ML19242D895
| ML19242D895 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/1979 |
| From: | Wilkerson W METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280779 | |
| Download: ML19242D895 (43) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of:
1 21 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
3 of W. Scott Wilkerson l
Engineer II, Nuclear i
Si i
6i i
i 7l 8l Trailer #203 9
NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10j.
Middletown, Pennsylvania lli 12!l May 16, 1979 (Date or Interview) 13!
July 9,1979 (Date Transcript Typea) 14i 201 and 202 15l (Tape Numcer(s))
l 16j 17 181 19i 20l 21l NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Thcmas H. Essig Darwin R. Hunter 23!
Tracy Binion John fi. Sinclair 1
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If SINCLAIR:
The following interview is being conducted of Mr. W. Scott gj Wilkerson.
Mr. Wilkerson is an engineer II-nuclear, Three Mile Island 3
Nuclear Power Facility.
The present time is 5:02 p.m.,
eastern daylight 4j time.
Today's date is May 16th, 1979.
The place of the ircerview is 5
trailer 203 which is located immediately outside the south gate to the TMI site.
Individuals present for the interview will be interviewers Mr.
6 7
Thomas H. Essig.
Mr. Essig is a chief Environmental and Special Projacts Section Region III USNRC.
Also interviewing will be Mr. Dorwin R. Hunter.
8 Mr. Hunter is inspection specialist, Performance Appraisal Branch, I&E g
Reactor Construction Inspection.
Also present during the interview will be 10 Miss Tracy Binion, Inspector Auditor, Office of Inspector & Auditor USNRC.
My name is John R. Sinclair.
I am an investigator, Office of Inspector &
I Auditor, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Prior to the interview being 13l recorded Mr. Wilkerson was provided a copy of m document explaining his rights concerning the in.irmation to be obtained regarding the incident at Three Mile Island.
In addition, Mr. Wilkerson was apprised of the purpose i
of the investigation, its scope, and the authority by which Ccngress author-171 izes the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct an investigation.
On the 18!
second page of the advisement document, Mr. Wilkerson has answered three questions.
The questions and Mr. Wilkerson's replies will no.. De recorded 20; I
as part of the interview.
Mr. Wilkerson did you understa.id the document?
21l 22!
l WILKERSON:
Yes, I did 23l l
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SINCLAIR:
Thank you.
Seccad question, do we have permission to tape the 2
interview?
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l WILKERSON:
Yes 4
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SINCLAIR:
Thank you.
Third question, do you want a copy of the tape or 6
.f transcripts?
8 i
WILKERSON:
Yes.
91, 10f lINCLAIR:
Ok, thank you.
At this point we would like to briefly have you give us a little of your background or training as it relates to the nulear industry.
14 WILKERSON:
I graduated from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1976 with a BS degree in nuclear engineering.
I took employment with Metropolitan i
Edison in the plant performance and engineering group in Septemcer of 1976.
17l I worked in that group for approximately 3 months before they reorganized 18j the structure of the corporate group at which time I went into the nuclear 19i fuels group.
I worked in the nuclear fuels group from approximately December 20!
1976 until January 1979, at which time I was transfered down here to work 21l 22j as a nuclear engineer for Unit I.
j 23!
l SINCLAIR:
Ok, thank you.
At this point we will turn the interview to Mr.
24!
Essig.
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ESSIG:
Mr. Wilkerson what we would like to do with you today is to go gf through, walk through with you as best you can, your involvement in the i
3l assessment of actions that took place following the event of 0400 on March
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4f 28, 1979 at Three Mile Island, Unit II.
What we would like you to do as 5l best you can 'is to tell us when you arrived onsite and just sort of walk 6i through all your actions that you took as best you recall, persons you 7f dealt with, what types of calculations you were asked to make, various 8l types of assessments you were asked to make, assistance that you provided to others, any of this type thing or any actions that you may have directed g
thers to do.
We would like you to go through that as best that you can 0
recall and where you can we would like you to pin it down in terms of the time.
We recognize now that its the 16th of May and we are talking about I
an event that happened on the 28th of March and your recollection may be a 13}
little fuzzy, but we ask you to do the best you can.
At this point I would 14!
like to turn it over to you and tell us where you were on the morning of 15 March 28 and carry it up through the 30th.
We may interrupt as the need 16 arises with questions that we want to key a particular point; others, we may just leave.
If you look like you are flowing fairly.vell, we may just 1
18!
leave things go right till the end.
Okay?
19i 20!
WILKERSON:
Prior to the Unit 2 trip, I was down at Unit 1 in preparation 21!
for physics testing for Unit 1.
After the Unit 2 trip, I was informed by somebody that we'd had a turbine trip down at Unit 2.
So I proceeded over 23 to Unit 2 just to follow up and take data from the normal trip review.
So 241 l
I went over to Unit 2 and I got over there approximately 5 or 10 minutes 25i
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4 after the trip and generally just sat back and watched, looked at the data lj 2{
as it came off of the recorders for post trip review, just to collect the i
3j data using the nuc engineers put together trip reports here.
When it i
finally came out I looked at things, noticed what had happened as far as Sj n rmal sequence of events.
I made a copy of that post trip review and, in gener 1, kind of watched what was going on.
A little bit after that I went 6
i up to check to make sure that all the rods had gone in, checked the present 7
boron concentration and performed assessment of our subcriticality shutdown 8
margin.
Upon doing that fo-the most of the next half hour or so just kind g
f went around and watched and listened to other people as they were working 10 trying to control the pressure and the temperatures of the normal post trip 1 11, type or efforts.
Pretty much I stayed uninvolved during the first hour or i
so with what was actually going on, other than like I said to take a look 13) at the post trip review, to notice tnat the feed pumps had tripped, the i
reactor tripped, and the turbine tripped, and, you know, just to look at 15; things that happened.
The emergency feed pumps had come on and I come in i
there a little, about 10 or 15 minutes after the initial trip.
I went back 171 over and was filling out sheets for shutdown mai gins calculations and 181 little things like that.
I can't remember what time, but at one time one 19!
of the shift supervisors that was on duty at the time ask me to give a 20[
number of people a call.
At the time, knowing my memory the way it is, I 21t wrote down who I called and what they said and what time it was called at.
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As to what happened to those sheets of tablet paper I really couldn't tell 23 l
you.
I don't know.
It was about, the first phone calls I made were about 24l t
as I remember about 5 o' clock or a little bit afterwards.
And that was to 25l ro7
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1 people such as Joe Logan, just higher operation's personnel and that was 2j because at the time I guessed we noticed that there was some steam in the i
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building and things just weren't perfectly normal, ok.
They were calling 4
other people and make assessments of what was going on.
Between, some time 5
between 5 and a little bit after 6 in the morning, again I can't pin down l
61 exact times, Mike Ross had arrived to come over and asked me if I had done 7
I said yes, we are shutdown considerably, naturally one stuck rod which didn't stick in at.. all the other shutdown margin calcu-gj i
lations.
And he disappeared again.
A little bit later, he came back g
10ll asking the same questions he said because he noticed the source and inter-l mediate ranges had came back on scale at the time.
So I went over and took a look at the recordings and graphs and noticed that indeed, they had come
,2!
1 up on, checked all the calculations for shutdown; tried to figure out any way that there could have boen a recurrent criticality event looking at the 14:,
temperatures and the coron concentrations.
And it lidn't appear that there 15:
was anything that could have cause-it... an actual criticality.
At this time, they were already borating and the rods were in.
So as far as 17l l
what else you would have done if it would have been a criticality, we were 18j in the processing of doing, and so, not knowing what caused their indication, 19i they were doing what I would have expected to be doing if it had been 20; i
indeed a criticality.
Also in the same time span here between 5 and 6, 21; George Kunder asked me to call all his lead engineers.
We contacted taem 22l l
and asked them to come in early.
Not, the tone a, the time wasn't one of 23l j
dire emergency but was, one of things aren't exa_tly as they are, we are 24!
j probably going to have to assess what's happened.
He wanted his engineers 25i
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in there early that morning so that they could get all the data they were 2{
g ing to need and keep things smooth.
I guess that goes to about 6.
In 3l between a quarter after six, six thirty, a lot of stuff went on concerning i
4j the charge feedback on scale, back chacked the procedures, check the data 5
to make sure everything was rrect.
Had some boron samples drawn to verify the boron concentration.
They showed the boron lower then it would 61 have bee',... was supposed to be in the vessel which was iow like 700 and 7
400... samples taken almost immediately after one another.
Again even 8l with those samples, the thing was shutdown.
It didn't explain any, it g
I didn't explain an apparent recriticality.
And sana people thought, we knew 10l the temperatures were hot, considered what effect the voids might have, not 11:
voids like in covering voids but two phase voids of some sort or another.
12!
j That type of thing might cross your mind, would have had on criticality, I
No, that wasn't going to increase that was going to decrease it, if anything.
14!
j Again, people put out all sorts of other different theories at that time if lbi it was actually criticality, how it could have been caused.
When they, I guess the next step and one thing I do remember was the first time they attempted to start a pump, I can't tell you what pump it was or exactly 18i what time it was.
My concern at the time was the intermediate and scurce 19j range indicaticns and concurrent with that start up, with that attempt, the 20!
turning of the switch, the instrument and source range dropped right back 21!
I off scale, back down to where they were prior to the, immediately af ter the 22l trip, range.
Thye didn't explain why they were up there but it took away 23l l
part of the immediate concern about criticality concerning it, at least in 24i j
my mind as far as criticality was concerned.
Then after that, I went over 25r a
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7 lj zeroxed some more data that was being printed out on the recorder, different 2,
sections of the post trip review; finished up some of the criticality, l
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,ical calculations based upon the new boron samples that they brought 4
out; and then, the time between that time and the time at which they declared 5
it a general emergency, again it was more or less sitting back watching 6l what was being done.
I wasn't recording what was hacpaning.
I was just kind of listening out of my own interest.
I guess at about a little bit 7
before seven, I am not sure exactly what time it was.
I heard concern 8
about radiation levels down at hot machine shop in Unit 1, and a site i
g e rgency was declared by the supervisors and superinti. dent that were 10j 11l!
there at the time.
Let's see what happened after that.
I believe at that time, or it was a little bit later, but again here at this particular 12!
sequence of time again between say 7 and again 7:30 what I more or less did was stay out of peoples' way that were very busy running around setting up tables, putting up charts.
I had been here for about, at the time I had 15!
been here for about three months, and I myself have not gone through an emergency drill here at the site.
And at 7:20, 7:30, two of the other nuc 17!
engineers here from TMI come in the morning.
One of them had been called 18t in, in fact, he came in a little earlier than that, before 7 or right 19t around 7.
He is one of the engineers that I called when I called the lead 20:
engineers in Unit 2.
They came in.
They were there prior to, I believe, 21, l
the general emergency being ceclared.
When that was declared my basic job 22l l
then became go over watch, HP214, HP219, the monitors.
That's basically 23l l
what I did for the next 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, that was in the control room.
24 Noted that, watched the monitors, reported when the monitors went up.
When 25!
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I started watching the monitors, the HP214 was reading about 10, I don't 2l remember were HP219 was, it was down on the scale.
For the first half 3
hour, 20 minutes to 45 minutes I don't really remember any distinct movement 4
of the monitors but some where in that time span HP219 I know was m ving 5l fi rs t.
It went up, followed very quickly by 214 which very steadily increased 5
6 until it stopped out at about 5 x 10.
There's an indication on the reading 7
and I don't know where PH219, offhand, I don't remember were it stopped.
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was relaying this information back to Howard Crawford and Mike Benson, who g
were over at the, with the maps doing source terms, dose calculations type of information.
I was not involved in the emerg :ncy plan calls which were g
made.
Although I did make calls early in the morning to Med Ed personnel I
to ask them to come in.
I made some calls to the incoming shift supervisor, lead engineers, I don't remember.
I wrote it down, if anybody ever finds the piece of paper that I recorded when and whom I contacted.
And the rest of that morning, I had been there since the night before at about 11 o' clock for the physic tests on the night shift for Unit 1, and when they starteu having concerns about airborne in the Unit 2 area in the reactor building, 17!
at that time I had a beard and I was tired.
I went home about 11 or 12 18!
o' clock that day.
I left the site.
20' HUNTER:
Did you shave while you were home?
22l WILKERSCN:
The next day I came to work.
I brought my razor and my shaving 23l i
cream with me although I hadn't shaved, I had really hoped when I had 24i gotten home, I called in at about 9 o' clock that night to ask what was 25!
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I myself had expected things to have been 2j settled down much mora *han they were.
3 4j HUNTER:
You indicated that you were watching HP21? and 219 and you were 5
supplying data to Howard Crawford and Mike Bensen.
Did you do any calcula-6i tions yourself or basically you were feeding information?
l 7!
i WILKERSON:
Not that day.
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ESSIG:
You indicated that the HPR214 was reading about 10,
10 11!
12l WILKERSON:
Well, I picked it up, yes.
3 i
13 ESSIG:
Would you, do you recall about what time that was?
15r WILKERSON:
It was probably about an half after the general emergency was declared.
17l 1SI ESSIG:
Ok, so around ten of eight or five of eight, somewhere in there.
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WILKERSON:
Yes.
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3 ESSIG:
And what where the units on that 10 7 23 i
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-WILKERSON:
Millirem per hour, however, there is a shield over the detector.
2:
3l ESSIG:
Were you relaying the reading on that monitor directly as you got it off the monitor to Mr. Crawford?
4 5!
WILKERSON:
As it changed.
I was where I could turn around and speak 6
across the room to him.
7 a!
ESSIG:
Okay, and the value you gave him was actually the monitor readings g
n ems of mW?
101 11l WILKERSON:
Yes, It would have been the monitor reading.
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ESSIG:
Ok, then he had to then take, as I understand it, because I have 141 15; already interviewed him, he apparently then had to take the reading that you gave him and convert that mentally to R/hr so that it could be used 16,:
with the procedure 1670.4 which is the offsite dose calculation procedure.
17!
Is that ab'out how it went?
18i 19!
WILKERSON:
That's how I understand it, yea.
20!
21i ESSIG:
O k.
You said HPR219 at the time that you first noted HPR214 to be 3
about 10 mR/hr and 219 was roughly normal?
Or what... ?
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i 1l WILKERSON:
I don't know what normal would be on that..
on the instrument.
l It's the first time I ever looked at the radiation monitor instruments 2
3l around here.
If I remember correctly it was less than half scale and thats i
4j about all that I can give you on it.
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_I ESSIG:
Did you attempt to roll back the chart to see what it might have el been?
7 I
WILKERSON:
No, I was directed by Dick Dubiel at the time, just to go over g
i and monitor them and notify of any changes that occur.
And that's vhat 10l exactly what I did.
I just set there staring up at the tube, monitors
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between tte tube.
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ESSIG:
And then you proceeded to do that the rest of the day then?
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15j WILKERSON:
That is pretty much what I did the rest of the day that I 16; stayed there.
Like I said I had oeen there the night before, and I left 17!
that day to go home.
I left the control room.
I don't know if the other 18l people, another of us left about the same time.
I don' t know if it was 10 191 thirty or 11 o' clock, but it was right around that region of time.
We left 20!
l about the time that the first people were leaving the site.
I believe we 21l were in the north auditorium.
We were the last of the people that left the 22 site from the north auditorium, the collection area, we were to call it.
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12 ESSIG:
Ok, so you would have been watching that monitor then from roughly 1!
2 a little bit before eight unt il sometime before you went home about 11
' clock?
3 4l cf WILKERSON:
About 10: 30.
Gi ESSIG:
Ten thirty, so two and one half hours worth, On b a recall in that 7
period of time wnat the highest level was you saw on that HPR214?
8 9l 5
WILKERSON:
6x10, it went up there very rapidly when I first saw it move 5
10l 4
5 and it went very steadily through 10, 10 it went, then you could watch the needle move.
And it peaked out about 5x10 and then it kind of edged 5
12!
I up a little bit more and I never stw it move past that.
The last time I 13l noticed, it didn't move anywhere.
14i 15:
ESSIG:
Ok, and it did this fairly rapidly?
17I WILKERSON:
When it went up, when it started moving from the 10 it went up
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fairly rapidly, what I mean by that is noticeable, you could sit there and 19i 3
watch the needle move and it didn't matter really whether it was 10 or 20l 4
10 scale, you could see it move.
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ESSIG:
Ok, and you were relaying or attempting to relay as it was increasing?
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WILKERSON:
I told him it was increasing and like I said it was very steady, 2
it went up, stopped, and then it would go up, that's where it is now, and 31 told him what the new reading was essentially.
They probably wasn't two i
4f minutes, four minutes, I don't how quickly time goes when you're thinking Sj like we were at the time but probably no more than two. minutes it took to make the whole transition from where it was in the center of the scale to 6
the top of the scale.
7 8
ESSIG:
And did this transition occur within probably the first hour that g
you... that you looked at it?
101 l
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WILKERSON:
Watched it, yes.
12!
i 13l ESSIG:
Within the first half hour, perhaps?
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15j WILKERSON:
No, I don't think so.
Then again as far as when I actually started watching it, it was probably a half hour.
It wasn't immediately 17]i atter general emergency.
Some other people were over there working with 18i the meters, probably Dick Dubiel, when they started to get busy with other 19!
things, they asked me to go over and take care of that particular job.
And 20?
I I belive it was about a half hour maybe 45 minutes after the initial decla-21!
ration.
Again I am really not, unfortunately, I wasn't sitting back and 22 tak.~ag notes, although I could curse mysel f for not doing it.
I can't give 23 you time se:queces very good.
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lj ESSIG:
That happens a lot to everybody.
Don't feel badly about it because 2
as I said earlier that it's been a little while ago since this happened and i
3 we are just depending on your recall.
We would like as best you can to pin down the times because then we will put these, match these up against ott.er 4j 5
pe ples' times and maybe two or three people to agree to decide on the 3
time.
Ok, so we got the HPR214 stating off at about 10 mR/hr when you 6
first started watching and within about a half to three quarters of a hour 7
5 it increased fairly steadily and then leveled off at about 6x10 mR/hr.
9f WILKERSON:
Yea, that's what I remamber.
Of 11l 12l ESSIG:
Ok, now the c reading.
I just want to make, ask you one other clarifying questio-nn that particular one.
As I understand it, the true 13 !.
exposure rate then in containment is the factor of 100 above that.
Is this 14!
the actual shielced monitor reading.
Is that correct?
16' WILKERSON:
To make it even simpler, at the time I was reading the instrument 17l I did not kncw that there was a shield over the instrument.
So what I read 18t was what was on the instrument face.
191 20' 21j
'-ESSIG:
Ok 22l WILKERSON:
When I first started looking at it.
I mean later on somebody 23j told me, we went through the whole bit about it being a snielded detector 24:
I and you know that morning, we went through it that evening.
But when I 25l l
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first starting reading it and the readings that I relayed were instrument 2
readings off the face of the detector.
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ESSIG:
4; We have taken you now through the first day, through your first 5!
day, which ended about 11 o' clock or so on the 29th.
Then you came back in at about what time? Would have been that Thursday evening? Would you pick 6
it up from there?
7 8!
WILKERSON:
g; Wednesday evening about 9 o' clock or so I gave a call into Unit 1 control room which... that is... when I left....
They moved the ECS from Unit 2 to Unit 1.
I am sure you have that time probably pretty close.
11:
I came over with that to Unit 1 and then stayed there 5 or 10 minutes and 12!
proceeded down and out from the site.
About nine o' clock that night I gave 131 14{:
a call into Unit I control rocm just to see how things were going.
At which time I was told that things hadn't straightened out yet.
I don't think we had pumps running.
All I remember is the conversation I had which just erely was that things weren't settled yet at the time.
And in the 17l next, I went to sleep.
The next morning, I came into the observation 18!
center.
I got there about 8 o' clock that morning, spent time there in the morning making calls, contacting people from (I can't remember the name) 20; l
but one of the labs that provide this monitoring equipment the first day.
21?
Try and tell exactly when was it going to get here and the people that own 221 the whole body counten Trying to get everything located so that we.. auld 23 use their equipment.
I did that early in the morning, I did a little odds 24t and ends, I 25!
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!lj ESSIG:
Excuse me.
This would have been on Friday then, the 30th?
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3 WILKERSON:
This was Thursday.
It was the next day.
I went home Wednesday 4j at 11 o' clock in the mornin.g, went to sleep essentially.
Came in the next 5f m rning at 8 o' clock on Thursday.
Went over to the observation center, 6l made some contacts with Radiation Monitoring Services, I think that's the pe ple, RMC 7
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t ESSIG:
gj Radiation Management Corporation.
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WILKERSON:
Yes, that's it.
11!
12l HUNTER:
Ok, Helgeson.
You say you contacted the whole body counter people?
i 14 WILKERSON:
Yes.
15l 16 HUNTER:
O k.
17l I
18l WILKERSON:
Then I set down at the table that they had put together there.
19:
Did some little work with mapping on the maps they had keeping track of the 20l l
onsite radiation levels, on the plastic enclosed maps of the site.
Showed 21; locations GE-1 through GE-10 on those maps.
22) 23l SINCLAIR:
Let me break in here, the time is 5:31 p.m., and we are going to 24\\'
break and change the tape.
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SINCLAIR:
The time is now 5:32 p.m.
We will continue with the interview 2!
with Mr. Wilkerson.
31 f
4j WILKERSON:
About 12:00 or 1:00 that day, whatever, we talked with the Unit 1 over the radio.
I went and shaved my beard that I had and proceeded to 5
come onsite.
I came onsite approximately 3:00 that day, and went up to the 6
7' Unit 1 control room to relieve Mike Benson who was directina and monitcring the offsite radiation reading in the teams.
I worked in conjunction with 8
Mike for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> or so.
I believe he left there around six, g
maybe a little bit after six, by the time he finally left the Control room.
At which time I started keeping track of the winds, which direction they were blowing, the intensities, directing the monitoring teams or providing I
direction to the person who was on the phone as to where to send the moni-13l toring teams or, keeping track of results, passing them on to the Bureau of 14!
Rad Health.
And that was pretty much what I did straight through for 8 15l 16,'
hours, until I got my relief the next morning, through that night.
I did do some source term calculations as per the procedure which Med Ed has i
17l depending upon the wind class, the velocity and most of the source terms 18; that we did were essentially back-calculated source terms.
Essentially, 19j let me clarify that a little bit as far as what was done there usually was 20; in trying to get a estimate of the source term coming out of the stack, or 2~.!
ccming from wherever it could have been coming from the island.
Generally 22l 23l what was done was when I was working there was a helicopter would be plume I
modium, mapping essentially.
They were taking the highest plume readings 24!
l that they could determine.
Iaking the worst case of X/Q value from the 25!
@3 si l
I f
18
[
1!
1soplots of X/Qs they had and backfitting out ;or a source term.
And that 2
pretty much takes care of what I did that day, what I cid the next day.
If 3
y u have any particular questions I can answer them but it was the same 4
type of thing, keeping track of winds, readings, and passing them on to the 5
Pennsylvania Department.
61 ESSIG:
7 You indicated that you had not been through a drill before and that y u nad gone over with Mike Benson what you were doing for about a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> 8
period.
Would you, did you have any indoctrination or training in addition g
to that either prior to that time or subsequent to that time that you were 10 l,gl heing provided?
l 12' WILKERSON:
In particular to Unit 1, Unit 2, TMI?
14!
ESSIG:
In regard to the implementation let's say of this procedure that we were discussing earlier 1670.4 which covers the offsite dose assessment.
17l WILKERSON:
No 18l 19!
ESSIG:
Ok, so you were resequencing events 20!
21 WILKERSON:
What I got as for as briefing was the three and a half hours 22!
l that Mike and I worked together.
Mike Benson.
23 24!
25!
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t
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19 1l ESSIG:
Ok.
The times that the, let. me haul out the survey sheets here, 2
probably a little easier to speak from.
I have in front of me, for the 3
record, the cop Ns of the log maintained at the emergency control statior g
which is a calculation of all the survey, offsite survey results that came in over the radio.
And the question that I have on this survey log, since y u were involved with this on the second and third day.
Is the time that 6
_l is recorded here the time that the survey was performed or the time the O
result was received via the radio.
9l WILKERSON:
What was being done on the first day, was that as the teams got 11;f the readings, they relayed them.
So in other words if the teams was at a location GE-10, they were saying - I am at GE-10 reading so many millirem 12!
l per/hr and the time was recorded by control room operator.
Whoever was up 13{
there, not the CR ok, but who was operating the phone in the control room.
14!
l So at those times that they reported back immeaiately they gave us a reading 15!
as they got them.
For the times which they were out of radio contact 16:
during those first few days, times that I remember they used the times that i
17) they took their readings at.
181 19i ESSIG:
Ok, so for the first day then the measurements were relayed via 20i radio when they got them.
So the time was jotted down and would the 21l person making the survey say something like I'm at GE10 and the dese rate 22l l
is 3 mR/hr and the 3 mR/hr is as of, ok what 1015 or something like that?
23i i
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1 WILKERSON:
Ok, only go for what.. the times that I was over there working 2
near the radio, because I did not work the radio that day.
But all the 3l readings were coming and the best I could tell you is as they were taking
,g the readings they were relaying them.
I not sure if the person who gave 5
the readings said at such a such : time, or if their watch might have been i
g different from the control room clock or whether or not the radio operator was jotting down the control room time.
We know that they were jotting 7
8l down control room times, many times.
And so I belive that that's how the gf times were set.
They were in accordance with, when I turned around and 10j t ey gave me their little slip of paper they recorded on, at which time I put in the book and looked at the maps and the winds.
They did seem to me very close to the time.
13 ESSIG:
In looking at this same log, this survey log, it appears that during tne first day, I've just gone through and T. allied the number of air samples that ware collected and it appears that there were something on the order of 22 air samples collected during the first day And in going to 17 the second and third days, it appears like their were, at, least accordding 18i to this record that there were only about 2 collected each day.
Now I know 19i from other information that there were additional samples that were collected.
20l Can you explain what it appears to be a discrepancy? Why were the fact 21!
that a sample was collected or why was that fact not recorded by the ECS?
i 22 23 WILKERSON:
Actually what we were doing as far as recording were recording 24i monitoring.'eadings, anc that's when I started working and when I continued 25!
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?.1 llj w rking.
We had been taking air.;'mples whereever they nad hot spots.
If l
2!
they were going tc take an air sample, we had them take it, if the downwind 3
team, had them take one where the center of the plume was felt to be.
At 4j the same time if we had a team on the other shore they would take an air Si sample any how some where to record what isn't there essentially.
And we i
6i did n t record when the samples wher: taken on a sheet, you might see the i
7 first two days samples, I noticed when I looked at them, when I got there that they had numbers on them.
I assumed that they were taken wita some 8
one of the equipment which essentially gives you a immediate readout of g
I
"* I***IS' 10 i
11l l
ESSIG:
Would this be the Eberline Sam-2?
12l l
r 13l WILKERSON:
I don't know.
14i f
15' i
ESSIG:
Okay.
16!
17l 18r
-WILKERSON:
But as far as why we no longer recorded them, I don't think they ever were recorded.
It wasn't until later on that se started recording 19i where and when an air sample was taken.
Earlier what we recorded were 20!
readings that were relayed over the radio.
I assumed that those readings 21 of iodine levels on the first day were probably relayed over the radio by 22 the team which had sampling equipment with them, for immediate readout 23 l
type of sampling.
That probably explains why, I don't know why they switched 24; from immediate readout to air samples.
I assure the air samples, as !
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l 22 1!
understand it, are more accurate for actual numbers, although the portable monitors work.
I don't know if we had problems with the monitors.
I 2!
3 really don't know why they switched from one to the other type of reading.
They may have put them in control rooms or some place where they felt they 5
needed more efficient, quicker response to level readings.
l 61 ESSIG:
Was Mr. Sidney Porter of Porter-Gertz Consultants in the emergency control station at the time that you were there on the second and third g
gj day? Or do you know Mr. Porter?
l 10j WILKERSON:
I know Sid Porter.
I saw him from time to time.
I could not 11j!
tell you what time, what day, that I saw him there.
I did not myself work I
with him, ok so he what just another person that was in the control room.
13l No, since I really don't have any good recollection of what times, I really Jon't know what was the first day I saw him there.
16l ESSIG:
Do you recall who was in charge of the emergency control station at
,7) the time you ure there on the second and third day?
18l 19!
1 WILKERSON:
Lex Tsaggaris, the ECS coordinator when I was working there, 20r 21(j tne first couple of days.
I realize it then changed off when people changed shifts.
22l 23l l
ESSIG:
Was Mr. Bill Potts there also?
241 1
25!
683 3 5 ')
l i
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23 l!
WILKERSON:
Bill Potts was also there.
2:
ESSIG:
Was he there at the time you were?
3 4!
WILKERSON:
Sf No, in fact he, I really cannot tell you for sure if he was there when I first came in.
I don't remember him.
I do know that when we, 6
like the second, no, he was not on the shift I was on.
When I was going to 7
go to the shift that he was on, that Bill Potts was on ECS, he went to Unit g
2.
So I never did work directly with him, maybe a little bit during shift Oh 10i g
e un, but generally the person I was working with was ECS coordinator, Lex Tsaggaris 11:
12!
ESSIG:
Ok, what type of direction was Mr. Tsaggaris giving you?
13l 14!
WILKERSON:
The main direction he wanted to know, and keeping track of it 15; was the wind shifts, any radiation level readings which were higher than 16!
previous readings, and to keep the on and offsite maps updated as to what 17!
i the levels were.
And that's, during those firt few days, that's the 18j information that we relayed and that was about it.
19!
20; i
ESSIG:
I would like to go back to the very first day, realizing that you 21; may have not been involved with this has heavily as you were the second and 22 third day.
I would like to just ask you a question anyway and see if you 23 l
can perhaps help me.
The ECS log sheets that I have for the first day 4l appear to start, the times are somewhat out of order, b.t they appear to 25 1 7 7
O[ () )
V
./ I /
b
i i
(
24 ilj start at about 08:42 in Goldsboro, with being the first survey on March t
2f 28th.
I know from other information that they were some earlier surveys actually made on the island at the various points that you have already 3
f 4l mentioned, that you gava 10,1, 2 and so on.
Do you know where these p rticular survey results may have ended up?
5 6i
[
WILKERSON:
I bel ? eve I do know where scme of what you are looking would be and as to where it is right at the moment all of the slips of paper that 8
were filled in the later days, all of the calculational sheets that were i
9l used like during the first day from the monitors to determine what would be g
the dose, taking worst case, leakage rates and this type of thing, downwind, were kept in the box in two or three plastic bags and they were kept up in 12l I
ECS.
They may even still be up in Unit 1 control room at this moment.
In 13l there as part of the procedure for calculating potential dosage rates were the readings that were given.
Something was done based upon the stack readings and the come monitor readings.
It was compared to what action was i
being found downwind, it was being used to buffer against the two of them, 17!
l to try to come with a actual type of release rate.
A lot of things are 18i done on a worst case, release rates, maximum for the Reactor Building, 19!
which would have been at, 55 pounds.
That type of calculations.
On those 20l l
sheets you should be able to find some of the earlier readings, as far as 21; l
whether or not anything earlier was recorded down on paper, I don't know.
22l l
2.T ESSIG:
You indicated earlier that with respect to the source term calcula-24i tion and the offsite cose assessment that, and this sculd be the assessment 25!
l
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7 U
) I d l
I l
25 l
1 If thats outlined in procedure 1670.4, you indicated that the calculation was 2f run backwards at least during the second and third day.
That is the offsite, I
if I understood what you were saying correctly, the dose rate measured 3l 4l offsite wculd be backed up through the atmospheric dispersion parameter X/Q 5l to give an apparent source term then which would have resulted in that i
6j offsite dose rate.
Is that correct?
i 71 WII.KERSON:
That was being done in that manner by t.he individuals working 8
with radiation monitoring teams.
Again my understanding at the time was g
also that there were other people involved with calculating source terms 10 based upon monitor readings and flow rates and documenting that type of information.
I 131 l
ESSIG:
Were you involved with that particular calculation of the calcu-14!
lations of source terms from which then a estimate could be made of the 15:
offsite dose rate for comparison with the measured values?
17 WILKERSON:
No, I don't believe I ever did one that faced that direction.
18!
The only one that I was a party to was the ones that were done the very 19i first day in the morning at which time I essentially watched what was being 20!
l done based upon monitor readings and, like I said, the procedures sets out 21!
and calculates potential down site readings.
23 ESSIG:
This one in particular would involve the use of the HPR214 25!
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26 1
1l WILKERSON:
Yes l
2:
i ESSIG:
That dose rate which gives then a noble gas rate release in terms 3
y of curies per second which then can be used with a procedure to estimate an ffsite dose rate.
Do you recall what some of those early estimates were 5
6 that you were sort of watching as you said.
l 7
WILKERSON:
No g
9 ESSIG:
Darwin, if you have any questions at moment would you go ahead?
I i
will come back to some others that I have here.
llt 12!
HUNTER:
I want to pick a couple of i+. ems.
You left early in the morning, 131 14l!
you ended up in Unit 2 with the word in the turbine trip reactor trip and you pulled off data off the post trip review, the computer.
Did you know anything different from this trip than any other trip that you looked at in I
Unit 1 or 2?
17]
l 18i WILKERSON:
No 19j 20l l
HUNTER:
Did ycu get involved at that depth? Were you just taking the 21',
l data?
22l 23 l
WILKERSON:
Actually all I did was taking the data c'f, lacking at, looking 24l l
at the points and saying, at first, first my information was a mid turbine 25j I
^
rn7 l
uDJ uu i
6
l l
.(
27 l
1 trip.
I actually went over to Unit 2 to see how the reactor was behaving 2
in response to the turbine trip.
Supposedly it will run back and maintain at 15 percent power.
And at which time I got over there, looked at the 3l 4j first parts of the trip, not the... the sequence of events log and noticed i
5l that the feed pumps had tripped and nine seconds later or 10 seconds later 6l the reactor had tripped and that type of information.
When I looked at the post trip review, nothing really seemed out of the ordinary.
I didn't even know that feedwater was initiated some 8 minutes later.
Whei. I came in I g
looked at the things for, like feedwater pump discharge pressure and saw 1200 lbs of pressure.
That's good, which you expect to come up and go on 101 I
and expect pressure to drop.
When I came in they were working with the RCS i
12l pressure along with the cooling temperatures.
13l HUNTER:
You noted the you noted the all rods in 14!
15, WILKERSON:
Yes.
16; i
17l HUNTER:
By what, looking at the panel?
18i 19l WILKERSON:
That was going over and looking at the panel.
20:
21 HUNTER:
Ok, did you get involved in pulling reactivity, or data or did
{
they pull that lattr?
23l l
24l 25!
_q 6 b, 3
^
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l 28 i
1; WILKERSON:
No, I did not.
They pulled that, as far as I know, much later.
2.
I 3j HUNTER:
You indicate that you did an aarly shutdown margin test, shutdown 4
margin procedure calculation.
Do you recall wiat the shutdown margin was?
Si i
6j WILKER50h If I remember correctly it was 8, 9 or 10 percent of that region.
7 8
HUNTER:
7.iat's a normal shutdown margin with all rods in after a unit g
t trip?
10 11l 12l WILKERSON:
For Unit 2 for instance we are required to have a 2 percent shutdown by tech spec.
In addition there is a stuck rod which is almost worth 4 percent.
So I wasn't surprised to see something well over 6 percent.
14!
r 15!
HUNTER-You indicated then that you were basically watching the events.
l Bill Zewe was there, the shift supervisor.
17l l
18!
WILKERSON:
ns he was.
19i 20!
21l HUNTER:
Ed Frederick was on the make up panel.
By time you got there Craig Faust was on the emergency feed pumps.
23 WILKERSON:
Ok, actually I don't know the names of thu operators.
I 25!
b03 i
s
{
{
29 i
1{
HUNTER:
Just make sure you know, I'm giving you an idea of who was there 2{
and did you walk over and look at the panel?
Particularly the pressurizer I
level?
31 I
4l c
WILKERSON:
Ok, i did not look at pressurizer level.
I looked at things Sj I
like Tav, RC pressure, source and intermediate range indications.
And I 6l said things were changing.
I didn't think it was unusual that pressure was gj dropping, the fault in the reactor trip and associated cooldown when I was looking at it.
But I really wasn't, I was letting the SR0's and CRC's who g
are trained to do the work.
Keeping out of the way out of the panel.
10 11!
HUNTER:
Have you had any reactor operating training on Unit 2 or Unit l?
12!
i 13i WILKERSON: No, all that I have ever received, okay, I received startup certif'Mion, you know, a week down at the simulator at B&W.
16' HUNTER:
Ok, do you recall talking with George Kunder at all.
18l WILKERSON:
I mean he did, I don't know if I called George in the morning 19' and called him in.
I did make most of the phone calls that were made 20l l
between 5 and 6 o' clock.
George did ask me to call some ct.ner people.
He 21j gave me a list of people, like onccming shif t supervisor and Mike Ross.
I 22 don't know if he gave me Mike Ross at the time but Mike was already or his 23 way.
A number of people I really couldn't tell you who they were or exactly 24!
I what time they were contacted.
The only person that I contacted that 25l PJ 07 o u.)
t
30 I
t 1[
wasn't available was Jim Floyd, and it was because as I understand it he 2
was down in Lynchburg at the time.
His wife told me he wasa't there.
{
3l HUNTER:
The next, that was the activity they asked you to be involved in 4
5 as far as phone calls, you did a shutdown margin.
Then, you indicated that 6
y u went back and did another shutdown margin calculation later.
Do you 7
recall the shutdown margin at that timc?
8 WILKERSON:
gj It was the same exact type of thing, I mean I just looked over i
all the graphs again to make sure I read e/erthing right.
Looked to see 10 how low boron would have to be to be critical.
And it was like 150 or 200 lli i
ppm boron....
12!
I 13l HUNTER:
With all rods in?
14+
15s WILKERSON:
Yes, to have gone critical again.
i 17l HUNTER:
So except for the, well your understanding at that time was that 18!
they had boron problem with the 300, 700 and 400 ppm.
19i 20r 1
WILKERSON:
It seemed to me, yes they had some type of boron problem.
21[
Whether or not it caused criticality didn't seem to be true.
22' 23 HUNTER:
You said you looked at the source range intermediate.
Did you 24, j
look at them early on, like you came over rignt away from Unit 2, from Unit 25!
1 to Unit 2.
10 after 4.?
So did you look at them that early?
t
-9 I (M
i 31 i
1l WILKERSON:
Not probably 10 after 4.
A little bit later, maybe another 10 2
minutes or so, and going over and looking at the instruments that were there and looking at the panels and stuff just noted that the ranges, 9
y things want off, you know, down range as I would expected them to go.
l 5!
HUNTER:
Ok, and then you indicated that you, in fact, looked at the source 6
ranges again later.
8 WILKERSON:
Later when it was, I was told later on, I was asked by Mike Ross to make sure, he wanted to know if I had done one.
And I said yes I 10l had, they were shutdown.
He came back a little bit later and said well, ll!
you know, the intermediate and source range were back up on scale, at which 12!
time yes I did go over and look at the, specifically, looked again at the i
detectors.
14!
r 15:
HUNTER:
The recorder is on the components up on the console, up on the..?
17j WILKERSON:
On the back panel console, the strip chart.
18i 19I HUNTER:
And they in fact did, the source range increased and the interme-20l diate range did come on scale?
21l t
22l WILKERSON:
Yes.
23 24l 25l n :r
! Yl
. ) t...
J i
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32
,1 HUNTER:
Did you and Mike Ross discuss that issue at that time?
2t WILKERSON-Discussed what possibly could have caused it, again I went back 3
i 4{
to check to make sure.
They said with a plant that runs all rods out, you gj are required to have all sorts of shutdown margin anyhow.
It seemed to me l
Gi that it would be shutdown, they were already in the process even then of 7
doing, if I remember correctly, borating.
In other words the HPI was on and it draws from a high baron source.
We didq't really go into any deep 8
gj discussion as to why it could have cone it.
10l HUNTER:, Was George Kunder in that conversation discussing that issue or Joe Logan?
131 WILKERSON:
Not that I remember.
14!
t 15' HUNTER:
Just you and Mike Ross?
16 l
17l WILKERSON:
It was just a short thing there.
Mike was very busy at the 18i time.
19!
20!
HUNTER:
You mentioned something about voids, formation of voids during 21\\
this particular period of time in or two phased liquid?
22l 23 WILKERSON:
In thinking about all the things that could happen to cause a 24!
recriticality one of the considerations was since we had a very hot tempera-25!
]/
-7 0 1 u
> w 30 )
i i
e
f f
33 i
1 ture in the hot legs at the time, was that, could you be getting some type 2
of nucleate boiling or something to give you other just moderator in the core.
And again the quick thought there was would that of caused a criti-3 4
cality not was that happening.
It's just the opposite effect, so that was l
the last thought I gave as far as, myself, to that type of thing.
Its just 5
6 a quick run down of other things which could have caused a recriticality 7j and end the result was I couldn't think of anything that would have caused it but we were doing whatever we could do if it indeed was.
g 9f 10f HUNTER:
You indicated that during that time frame that higher pressure I
injection was on?
12!
I WILKERSON:
Thats the way I remember it.
131 14i HUNTER:
Did you actually look at the makeup pumps and the high pressure injection flows yourself?
i 17!
WILKERSON:
I remember it going on, being on, people talking about emergency boration and that type of thing.
20!
HUNTER:
Then you sere just watching what was coing on?
21; 22l WILKERSON:
Essentially, yes.
23!
i 24j 25 i
,') 7
(:gfO3
l
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34 i
1 HUNTER:
Anything else?
Anything about the emergency people folks not gf being available?
You indicated that you did not realize that until some-i 3f time later?
4!
Sj WILKERSON:
Sometime later, much later.
6i 7l HUNTER:
Much later the next day, maybe?
8 WILKERSON:
Yes g
10' HUNTER:
Ok, so you weren' t aware of that.
12:
WILKERSON:
I was surprised when somebody told me that.
Like I said, the 13l I
two things I had done was going through the post trip and checking out what 141 this point was and what it was reading and did I expect it to do that; analyze the feed pump; discharge pressure came right up from some low i
reading to somewhere above 1,000.
So I just assumed we had, my cwn assump-17l tion at the time was that we had emergency feedwater.
19i HUNTER:
We have.
that was 14 seconds?
20!
21I WILKERSON:
Is that right?
23l j
HUNTER:
You had full pressure, line pressure, so that inricated that 24l i
everything was available as far as the feedwater system-Okay, Tom, I 25i ri 7 Q [; j JuV
t 35 i
ESSIG:
I just have a few more questions.
Again going back to the very, 1
2 y ur initial involvement the first day, I think we've already discussed the l
31 pr cedure which is used to calculate the offsite dose rate based on the source term.
Were you involved in any of the discussions which I think 4
,y took place be'. ween Mr. Dubiel and Mr. Crawford with regard to the initial I
6i prediction in Goldsboro which you say you don't recall what it was.
Mr.
7 Crawford has told me that his initial prediction was about 40 R per hour at Goldsboro.
8f 9f I
WILKERSON:
I remember that it was high but I didn't remember what it was.
10l 11l ESSIG:
The question I have is were you involved in any of the discussions 12j l
which took place between Mr. Dubiel and Crawford with regard to the source 13l 14!
term that, using the procedure, was coming up with?
In other words, appar-t ently they were convinced that it was an over estimate because the contain-15:
ment pressure was only about around 2 psi and the table was prepared based 16i on containment pressure of about 55 psi and the leak rate of course was 17!
quite a bit less.
18[
19l WILKERSON:
And maximum leak rates.
20t 21l SINCLAIR:
We are going to have to break here real quick.
The time is 6:02 22!
l p.m. and we are going to have to break to change the tape.
SINCLAIR:
The 23,I l
time is 6:03 p.m.
We are now continuing the interview of Mr. Wilkerson.
24!
l 25i
/
Lo a J Jw '
t I
36 l
1[
ESSIG:
I believe the question that I was exploring prior to our going to a 2
new tape was were you, Mr. Wilkerson, involved with the discussions between i
3l Mr. Dubiel and Crawford with regard to the actual source term that the 1
4 procedure was predicting and maybe attempting to come with a correction to 5l that source term because at the time it was believed to be an overestimate.
l 61 Where you involved in any discussions of maybe how to adjust the source 7f term downward to correct the difference in containment leak rate which might result from a lower containment of pressure?
8 9f WILKERSON:
No I wasn't.
The only thing that I did, was party to and that 10 was just a matter of listening not being involved in the conversation, was g
the fact the rates or the building levels that we were talking acout were i
higher than those that were already tabled in the procedure and how they 13l were going to quickly come up with an appropriate source term.
l 15:
ESSIG:
Do you recall what was done to come up with that?
16; I
171 i
WILKERSON:
No, I don't know.
18l 19; I
ESSIG:
Were you aware of any time during the three days that we are discus-20:
l sing here when surveys, the direction of the survey teams, when that was 21!
22;l performed at a location other than from the ECS?
23 WILKERSON:
No, I cannot remember any time.
From the time I started until 24!
the time I stopped working up in ECS, we were directing the radiation l
)
J
l t
[
37 If monitoring teams.
So I was telling them were to go, when to go, when to 2
take air samples.
That was essentially the job that we did have to do.
3l i
d ESSIG:
Where you aware of any information which might have been made t
5l available from your meteorological contractor Pickard, Low and Garrick with 6
respect to atomspheric dispersion, parameters X/Q values.
Were those made 7
available to you in the ECS?
l O
WILKERSON:
They were made available, however they were past times, if you gl know what I mean when we get it it was 8 o' clock in tne morning or that O
type of thing.
Essentially all that I ever did was look at them and say, gee did they agree with basically what we were using if we did the source term at that time, for that direction.
And the two or three that I looked 13l at they looked close, to me, and wece pretty much the same by a factor of 2 14, or 3, within each other, that was used, that we used based off the plot which would be more of a worst case than, hat they were actually getting.
And other than that the only time I did that was the first time we got and 173 i
them and wanted to know what to do with the sheets that were from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> 18; before and I didn't really see what they were going to do for me.
But we did have a little bit and pass them on to Tom Potter, Sid Porter and some 20l other people that were working with the information.
21 1
221 ESSIG:
Did anybody ask you to do anything with them or were they just 2 31 handed to you and you had to decide whether or not you were to do anything 24!
l with them?
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lj WILKERSON:
At the time I got ahold of them they were given to me to be 2
passed to two or three other people.
I looked through it because I had it i
in my hand.
3l 4i Sj ESSIG:
You indicated earlier that you were getting the wind direction data.
Where did you get that data?
6 7
WILKERSON:
From the Unit I control room monitor.
If you are facing the 8
panel it is on the left behind the main console.
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10j I
ESSIG:
What does that monitor provide to you?
11; i
12l WILKERSON:
It gives you wind speed and direction, and also the one below 13j it provides Delta T stability class.
14!
15r ESSIG:
What, with respect to the use of the iscplats that you mentioned before? These are the plastic overlays, I believe, which have the atmos-17l l
pheric dispersion values, the X/Q values plotted on them.
How did you 18l know which one of those to use?
19!
20!
WILKERSON:
I used it at that time as per procedure depending upon the wind 21; class.
And essentially there is in the system that TMI uses there is a 22l I
stable a neutral and unstable wind class, and there is all three.
The 23 method upon determination was the wind spread ts shown up on the monitor, 24{
the wind directional changes.
And that's what was used to determine which 25j
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llj pl t to use and the appropriate plot was kept on the emergency map to be 2
used when people were maybe doing source terms.
And also as another thing that the ECS director would use just to keep track of the wind change and 3j 4j stuff like that.
Si ESSIG:
Did you use those isoplats at any time to actually verify a plume 6
width, did you direct a team for example to go out and make a cross-wind survey and prepare say relative dose rate at point A versus point B and 8
i then see if the X/Q isoplot would have predicted that the dose rate should 91 have different by that amount?
10!
11; WILKERSON:
I did not do that type of determination.
The determination 12l l
that we would have done was to direct the team to travel north-south across 13i an east plume and get the readings and see indeed if they did drop right 14!
off on the ground at the edge of the plume and that they wera higher near 15i the center.
As far as if they dropped off X percent for the first quarter 16i i
of a mile, then another percent for the next quarter of a mile, no I did 17!
not do that.
My main if you want to call it determination of the plume was 18r to make sure that the width of the plume wa3 aopropirate.
19!
20:
ESSIG:
Did you at this, near as yuu can remember, find that it was about 20 what you expected?
22ll l
23 WILKERSON:
Yes, it was.
I wasn't surprised at the readings that I got.
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It maybe dropped off a little sooner than I expected.
They went a little 25; 63)
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bit longer than the exact map showed.
But it was pretty close, the ones 2
that I did, you know.
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4l ESSIG:
Were you involved with directing the teams to when and where to 5
collect their samples on the second and third days?
6l WILKERSON:
During the firs'. couple of days I worked I really spent most of 7
my time going between the wind monitor, the map, recording readings, and g
transferring them on to the State.
Actual talking to the, I mean I know g
that people wculd come in and say have air samples taken ecery hour and 10 pass it on to the people, we want air samples taken every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> or every 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> at the time.
I didn't go over and say "Take the reading here, take 12l a air sample here," that type of thing.
I told them where to go take 13l t
readings but really wasn't giving definite direction as to wnen to take an 14!
air sample.
Later on as things settled dcwn and less people where around in ECS and started do more things and less things at the same time.
By 16 f
that I mean we got a secretary in to transfer things on and record the book 17; and some other people left to do other things in Unit I and Ur't 2.
Then 18!
L we did definitely get involved very much with when to take a a r sample, 19:
who to send it to, when to take it out that type of information.
That 20[
wasn't until a few days later, when things started to quiet a little bit.
21l 22!
l ESSIG:
Ok, I just want to look at my notes here for a second and see if 23l there is anything else I need to ask you at this time.
I think I have l
24i about exhaustec my list of questions.
Dorsin, were you.
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l 41 I
I WILKERSON:
I got one more comment too that I thought about.
11 2:
l ESSIG:
Fine.
31 41 WILKERSON:
John Flint, frou B&W, came in that morning and one of the first 5l things ' hat we discussed with him was the intermediate range and source 1
c 6l l
range, apparent criticality in the morning.
And one of the things that he 7l put forth as a possiblity at the time was that perhcos we had increased 8
leakage which was just showing up on :,he recorders.
And the cause of 9!
leakage being possibly some sort of void in the core region or the down-10j
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comer region or somewhere between the detectors and fuel itself.
The fact 11l that it went away when we started the pump and hadn't come bc:k kind of 12f quieted any concern that I had at the moment with continuing p ablems, if 13l you understand what I am saying.
That was just one little other tidbit to 14!
l add.
15 16i HUNTER:
That discussion then appeared reasonable to you at the time.
17 18i WILKERSON:
Yes it did.
19' 0'
HUNTER:
And John Flint was in some where around 9:00 or so, I mean 9:30.
21!
So would that be 9:20 or 22 22!
wILxERSON:
I seem to remember John Flint coming in much earlier than 9:00.
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42 HUNTER:
Ok, I will make sure.
But then it appeared to be earlier to you y
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then.
Okay.
I 3!
WILKERSON:
Maybe it wasn't, with everything going on it just seemed that much sooner but that was one of the discussions we had when he first came 5
in.
I guess that's about all that I have.
6 7
ESSIG:
Scott I guess what we would like you to do since we are out of g
questions that we had for you is to give you the opportunity if you wish to g.
I make any remarks with regard to what you feel are lessons that we have 10[
11;!
learned from this, the follow up evaluaticn that takes place following an event of this type, or any comment that you would like to make either on 12!
I actions that you felt Med Ed could done better or that they could have been 13l better prepared for you either in terms of training, or particular type of 14!
equipment that they should have had, or any involvement with NRC or other 15 offsite agencies that presented problems, or any comments that you would i
like to make we would sure like to give you that opportunity now.
17l 18j WILKERSON:
Actually all the interfaces, a few interfaces that I did have 19!
with the NRC or Pennsylvania Bureaus went smoothly as far as I could see.
20!
l And of course a lot of what I walked into was something that was set up 21!
l already.
The only comment I have as far as things you can do better is 22l that it's so hard to get things documented straight and I think such about 23 things as these radiation monitor meters, one of the first things we had 24i such a hard time doing was making sure we kept all the date on things and 25j
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get the pages in order and I guess that is my one comment as far as things f
1 ng term.
And that's about the only thing I can think really about 2
3l doing better is just better documentation while its being done even if it causes things to go a little bit slower.
i 51 ESSIG:
Were you satisfied with the radio communicationi that you had Gi available to you? Were you able to contact the offsite teams?
WILKERSON:
They worked.
Sometimes the batteries go dead, or go weak, and 9l you would have to get another battery out to the team.
It would have been nice if it had been like a telephone, but things seemed to have worked.
I wasn't dissatisfied with that.
I thought the response that we got, like i
the helicopter teams and stuff was very good.
I can't tnink of anything 13l l
else to comment on.
No, that's all I have.
14!
15:
SINCLAIR:
Thank you, Mr. Wilkerson.
We will conclude the interview at 16; i
this time.
The time is 6:17 p.m.,
eastern daylight time.
Today's date is 17
.ay 16, 1979.
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