ML19242A095
| ML19242A095 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1979 |
| From: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19242A096 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907310232 | |
| Download: ML19242A095 (7) | |
Text
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?'NITED STATES c
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.' t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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GEORGIA POWER COMPANY OGLETHCRPE ELECTRIC MEMBERSHIP CORPORATION fjuNICIPAL ELECToC ASSOCIATION OF GECRGI A
..ITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA r
e EDFIt.' I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, LINIT NO.1 AMENDME _' TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 66 License No. DPR-E7 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commissicn) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Georgia Power Company, et al., -(the licensee) dated May 11, 1979, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the-application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) tnat such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
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D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the connon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all i
applicable requirements have been satisfied.
79073yo m 462 316 i
. Isccordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical 2
Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendm2nt, and paragraph 2.C.(2) Of Facility Operating License No. DPR-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No. 66, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the f acility in accordance with the Technical Jpecifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION khomasY/
olito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch p3 Division of Operating Reactors
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date :T Issuance:
June 12, 1979 462 317
ATTACHMENT TO LICEllSE AMEtJDMENT !.3. 66 QCILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-57 DOCKET NO. 50-32.l_
Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are ide:.tified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 3.10-l*
3.10-l*
3.10-2 3.10-2 3.10-7 3.10 '
3.10-8*
3.10-B'
- 0verleaf provided for convenir.nce only.
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SOVE:1!_CE FlOUIFF.:.E5 Ll.".lTISG CCSDITIONS FOR OPE?aTIO'i 4.10 _REF.UELING 3.10 FIFUEL L Apolicability An o li c ab ili ty_
The Surve111 ante Require =ents apply Th> Limiting Conditions for to the periodic testing of those Operation apply to the fuel intericeks and instrucentatien used handling and associated core during ref ueling and core alterations.
reactivity limitations, Ob j e c t.' v e Objective The objective si the Surveillance The objective of the Limiting Require =ents is to verif y the Conditions for Operation is to operability of ir.stru=entation and assure that core reretivity is int-rlocks used in ref uelinh and within the capability of the core alterations, control rods and t- ~ prevent criticality during refueling.
Specifications Soccifications A. Re' ueline Interlocks A. Refueline Interlocks Prior to any f.nel handling with
- 1. Reactor..vde Switch _
the head of f the reactor vessel, the refueling interlocks shall The Mode Svitch shall be functionally tested.
They be locked in the REFUEL posi-shall be tes:ed 2 veckly in-tion during core alterations tervals :hereaf tcr until no and the refueling interlocks longer cequired. They shall alto shall be operable except as be test'ed following any repair stated it: Specification vork associated with the interlocks.
3.'0.E.
- 2. Fuel Gracole Hoist Load _
Setting Interlock _
The fuel grapple hoist load setting interlock switch shall be set at 485 t 30 lbs.
- 3. Auxiliary Hoists Load Setting Interlock if the f rame-mounted auxiliai, hoist, the monorail-mounted auxiliary hoist, or the service platform hoist is to be used fer handling fuel with the head off the reactor vessel, load setting interlock the be used shall on the hoist to be set at 485 t 30 lbs.
Lggdinc 5.
ruc_
Ib jf9 r
s,.. not be leaded intc the e :_
unless all control rods rem:: :: ccre u _ '.
_cs:rted.
L 10-1.
5 CO::DITIO::S FG OPERATIO::
S UR '.' E I L L A':CF.lEC ; RE"::TS 1: ': __
.10.C Core " nitoring During Core 4.10.C Core Monitering During Cora Alterations Alterations Prior to taking ner al alteratio.is
- 1. Durirg normal core alterations, two ' R::'s shall be operable; one to the core the SRM's shall be fun :ionally te;ted and checked in ti.e core quadrant where fuel or for neutron res>onse.
There-control rods are being coved and after, while required to be one in an adjacent quadrant, ex-cept as specified in 2 and 3 belcu.
operable, the SRM's will be checked daily for response.
For an SRM to be considered operable, it shall be inserted to the normal Use of special moveable, dunking operating level ahd shall have a type detectors during initial fuel loading and major core alter-minicum of 3 cps with all rods capable of normal insertion iully ations in place of normal de-tectors is perrissible as long inserted.
as the detector is connected
shall be proven operable as stated above, however, during spiral unloading Prior to spiral unloading or re-the count rate tay drop below 3 cps.
loading the SRM's shall be func~
tionally tested.
Prior to spiral
- 3. Prior to sprial reload, two diagonally unloading the SRM's should also be adjacent fuel asse blier will be checked for neutron response.
loaded into their previous core posi-tions next to each of the 4 SRM's to obtain the required 3 cps, Until these eight assemblies have been loaded, the 3 cps requirement is not necessary.
D.
Scent Fuel Porl Water Level D. Scen;. Fuel Pool Water Level Whenever irrad ated fuel is Whenever irradiated fuel is stored in the spert fuel pool, s ored in the spent fuel pool, tP water level shall be checked the pool water level shall be maintained at or above 8.5 and recorded daily.
feet above the top of the active fuel.
E. Control Rod Drive Maintenance E.
Control Rod Drive Maintenance
- 1. Reauirements for Withdrawal
- 1. Recuirements for Withdrawal of 1 cr 2 Control Rods of 1 or 2 Control Rods
'. caximum of two control reds separated by at le as t two control cells in all directions ca'; be with-drawn or recoved f rom the core for the purpose of perforcing control rod drive raintenance provided that:
. T1.e '-:cd e Swi t ch is locked in the REFUEL a.
This surveillance requircren:
resi:icn.
The refueling in t e r '_ o ck is :P e same as given ir 4.10.A.
nicP prevents mere than one cen:rol
- . frcr bein; w;: 1drawr -, be kr;assed
,d fcr en; of the centrol rodi on which
[r F "/
- m mainternnce is bei
At -i ent No. 66
- .10-2
~ ~ ~~ ' FASES FOR LIMITING CONDITJONS FOR OPELu.c._
3.10.A.2. Fuel G:arnle Hoist Load Se: tine Interlocks The total Fuel handling is normally conducted with the f uel grapple heit t.
load on this hoist when the interlock is required consists of the weight of the fuel grapple and the fuel assembly.
This total is approxirately 1500 lbs.
in comparison't, the load setting of 485 ; 30 lbs.
- 3. Auxiliarv Hoists Lead Setting Interlock Provisions '. ave also been cade to allow fuel handling with either of the three auxiliary hoists and still caintain the refueling interlocks.
The 485 + 30 lb.
the interlock when a fuel load setting of these hoists is acequate to trip bundle is being handled.
B.
Fuel Leading To d
d-d e the poscibility of loading fuel into a cell centaining no control all centrol rods are fully inserted wien f uel is rod, 1: is required that being loaded into the reactor core.
This requirement assures that during inadvertent refueling the refueling interlocks, as designed, will prevent criticality.
C.
Core Monitcring Durint Core /dterations shutdown The SRM's are provided to conitor the core duri. g periods of Unit and to guide the operatcr during refueling opert tions and Unit startup.
Requiring two operable SRM's in or adjacent to say core quadraat where fuel or control rods are being moved assures zdequate cct itoring of that quadrant during such alterations. The requirements of 3 counts per second providec assurance that neutron flux is being manitored.
During sprial unloading, it is not necessary to tain.cain 3 cps because core alterations will involve caly reactivity removal and will not result in criticality.
The loading of diagonally adjacent bundles around the CRM's bef ore attaining the these bundles were in a subtritical configuration 3 cps is per=issible because when they were removed and therefore they will re=ain suberitical when placed back in their previous positions.
D.
Spent Fuel ? col 'ia ter Level fuel storage pool provides a storage location for The design cf the spent approximate 1: 150 percent of the full core lead of f uel asse=blies in the reac tor building which ensures adequ c e shielding, cooling, and reactivity centrol of irradiated fuel.
An analysis has been performed which shows icvel at or in excess of eight and one-half feet cver the top of that a water the ac:iva fuel vil: provide shielding such that the maxinum calculated radiolegics; doses do not exceed the limits cf ICCF?l3.
The normal water level rov;ces. -1/' :eet of additienci water shielcing.
All penetrations of
- he feal pec1 have beer installed at such a heigh: hat their present2 does not provice r corsibic _:iircge rcute that could 1:wcr da wa:er level to less
- har 1 eet abovs-the cp ci the active fee..
_snes entending below tr.is level cre ergi rad 2 :H tw ct. - /alves in series to : resent inad.ertent pcol drainage.
2
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.. _' - t e n a r r e Durirr c-
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s desirable t o p e r f c r- -- ir : n c n -
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B ASES FOR LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATICN 3.10. E.1. Require ents f or Withdrawal of 1 or 2 Control Rods The maintenance is perforced with the Mode Switch in the ?.EFUEL position to provide the refueling interlocks norcally available during refueling operatiors.
In order to withdraw a second control rod af ter withdrawal of the first rod, it is necessary to bypass the refueling interlock on the first control rod the same which prevents core than one control rod f rom being withdrawn at time.
The recuirement that an adequate shutdcwn cargin be de=enstratec and that all surrounding control rods have their directional control valves electrically disa rted ensures that inadvertent criticality cannot occur during this main-The adequacy of the shutdown cargin is verified by deconstrating that enance.
the ccre is shut down by a cargin of 0.38 percent Ak with the strongest avail-able control rod fully withdrawn.
The safety design basis (FSAR - Section 3.6.5.2) states that the reactor cust remain rubcritical under all conditions with the single highest worth control cod fu.1y withdrawn.
1
- 2. Requirr.nents for Withdrawal of Mote Than 2 Control Rods Specification 3.lO.E.2 allows unloading of a significant portion of the reactor This operation is perf rmed with the Mode Switch in the REFUEL position core.
to provide the refueling inte : lacks normally available during refueling operations.
In order to withdraw more than one control rod, it is necessary to hypass the refueling interlock on each withdrawn control rod which prevents core than one contrcl rod f ro= being with3rawr. at a time.
The require =ent that the fuel e
assemblies in the cell controlled by the contr ol rod be re=cved from the reactor core befs e the interlock can be bypassed enst res that withdrawal of another control rod does not result in inadvertent crit icality.
Each control rod provides primary reactivity control for the f uel 2ssemblies in the cell associated with that control rod.
Thus, renoval of an entira cell (fuel assemblies plus control rod) results in a lower reactivity potential of the Core.
F. Peactor Building Cranes l
The reactor building crane and monorail hoist are required to be operable for handling the speat fuel cask, new fuel, or spent fuel pool gates.
Administratively limiting the height that the spent fuel cask is raised over the refueling floor ninimiz c s the damage that could result from an accident.
The design of the reactor building and crane is such that casks of current design cannot be lif ted core than two feet above the refueling fluor.
An analysis has been made which shows that the floor over which the spent fuel cask is handled can satisf actorily sustain a drcpped ca sh f rom a height of 2 fett.
Modifications to the main reacter buildc.ig crane are being studied in order to increase its ability to withstar" e singic failure.
a spent fuel cask will nct b e lif ted until these radifications have been accepted by the '?C anc the sc nas appraved the lifting of a can t) the crane, cnd the apprcpriate Technicci Specifications.
G.
Snent W:_
C r; c Liftine Trunnicns and Yoke the trunnicr-anc,
challbc ir goed h:uro u.1 at,.,
vo r;.
t
- r upe rl-connected.
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7]2 3.10-5 9g
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