpcir.t bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety. injection would be initiated regardless of th.e pres-Surizer level.
In addition, instruct operatcrs to manually in;tiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actua ticn setpoint '.-hether or not tne level incicaticn nas croppec to the actuation setpoint.',
i.
Informaticn from licensees and Westinghouse has ideatified'that 1mo,lementation or this action houid prec. de tn.e per ormance cr survell-lu lance testing.of the pressurize pressure bistables without initiating a safety injection.
In order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restared to normal operation for the dur ation of the surveillance test of that coi"cident pressurizer pressure channal.
At the conclusion of the surveillante test ci each pressecizer pressure channel, the coincident pressurizer level chanc.el must te returncd to the tripped mcde defined in Action Item 3 cf IE bui te tin 79-CSA.
As a result, Item 3 should be revised as follows s
344 284 9
IE Eul'etin h'o. 79-0 A (Revisica t'o.
1)
, ate; npril
.,ic,
. c,/ a.
1-v 9
n race c or c 3.
For ycur facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure fcr autcmatic initia-tien of safety injection into the reactor coolant sys~ tem, trip the low pressurizer level etpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injecticn would b.e initiated regcrdlcss of the pres-surizer level.
- ne pressurizer level bistac.,les may be returr.ed to their normai cperating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests.
In additien, instruct cperators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether cr not the level indicaticn has drop'ed to the actuation satpoint. "
Item 13 of the actions to oe taken, as statad in the original bulletin,
'5 Was:
" 13. Propose changes, as recuired, to those technical specificaticns which must be modified as a result of your i
.p- ]r m...a n 'wi rig
- t..h. a c w o s/a itc oc."
-L o
Long term resolutions of scme of these recu actions mav recuire design cganges.
InereTore, item,la Jr acti,
,g n
ve ta,en sncuid te revised as folicws:
" 13. Prcpose changes, as recuired, to : hose tecrnical specifications.;hicn must be modified as a result of.our implementing the above items and identify cesign changes necessary in order cc er* rect lcng term resoluticns or these g
A i
4 e
4 2,c.n 6
v~.e.J ece all... t water reactor racilities cesignec by L'estir.gnouse with an 11gn.
c_ r a ra m <. r. al. '. c =.q c e,
me-
.~a
'so
.T c..s 1.
19 v,1._h. :i n i n c' :. ; c.
v e,
".c n_ r c
=i g '.
m -
m.
-y m
u i
cf this Bulletin.
Respond to Item 13 (Technical Specificaricn Change prcposals and icentificaticn of design changes in 30 cays.)
-.ine otner requiremen s or 1; lle in /c c..can remain in er,. ect.
tu e
- ucco (-nC/ c), clearance expi res
/-a,.-t0.
c.p p ro v a,i npproved by C,r.0,
,n--
au c
was given under a blanket clearance specifically fcr identified generic
, r e. w ! c.,. c.
yi s
. a M
s v ( uINa*
Nf O -
s
~ n e s' fb A
p.
pg w a sL V,
wu a t-s*
FM.{
A b" (u u, ) w
&h}
i n ast WO Ve,onths
IE Eulletin No. 79-C5A (Revi:i 1) 4 Date:
i i8, 1979 Page 1 ci a L T < - _,a,u, 0
L.a L E i I n,,a-Mi 1
t r _e e Li r,m]. m L.f.c :
--. c L u :.u.n.i i n S o-.
in-im s
n Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
78-05 Defective Cutler-5/31/78 All Pcwer Reactor r,ammer, lype M, xeiays racilities with an With DC Ccils OL or CP 78-07 Protection afforded 6/12/78 All Fewer Reactor by nir-Line Respiratcrs Facilities with an and Supplied-Air Hecds OL, all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority I Material Licensees
,, Ce-n
/c-agla lon Levels Trca e,,12/,/ 8 nl,i e,cwer, test and Fuel Element Transfer Research Reactor Tubes Facilities with an OL naving ru.el tiemen+u Transfer Tubes 75-09 EWP. Dryweil Leckage 6/la/78 All EWR ^cwer Paths Associated aith Reactor Faci with an uL (,lities ina cequa te,rywe,il ror action) a Closures cr CP (for information) 78-10 Bergen-Paterson 6/27/78 All EWR Pcwer Reactor Hydraulic Shock Facilities with Suppr 2:scr Accumulator an OL or CP Spring Coils 78-11 Examination of Mark i
//24/78 EWR Puwer Reacter Containment Torus Facilities with an CL Welds for action:
Peach Ecttcm 2 and ^, Cuad
'~~
c:ities I
- c. a,
- a.,. e.nI,
. n. a
- t.,
E'.O n t i c el I. o a r.d '/ r rm O n t A
}
T a n k<e e.
All Ct"er E'.'R J
.? r... e. r. r, c_ m r.iic-'cc.
-n t w v i-i L iw l-
.h
.n r Of
~ m I4
~ n r.- 3 7 4 r.
4
,e IIii v6i m w o
aw i
.6
% v 4
s ti 6 9
IE Eulletin No. 79-CEA (Re/isica 1)
Date:
3.pril 13,1979 -
Page 2 of 4 LISTING OF IE EULLETINS T. c. c o n._3 i.n
'L n d i c-
&.:' u p.u.n :I 1 i ~s
- Li v.
- r. n 'd' I..n n.; n>
u i
t
- v tv Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued To No.
75-12 Atypical Weld' Material 9/29/78 All Pcwer Reactor in Reactoc Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Weids OL or CP 73-12A Atypical Weld Material 11/2?/78 All Pc.wer Reactor in Reactor. Pressure Facilities with an Vessel Welds CL or CP 4
73-123 Atypical Weld Material 3/10/79 All Pcwer Rcactor in Reactor Pressure Facilities with an
- - ' ~
.~
78-13 Failures In Scurce Heat 10/27/78 All General and of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges Specific Liccnsees Models 7C50, 70503, 7051, with the subject 70513, 7CCO, 70503, 7061 Kay-Ray, Inc.
and 7C51E Gauges 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-N 12/19/78 All GE EWR Faci-Ccmponents In ASCO lities with an OL Solenoids (for acticn), and all other Pcwer Reactor Fa;ilities with an OL cr CP (for information) 9-01
- nvironmen al Qualli-2/ o/ /
a l,l Pcwer heactor
~
,n
,r
/
u ication of Class IE Facilities with an OL, Equipment except the 11 Systcmatic Evaluation Prcgram
~'
Plants (for ac icn), ant all other Pc.. r Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information) 79-02 Pipe Support Base Plate
.2/8/79 ill Power Rcactor Design Using Concrete Facilities with an OL Txpansion Anchor Eoits
- or CP
-i 344 287 9
IE Sulletin "q-79-CEA (E= vision 1)
Date:
. pril 18,1979 Page 3 af 4 L 'l a i ll"i s-(i lu C~'
f'
' C C f l'L ' ; l 4 'i a T 'c L_
ev
- t. >.*n...S
(' r. 0."< ~i. a"'u' r iJ T, 1..e. a c D r N. L.a. :
i.u v, :
r1 w
T u
Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued to No.
79-03 Longitudinal Wel6 Cefects 3/12/79 All Pow 2r Reactor c,-e_le _ type rac111 ies wit.n I n n, c.,-
_o; on m
204 Stainless Steel Pipe an OL or CP Spools Mar.ufactured by founcstcwn Weiding and tnai neeri r.c Com.pa ny
-c-C3 a
2/;0,/ / s nll e-cwer neactor incorrect i'eignts for a
/
n
~~~
Swing Check Valves Facilities with an Manufactured by Velan OL or CP P
=
orporation tagineering Cg 4
79-05 Nuclear Incident at 4/1/79 All Babccck and Three Mile Island Wilcox Power reactor rac1titics
., i h c_.,. C1 n e
-, - m u u g >.
Three Mile Island 1 and 2-(For Action),
and All Other Power Reector Facilities With an OL cr CP (For Informaticn)79-05A Nuclear Ir.cident at 4/5/79 Same as 79-05 Thrce Mile Island -
Supplement
/ 9-u o-neview ct p,p e ra tional
- /1.//9 a l l r,re s s u ri ze d,n,a te r 1
Errors and System Mis-Power Reactor Facil-aligrments Identified ities with an OL Except During t.,1e inree h,1,1e
. racilities ( or ca.e r
Incicent nction), n,.i u tne r Power Rca c to r.~acil-ities with an._ or CP (rcr In:crm; acn 344 288
a
, ll eti n n,,a.
/ e-Con it -u (Revisicn 1)
Date:
April 18, 1979 r
. age 4 ct *.
LISTING OF IE EULLETI,NS
.c ncD i,d L..Si
- c.. -..&.,, )
in:,. L s., -c m,a a na u.ua Lx a cu Bulletin Subject Date Issued Issued to No.79-06A Same Title as 79-05 4/14/79 All Westinchouse Desicned Pressurized Pcwer Reactor Facil-ities witt an CL (For Action), and All Other Power C.aector Facilities with an CL or CP (For Information)79-053 Same Title as 79-05 4/14/79 All Ccmbustion tngineering uesignet; Pressurized Power Reactor Facilities with an CL (For
-Actica), and All Other Power,ieactor Facilities with an CL or C? (Fcr Informaticn) 79-07 Seismic Stress Analysis e/14/79 All Power Reactor cf Safety-Related Piping Facilities y,ith an OL or CP 79-03 Events Relevant to e/14/79 All S',lR Power Eoilina Water Pcwer Reactor Facilities Reactors Ident-.ed with an 0.L (For During inree ville
., c ti c n ),
,,11 1 Other c.
Island Incident Pcwer Rsactor Facil-ities with cn OL cr CP (For Inicrmation) 79-09 Failures of GE Type 4/17/79 All Fc,1:r E: ctor AK-2 Circuit Ereaker in Facilicies with an c c :1 +. v.;
.c. =_ l = v :. a e,. c =.a m
c
-m-w c
cc
-j~-.
o l-m L.
v-e s
344 289
_e... Lnepe c 9-n m
-.m L I c.s l Or. ittinatt3 -
,,c---
---,7..-
.. n_, l l I t L
r
.L cin !.,b It LE cu NO. ~/ 9-C5 A ( RE','IS IO:i i ) FOR ACTIO.4 Conneccicut Yankee Atcaic Power Ccapany Cacket I;o. 50-213 ATTi':
c'r. W. G. Counsil Vice Presidcnt
';uclear Engineering and Operations P. O. Eox 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Consolidated Edison Ccmpany of Eccket i;o. 50-247 i;eu fork, Inc.
r n i i tc nr. J. J. Ca..ll, Jr.
ni
,, ice eresiaent.
v.
4 Irving Place iiew V. c r l:, fiew '(cek 1C;u^^a^
u Ducuesne Licht Ccmpany Cocket ?;o. EO-234
=~s et ni ni:
i.r. C.
s gn. Dunn Vice President Operations Division 435 Six:1. Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219
~
Po.ler Authority of the State of i;ew York Eccket ::o. 50-2E6 I n c..ian reint a,,.nucletr rc.;er.sian, c i i n,
- e.,
v.
t.
o,,,.t.
P.esicent "anager P. C. Box 2i5 Euchanan, I;ew Ycrk 1C'511 rublic Service Electric 2nd Gas Cemcany Docket :;o. 50-272 i
nain nr.
t.
p c a4
- m.... u., c. r a.
Vice President - Production 20 P;rk Place ilewark, tiew Jersey 07101 Rochester Gas and Electric Company Docket I;o. 50-2L '-
ATT!i:
.r. Leon D. Whi te, Jr.
Vica President Electric and Stetm Prcduction 20 _c 2 c..,, n w,. c..., t.
,n m,
m r"m i.. c., _ u r,.. t,c.,
V, v y g,
] w.* C,* tG z.
e'n a
a u
..s 94 290
2 Ycnkee At =ic Electric Company Occke: I!a. 50-29
,,r.
.c,e e r r.. d. Grece r.1 u i:
e Licensing Engir.eer 20 Turnpike iscad
'r.'e s t';crcu g h, l'.a s sachu s etts 01581
~.m e a
b
.- s 6
344 291
= m rJ_e v.D,:
a..
- o qr', ','3,pl.C 1 E i i u D,
(' ; L,?,
r i. 0 ' ' 'j I
n P
T t -
um nu Dccket Nc(s).
C1 2:
.,nn
- c 11/J 'a c b..,itu ho dNLdJ '
Gen ti cr..e n :
fn icn recuires action,y s.,evision 1) wn...
o
-tncloseg 1 s I - c u l,i e t i n n.o.
/9-C:,s, vou with recard to vcur Westinghause designed cressuriced water re ctor a
-Tacility(Tes) witn an ci:ereti:.,
..11 cense.
Should you have cucstions regarding this Eulletin or the actions re-quired o' yeu, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Ecyce H. Grier Directcr a
-tnclosure:
IE Euiletii No. 79.C6A
(.evisici ij waai
,y Enclosura 441 344 292
.w
'un df
~
+ - - - - -
-.. c L a_.c i, c. 4 4
tno x
L I.q,
O r L,1 C n, r r-S
- n.. D w-n. - -,,, C i i L,,J e,t e,,I t n
-n n07_g k.q
- ntt n
,,a m m vt
<ELt1 E,.,6, It t U L Lt. t I N n, o. / 9-u_ m.
( e. ~, i a l a. l: 1)
.t v... -
F0li ItWGRliATIO4
~
Ealtimore Gas and Electric Cccpany Docket l'os. 5C-317 ATTU:
Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
50-318 Vice President - Susplv t
P. 0. box l w,,/ D Baltimore, Maryland 21203 Bos ton. Edison Ccapany 'M/C Nuclear Docket tio. 50-293 ATTN:
Mr. G. Carl Andognini, Manager
- uclear Cparations 1ioarfment 800 Eoyiston Street Soston, Massachusetts 02199 Consolidated Edison Company or Docket !!o. 50-03 New Yot,,, Inc.
ATTN:
..r.
W. J. Cahill, Jr.
Vice President 4 Irving Place Nea York, New York 10003 a
Jersey Central Power ar.d Light Ccr any Eccket No. 50-219 r.iid:
. ;r..
er.
Ivan e,.
- rinrrect, Vice President iiadison Avenue at uncn -c 'l no a c.
r e'.o rri s to,,n, New Jers ey CE5O l'aine Yankce Atcmic Pc'_.er Ccm;any Occket No. 50-309 4..,.e...
1 ~,o
.t..
- ciuvc, u
.uin u
Licensing Eng ineer 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, MassachJsetts 01551 Niaara Mohaw' Fower Corporation Docket No. 50-220 ATTN:
Mr. R. R. Schneider Vice President tiectric U,perations 3C0 Erie Ecule/ard W2st
~
Syracuse,-heu-York 13202 344 293 e
.CClOsure 2+
a r
- ortheast i:uclear' Energy Ccopany C ce:et l'os. 50-236 n~-
n : i n,:
4,r. 3,
G. Ccunsli cu-m o Vice Presidcat - Nuclear 50-.;23 Engineering and C'peraticns
.,e. O. cox 4/0 Hartford, Connecticut 05101 Philadelphia Electric Company Docket tios. 50-277 ATTi;;
Mr. S. L. C21troff 50-278
- u. :. C a
%. p. 4 ?,, e..
t asu-.
Electric ProdUCtiCn 2, nl t.h.. r t. +u za'.~ a a +
u Philadel. chia Cennsvivania 191.01
,,. r,, u,. n:o..:.0.m~a c.u. ;, 1 ~s.,
- c. _mh, c
,, e.
una..
o
..,.t 1v', i. k, r v.. :,,.. 1 u.
u me v
ne.
James A. Fit: Patrick ;ucl a r Power Plant n
ni.n.
3 D.
i__uns.,.,
o.,.
m.
v, Resident O r'.ger P. O. B o x ', c.,.I "t o,.,,
l L,. c,. ;a,. 3,.
1 Cc, 3
v..
n-Ver ont Yank ; !;uclear Power Corporation Docket i;o. 50-271 ATTN:
?'.r. Robert H. Grcte Licensing Engineer an -
i,J 1 T.,,,,6 r.. r', u a,,ze %,9v.c,m b, lh e.'.,=.CbUc &u.a" 012v1 9
i
- i
~.
s h.. n., e..., 3 L 4,. l. s..
t'~* -.. g,. r,j3 C. o r 'r,. e n' ' o. C,u -., 'i c 9
u m.w
. t v.,
7,,, - l e.,/ c, i, c
h6ill.
in - -.
v.
,m u U:
~.r, c e 'i m r r.
Ha.i eJCn-r m-425 Sixth Avenue P i '. s d rg h, P2nn5ylVania I E219 v. r.
n_ yi C., n +u ir;i p c p. 2. r.
f I 4.P. i i, [ i..g, n,y r+. L e"5 0. Cp)_;;0 in -
e.a v
u i.
s v
3 r
4 niin:
F.F.
1.
M.
r i ni roc.;, Jr.
Vice Presidant 2c0 Cherry Hill Road n
s.
u / r r. -
c e
r..; ra, p p a n.y, nu,a a e r-a e.f J
Lcng I: land Lightino Cc m any C:, het i;os. 50-222 r'. 6
- 1. s.
- c. 1 I t,i,.,i,.
m,, e. ei C.. s rr.;!u
,s
.u s
r,, e sr,.,. ; ga... -
.,t",
- l,7 st i,m e i
..u A
D *".9 f
6 7 f '*
vJC
- y
..-"5srw 7
i /v mus L
.: : j 1
'l ' 7 ^; 1
,c
.. 'I. ;.
., V,si,r 1b
. i o t, a <, 1 it..'.
i 3
344 294
Encicture 4 o
a I
u
_-,rc-
.. u a,,,,
r e
r ~.a r
_n t,-
r a- +u l c r,.
vu c ' -
.o. c.0-410 o n.
r r.c u n nm u,
.. r,.
C..
.v.
..., a_
n.in..
- v. :i t t, -. i u c.
er a.,, n.
e,, et. c -..o., ; ; c - cu rug-
- 1.. I,.,. c m.., n u 3% _
=e
~n : - i o n u, c.,=.cd, u
a a
nse mu
,c; r - u c. a,
' m, Yo r. k l'202
,c n-Pennsylvania Pc',er & Light Ccc.cany Docket Nos. 50-3S7
-- i u
er h0.
.ii n.
C.d r +L, s
- 0,mo 4
.cr t\\lin.
Vice Ocesiccnt tnG s,
a n m, construct 1Cn n-9 2
- n. r h n..li.cerinG ie ec -,.
i n, s. n a c r c c,
u c u
$l l e rit cW.1, PernSjlVCnia 10101 n*
h lc.Leichic c,,g,.,
z.,
Cc..,;c ny D v, c (. -..e u a
on,3.
u - 2.r <.
r
_m.
m
.---u v
61in' r.".,/.
3.
c "- ^r 0 J.:0 0 p
Vice President Engineering ci;d I,eStarch
^ 7, F 1Ji I.5 r'.
.- C.,i,rcn -
4 d
~
~..,1 1 c. s I j., -).:,
- n, 0,i c't.ata..,, _ f, i,,, c n l,
l :* 1 P.4 ce
.c
%a v ] i C C ' "..' #. u^ $
lce' rim ^
o' G=c L -
C. g u' '.y
~ ^ - F. c' 'u a" o c. = 0 ',. '.
u L
--o v
p g,.
-l.
v.
1 u,r.
.r, U - c,- C ;
i - w a fl hlI.t.
a.-
Vice Dresident 50-311 p
- n
- A u.r,, 4
- 1.,1 4., chu
(' v n, 2 v.... - 4,, n
.r sy1..
3 uvwev e
n-CO erark t'iace n u n J:,.. t.,
...- rx s.,,
t e.c.. :),
0, i c,i i s c.-
IJbliC Service Cc'.pany Of h W 2Dp5hirO C0cket N05. 50 w43 a --
i
,l n 1 1. i.
in.
- n. p I d i i n.c e O V -.- er c;2
.v. e m i _. :a.. -
, cm c,1 r-
.v, t <.
Iwsu -.
c c..
.c
.s
.,,+ c._.c, a i., a ~.. /
C.,1 c :;
ii um v.
y
~
Fcchester G2s & Electric Ccracration D cket No. 50 23;
,,r.
J.
. a.rthur si;o.
i.
c Chief Engineer a a :..
t>.
- o. I,.,J a v.
--a-O r.. H.
. "u._ r,
'1 '. u't sC
".u, '1 O r k
'I li-n
~.
a
. p,. s m Ol # "_.". E d 4. _c r,. r~
'. 8 3 -
n3>
r - D n-
- C '' o a
n.
m c.
<.m.._ i n
. 1 l it.
L v-v.
me presico - Ceratic.n 344 295
.h
"' u, A 7,1 f.
- 7
.J.
s
".,',.,r PC.
r,.+
i,
'd l j G 't *
..J, 4.IJg t
... j 1.
. c-i 9
..c, a. ~r i ne iJ r.,c :
a
- e. r-m.. i.. _: l i :.0 (6ca
- e. c c -. ~r 1_n. s
_s Li
. _ _. i t _i 1 1 uv,i.
.30 O s_. e.
v.
", s.,'.'~r ". 13
- f. r r_s. s _ t c
~
Cm,.
,i__ -_.
u
..e..
The enclosed Eulletin 79-CEA (Rcvisicn i) is for..arded to jou for I n :i G r'.. v :. <-,,..
.50 b.. < >. ' =,1 r,_ c e -. n ac < c c,., suir.s uu u
as. u. i _
+ l'.. n.
T =i e
.. ~.
u-m.
_ gu a m 4
v o
. ; ma v.
~
d n_ <: j. n.
g H j 'u. C.^ ' l "i n" # ^ m.. * # ^ P.
".A_ r n l"u l' "i g " h 'I "a.".."_u",
4
+1u.11' c e n n M c "u g, a_ c..s
-m iu.-
iu
- m vo a
OffiCO.
DinCereiV, 1
r.o vc e n,, urier i
rJ,., n u a l, ni s
,,. i m t < n_
e I E Eu i l eti n.';3. 79-C5A (; visica 1)
.. : n.,1
=_ n u l C y-. l.. -
ni t ia b
344
)
-. o e