ML19242D688

Forwards Request for Addl Info Required to Conduct Review of PGE-1020, Rept on Design Mods for Trojan Control Bldg

ML19242D688
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	07/20/1979
From:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Goodwin C PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
References
PGE-1020, NUDOCS 7908160082
Download: ML19242D688 (8)

Text

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,0, UNITED STATES e

y,( 'h NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5,$,7 C

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July ?0, 1979 Docket No. 50-344 Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.

Assistant Vice President Portland General Electric Company 121 SW Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204

Dear Mr. Goodwin:

In conducting our review of PGE-1020, " Report on Design Modifications for the Trojan Control Building," as supplemented and amended, we have determined that we will need the additional information identified in the enclosure to continue our review.

In order for'us to maintain our review schedule, your response is requested as soon as possible. Three signed originals and forty copies are required.

Please contact us if you have any questions concerning this request.

Sincerely, M /V/./Ykudl A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information cc: w/ enclosure See next page

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Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.

Portland General Electric Company cc:

Mr. H. H. Phillips Mr. John A. Kullberg Portland General Electric Company Route One 121 S.W. Salmon Street Box 250Q Portland, Oregon 97204 Sauvie Island, Oregon 97231 Warren Hastings, Esquire Ms. Nina Bell Counsel for Portland General 728 S.E. 26th Street Electric Company Portland, Oregon 97214 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portlano, Oregon 97204 Mr. Stephen M. Willingham 555 N. Tomahawk Drive Mr. J. L. Frewing, Manager Portland, Oregon 97217 Generation Licensing and Analysis Portlanc General Electric Company Mr. Eugene Rosolie 121 S.W. Salmon Street Coalition for Safe Power Portland, Oregon 97204 215 S.E. 9th Avenue Portland, Oregon 97214 Columbia County Courthouse Law Library, Circuit Court Room Richard M. Sandvik, Esquire St. Helens, Oregon 97501 Frank W. Ostrander, Jr.

Counsel for Oregon Dept. of Director, Oregon Department of Energy Energy Labor and Industries Building, Room 111 500 Pacific Building Salem, Oregon 97310 520 S.W. Yamhill Portland, Oregon 97204 Dr. Hugh D. Paxton 1220 41st Street Maurice Axel rad, Esquire Los Alamos, New Mexica 87544 Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad and Toll Michael Malmrose Suite 1214 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Trojan Nuclear Plant Washington, D. C.

2CO36 P. O. Box 0 Rainier, Oregon 97048 Mr. David B. McCoy 348 Hussey Lane Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 Division of Engineering, Architecture and Technology Ms. C. Gail Parson Oklahoma State University 800 S.W. Green #6 Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 Portland, Oregon 97526

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Mr. Charles Goodwin, Jr.

Portland General Electric Company cc: William Kinsey, Esquire Dr. W. Reed Johnson 1002 N.E. Holladay Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Portland, Oregon 97232 Boa rd U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissie Ronald W. Johnson, Esquire Washington, D. C.

20555 Corporate Attorney Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Mr. Donald W. Godard, Supervisor Siting and Regulction Oregon Department of Energy Labor and Industries 3uilding, Room 111 Salem, Oregon 97310 Rcbert M. Hunt, Chairman Board of County Commissioners Col umbia County St. Helens, Oregon 97051 Marshall E. Miller, Esquire, Chairman Atomic Satety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (5)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Docketing and Service Section (4)

Of fice of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

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e REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL It' FORMATION TROJAN CONTROL BUILDING MODIFICATIONS 1

Since the proposed control building modifications are to be rade while the plant is operating, with the aid of drawings, provide the following:

a.

Identify and describe each critical load that will be handled during the control building modifications.

(A critical load is defined as a load which if dropped or handled in an uncontrolled manner can be a direct or indirect cause of the plant's loss in ability to attain and maintain a cold safe shutdown or to cause en unacceptable release of radioactivity).

The description of the loads should include the weight, size, orientation when being handled, maximum potential drop height, and the load path.

b.

In regard to the movement of the mobile, temporary and/or construc-tion type equipment employed on the plant site, describe and discuss those measures which will be taken to preclude damage to essential plant equipment located below grade.

Within the areas where the above equipment may be positioned or travel, identify and indicate the location, depth and construction of all essential plant equipment located below grade.

c.

In regard to the construction people engaged in the handling of critical loads, describe their training, qualifications, and familiarity with the critical load handling equipment as well as the written procedures to be followed during the handling of critical loads, d.

In addition to the train A cable trays, for each critical load handling operation, identify and describe all olant equipment essential for normal plant operation and/or essential in attaining and maintaining a cold safe shutdown that is located beneath or within the area of influence of uncontrolled movement or dropped loads.

e.

For all essential equipment identified above, analyze the potential consequences of a load drop and uncontrolled movement of the load.

Describe all assumptions made in the analyses and all intervening structures or other conditions which mitigate the consequences of the accident.

Indicate the results of each analyses.

2.

From the plant visit, and your submittal entitled, " Report On Design Modifications for the Trojan Control Building," it appears that there are at least four cable trays passing between the control building west wall and the turbine building in the vicinity where the three inch thick plates are to be added.

Further, it is our understanding that the equipment associated with these cables is limited to train A equipment.

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'y y In reference to the handling of plates 7 and 8, described in the July 5,.979 submittal, which are handled above train A cable trays, provide us with the results of analyses that deconstrates that the plant can be maintained in a cold safe shutdown condition.

The.

analyses shall make the following assumptions:

a.

the plates are dropped from the maximum drop heights.

b.

the most adverse combination of adverse results in terms of severed train A cables and damage to other essential systems located below or within the area of influence of the dropped plates; and c.

the most adverse " single failure" (as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix A) occurs in train B equipment.

The analyses results shall clearly indicate how long the reactor has been in a cold shutdown condition before the plates are dropped.

3.

In reference to plates 7 and 8, on Bechtel drawing RSK-1, provide additional information on the rigging used in moving the plates from the transporter (elevation 45'-0") to the turbine building floor (ele-vation 93'-0").

The additional information should include the redundancy and safety margins.

(From OSHA 1910.184 Table N 184-3 or N 184-4 it appears that the two legged sling shown on dra6ing RSK-1 for handling the 47 Kip load, plate number 8, could be marginal as well as not being single failure proof).

4.

Provide additional descriptive information on the operations involving the plate support framing, shown on Bechtel drawing RSK-1, as it relates to the safety margins, redundancy and control over plate nunber 8 when the load is being transferred from the auxiliary hoist to the plate support framing, moved.'nto position whcre the chains hoists will pick up and control the load.

5.

Provide information on the methods that i,ill be employed to sequentially move plates 1 through 6, Bechtel drawing RSK-1, from the incoming transporter to a position where they are lifted by the chain hoists.

The information should incluoe the safety margins and redundancy which will enable one to preclude uncontrolled load movements or drops.

Further, should a drop or uncontrolled movement take place from its maximum carrying height demonstrate that the consequences are acceptable in terms of attaining and maintaining a cold safe shutdown.

6.

Identify any safety related equipment which will be disabled during any part of the modification work while the plant is in operation.

If so, justify.

Does it constitute a violation of any Tech. Spec.?

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7.

Identify and describe in detail all the safety eclated c. n 2nt and r

cables located within each of the work zenes of the creas in '.;hich modification work is to be done.

8.

Identify any area containing safety related cebles and or equiprent in which equipment or materials of constructicn v;ill be stored.

Describe the safety related caoles and equipTent in these areas and the equipment and materials to be stored.

Describe how the storage will be accomplished so that operators will have the necessary access to the equipment in these areas.

9.

Provide in more detail the type of cable tray cover to be used for protecting cables during installation of the plate -ashers and justify its adequacy.

10.

For areas containing unqualified walls in which safety related cables are located and for which there is potential for chunks of debris from the wall to impact safety related cables in open trays or to cause damage to other safety related equipment, describe the area and what measures will be taken to mitigate the effects of falling debris.

11.

Describa how safety related cables will be protect 2d to prevent damage during construction activities.

Describe the drilling equipment to be used and measures to protect cables during drillina.

12.

Describe the areas containing safety related cables where modification work will have some potential for ignition sources ('.elding, cutting grinding, etc.) and for additional combustibles.

For any areas where this potential will exist during modification work, describe the fire protection measures to be taken to assure that fires are not likely to resul t frcm the work and the means to detect and extinguish them quickly should one start.

13.

Assess the impact of drilling on any ventilation system differential pressure requirements and discuss how these requirements will continue to be met during construction.

Will removal of the equipment access door (east wall, el. 65) have a similar impact? If so, discuss.

14.

Describe and discuss what measures will be taken to minimize the naturally airborne and construction created dust, dirt, and grit from being drawn into the emergency diesel generator compartments and being deposited on the electrical equipment located within the compartment during and following the completion of the building modifications.

Inpreparing your response see the reconmendations in NUREG/CR 0660, " Enhancement of Onsite Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability."

15.

Demonstrate that the relocated diesel generator air intake system will not be impaired by all natural phenomena such as earthquakes, wind, tornado, rain, ice and snow.

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16.

Describe and discuss the precautionary measures that will be taken to exclude dust, dirt and grit created by construction activities from being drawn into other areas of the plant housing essential electrical equipment, in order to avoid the failure or sporadic operation of assentiTl electrical equipment whose operation is dependent upon electrical contacts.

17.

The control building modifications involve the removal of concrete which requires the use of eqbipment that may create vibration in the structures.

Describe and discuss what measures will be taken to prevent failuce or sporadic and unreliable operation of essential plant equipment due to vibratior created during the construction activities.

18.

In rega"d to the noise level created by construction activities, describe and discuss what measures have or will be taken to preclude an unacceptable chain of events from taking place due to the operating personnel not hearirg an alarm or being unable to satisfactorily conduct voice communi-catica during plant operation.

As r entioned in your July 5,1979 letter, will a..oise test program be coraucted?

If so, provide details and results.

19.

In regard to the June 22, 1979 response to question 23, provide the following information on the Burlington Northern bumping post:

a.

Parametrically present the energy absorption characteristics of the bumping post in terms of the mass and velocity of the rolling transporters.

b.

Indicate the mass and velocity of the various transporting devices which may impinge on the bumping post throughout the life of the plant.

c.

Describe the measures that will be taken to provide assurance that the transporters will be stopped before contacting the bumping post.

Further, in the unlikely event that it should contact the bumping post indicate what measures vill be taken to be assured that the contact velocity will be below the design limitations of the bumping post.

d.

Provide a drawing of the bumping post.

e.

Describe what is meant by the phrase " draft gear."

20.

The June 22, 1979 Trojan response to staff question 1 states in effect that certain equipment which was formerly qualified would not be re-qualified to the new response spectra.

With regard to this response:

a.

Clarify the sentence under CVCS, subheading "?iping."

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. b.

Clarify which sampling system lines will not be seismically qualified.

State clearly whether or not the Containment Hydrogen Sampling System is to remain seismic Category I.

c.

Tne fact that RG 1.29 Rev. 3 does not apply to the gaseous waste systeci or to the sampling system is not an acceptable reason for excluding portions of these systems from seismic requalification.

Provide your analyses which demonstrate that a rupture anywhere of those portions of these systems you desire to exclude has acceptably low radiological consequences and is other-wise acceptable from the standpoint of safe plant operation.

d.

To eliminate any concern for synergistic mechanisms, discuss the safety impact of a simultaneous rupture or maloperation of all the excluded systems and components.

e.

Indicate on FSAR Fig.11.3-4 the exact boundari. s of the WGS that will remain sei rally qualified.

Specifically discuss the boundaries of the waste.. decay tanks cod connected piping.

Discuss why it is unlikely that the contents of more than one tank would be released (contents limited per Appendix B Tech. Spec. 2.4.5.e.).

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