ML19242B289
| ML19242B289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/14/1979 |
| From: | Kohler J, Spessard R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19242B285 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-295-79-11-01, 50-295-79-11-1, 50-304-79-11, NUDOCS 7908070825 | |
| Download: ML19242B289 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000295/1979011
Text
,
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Report No. 50-295/79-11, 50-304/79-11
Docket No. 50-295; 50-304
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690
Facility Name:
Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
Insnection At:
Zion Site, Zion, IL
Inspection Conducted: April 30-May 18, 1979
'(d' & as .-d
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.nspector:
J. E. Kohler
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Approved By:
R. L. Spessard, Chief
6//V/79
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Reactor Projects Section 1
Inspection Summary
Inspection on April 30-May 18, 1979 (Report No. 50-295/79-11;
50-304/79-11)
Areas Inspected:
Special inspection of the operator training
conducted as a result of the Three Mile Island incident, com-
plete review of engineered safety features systems, modifications
to safety injection logic, and licensee's response to IE Bulletin
No. 79-06, 06A and 06A Rev.
1.
The inspection involved 71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br />
of onsite inspection by one NRC inspector.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- N.
Wandke, Station Superintendent
- C. Schumann, Operating Assistant Superintendent
- E.
Fuerst, Unit 1 Operating Engineer
R. Ward, Unit 2 Operating Engineer
F. Stecha, Engineering Assistant
T. Oling, Engineering Assistant
B. Lowe, Training Instructor
F. Stetkar, Shift Foreman
T. Boyce, Shift Engineer
K. Garside, Shift Foreman
J. Harbin, Shift Engineer
G. Armstrong, Shift Engineer
G. Rowe, Nuclear Station Operator
R. Landrum, Nuclear Station Operator
D. Kaley, Nuclear Station Operatcr
N. Val
Shift Foreman
F. L
.ae,
Shift Foreman
F. Pauli, Shift Engineer
L. Pruett, Shift Foreman
C. Keene, Nuclear Station Operator
J. Brandes, Nuclear Station Operator
2.
Review of Operator- Training on Thcee Mile Island Incident
a.
The inspector met with various operators of each shift and
unit during the three working shifts to determine whether
the operators had received training regarding procedure
changes initiated as a result of IE Bulletin No. 79-06,
No.79-06A and No.79-06A, Revision 1.
Two procedure changes resulted from the bulletin that
required operator cognizance.
These changes dealt with
the following:
(1) Actuation of the safety injection system based on a
two out of three low pressurizer pressure logic and
temporary annunciator response when one pressure
channel is in test.
(2) Additional precautions regarding isolation of the
power operated relief valves during operation and
-2-
507
004
operator notification that setpoints for power oper-
ated relief valve actuation will be changed to comply
with IEEE requirements.
All discussions with operators indicated that they were
aware of these procedural changes and the location of the
instructions in the control room procedural file.
b.
The inspector determined that licensed personnel of each
unit were aware of the requirements for returning engineered
safety features to an operable status following test and
maintenance.
c.
The inspector discussed with licensed personnel when
automatically actuated safety injection can be reset.
Based on these discussions the inspector determined that
licensed personnel were aware of when overriding emergency
safety features was permitted.
d.
The licensee has committed in respm...e
so item 4 of IE
Bulletin No.79-06A to modify the following valves such
that they remain closed following reset of t>e safety
injection signal.
FCV-BD17
Steam Generator Blowdosn
A0V-BD0001 thru 8
Steam Generator Blowdo n
AOV-RV0001 thru 4
Containment Purge
FCV-SS-2 thru 5
Steam Generator Blowdown Sample
FCV-WD17A, B
Containment Sump Pump Discharge
Licensed personnel were questioned regarding automatic
actions initiated by reset of engineered safety features
that could affect the control of r adioactive liquids and
gases. The inspector determined *. hat licensed personnel
were aware of reset functions and requirements for switch
positioning prior to resetting safety injection.
e.
Plant operators and supervisorf personnel were questioned
regarding early notification of NRC as a result of serious
events.
At the present time, the licensee has not commit-
ted to the requirements of IEB-79-05A, item 11 as far as
staffing required and provisions for a continuous communi-
cation channel.
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The licensee's response to item 11 of IEB 79-05A requires
+ hat the station's General Site Emergency Plan be followed:
In an event that requires early notification of the NRC
the shift would immediately notify the System Load Dis-
patcher who would in turn notify the Command Center Director
on duty who makes an immediate call to the NRC.
In the
event that the load dispatcher cannot reach the Duty
Command Center Director within five minutes the load
dispatcher will then notify the NhC.
Command center
procedures require that specific telephones be designated
as open lines in which continuous communications would be
established. This matter, as well as the entire licensee's
response to this Bulletin, will be evaluated by NRR.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features Systems (ESF)
The following systems designated as ESF were inspected:
charging
safety injection
diesel generator
The inspection consisted of an examination of the electrical
and mechanical positioning to pr; vide assurance tha'
.. e
required safety related functions would be operable when
necessary.
Visual inspection was performed where possible.
A
detailed comparison of system valve and electrie:al valve lineup
procedures against current P&ID was also made.
For the above systems, the inspector made the following deter-
minations:
a.
Review of the following valve / breaker / switch alignment
procedures verified their accuracy.
System
Procedure
Unit 1
Unit 2
charging
SOI-14
14A-2
safety injection
SOI-11
11A-2
11B-1
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auxiliary feed
SOI-25
25A-2
residual heat
SOI-38A
38A-2
removal
diesel generator
PT-11
PT-11
PT-11
ser ice water
SOI-36A
36-Al
36-A2
b.
Using the above procedures, valve / breaker / switch alignmer2ts
for accessible components in ESF systems were found to be
in procedurally designated positions.
c.
Administrative procedures listed below were reviewed to
determine whether procedural controls to assure proper
return to service following maintenance and test were
adequate.
ZAP-14-51-2
Out Of Service System Control
ZAP-3-51-1
Work Request System
ZAP-3-51-4B
Nonroutine Valve Lineup Control
System
PT-14
Inoperable Equipment Surveillance
Program
These procedures which require independent management
verification of valve position and return to service
status following maintenance and test were found to be
acceptable.
d.
The following surveillance tests were reviewed in order to
determine whether the systems would be returned to an
operable condition following maintenance and test.
In
addition the last surveillance on each designated system
was reviewed to determine whether acceptance criteria were
met.
Surveillance
Acceptance
Management
Date Performed
Criteria
Verification
System
Test
_
UI
U2
UI
U2
charging
PT-2I
4/13/79
4/15/79
Yes
Yes
Yes
safety
PT-2A
4/20/79
4/14/79
Yes
Yes
Yes
injection
- auxiliary
PT-7
4/28/79
4/12/79
Yes
Yes
Yes
feed
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.
- containment PT-6
4/25/79
4/15/79
Yes
Yes
Yes
sp ray
diesel gener- PT-11
4/29&30/79 4/7&23/79
Yes
Yes
N/A
ator
service water S01-61
4/24/79
4/24/79
Yes
Yes
Yes
residual heat PT-2J
4/22/79
4/5/79
Yes
Yes
N/A
removal
- Findings see Attachment 1
- Findings see Attachment 2
e.
Pressurizer Level, Safety Injection Coincidence
The licensee has requested and been granted a technical
specification change to require actuation of safety
injection based on two out of three channels of low
pressurizer pressure, thereby deleting pressurizer level
from the safeguards logic.
The modification is installed
on both units as of May 4, 1979.
f.
Inspector verified that adequate administrative controls
exist to assure that ESF systems are returned to an oper-
able condition at the conclusion of extended outages.
g.
The inspector determined that the licensee uses management
verification as described in the Zion Administrative
procedures.
h.
The inspector determined that the following auxiliary feed
valves for each unit requiring locking were locked in the
required position.
FW34 Locked open
ICD 0369 Locked open
1FW35 Locked closed
FW36 Locked open
1CD0100 Locked open
1FW37 Locked closed
FW38 Locked open
ICD 01^' Locked open
FW42 Locked open
No items of noncompliance were identified.
4.
Onsite Assessment of Operating Prccedures
a.
The licensee does not require partial actuation of SI to
assist in level control of the pressurizer during routine
pcessurizer level fluctuations.
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10
.
.
b.
The operators are instructed to secure reactor coolant
pumps in the event pressutizer level is lost.
c.
Commonwealth Edison Company has not committed to Item
7.6(2) of IEB '/9-06A.
This iaatter will be reviewed by NRR
during their evaluation of the licensee's re=ponse to this
Bulletin
d.
The licensee does not have a procedura for feeding a hot
steam generator should it inadvertently be boiled dry.
e.
Tags have been placed so that no indicators are obscured
from view.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Exit Inte rview
An exit interview was held with Mr. N. Wandke and others of his
staff (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspec-
tion on May 18, 1979.
The inspector summarized the scope and
findings of the inspection.
Attachments:
1.
Auxiliary Feed System
2.
Containment S ray
t
System
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ATTACHMENT 1
Auxiliary Feed System
The euxiliary feed system for each unit consists of two electric
pumps feeding into a common header and one steam driven pump feeding
its own header.
Each header can feed all four steam generators.
Technical Specif :ation 3.7 requires that two of the three pumps be
operable during aver operation; Technical Specification 4.7 requires
surveillance testing of these pumps each month.
The surveillance test requires that the discharge isolation valves
be closed and the pumps put on recirculation back to the secondary
water storage tanks.
If the turbine driven auxiliary feed pump were
out of service when the monthly surveillance test for the auxiliary
feed system came due, then no auxiliary feed would be automatically
available during performance of the required surveillance test.
If two of three auxiliary feed pumps became inoperable, reactor
operation is permissible during the following seven days per
Technical Specification 3.7.2.C provided that the operable pump is
tested immediately and tested daily thereafter.
As stated above,
portions of the surveillance test require the pump being tested to
be placed in a recirculation mode to the secondary water storage
tank.
During recirculation and with 2 auxiliary feed pumps inoper-
able, no auxiliary feed would be automatically available.
With respect to this surveillance test procedure, the last step in
the procedure reestablishes the steam generator injection path by an
actual flow verification.
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ATTACHMENT 2
Containment Spray System
Technical Specification 4.6.C requires an immediate demonstration of
operability for the remaining two containment spray pumps when one
pump is made or found to be inoperable.
The performance of this
surveillance requires closure of the header isolation valve.
Closing
the header isolation valve to perform this required test, negates
the injection path, and therefore, during the LCO with one pump
inoperable and one pump in test, only one pump is available.
A
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