ML19242D139
| ML19242D139 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Skagit |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1979 |
| From: | Jacobsen G PUGET SOUND POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| PLN-223, NUDOCS 7908140544 | |
| Download: ML19242D139 (24) | |
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August 13, 1979 s
' ' !/,. l..J., N PLN-223 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
Dr. Harold Denton, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
Subject:
Skagit Nuclear Power Project Docket Numbers 50-522 and 50-523 Puget Sound Power & Light Conpany's responses and commitments to the following NRC documentation re. the Three Mile Island incident.
1.
Recomnendations of NUREG-0578, "T:!I-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE STATUS REPORT AND SHORT-TER" RECOMMENDATIONS," July 19, 1979.
2.
Requirements of IE Bulletin 79-08, " EVENTS RELEVANT TO BOILING WATER REACTORS IDE:'TIFIED DURING THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT,"
April 14, 1979.
3.
Requirements of the NRC Staff neno to the Connissioners entitled, ' ACTION PLAN FOR Pt' '!PTLY IMPROVING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS," July 23, 1979 (CECY-79-450).
Dear Dr. Denton:
As discussed with Puget Power's Vice President of Engineering and Construc-clon, Mr. Warren J. Ferguson, on August 3, 1979, in neetings with Mr.
Vassallo, Mr. Varga and others of the NRC, we are at this time submitting 40 copies of our responses and commitments to the above subject NRC docunenta-tion.
As suggested during the August 3, 1979 neetings, we are submitting this material at this tine so that an early review can be initiated and so that the NRC may implement those actions necessary to grant a construction perait for the Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2, in an orderly and timely nanner.
Puget Power has followed the Three Mile Island incident and studied all aspects to determine how they night be relevant to and impact Skagit. Puget Power's Manager of Skagit Operations is prese ly directing the company's efforts with regard to the Three Mile Island incident.
He draws upon the Manager of Nuclear Licensing and Safety, the Principal Engineer Nuclear, who is also the Project Engineer for Skagit, and other company expertise as appropriate to ensure that all.alevant lessons learned from the incident are reviewed and incorporated into the conpany's nuclear progra a and plant design.
Puget Power is also participating in industry efforts to study and review the incident and has, as an exauple, a representative to EPRI's Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.
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Dr. Harold Denton August 13, 1979 The conpany's efforts are in addition to those reviews being performed by the Bechtel Power Corporation, Puget's Architect-Engineer, and the General Electric Company, Pugat's NSSS vendor.
The latter reviews will be factored into the Puget Powe r's assessnent s.
This letter and its attachments repre-sent Puget Power's responses and commitments with respect to the recocaenda-tions set torth in the above subject d oc ume nt s. As appropriate, the connitments will be incorporated into the plant design, training programs, operating procedures and energency response plans.
Necessary details of these commitments will be set forth in the FSAR.
It is Puget Power's intent to continue to review, study, and assess all relevant material and data as it becomes available through the construction phase and implement any additional changes necessary to protect the public health and safety.
If questions arise during the course of the NRC's review of our responses and commitments, please call us immediately.
Very truly yours, V
s G. W. Jaco$(en, Director Skagit Nuclear Project JE!!/ bv cc: Attached Correspondence List
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Attachnent 1 SEACIT i;UCLEAR PO'. i:R PROJECT 1:!:lTL 1 and 2 Pl!GET SOU:;I) PO' Pt & LI GII1 CD::PA:;Y l>u cke t ':o s. $0-522 6 50-523 I;UREG-U 57S COS"!1 TT.TS The followin: infornation addresnes the requirements of ::UREG-057 8, "T'il-2 LESSC::S LEAi7.D TASK E011CE A::D SHORT-TEi?'t RECC :1E::DATIG!!S," (July 19, 1979). 1:here nore detailed engineering or design is necessary, the details of implenentation will be spelled out in the PSAR.
2.1 Desien and Anal.nis Iten 2.1.1 Energency Power Supply Requirenents for the Pressurizer Heaters, Pnwer-Operated Relief and Bloch Valves, and Pressurizer Level Indic a tors in P'.!Rs.
Re c o:'me n d a t io n :
Provide redundant encrr,ency pouar for the nininin number of pressurizer heatets required to naintain natural circulation conditions in the event of losa of offsite power.
ilso provide crergency p wer to the control and notive power systens for the power-operated relief valves and associated block valves and to the pressurizer level indication instruuent channels.
Resnonse:
This recormendation is not applicable to the BWR/6 t.SSS of the b;.agit I;uclear Power Project.
Iten 2.1.2 Perforr.ance Testing for In:R and P'. R Relief and Safety Valves.
Recorocndation:
Connit to provide performance verification by full scale prototypical tt : t i n y.
for all relief and nafety valve?
Test conditions shall include t :-co pha se clug flou and subcoolod liquid flow calculated to occur for desir,n Lasis trin';ientn cud accidents.
Renpanne:
PSP &L is folloufng inlustry offorts to e-tablir. the functional pe r t orr mee capabiliti." of P'!K.,ed U m. ;f or y and roliof valv.
for n o r; :a l, t ra n.;ie n t and accidt ut 0..dition.
PSP &L cu ;its to incorporatinn in 'Uagit the resolution arrived at by o nno t.ng 1 of 10
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industry /NLC activities.
I t cu ').1. 3 Infornation to Aid Operators in Accident Diagnosis and Control.
a.
Direct I nef i ca t ion o f Power-onerat ed Helief Valve and Safet'. Valve _
Position l or I"
, and N.'As.
Peco:,endation:
Provide in the control room either a reliabic, direct position indication for the valves or a reliable flow indication devices do.:nstreaa of the valves.
Respanse:
Shanit uill conply with this reconnendation.
Among the alternatives ue will examine is the detection of flon by acoustic methods.
In this regard, PSP &L is for instance nonitoring the results of EPRI research project no. RP1246, " Acoustic Monitoring for Power Plant Valves'.
b.
Instrumentation for Detection of Inndequate Core Coolin PURs and In:Pi.
Reco-'endation:
Perform analyses and inplement procedures and training for preapt reco;;nition of low reactor coolant level and inadequate core cooling usin;; exi s ting reactor ins t rumentation.
Response
Shagit will comply uith this reconnendation.
Iten 2.1.4 Containrent Isolation Provisions for PURs and EURs.
R e c o:re n d a t i on :
Provide contair ent isolation on diverse sinnals in confornance with Section 6.2.4 of the Standard Review Plan, review isolat'on provisions for non essent:a1 systens and revise as necescary, and modify containnent isolation desinns as necessary to clininate the potential for inadvertent reopenina upon reset of the isolation signal.
Response
The Skagit design inclu,les diverse signals for initiating containment isolation and prov <.lons uhich eliminate the potential for inadvertent reop.uing u'on i< uet of the isolation ;innal.
PSPLL will perforn a desinn review of Shagit to deterninn whether any 3 9
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corrective neasures are necessary.
Isolation provisions for non essential syste'm will also h reviewed and revised ar necessary.
Shagit's final design will neet the requirements of this recon =endation.
Iten 2.1.5 Post-Accident Hydrogen control Systens for 1". R and B'. R Containments.
a.
Dedicated Penetrations for Internal Reccabiner or Post-Accident Extarnai i>uroe Svst(q.
P e c orr enda t i on:
For plants that have external reconbiners or purge systems, provide dedicated penetrations and isolation systems that teet the redundancy and single f ailure requirenents of the Conair aion regulations.
Modify desien as necessary so that these systens are not connected to, or are branch lines of, the large containnent purge penetrations.
Response
The Shanit design includes 1007' redundant hydro;;en recombinera loca ted within the containment of each unit as described in section 6.2.5.2.4 of the PSAR.
This recommendation is therefore not applicable, b.
Inertinc B"R Containments.
Reconmendation:
Provide inerting for all Mark I and thrk II Ella containments. Thie would require ch2nges at Vernont Yanhee and Hatch Unit 2 (operatir.
plants), as well as pending OL applications for " ark I and II ITRs.
Responne:
Thir is not applicable to Shagit, which has a concrete !brh III containment.
c.
Capabilit. to Install I!vd roner. Recombiner at i'.ach Licht 1:ater iluclear Pover Plant.
Reconnendation:
A ninority of the Tash force recornends that all operating reactors, which do not already have the capability, he required to provide the capabilitf to add, within a fev days after an accident, a hydrogen recoabiner systen for post-accident hydrogen control.
Response
The Sha;;i t desigt inclvb, 10 nl' redunlant hydro,.en recombiners located eithin the containm nt of each unit as describei in section 6.2.5.2.4 of the PSAR.
1 h i r. reco.. mndat ion is theratore not applicable.
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Iten 2.1.6 Post-Accident Control of Padiation in Systens Outside Contcinnent o f 11lR s and EURo.
a.
Intecrity of Systems outnido containnent Likely to Contain Padioactive ':3terials (Enaineered Safety Systens and luxiliary Systens).
Pecor.endation:
Perforn leahane cate tests on systens outside containment that process prinary coolcat and could contain high level radiactive r+aterials.
Develop and inplenent a periodic testing prograu and preventive naintenance programs.
Responne:
PSPGL will perforn a design review to identify systems outside containnent that process prinary coolant and could contain high level radioactive naterials.
Appropriate periodic testing and preventive naintenance prograns will be inplenented to comply with this reconuendation.
b.
Desien Review of Plant Shieldina of Spacen for Post-Accident Operations,.
'ecornendation:
Perform a design review of the shielding of systens processing prinary coolant outsid; of contai:nent.
Deternine any areas or equipnent that are vital for post-accident occupancy or operation and assure that access and performance will not be unduly inpaired due to radiation from these systens.
Rennance:
The necessary review will be parformed to assure that access and perfarnance vill not be unduly impaired, lten 2.1.7 Improved Auxiliary Feeduater Systen Reliability for PWRs.
a.
Autonatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Pooduater Systen.
Rec on".e n d a t i on :
Provide autoratic initiation of all au::iliary feeduater systens. The initiation signals and circuite shall be desir,ned in such a nanner that a single failure will not result in the l o s <> o f auxiliary f eedwater nysten tunction.
Testability oi the i ni t ia t ing nip,nals a nd c ircuits shall be a feature o f 'fa e d e s i gn. The initiating signals and circuits v
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a e,in;,l o failure vill not result in the los, of auxiliary feeduater syster function.
Testability
<>f the initiating sinnals and circuits shall be a feature of the design.
The initiating signals and circuits shall be pow.: red f rom t he e: ernency huset.
"anual capchility to initiate the auxiliary feedwater systen fron the control roon nust be retained and nust be inplenented in such a nanner that a single failure in the nanual circuits vill not result in the loss of systen function.
The a-c notor-dri'.en pumps and valves in the auxiliary feedwater systen must he incleded in the auton itic actuation (sinultaneous or sequential) of the loads to the energency buces. The design of the automatic initiatie signals and circuits must be such that their failure will not result in the loss of nanual capability to initiate the auxiliary feedvater sys ten fi e control roon.
Rennanse:
This reconnendation is not applicable to Skagit.
b.
Auxiliarv Feedunter Flow Indication to Stean Generators.
Recce endation:
Provide safety grade indication in the control roon of auxiliary feeduater flow for each steau generator.
Tiu. flow instrument channels
,ith satisfying shall be powered from the energency buses, consistent the pouer diversity requirenents for auxiliary feedwater systen,.
Resnonne-This recon,endation is not applicable to Shagit.
Iten 2.1.3 lastrumentation to rollou the Course of an Accident.
a.
Inproved Post-Accident Sannline Capabilitv.
Recomnndation:
Review and uparade the capability to obtain sanoles from the reactor coolant systen and containnent atnosphere under high radioactivity condillons.
Provide the capability for cuenical and speJLrun analysis of high-level sanples onsite.
Response
PSPLL will conduct. a deaign and operational review of the renctor coolant and containc:ent atnospheric sanpling systens to deternine the capability of personnel to obtain a sanple under accident conditions without incurrina excessive radiation expanure.
A comparable review will he nade of the radiological :pectrun analyses facilities to deternine ability t.o quantify certain radioisotopes that are indicators of core damage.
Theco nyst ens will be up raded as necessary, as will chenical analy,;en facilities.
5 of 10 M ',, lg
b.
Increased "atrce of Radiation "onitors.
Pecornendation:
Provide high ranze radiation nonitors for noble gases ir plant effluent lines and a high-range radiation nonitor in the containnent.
Provide instrunentation f o r noni t o rin;' ef f lu.> n t release lines capable of neasuring and identifying radiciodine and particulate radioactive effluents under accident conditions.
Her.ponse:
PSP &L will participate in the industry efforts to provide: a) high rane;c radiation nonitors for noble gases in plant effluent lines, b) a high-range radiation nonitor in the contairnent, and c) instrunentation for nonitoring effluent release linen capable of neasuring and identifying radioiodine and particulate radioactive effluents under accident con-ditions. The instrunentation for Skagit will conply with the final re-solution between the ::RC ard the industry based on state-of-the-art capability.
c.
Innroved In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation.
Recomm ndation:
Provide instrunentatien for accurately deterninin', in plant airborne radioiodine concentrations to ninini::e the need for unnecessary use of respiratory protection equipment.
Response
Instrunentation will be provided for determining in plant airborne radioiodine concentrations to nininine the need for unnecessary use of respiratory pro.tection equipnent.
Accuracy and sensitivity uill be based on statc-of-the-art capability, c
Item 2.1.9 Analysis of Design and off-;ornal Transients and Accidents.
a.
Reconnendation:
Provide the analysis, energency procedures, and training to substantially inprove operator perforr:ance during a small break loss-of-coolant accident.
lesponse-PSPGL uill provido the appropriate analysis, procedure: and training, as outlined at pp. A-4 2 t o A-4 5 o f I;UREG-05'/8.
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b.
Reconnend1tfon:
Provide the analysis, emergency procedures, and training needed to assure that the reactor operator can recognize and respond to conditions of inadequate core cooling.
Response
PSP &L vill provide the appropriate analysis, procedures and training, as outlined at pp. A-42 to A-45 of NUREG-0578.
c.
Recornendation:
Provide the analysis, energency procedures, and training to substantially inprove operator perfornance during transients and accidents, including events that are caused or worsened by inappropriate operator actions.
Response
PSP &L Jill provide the appropriate analysis, procedures and training at discussed at p. A-4 5 o f 1:UREG-0578.
Iten 2.2 Operations Iten 2.2.1 Improved Reactor Operations Connand Function.
a.
Shift Supervisor Resnoncibiities Recor andation:
Review plant adr.inistrative and nanagenant procedures.
Revise as nece car; to annure that reactor operations command and control responsibilitie and authority are properly defined.
Corporate rnna nene n t shall revise and prcnptly une an operations policy directive that enphasinen the duties, responsibilities, and authority and lines of con und of the control roop operators, the shift techaical adviror, and the person respon :1ble for reactor operations connand in the control roon (i.e.,
the senior reactor operator).
Rerponse-PSP &L has revieued the discum: ion at pp. A-47 to A-43 of *:l' REG-0578 and will atsure that adninistrative and mana;;enent procedures are estahlished and inpl.nented to conply viih this reco.~endation.
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b.
Shift Technical Advisor Reconnendation:
Provide on shift at each nuclear pouer plant, a qualifiol person (the shift technical advisor) with a bachelor'- degree or equivalent in a science or engineerin;; discipline and with specific training in the to of f-normal events and in accident analysis of the plant response plant.
Shift technical advisory shall serve in an advi::ary capacity to shift supervisors. The licensee shall assign narnal dut ies to the shift technical rdvisor that pertain to the engineering aspects of assuring safe operations of the plant, including the review and evaluation or operating experience.
Response
These staffing recontendations will be reviewed by PSP &L.
Skagit will at the tine be in conpliance with such requirenents as nay be in effect of operating licensing issuance, and PSPSL uill nahe appropriate provisions in its staffing and training plans.
c.
Shift and Relief Turnover Procedures Reconmendation:
Review and revise plant procedures as necessary to assure that a shift turnover chechlist is provided and recuired to be completed and signed by the on-coning and off going individuals responsible for connand of operations in the control roon.
Supplementary checklists and shift logs should be developed for the entire operatione organization, including instrument technicians, auxiliary operators, and nalntenance personnel.
Respons"-
Necessary shift and relief turnover procedures will be in place prior to operation of Shagit. Icong the features of inproved procedures which will be considered are those identified at pp. A-52 to A-54 of NUREC-0578.
Iten 2.2.2 Inproved In-Plant Energency Procedures and Preparations a..
Control Roon Access Recornendation:
Review plant energency procedures, and revise as necesary to assure that access to the control roon under nornal and accident conditions is liuited to those person, necessary to the ;a f e connand and control or operations.
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ce controls for control Roon access will be provided, along the Adequ lines of the limitations identified at p. A-56 of NUREG-0573.
b.
Onsite Technical Surnort Center ReccrnendaLion:
A separate technical support center shall be provided for use by plant nanagenent, technical, and engineerin., suppoct personnel.
In an enargency, this center shall be used f or assessnent of plant status and of the control roon connand and potential of f sit e inpact in support The center should also be used in conjunction with control function.
inplementation of onsite und offsite energency plans, including connunications with an offsite energency response center.
Provide at the onsite technical support center the as-built drawings of general plant arrangenents and pipie,, instrunentation and electrical systems.
Photographs of as-built systen layouts and locations nay be an acceptable nethod of satisfying sone of these needs.
Penpense:
Shanit will have an Oasite Technical Support Center which uill comply with the above recor endation. A prelininary partial description of this facility is included in the follouing paragraphs.
the The present Shnit design already includes an area which should neet requirenents for an Onsite Technical Support Center.
This area consists
" Work of the Shift Suparvisors office and the space designated as a Area" on Figure 1.
This area is innediately adjacent to the control roca and has the same habitability requirements as the control roon for postulated accident conditions.
The Dh'R/6 ';uclenet control roca design for Shagit includes a Super-visor's Console located in the Shift Supervisor's affice. This console and provides CRT displaya which can be esed by plant ranagement technical support personnel to deternine plant status.
These are the sane displayr available to the control roan operator fron the plant conputer. Additional infornation ta follou the course of an accident, such as area radiation,nd effluent nonitoring, is available on "back rou" panels in the control roon.
("nack row" panels are referred to on Figure 1.)
The accessibility of the the "/tuxiliary Control Roon" panels frca the Technical Support Center ceabined with the Nucienet Supervisor's Console sLould greatly redece the potential for congestion in the control roon and avoid interference with the reactor cornand and control function.
The Technical Support Center described above will include the necessary equipnent for con unications with thu '4C and the Emergency Operationt Center (S-ret non se:. to it.n 9 of Dull et ! n 79-M, Attachment 2; and itin 3 of ECf-70-c.50, ittachnent 1).
It is anticipated that the *:XC,
state and local governnent would have individual, located in the Technical Support Center.
Space i: available for a linited number of hy.
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non-PSPL personnel in the Technical Support Center and connunications equipnent will he provided for them to renain in contact ':ith their respective offices or the Energency Operations Center.
PSPL believes that it is essential that representatives of these goverPrent apencies have direct knowled;;e of current and projected plant status since they have responsibility for recomuending the protective actions which nay be appropriate for the public.
c.
Onsite Operational Support Center Recornendations Each operating nuclear power plant should establish and naintain a separate onsite operational support center outside the control roon.
In the event of an energency, shift support personnel (e.g., auxiliary operators and technicians) other than those required and allowed in the control roen shall report to this center for further orders and assignuent.
Response
Shagit vill provide en Onsite Operational Support Center outside the control rocn, as a nustering point for operational support personnel.
Iten 2.2.3 Revised Li,iting Cenditions for Operation of Nuclear Power Plant Based Upon Safety Systen Availability.
R ec onn r> nda t I on :
Require that the Technical Specifications for each reactor provide that the reactor be placed in a hot shutdoun condition within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and in a cold shutdown condition by the licensee within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of any tine that it is found to be or to have been in oper.. tion with a conplete loss of safety function (e.g.,
loss of energency feedcater, high pressure ECCS, low pressure FCCS, containment, energency p Wer or other prescribed safety function).
Require that an asses,nent of the cause of the losn of safety function he made (e.g., twintenance, operations error) and that an evaluation of alternativa corrective actions be nade and doctr. tented by the licensee.
Require that the senior corporate officer responsible for operation of the faciity present the licensee reccomendation for corrective action and evaluation of the alternatives at a public nectina with nenior ':RC officials. Require that the senior NRC officials iwua their decision at that public.necting, or a subsequent public neeting if tine is required for staff evaluation, concerning the adequacy of the channes to inprove operational reliability proposed by the u t il i t:,.
Allm the facility to return to po cer only af ter :,RC approval of the changes proposed by the licensee.
Resnonse'.
As ind icated by 'mRI:C-0578,
- p. A-63, inplenentation of this sum,estion requires a rule c ha n;;e and certain rulemising procedures.
PSP &L will comply with any role which.'ay he adoptml by the MRC on this cubject applicable to the Shagit plant, g G, c": ;~,.
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Attachnent 2 SPaGIT NUCLEAR Poi lER PROJECT U::ITS 1 and 2 PUGET SOUND POUER 6 LIGilT CO:!PANY Docket Nos. 50-522 6 50-523 EULLE11: 79-08 CC:DIT:' ':TS The infor ation which follows addresses PSP &L's response to IE Eulletin No.
noiling ;later Reactors Identified Durinp, Three 79-03, " Events Pelevant to
'lile island" (April 14, 1979).
Althou;;h this document is, at least ly, intended for operators of licensed Boiling !?ater Reactors, PSP &L init4 has re,it aed it for its applicability at construction peroit stage. Ce rt ain itens have been identified, as to which appropriate connitments can be nade The following responses address each iten of IE Eulletin 79-Od.
now.
I TI:". -
1.
Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE nulletin 79-03 and the prelininary chronology of the T !I-2 3/28/79 cccident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
a.
Thin review should be directed toward understanding:
(1) the extrene seriousness and consequences of the sinultaneous blocking of both trains of a safety systen at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to eventual core dana;;e, and (3) the necessit-j to systematically analyac plant conditions and paraneters and take appropriate corrective action.
b.
Operational personnel should be instructed to (1) not override autoaatic action of enqineered safety features unless continued operation of ergineered safety features vill result in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 5a of thic bulletin); and (2) not nahe operational decisions based solely on a single plant paraneter indication when one or nore confirnatory indications are available.
c.
All licensed operators and plant nanagenent and supervisors with operational responsibilities shall par:ticipate in this review and such participation shall be doeur ente.1 in plant records.
Response-la. Tbse mtters vill be incorporated and : tressed in the trainInc, prograu for the ';ha n i t operating staff, indicated and appropriate lb. Operatin;; personnel cill be instructed procedures will be established to neet tLe requirement of reco:.nendation lb.
m
,-cr, 1 of 6 L4 (t t> C
Ic. Ope rating personnel, as uell as plant 'iana 3 and supervisors with operating responsibilities, will participate in the prograru described in la. and lb.
Thic vill be docunented in the plant training records.
1Ti:!!:
2.
Revia the containnent isolation initiation design and procedures, and prepare and inplement all chnn:;e3 necessary to initiate containment isolation, whethar nanual or automatic, of all lines whow i coln ion does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capability, upon autenatic initiation of safety injection.
Response
2.
The reco: ended revieu will be conducted for Skagit.
The scope of this revicu is addressed in the response to lten 2.1.4 of ::UREG-0578 in Attachnent 1.
1Ti' :
3.
Describe tL2 actions, both automatic and nanual, necessary for proper f unctioning of the au::illary heat renoval systen (e.g., RCIC) that are used when the nain feeduater systen is not operable.
For any nanual action necessary, describe in uu: nary fora the procedure by which this action is taken in a tinely sense.
Response
3.
If the n,in feochmter systen becones inoperable during operation, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) systen and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systen vill autonatically start and provide an abundant anount of nahe-up cater to the reactor.
Safety relief valves on the main ;tean lines autonaticall:, control rcactor pressure by discharging stean to the suppression pool.
A feu nanual actions are required to initiate long tern core and contair, cat cooling.
Sufficient infornation vill be available to the operator in the control roon to assist hin in taking the required nanual actions.,nd to verify that automatically initiated systens are achieving their objective.
A detailed description of the autenatic and nanual actions and procedures necersary for proper functioning of the heat renoval systens that are used then the nain feeduater systen is inoperable vill be provided during the OL review.
ITE. !:
4.
Describe all us % and types of vessel level indication for both
':U.E r rk2 2 of 6
aut onatic and mnual ini Liation of naf ety systenn. Descrite other redundant instrunentation which the operator night have to give the sane infornation rcr.arding plant status.
Instruct operators to utilize other available informtion to initiate safety systeus.
Responne:
4.
All uses and types of vessel level indicat.on for both autonatic and nanual initiation of safety systens uilt be reviewed and described in the FSAR.
Uedu 9 ant instruaentation which the operator will have to give the s.me infuruation re;;arding plant status will be identified and factored into operator training, Instruction, and procedures.
The operator training pro;;rnn will be revir.:ed to assure that operators utilice all available in f o rna t ion to initiate safety systens.
Details will be described at the tine the FSAR is subnitted.
IT""-
5.
Review the action directed by the operating precedures and training instructions to ensure that:
Operators do not override autonatic actions of engineered safety a.
features, unless continued 0:eration or engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (e.g. vessel integrity).
Os ~re ~_ provided additional information and instructions to b.
c not rely upon vessel le'zel indication alone for nanual actions. but to also exanine ot.her plant parancter indications in evaluating plant conditions.
nesconne:
Sa. procedures vill be developed to ensure that operators do not override autonatic actions of ennineered safety features unless continued operation will renult in unsafe conditions.
5b. The proceduren and operational training for Shagit vill stress that operators shall take into account all available plant paraneter conditions ani not nerely rely on ver sel level indication.
1TDI:
6.
neview all nafety-related valve paritions, positioning requirenents and positive controls to a33nre that valves, rcnain positioned (opan or cloned) in a n.umn to ensure the proper oporat. ion of engineered safety features.
Also review related procedures, :nch as those for naintenance, te, tina, plant a n'! :ys t i n ; tart op, and cupe rvisory p.'riod ic
( e. e.., dail y/nhi f t. chech,,) mrveill.mce to onnure that such valves are returned ta their correct ponitican f ollowi m, nece: ;ary manipulationn
~
3 of 6 k n > :,.:
and are naintained in their proper positions during all operational rodes.
Response
6.
PSPSL 1111 revieu all safety-related valve positions, position requirenents and controls to assure that valves remain positioned to
- suureproper operation of engineered safety features.
Procedures vill also be developed and revie:.ed to assure that such valves are returned to correct position after bein., noved and are nalntained in that position. The inpienentation of these procedures and their adequacy vill be confirmed on a continuing basis by the Quality Assurance Pro;;raa for Operations.
ITE:1:
7.
Revieu your operating codes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gaset and liquids out of the primary containment to assure that undesired puaping, ventin,; or o.he r release of radioactive liquids and gases vill not occur inadvertently.
In particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engin wring saftty features instruaentation.
List all st.ch systens and indicate:
a.
Uhether interlocks exist to prevent transfer uhen high radiation indication e::ists.
b.
Whether such systens are isolated by the containnent isolation
- signal, c.
The basis on e:hich continued operability of the above features is assurred.
Response
7.
PSP &L vill revieu Ska;;it's operatirn; modes and procedures and, at the time of FSAR subaitral, provide de;criptions cf procedures and contrc;1s to prevent the inadvertent or undesirable transfer of radioactive fluide or gases outside of containment.
ITE:1:
8.
Revieu and nodif y as necessary your unintenance and test procedures to ensure that they require:
a.
Verification, by tent or inspection, of the operability oi reJuudant safet - related systens prior to the renoval of any catety-related systen froa service.
4
< v94 N A. [ (s ' (,
4 of f>
b.
Verification of the operability of all nafety-related systets when they are returned to service follouinn maintenance or testing, c.
D;plicit notification of involve.d reactor operational personnel whenever a saiety-related systen is removed fron and returned to service.
Resnonse:
8.
Shagit naintenance and test procedures vill be written to ensure that maintenance and test procedures address verification of the operability of necessary safety-related systens and tho explicit notification of appropriate personnel of any cht.nge in the operational status of thow syste:m. During the approval process these procedures vill be reviewer' to ensure that the necessary adninistrative controls are included to fully comply with this requirenent.
ITE:t:
9.
Review your pronpt reporting procedures for MMC notification to atuure that NRC n notified within one hout of the tine the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of ore.ation.
Further, at that time an open continuous cconunication channel shall be established and naintained with NRC.
Resnonse:
9.
I'rocedures for this purpose will be described durinr; the OL revien for Skagit at the tine the FSAR is subnitted.
ITE!!:
- 10. Review operating. odes and procedures to deal with significant anounts of hydror,en "as t h:i t nay he generated durin:; a transient or other accident th n would cither renain inside the primary systen or be released to the containnent.
Reg onne:
- 10. The review will be conducted and operatina nodes and procedures will be described, at the tin - the FSAR is suLn!Lted, for dealing with significant amounts of hydro;;en gas inside the primary systen or containaent chich.
be p,cne ra t ed during a transient or accident, c.
,,,, o
$(. $e y
5 of 6
ITF:!:
rerpti red, to those technicai specifications which
- 11. propoce cha:r e s, as rut ;t be nodi ied as a result of your inplei:enting the itens above.
Recnonne:
- 11. All of the foi enoing itenn ill be revieued prior to submittal of the OL application. Tecnnical specifications coning out of this review will be prepared md incorporated during OL review.
D A i e'm-,,, 9
/_.
6 of 6
Attachnent 3 SKAG 1T ?;UCLEAR PO',l :R PROJECT U::ITS 1 and 2 PUCCT SOU:;D PO',lER & LIGHT COMPA!;Y Daciet !:0 3. 50-522 & 50-523 F!fERGi2:CY PL": CD'Ufl T:', ':TS The Comiscion's Staf f recently subuitted to the Conaissioners an " Action Plan for Promptly Inprovire, 'nergency Preparedness" (SECY-79-450, July 23, 1979). That docunent outlines innediate steps to improve licensee prepared-ne s r. "at all op catin;; pouer plants and for near tera OLs."
Although not applicable by its terns to pending CP applicants, PSP &L's Task Force on Energency Plan., has been evaluating many of the aatters disenssed in SECY-79-450.
Although details *:111 he furnished during the OL review, PSPLL, based on its study to date submits the follouing conaents and conmitments with respect to emergency plans for Skagit:
ITi"1:
1.
Upgrade licensee energency plans to satisfy Regulatory Guide 1.101, with special attention to the developatnt of unifora action level criteria based on plant paraneters.
Respcuse:
1.
The energency plan for Skngit will comply uith the requirenents of Regulatory Guide 1.101.
In developing the plan, special consideration will be giver to the establishnent of uniforn action levul criteria appropriate to the Shagit design.
ITT2':
2.
Assure the inplementation of the related recenmendations of the I;RR Lessons Learned Task Forca involvin;; instrunentation to follow the course of an accident and relate the information provided by this instrunent. tion to the energency plan action levels.
This will include instruaentation for post-accident ;anpilnn, hip,h range radioactivity nonitors, and improved in plant radiciodine instrumentation. The inplenentation of tl.e Lersons Learned recornendation on instrumentation for detection of inadequate core cooling 'illi also be factored into the energency plan action level criteria, n.
,,, z 1 of 3
_Ri'; Don c e :
2.
PSPf.L i< connitt(d to these design featuro< in Attachn2nt 1.
(See respan':e to Reco :endat ion 2.1.0 of ::Imc-0578.) The inplenentation of the Le: sonu Lea-ned reconnend. tion on ins trunentation for detection of inadequate core coolin<; uill aco be factored into the ene rp,ency plan action level criteria.
ITT"!:
P.nernency Oparations Center for Federal, ctate and 3.
Deternine that an local personnel has been established with suitable connunications to the plant, and that up radin;' of the facility in accordance with the Lessons Learned reconnendation for an in plant technical suppurt center is underway.
Respanne:
3.
PSPf L it connitted to establishing an Energenc'/ Operations Center as required by this re c or"ne nd a t i on.
(See response to Peconnendrtion 2.2. .b.
of ::UREC-057 8 ( At t achne n t 1).)
Thu location of the _nerp.cacy Operation Center and the facilities to be provided there.ill be described in the PSAR.
ITrit:
4.
'ssure that improved licensee offsite nonitoring capabilities (includ-in;; additional TLD's or equivalent) have been provided for all sites.
Resnonse-4 Shap,i t vill conply with this requirenent.
ITFN:
5.
Asresi the relatin u, hip of '.te/ local plans to the licensee's and rederal plans so an to a:,sure the capability to tahe appropriate enerr,ency action.
Assure that this capability vill be extended to a distance of 10 niles as soon an practical but not later than January 1, 1981. This iten uill be perforned in conjunction uith the Otfice of State Pro;;rans and the Office ot~ Inspection a nd Enforcenent.
bq. 6' e - ! t 1:esponne:
5.
PSP 6L 13. cooperatiny with oth"r utilitie in Washing, ton as well as cor,nizant arenei.,ot the State at Washinnton and local :;ov e r nn e n t e to develop an emo rerney respons,e plan desirned to assure the capability to take protective neasures out to a distance of 10 nileu fron the plant site.
2 of 3
I T f _'_! :
6.
P.equire tent c:w r c i r e - of approved Energency Pl. ins (Federal, itate, local, licen ms), a recic.' pluin f or cuch c:.erc iees, and part icipa t o in a linited tu ' 2r of ioint exe rc ines.
Tests of licensee plans <<ill he conducted as soon ar practical for all facilitier, and required to before reac tor startup f or ne.i licennee,.
Exercises of State plann <,:111 be parfor d in conj anct ion with the co,currence revie'rs of the Office of State P.i rans.
Jo int test exercise, involving Federal, State, local a nd l ic c a r.1 will be conducted at the rate of about 10 per year, which would result in all ;ites being c:mrcised once each five yeart,.
Response
nature and 6.
Skagit vill conply with all requirenents regarding the frequenc) o: rariodic driils of e:.e rnency plan.
Procedures for this purpose will be provided in the FSAR.
w, 8 *.
g.'
3 of 3