ML19242D884
| ML19242D884 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1979 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908280715 | |
| Download: ML19242D884 (31) | |
Text
I i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i
ll In the Matter of:
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IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIE'd 1
3!
of Joseph J. Keily, Principal Engineer, Babcock & Wilcox, Inc.
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6; Trailer #203 9i NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear f'cwer Plant 10i Middletown, Pennsylvania 4
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May 9, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13j June 29, 1979 (0 ate Transcript Typea)-
187 15i (Tape Numcer(s)j 16i 17:
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20i 21 NRC PERSONNEL:
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James S. Creswell Owen C. Shackleton 23-24:
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SHACKLETON: This is an interivew of Mr. Joseph, J. Kelly. Mr. Kelly is 2l a principal engineer in tre Plant Integration Division or Babcock and 3!
Wilcox Incorporated, their Nuclear Power Generation Division.
This 4
interview is taking place at 8:36 a.m., Eastern Daylight Time, May 9, 5
1979.
The place of the interview is in one of the offices of the 6l Babcock and Wilcox facility for their Nuclear Power Generation Division i
p in Lynchburg, Virginia.
Present to conduct this interview from the U.
g S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. James S. Creswell, the Mr.
gj Creswell is a Reactor Inspector assigned to Region 3.
My name is Owen 10 C. Shackleton, I am an investigator assigned to Region 5.
Just prior to starting this interview on tape, I presented to Mr. Kelly a two
,2l page document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which 73{
explains the purpose and sccpe of this investigation and the authority i
of the U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation.
It also sets out Mr. Kelly's rights to refuse to be interviewed or to refuse to submit a signed statement.
In addition, it identifies his right to have someone of his choice present during the course of the interview.
Mr. Kelly has present Mr. Byron D. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson is the assistant council for Babcock and Wilcox their Nuclear Power 19<
Generation Division at Lynchburg, Virgilia.
On the second page of this document are three questions all of which Mr. Kelly responded to in 21:
writing to the affirmative.
At this time to make it a matter of 22l record on this tape I'm going to ask Mr. Kelly these questions and 231 have him respond crally.
Mr. Kelly did you understand the text of the 24\\
two page document I'm referring to?
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r lj KELLY:
Yes, I did.
2; SHACKLETON:
And do we, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have 3
4 your permission to tape this interview?
6 5!
KELLY:
Yes, you do.
6 7l SHACKLETON:
And would you iike a copy of the tape?
8 91 i
KELLY:
Yes, I would.
10!
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12;!
SHACKLETON:
Alrignt sir, that will be provided and we will send it to you, to your office through the mail.
And now Mr. Kelly to assist 13!
14l1 those persons who will be listening to your tape as you provide infor-mation to help us establish the chronology of what transpired in the incident at Three Mile Island beginning on March 28th, would you
,6 1
please briefly give your education and background in the nuclear 171 field?
18f 19!
KELLY:
I was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in June 20t of 1965.
I had six years of commissis carvice in the United States 21:
Navy and nuclear submarines.
two of wh,_a I served on board the 22!
l USS Lewis and Clark and the last two I taught at the U. S. Naval 23l Nuclear Power School in Mare Island, California.
In June of 1971, I 24l resigned my commission got out of the navy, and came to work for 25!
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l lj Babcock and Wilcox starting in July of 1971.
I joined their Nuclear 2
Service Department, trained on the Babcock and Wilcox plant, I studied I
31 it for the first year and then went out to field service in Russell-4 ville, Arkansas and I spent almost two years in Russellville, Arkansas, on the startup on Arkansas Nuclear 1, Unit 1.
In June of 1974, I was c
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6 transferred to Crystal River, Flordia and I spent the next three years in Crystal River, Flordia, assisting in the startup of Crystal River
/t gl Unit 3.
And in 1977, in May of 1977 I was transferred back to the i
g home office in Lynchburg, where I joined the Plant Integration Unit a
ae een ng n un ever s ce.
10; 11I SHACKLETON:
Thank you very much, and new I'll turn the interview over I
to Mr. Creswell. Go ahead Jim.
131 14!
CRESWELL:
Mr. Kelly, you mentioned that you had a tour of duty in a nuclear submarine, what was your, you were an officer?
17j KELLY:
Yes, I was.
18!
19:
CRESWELL.
What were, what was your assignment, or what was your 20:
title, on the submarine?
21i 22l l
KELLY:
Of course, during my tour there I was promoted in rank from 231 Lieutenant junior grade to Lieutenant, but my specific duties I spent 24j in the engineering department on board the submarine as auxilliary 25; division officer and machinery division officer.
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lj CRESWELL:
O k.
You mentioned that you are presently employeed in the 2:
Plant Integration Unit, could you briefly describe what the responsibil-t 31 ities are for that unit and what your responsibilities are in that unit?
4 SI i
6j KELLY:
We... the unit serves to work throughout our division to make y
sure that the design of the nuclear system is our responsiblity g
for that design is cross-checked between different departments.
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make sure that the interfaces fit together.
For instance, the control 10; r d drives a uid be designed by one group, and the reactor vessel by atother group.
And we have to check to make sure that they interface together.
13!
CRESWELL:
And then you particula? duties in that group?
15 KELLY:
Well, I am working the group is subdivided into control and instrumentation integration, nechanical hardware integration and etc.
And my part is overall plant desian.
18:
19r CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
In the course of your employment in the Plant Integra-tion Unit, had you been involved with these activities on Three Mile 21i Island, Unit 2?
22l 23l KELLY:
Oh, yes,. nave.
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5 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
I'd like to go back in time to tha date of March 28, y
2 1979, and to that point in time, during that day when you first became 3i
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'at there had been an event at TMI 2.
Could tell us about what 4j time you found out about the event?
Si 6
came in to work normally at 8 o' clock aat morning and I had heard Bob Winks come down and tell 'e that there had been an incident I
at Three Mile Island and that we were supposed to attend a briefing 8l he and myself, and I'm sure there were other people involved.
And 91 that was about 9 o' clock.
And we went to the briefing, I believe 10t about 10.
It was here in this building.
11l 12l l
CRESWELL:
The briefing was held where?
13!
14:
KELLY:
Down in classroom A or 8 in our simulator area downstairs.
15.
16:
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
When Mr. Winks initially contacted you about the 17i Svent. around 8 o' clock, what was the discussion like? What was the 18' nature of the discussion? Did he give an indication of what plant 19!
conditions were at that time?
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21.!
KELLY:
He said that what.
what he told me was that he heard the 22l l
plant had depressurized; that they had lost feedwater and depressurized; 23i and there had been one report of a reading of radiation levels in the i
24!
l Reactor Building of 800 R.
And that was about all, I guess that he 25i said at the time.
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6 CRESWELL:
lj Did he indicate to you which particular monitor was reading 2j 800 in the containment?
I 31 KELLY:
No.
Not that I remember.
He just said there was e radiation 4
Sj m nitor.
6i y
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Between the time period of 8 o' clock and 10 o' clock, I
gj when you attended the briefing, what activities were you engagec in?
9l 10!
"m e a e supen sor had called..
I sa N I belonged to this small NSS design group, and tnere are about six of us in that group.
My supervisor had called a meeting to discuss what our little section would be doing for the next few months.
And I was in that 13!
meeting when Scb Winks came up.
And then we were still talking about that when I got called away to the briefing.
16' CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Who is your supervisor?
18r KELLY:
Eric $wanson.
19r 20-CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
So, if I understand it correctly, between 8 and 10 21 o' clock, you were talking about other activities 22!
i 23l KELLY:
Yes.
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CRESWELL:
Rather than the time..
except for the time that Mr. Winks 2
told you tt: information that you already given us.
When you attended I
3 the brie'ing at 10 o' clock in this training room near the simulator, approximately how many people were in the meeting?
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KELLY:
The attendance built up as the meeting went along.
And I 6
7 guess there must have been 20 people by the end.
81 CRESWELL:
g Who, in your opinion, was in charge of the meeting while Of y u were there?
i 11!
KELLY:
Don Hollerman started out in front of the classroom asking telling us what had hapcened.
And Bill Spangler was also up there 13t with him.
But Hollerman was doing most of the asking most of the questions doing most of the talking.
1.6 ;
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
What was the nature of the information th t you were given at that time?
19' KELLY:
He told us what he knew about it, and I guess he had gotten 20' l
it, I don't kr.cw, maybe from Bill Spangler, but he said that they had 21; turned the reactor coolant pumps off, and they had lost the feedwater.
22; He just basically repeated what Bob Winks had told me.
The new piece 23; of information that I heard at that time was that the reactor coolant 24!
pumps were off.
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CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Were you given any instructions during the meeting?
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3 KELLY:
Specifically, they said that Bob Winks and Bob Twilly and 4
myself were setup to leave on a chartered plane as soon as we could 5l get our bags packed and go, to go up to the site to assist Lee Rogers, 6
in finding out what the sequence of events were, and what happened and 7
try to determine the plant's status.
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CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
So, what did you do after the meeting? About what gj Y"
"9 10 ll!
KELLY:
It was not maybe about 10:30, I guess, because I didn't stay at the meeting very long, once I got my specific directions.
I 14i knew the charter was supposed to leave at noon, and I had to go druw money and try to take care of the paraphernalia you have to do for
,5 1.
things like that.
And then run home and pack my bag.
And that's tha kind of things I did.
Got to the airport about noon and took off on the flight.
181 19i CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
That was the local municipal airport here?
21l KELLY:
Yes, in Lynchburg.
In Lynchburg, it was a charter flight.
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CRESWELL:
And then you landed in Harrisburg?
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Yes, in Harri',curg International Airport.
2!
i CRESWELL:
About what time would you w timate?
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KELLY:
About an hour an a half later.
It was 1:30.
I 71 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Upon arrival at Harrisburg Airport, what did you do?
I 8;
KELLY:
g; We rented two cars and drove to the motel, where we had reser-10 vations, which was the Simmons Motel in Hershey, Pennsylvania.
Checked g
into the motel.
At that point there was a message waiting for us, i
12j that Greg Shidell had called the motel and we were to return his call, which we did.
3 We went and got our rocms from there and called Greg back.
r 15:
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
At that point in time, did Greg have any more infor-16-i mation about what was going on at the plant?
17!
18t KELLY:
He said that he had been in contact with Lee Rogers and that we were supposed to go to Greg's house.
That's where they were going 40 to set up communications that Greg was talking to Lynchburg from his home phone.
And he gave us directions on how to get there.
to his 22i house.
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About what time did you arrive?
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KELLY:
He said... he said the time on that phone..
that phone i
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conversation that they were in gas masks.. wearing gas masks in the 5
Control Room at that time.
That's the only thing that strikes me as a i
6 big difference than anything on the radio.
I don't know, maybe it y
took us an half an hour to get there.
The times at that point become i
8l obscure.
It's not far away.
I could find it again in a half an hour.
9I.y CRESWELL:
So approximately, two o' clock.
11:
KELLY:
Two o' clock or 2:15, something like that.
It took some time to check into the motel and call Greg.
Drive to Hershey.
That time was involved, too.
Getting from the airport to Hershey.
15, CRE5WELL:
Upon arrival at Greg's home could you relate what the discussions were abcut the plant?
18:
KELLY:
We got there, Greg was on the phone.
He was talking, so you know, we were talking to his wife, Marie.
When Greg got off the phone, he said that they had stopped the reactor coolant pumps.
I 21; asked him why.
And he said he didn't know, but he would... said that he didn't know at that time, so he would try to find out the next 23l l
time he got hold of Lee.
And Lee Rogers was periodically calling into 24j Greg's house.
And Greg would relay the information to Lynchburg.
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There were a series of these phone calls, and I guess I can't straighten 2{
out what I learned from any one of the phone calls.
But during that 31 afternoon, we got information that they were getting.
they had 4l taken a RTD bridge reading of hot legs and got temperatures of about Si 700 degrees.
l 6i CRJSWELL:
tihat did that mean to you?
7 8
KELLY:
g Well, at that time I don't remember the number, but I
. they also told me what tha reactor coolant system pressure was, and I 10:
f didn't have a steam table with me.
But I knew that that temperature was much above any conceivable pressure.
That it could, in other words, that that had to be, to me it either had to be a steam bubble 13t i
in the hot leg or the reading was wrcng.
14; 15 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
16, 17l KELLY:
I mean it wasn't conceivable at that point that for the existing 18t pressure that that could be in a liquid phase up there.
20:
CRESWELL.
- 0. K.
So you said there was two possibilities.
Which one did you believe it was?
23!
l KELLY:
At the time, I thought that the reading must be wrong.
Cause 24l I didn't know enough about what had happened.
Then, to be able to 2 51 all I was getting was what Greg was telling us.
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12 1l CRESWELL:
That would assume that there was a solid system.
That the 2
reading was wrong.
31 4
XELLY:
Yes.
If the reading was wrong they should have... there 5l w uld not have been a steam bubble there.
i 6l CRESWELL:
Now at this point you were aware that the reactor coolant 7
g pumps were turr.ed off?
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CRESWELL:
What would have been the condition of the reactor regarding naturai circulation, at that point in time? Did you infer that there I
was natural circulation or that there was not?
14:
1 15 KELLY:
If they had a steam bubble in the hot legs that I knew that there couldn't there nouldn't have been natural circulation.
I 17:
didn't know how they were cooling the core.
One of those phone conver-sations, Greg was relaying to Lynchburg to try to get permission to 19t start our reactor coolant pump again.
And they when
_ was 20; saying that they were trying to decide at the site, that they wanted 21!
to start the reactor coolant pump again.
22!
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l CDESWELL:
Did he receive that permission?
24!
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KELLY:
I don't knew.
There was one other thing that happened in the 2
middle there.
About five or six o' clock, we decided by this time, 3j b-sides Bob Winks and Bob Twilly and myself, Dale Yule and Eric Gilheim 4l had showed up at Greg's house.
So we all went out to eat.
By the p
time we got back, maybe 7:30 or 8, Greg said their reactor coolant 6
pump was runr,'ng already.
And that everything looked alright.
The 7
pump was running.
8!
CRESWELL:
0.K.
Do you remember that any recommendations that were g
given to Lee Rogers from Mr. Shidell?
11l 1
KELLY:
No, I don't remember any.
Most of the time I can remember 12!
I Greg doing on the phone was writing.
He was listening.
He wasn't 13I 14l tal ki ng.
Then we'd wait for him to get off the phone and he would tell us what Lee had said.
15 <1 16 CRESWELL.
Was there at any time during that afternoon any discussion about the incore thermocouples?
19:
KELLY:
Not that I remember.
20' 21l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
We've mentioned the reactor coolant pumps, was there 22!
I any mention of the attempted start of the rcactor coolant pumps currents 23l l
drawn, and that sort of thing?
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KELLY:
During the... that's right, later in the afternoon, when I 2j had asked Greg earlier why they turned the pump off, he asked Lee that i
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during one of the times he was in conversation with Lee Rogers.
And the report we got was that the ficw indication had become erratic on i
Sj the reactor coolant pumps, so they turned the things off.
Then Greg I
6l said they attempted to restart the reactor coolant pump, out the amperidge was so low that it was indicating that it wasn't pumping any water.
I have forgotten the number, but it was something.
100 amps g
t or something like that.
I don't remember.
91 101 IL[
CRESWELL:
You say the current readings were so low th?t
. to indicate they weren't pumping any water was that the context in which it was 12!
discussed?
131 14!
' ILLY:
Yes.
15 16:
CRESWELL:
Were there any others?
18:
KELLY:
That's what he had said.
He said that they started the reactor 19!
coolant pump and mcnitored the starting current.
And when it didn't 20:
come up to normal value, it was so low, that they assumed it was 21; pumping steam, or not pumping water 22; 23l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
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lj KELLY:
The pump was cavitating.
2!
i 3l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
What would that sort of infornation iidicate to you?
I 4j 5l KELLY:
That reading.. the 700 degree reading was probably trua.
I 6j That they were having a steam binding in those loops.
7 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
And what would that mean as far as core conditions g
were concerned?
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KEL,M:
That you wouldn't have any circulation through the core at i
all.
I mean through the loops.
I 13l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
How would the heat that the core is being generated 14i
.. that the core is generating at that time be removed?
15:
16; KELLY:
It would be removed through boiling water that's still in the core.
18; 19' CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
And how would the steam be removed from the system?
20i Or would it be removed from the system?
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22l KELLY:
The only way you could remove it, is trying to collapse the 23 steam with pressure and get into a natural circulation mode again.
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CRESWELL:
Was that discussed, to do that?
That is to increase the pj pressure?
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4j KELLY:
I don't remember.
I don't personally remember discussing it Sj because at the time again, I said I thought the pressure readings were 1
61 high, and Greg..
I'm getting confused now.
7 CRESWELL:
g v'as there any discussion of high pressure injection flew during that afternoon?
g 10j KELLY:
Again, I can't remember.
12'.
CRESWELL:
What's the next significant thing that you remember that happened that day?
15-KELLY:
When we got back from dinner, Greg had said they had gotten the reactor coolant pump started.
They cleared the steam bubbles out of the loops.
And, I think conditions had reached a steady state.
And he told us that Lee had told him there would no chance that we 19l could get on the site that night.
We should go back to the motel and 20t I
go back to Greg's house the following morning.
21:
22!
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
About what time was that you came back from there?
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1l KELLY:
It was, I thought it was about 8 or 8:30, because we waited 2
around and watched the evening news to see what the local news was 3
g ing to be and we had to wait for that to come on.
Then after the g
news was over, we left his house and went back to the motel.
Si i
6j CRESWELL.
- 0. K.
So all all three of you left and went back to the motel?
7 1
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KELLY:
No, there were five of us.
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11l CRESWELL:
Oh, there were five at that time.
Yeah.
About what time
... let's see, we originally established that Mr. Winks, yourself and 12; Mr. Twilly took a flight down and arrived about one o' clock.
14!
KELLY:
One-thirty - something like that.
16' CRESWELL:
0.K.,
one-thirty.
You arrived at Mr. Seidell's residence.
ISr KELLY:
No, it was at the airport.
And then we had to go to the 191 motel, call Greg, and then get there.
- 0. K.
20 21i CRESWELL:
Roughly, about that time.
What time did the other two 22' individuals arrive?
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KELLY:
We had been at Greg's for a couple of hours, so it must have yj 2
been about 5 o' clock when they got there.
3i 1
CRESWELL:
And those two individuals there names were?
4 5
KELLY:
Eric Yoheim and Dale Yule.
6,i i
71 gl CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
When they got there, were they were you..
were 9I they brought up to speed about what was going on?
10' KELLY:
We told them what we knew about it.
Yeah.
11:
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CRESWELL:
What was their involvement as you recollect it, from that 131 point on into the evening?
15:
KELLY:
They're both
. well, Eric is a radio-chemist and I believe 16' that Dale is also a radio-chemist.
So they didn't have any direct involvement in what we were doing.
18!
194 CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
20t 21!
KELLY:
They were waiting to get on site to find out what the radio-22!
logical situation was.
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1l CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
So, I believe that you stated that that after 2
dinner you'd gone back to Mr. Seidell's residence.
And then the five i
31 f y u left the residence, about what time?
4l KELLY:
5 Like I said, we watched the news, so it must have been 10:30 r eleven.
But, it was probably closer to 11 by the time we got out.
61 7\\
gl CRESWELL:
The five of you went back to your motel.
I believe it was i
in Hershey?
i 0I 10j l
KELLY:
Yeah.
11.'
12l i
CRESWELL:
And what happens next?
13j 14!
KELLY:
The next morning, I got up and I went to Bob Twilly's room.
15 He said tnat during the night, that Bob Winks had gotten a call from Greg Shidell.
And Cob Winks had already left to go on site.
We went over picked up
.. gee, I'm not sure whether we picked up Eric Ya'eheim lSt at that time or not.
At least Twilly and I went over to Seidell's 19i house and Eric Yaleheim and Dale Yule, I believed followed us in their 20l car.
We got over there and talked to Marie, who was Greg's wife.
She 21!
j said that Greg had left to go into the site about 3 o' clock in the 22!
morning.
And that's where Bob Winks was.
So we went we had left 23 his house and went over to the Three Mile Island Vistors Center.
And 24:
just spent almost all day there trying to get in touch, and in communi-25!
cation with someone on site, either Greg or Lee Rogers.
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lj CRESWELL:
Were you successful?
2!
3 KELLY:
About four in the afternoon, John Flint came out.
John Flint works for B&W and he was on site.
I found out at that time that he 5l had been on the site at the time.
And he said that yes, Winks was on I
6i there, delogging the reactimeter data, and plotting it, which is what 7
we were there to find out, the sequence of events.
And that we should 8l g ahead home and come back to relieve Winks that night at 8 o' clock.
g And that Bob Twilly and I would take the night shift and work from 8 5
10 at nignt to 8 in the morning.
And that's what happened.
We went through the badging process and to get on site, I got in there and relieved Bob Winks.
Now this is Thursday night about 8 o' clock.
13 CRE5WELL:
What did you do after you said you've been badged, received a TLD, I assume.
16; KELLY:
Uh, uh.
A dosimeter.
13:
LRE5WELL:
Did you go to the Control Room then, or where did you go in the plant?
20' 21!
KELLY:
No.
We went to a it a processing center.
We went in througn the north gate and went to the Processing Center, and there 23; t
was one little room that was allocated to B&W there, where I ran into 24!
Winks again, and was delogging the reactimeter data and he had showed 25!
us at that time what he concluded looking at the plots.
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l{
CRESWELL:
What were those conclusions?
2:
6 3l KELLY:
He said that looking at the plots, that they did not have 4l auxiliary feedwater flow for the first eight minutes af ter the reactor 5l trip.
That they had in fact lost feedwater when the reactor went into Ig pressure, wer.t into an excursion, they got the reactor trip, etc.
And I
7l he said that they had blown... that the reactor coolant system...
I you could just look at the plots and see that the reactor coolant g
system pressure had come down, continued to go down, past what we g
Would normally expect it to.
Concluded from that that the electromatic relief valve had not shut again.
12!
CRESWELL:
You said again?
13!
14!
KELLY:
Again.
16-CRESWELL:
It hadn' t shut "agai,1"?
i 18f KELLY:
Oh.
Bob Winks and I had been involved in an incident at 19!
Toledo Edison in the fall of 1977.
I've forgotten the exact date.
20P But at that time they lost feedwater and had a pressure excursion and 21 their electromatic relief valve had not shut.
That's what I meant 22!
when I said, "again" 23i 24!
t 25l
..{'s
I 22 ilj CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
l 2
3{
KELLY:
And then he showed me a plot of the quench tank
. maybe it's 4{
called the reactor drain tank at Three Mile Island.
Si CRESWELL:
Reactor coolant drain tank, I think is 6
i 7l KELLY:
g He showed me the drain tank pressure plot and you could see where the ruptured disc had blown out.
g
(
10j CRESWELL:
Is that plot of the reactor coolant drain tank pressure?
12!
KELLY:
Pressure.
13 14:
CRESWELL:
Pressure.
Did it look look like everything.
The 15.
relief valve had actuated as it should have.
The quench tank and the disc had blown and then it was all reasonable.
18!
KELLY:
It looked very logical.
You could pick it up off of the plot 19i of pressure.
20!
Elf CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
22t 23l KELLY:
And he had, I don't remember exactly, but Bob had de ' aged
^
24!
like the first 30 minutes of the transient and plotted the first 30 25{
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Ora-
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lj minutes.
And we spent the night working on the first 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> about of r
2{
the transient, reducing down.
3 4!.
CRE5WELL:
- 0. K.
Were there any other things that you noted of intarest 5l in g ing ver those plots?
l Gi KELLY:
7 It's hard for me to remember now, how much I found out that first night I was there.
Because I had been up all day and working g
all night.
I did that for the next 10 days.
I worked like 16 on and g
8 off.
10!
i 11!
CRESWELL:
Long hours.
12!
13 14{;
KELLY:
I don't know what I'm telling you any more past that point of time of.. of what I had subszquently learned, studying it or how much I learned during that initial period of time.
If you have a specific question, I might be able to - to l
18:
CRESWELL:
Nothing really jumped out at you any other malfunctions or problems?
20:
21l KELLY:
No, you could see reactor coolant system pressure come down to 22' saturation pressure on the plots.
We were at pressurizer level went 23 up and it pels out at 400 degrees.
at 400 inches rather, and 24 just ran across a straight line from the data that Bob had showed us.
25!
j It had gone solid.
F e
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24 1.
CRESWELL:
What did you derive from that?
l 2;
KELLY: That they had drawn a steam bubble some place else.
Because of 31
[f the silent condition of the pressurizer.
When you come down and can 5
see the pressure on the plot, go down to saturation pressure in tha 6i reactor coolant system temperature, you have to be making steam.
7!
l CRESWELL:
OL I'd like to go back to earlier in the morning of the 8
28th, before you left.
o, b,
KELLY:
- 0. K.
12{
I CRESWELL:
13t What sort of instructions were you given and by whom about what your mission would be at the site?
151 f
KELLY:
Don Hollerman said that they had chartered a plane, and that lo:
Winks and Twilly and I would go to the airport at noon, and when we i
17!
got up to the site, to report in to Greg Shidell and Lee Rogers.
In the meantime, other than the general instructions that we were to go 19t up there to support them, and determine the sequence of events in the 20; l
system recovery.
In the meantime, they would be in communication with 21; Greg, to tell him what we were to do.
When we got to the site and got 22 to talking to Greg, it was obvious at that time. ' hat we could not get 23' on to Three Mile Island to do anything.
So we were caught in this 24l information vacuum, listening to half the telephone conversations, for 25j the rest of the day.
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25 lj CRESWELL:
I don't recollect whether you said who was giving you the instructions.
2 3l f
KELLY:
Don Hollerman told us.
4 Sf 5l CRESWELL:
What is Mr. Hollerman's pcsition in the company?
7:
KELLY:
He's a manager in the Nuclear Service Department.
8 9!
I CRESWELL:
0.M.
101 11!
l KE LL~Y: There were many, many people at that meeting.
Higher ranking 12' i
managers than Hollerman's.
It was just that he was the one in front 13!
of the room kind of leading the 14' 15' CRESWELL:
Did any other higher managers or executives give you any instructions?
17' 38i KELLY:
No, not that I can remember, specifically.
They tre agreeing 19' at the time it seemed to me that, rather than sit around and try and 20) think of what specific things I should be looking for, they could do 21!
j that while I was on the airplane and tell me when I got up there.
The 22l gist of what I was getting from Hollerman.
23!
i
- 241, 25 I
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26 If CRESWELL:
Did they discuss with you any sort of posture regarding 2j giving the licensee recommendations?
3t KELLY:
No.
Not at that time.
4 5l, I
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
Owen, at this point I'd like to turn it back to you.
6 And you may want to discuss the conditions under the interest of the 7
plant and so f rth.
g 9!
SHACKLETON:
Mr. Kelly, for the benefit of those people who will be 11:!
listening to the tape, if I recall correctly, prior to going on tape, you mentioned that you had worked on Babcock and Wilcox involvement in the construction of the reactor for Unit 2.
Is that correct? Were 13!
you involved with Three Mile Island anytime prior to this incident?
15' KELLY:
No.
16' 17 SHACKLETON:
Alright.
Fine, thank you.
ISr 19' KELLY:
Excuse me.
You were saying the construction 20' 21l
,t SHACKLETCN:
I'm possibly not using the right terminology.
Were you 22l t
involved in anyway with the design work or anything for the reactor 231 unit for Unit 2?
24j n r.)
(,o.Cm us 25:
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27 1;
KELLY:
At Three Mile Island?
2l l
3l SHACKLETON:
Yes.
4!
Sj KELLY:
No.
6i i
SHACKLETON:
No.
Alright, the answer was no.
7 8i KELLY:
g When you were asking, I r.hought you meant the morning of the i
incident.
Was I involved with Three Mile Island, Unit 2.
10f I
11{
i SHACKLETON:
12L Yes, I maybe m'sintepre+at? something that you said I
earlier.
In your role as an engineer in the Plant Integration Unit?
13l 14!
KELLY:
- 0. K.
When I came back to Lynchburg in 1977, and got into tr.e Plant Integ ation Unit, and I said I'm a member of the plant design 17l group, at that tinia in May 1977, th; plant design emphasis was on the Babcock and Wilcox 205 unit.
The 177 ur.,a had already been designed, and Three Mile Island 2 was operational.
So we had.
my little 19t group had nothir ' to do with the design by the time I got involved 20i with it.
21!
22f SHACKLETON:
- 0. K.
23l 24l
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28 l!
KELLY:
Now I see wi.at l
2:
SHACKLETON:
You must realize that this is very difficult to try and 3
4 reconstruct a very difficult period.
When you were working long hours 5
and tired and so on, I appreciate your attempts to try and recall 6l facts the best you can.
What Jim spoke about is one thing that we're 7
interested in as regarding the security that you found wnen you went on to the island.
Now, when you and Mr. Twilly went on to relieve the g
other gentlemen from Babcock and Wilcox, 8 o' clock shift, was that the g
i night of the 29th?
10l
\\
11l KELLY:
Yes.
12!
13 SHACXLETON:
Were you given a dosimeter and a TLD before you went on 14!
board the island? Do you recall?
16' i
KELLY:
Yes, I had a dosimeter and a TLD before I went on the island.
17'1 13:
SHACKLETON:
When you mentioned that you went on to the island through 19) the north gate, which be across the north bridge, were there any 20 security officers at that point? Was there any check point?
21:
22 KELLY:
Yes.
There was.
There were guarua - ' the entrance to the 23 north gate.
Not on the island side of the bridge, on the other side.
241 Before you went across the bridge.
25!
I
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d
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29 l
1{
SHACKLETON:
Just off the highway then?
i 2t KELLY:
Yes, just off the highway.
3 4l SHACKLETON:
Parallel to the Susquehanna River?
5 6j KELLY:
Yes.
7 8!
SHACKLETON:
g Did you see any security officers after you got on to the 101 11 KELLY:
No.
There were none that I saw.
12' 13 CHACKLETON:
And you went
. when you got on to the island, where did 14!
I you go?
15 16; KELLf:
They called it the Processing Center.
17!
18!
SHACKLETON:
And that's where your headquarters were maintained for IT at that time?
20!
i 21; KELLY:
Yes.
22' 23l l
SHACKLETON:
I have no further questions, Jim.
24l 25!
l 4
l' U U L-
30 r
i
!lj CRESWELL:
I'd like to go back again, early in the morning of the 2{
March 28, 1979.
Do you recall seeing Mr. Floyd of the Metropolitan 3f Edison staff anytime that morning?
4j i
KELLY:
Of which date?
6 7l CRESWELL:
March 28th. The day of the event.
l 8!
gj KELLY:
That morning I was in Lynchburg.
i 10l I
CRESWELL:
Yes.
111 12 i
KELLY:
Mr. Floyd?
131 i
14!
CRESWELL:
Mr. Floyd.
15!
16 KELLY:
No, I didn't.
I don't recall seeing him.
18!
CRESWELL:
- 0. K.
That's all I have Owen.
19I 20t SHACKELTON:
Mr. Kelly, is there anything that you would like to say 21, f
before we close this interview?
22l 23li KELLY:
No, I have nothing else to say.
24!
25j 6
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31 i
r 1.
SHACKLETON:
We thank you very much for helping us this morning.
2 We'll close this interview.
The time is now 9:16 a.m., EDT, May 9, I
~
1979.
31 4l 5
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