ML19241C227

Forwards Supplemental Responses to IE Bulletins79-06A & 06A,Revision 1.Submits Info Re Summary of Changes in Operating Procedures,Containment Isolation,Schedule of Review of Training Procedures & Alignment

ML19241C227
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/22/1979
From:	White L ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
FOIA-79-98 NUDOCS 7907300389
Download: ML19241C227 (32)

Text

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• ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. ? LJ?

LtoN Q. WHITE, J R m t.uc%t vier passicawv

..u cos is 5462700 June 22,1979 g

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 Subj ec*:

IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Revision I entitled " Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident" - additional informa-tic q0eged during staff review of responses R.

. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.1 Do et No. 50- 44

Dear Mr. Grier:

Attacued is the reply cf the Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation to a request from members :f :he NRC Staff for additional information as a result of the Staff review cf c.ir letter dated April 28, 1979 which respended to II Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Revision 1.

Our responses have been prepared by a centinuing Task Force at Ginna Station. The questions we have received from the NRC Staff and our responses are numbered to ccrrespond to the bulletins' action items.

Very truly yours,

h5,f-L. D. White, Ir.

Art.

xc: NRC Office of Inspection and Inforcement Division of Reacter Cperaticns Inspecticn Washington, D. C.

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Item 2.

PPcvIm rME FCR CmPIETIQi CF E'R R.tVIEN. UPQi CCNPICIQ1 T n'R EEm:S WE RDQUIRE SRT 100 SUB!dIf A SRdARY T E RESUL'IS INCIEDDG RE.VISICNS PRT ':0 CPEFATHG PPCCEDCRES. IN ADDITIOi, 3.MdARIII SIE r' VIEW FESULTS 12;D ICTIO;S " MCI WISI REaRD 'IO SIE IWIt'RAL CIFCUIATICN MCT CF CPERATICN.

Substantial prcgress has been m!e in c:r::pletirq the suure charges described in our April 28, 1979 letter. In addition several new procedures Fave been developed.

RCS accident emegency procedures have been reviewed with particular attention beirg psid to the p:ssibility cf void fecation. Actions to prevent inadvertant focaticn of voids, as described in our April 28 letter, Pave been inccrpcrated in the procedum. Specific enegency procedures which have been r:rdified include: E-1.1, Safety Injection Initiaticn; E-1.2, Ioss of Coolant Accident; E-1.3, Steam Line Break Accident; E-1.4, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident.

A new energerry procedure, E-1.6, CNG Breaks, is beirg developed. ':his procedure will consolidate three existirg procedures ard will, w believe, prcvide fcr better operator response to breaks in the CVC system. We expect this procedure to be ccr:pleted ard approved for use by July 2,1979.

Two procedures dealirg with heat terrval frtra t' e pri=ary system ard potential void for=aticn are beirg p epared.

Procedure 0-8, Natural Circulation, will provide instructions en identifyirg whether er rot heat ir. beirg re:cved fr ra the primary system by Natural Circulatien. Key parreters are idencified ard instructicas for establishing, cr reesth lishing, natural circulation are provided. Inferraticn fran the pre-operational tests which were performed at Ginra is ecployed as well as guidelines fran Westirgrouse. We expect that this procedure will be coupleted ard approved for use by July 2, 1979. In the interim, c5 err.cor mainirg sessiens bave cc ered, ard will continm to address, key features of natu al esculation. (see infer: nation fran lesscn plan, Attachments 2, 3 & 4).

A new procedure, E-1.5 Void Fecation in the PCS, Fas been written ard is currently undeqcirs plant review prior to apercval. Final aperaval is expected by June 25, 1979. 'Ihis -

procedure will provide guidance cn bcw to eli;ninate voids frca the RCS. In addition, guidance cn rer/ irs beat fran the RCS if neither forced rcr natural circulaticn is available ard if the break ficw in a ILCA is not sufficient to revie decay heat.

Finally, cperator trainirs sessions will continue to incitxfe presentations on the most recent infocaticn (see lesscn plan outline Attac. tent 2) which is available fran Westinghouse ard elsewhere cencer:urg void foration.

51325

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Item 4.

PKV, IIE SWFICIDC Ih"tTRdATICN A3 'IO WEIG LINES ARE CR APE

!Dr ISCIATED SO 'IEAT A CI2X2CSICN CM EE REAGED AS 'IO Wmx AIL LINES - EXCEPT 'ISCSE hwrm KR bTerm SAFEIY FEAE', PES CR CI2]LDG CAPABILITY - ARE ISCIA'ED.

INCIL'DE A DISCUSSICN &

'IEE OPERABIIZY CP REACICR CCCIRC ICMPS UNDER ' SIS ISCIATED CI2iDITIW.

Tacle 1 lists all valves Wiich are isolated (*rM) cn either a contairment isolaticn signal or a contalment ventilation isolation signal. A contairment isolation signal closes the valves slown as iter::s 1 through 28 in Table 1, trip the ecntaiment surp pops, ard initiates a contairment ventilaticn isolaticn sicnal. Centaiment ventilation isolation c1cses the valves stown as itens 29 through 38 in Table 1 ard trip the purge supply ard etaust fans.

Retaining lines, tich are ret isolated cn a c:ntairment isolaticn er contairrent ventilaticn isolaticn signal, are those required f=r safety functicns. L7 addition, can;=nent cooling water to the reactor coolant ptr:ps ard seal injection to the reactor c::olant p.ps are rot isolated. 'Iherefore, the reacter em1m pu:ps remain cperable urder this isolated ccrdition.

In cur res;:ense cf April 28, we stated that mfeguard icgic sche:es wre beirg reviewed in order to identify whether any charges were required with regard t:0 centairment isolation.

'Ihat review has been ec:pleted with the conclusicn that re c! urges wre recessary.

We have feher verified that all lines which pnetrate contairnent that are rot required fcr safety features er reactor c=olant pu:ps are isolated by either lcc,md valves, nc=: ally cicsed valves er auta.atic valves that c1cse en an isolation signal.

F51326

3-Item 7 a.

PICVIIE A S.A. WIZ ECR CCMPLETIO1 & 'EE REVIEW CF TEPATDG F50 :u.2ES rid 'IPAINEG D6uu.;nCNS, DCCRPORATDG SUG MODIFICATIQ3 AS APS NNARY 'IO E2SURE ' EAT TEFA'ICRS WIII !Ur CVERRIIE AUIGATIC ACTIOS T DGUiEEPID SAFEIY ETA':WES, UNI 2SS COCDIUr'D OPEFATIOi T DCDIEERED SAFEIY ETAURES WIIL RESCLT Di QEAFE PIA!C COIDITIGE Di CREER 'IO CWPIX Wrm ITDi 7.A T 'EE BULIEfIN. CIARIFY SE MEANDG T HEC IS MEA!C BY REQUIRDG COCURRCCE BY 'ITr0 LICDGED INDIVIDUM.S TO OVERRIDE EMERGCCY SAET:Y EEA"MS.

' Die following Ebergency procedures have been reviewed, modified and issued as necessag to ensure preper egerator actions.

a).

E-1.1 (Safety Injection Systen Actuntical b).

E-1.2 (Inss of Coolant Accident) c).

E-1.3 (Steas Line Break Iccident) d).

E-1.4 (Steam Generator Tute R:pture)

Specific guidelines have been incitx!ed Q11ch closely reflect the Westingrcuse reccmerdaticns. 'Ihe revised energency procedures are currently being presented to t.%

cperators by the Training Eepart:nent. 'Ihis presentatien will be cc pleted by July 13, 1979. Also, changes to procedures are reviewed by licensed perscenel via the procedure acknowledge hock.

In afditien, Aininistrative Proct. dure, A-54.1 (Licensed Perscnnel Authority) was mcdified by Ginra Staticn procedure change notice No.79-1168 to state that tm licensed operators shall agree en any everriding before the merriding acticn is executed cn any safeguard systen active cc:penent. ':his administrative acticn is designed to meet the guidelines of IE B211etin 79-06A in allowing the operater to everride any w pent in the safeguards systen if the continued cperation of that co ponent will result in unsafe plant conditicns while ensuring that -

undesired cuerrides, such as st=ppage of SI ficw to t".e RCS when it is required for core cooling, is precitried.

551527

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Item 7 b. '

YOUR RISHESE 'IO ITDi 7.B APPEABS 'IO BE HCIECUME WI"3 REIARD "D E FEUIRDiDTIS T IID4 7.B T E BULI2rDi.

PICVIrE ASSLTANCE 'IRAT CP_NG FPM WIIL BE MCDIFIED 'IO REEP HIG PRESSURE dos.;nal AND CSAICDG ICMPS Di CPERATIC21 Di ACI:CRCAfrE WTIH 'IEE CRTIERIA wu DIED Di m 7.B T 'IHE nmTHi. PICVICE A h12 ECR CCMPLETIOi T 'IEE PEVIIW T OPERATDC PPfYTTYNS DN'"DG SIIH FCDIFICATICNS AS ARE Nn W,ARY 'IO CCMPLY WrIH ITDi 7.B T 'ISE BUIIErDi.

'Ihe guidelines set irth by the NRC in the IE Bulletin 79-06A Rev.1 for stcpping SI wents are ret c:xisistent with the guidelines that w have received fran our NSS supplier, Westingrcuse. It is PG 2 ;csiticn at present to closely reflect the Westingicuse recareMaticns. As stated in our response to item 2, procedures E-1.1 through E-1.4 have already teen revised.

In additica noru infcz=aticn will te fcrthcaning frun Westinghouse, as a result cf their res;cnse to a letter frun D.F. Ibss, NIC to T.M. Arderscn, Westingrouse, dated June 4, 1979.

Iten 14 cf that letter requests, in part:

Provide the results of an analysis of the effects of different HPI temination criteria en the course cf m.all IDCA's. Specifically fcr eacts r.all break IOCA analyzed, mare the effects of the NRC EPI temination criteria (as stated in IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A, Rev.1 item 7 (b)), to those Sr the EPI ternination criteria Q1ich have been recomeMed to licensees with Westingrouse designed cperatirg plants.

U;cn receipt of additional er revised guidelines fran Westingtruse which are applicable to our plant, with its lower head high head safety injection pLraps, w will su+J.y revise the applicable procMures.

55158

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Item 7 c.

M CRITERIA FOR TRIPPDG REACItR COCIANT PCMPS IS DCC2EIS22E hTIS E FJCVISICt3 T IE 7.C T E BULLErIN. PICVIIE ASSL7MC 'ISAT CPEPL"'DG PFCCEDCPIS WILL BE MDDIFIED 'IO EEEP REAM CICII2C FE Di OPEBATICN Di ACIrPI' 2C hTIS TIDi 7.C CF IE BLT.L".rDi.

I PPGVIII' A _NTm ECR CDGLE' TION T E REVIEW T OPERATDG Pfu.u.UxES DN'TG SUG MCDIFICATIOS AS ARE bM%RY 'Io CDsLY WrIH IIDi 7.C T E BLT.ErDi.

Be NRC requirements for ICP cperaticn in an accident ccndition are ret cmsistent with the Westirghause reccmendaticn. At present IG&E is usirg the Westirgbouse rec:rmerdation for stc;cirg RCP's in an accident situaticn. Westirsbouse's guideli.m is to st=p all runnirg RCP's @.en system pressure is 51550 psi ard the SI system is delivering water to the BCS. 'Ihis

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reccmerdaticn has been incoricrated in the i=nediate acticns of the Icss of Coolant, Safety Injecticn Sys*am Actuation ard S/G The Pupture procedures (E-1.1,1.2, ard 1.4). B:Never,1500 psi has been used because the wide rarse pressure irdicator cn the main c:ntrol intM has a major divisica at 1500 psig. 'Iherefore, this pressure is ctnsen as an aid to the cperator.

In the Steam Line Break Accident procedure the PCP's are tripted i=nediately <mce the accident is identified to slow ckmn the heat transfer rate to the s*aam generater.

Bis cordition is being M e W cn an c:ntinuirg basis with Westirghouse.

It should be rcted that analysis of main steam lire breaks show a rapid RCS pressure decrease with the pressure d:cppire below 1500 psia withing 25 sec for large breaks ard within about 2 minutes for a break equivalent to a stuck cpen relief valve. 'Ihus, w believe the criteria in this ;roceiure are consistent with the 'riestirghouse guidelines.

.951329

. Iten 7 d.

PIZASE VERIFY 'E7<!' 'nIE IECTI'IFIID FARME"ERS EAVE BEDI Dr*m n 21 AFPBCPRIATE CFEFATDG W.CuBIS.

Pressurizer level has been eliminated in the diagrostic scheme fbr the identification of accident category.

Pressurizer level has also been re:cved as a syqt=s fran all RCS accident procedures except CVCS break. 'Ibe operater is directed to other iMicaticns for accident identification. 'Ibe diagnostic tree is attached.

'Ibe iMicaticns listed in the initial EE respcnse to NBC bulletin 79-06A Pav. I were incer; crated fran the Westinghouse resperse to the bulletin.

Wide range PCS ten;:erature & pressure Steau pressure Steam generator water level Ccntainnent pressure EST level Condensate storage tank level Pressurizer water level Beric acid storage tank level All the parameters listed are not indicative of RG water inventory. Each cf these parameters except the condensate storage tank level are however, procedurally addressed in the IOCA aM steam line break procedure.

'Ibe Beric acid stcrage tank level is addressed in LOCA aM steam line break procedures in the SI pu: p suction change over verificaticn to the EST. 'Ibe retaining indications listed above are sy=ptms of the accident, are used during the accident as cperatcr aids for verification of safe plant conditions, are regaired fbr cperater acticn during the accident and/cr are alar:ned on the c::ntrol 1: card.

('"he attached diagnostic tree provides an example of h:w the operatcr is instructed to consider a variety of plant indicaticns in his evaluaticns).

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Item 8.

PLEASE PIOVIIE YCCR SCEE L'IE ECR C2PIErDG REVIDE OF ALI'2;MDTI RDQUIRD'D7FS AND FPCCEIL'RES C27rPCLLEG MA!TIPULATIOi OF SAFETY-FEIAII"D VALVES. SUIMIT A S*2%*E OF M RESUL'IS CF E REVIDiS NiD RiY REVISIOG NECESSARY hTHIIN ':hV vEEKS AETER CCMPLLTIQ1 OF E Rt.V. IIWS.

AISO REVIDi FIRTr EPCCEIt'PIS NID REVISE ': HEM AS ?"%RY ':0 DEURE 'IBAT ICCKED SAFErY-REIATED GLVES ARE SUIL7ECIED 'IO PERICDIC SCRVEILLANCE. SCBMIT A L* MARY T E Rm"S T E RLVIIM.

All Periodic Test (PT) procedures that concern the Engimered Safety Features Systers have been reviewed aM updated where applicable, to e.nsure pecser valve realigtrnent followi.g testing. Each pMure directs test personnel to prcperly realign systems. Further, a3ditiicnal steps have been added to assure the systec:s hue been realigned for cperaticn.

Bis Mditional verification of realignment of systes is perfcced by persennel other than Testing Personnel, usually the Ct:eration Department. 2e Periodic Test (Fr) procedures are perfomed cn a scheduled basis accordin; to Technical Specification requirtraents, and prior to and Sallcving Maintenance of Engineered Safety Features Systes. De Pericdic Test (PI) prcedure ctianges were reviewed and ascreved by the plant operating review cermittee (PCBC). Table 2 lists the Pr procedures 5hich have been revised to incerscrate the additional steps and describes the chrnges.

New precedures have been develcped an3 incorporated in Plant Operaticns to assure proper systen valve lineup. 2ese systen valve position verification procedures are perfor:ned cn a regularly scheduled basis. Se perfc cance of these Mures is in Mdition to the valve verificatien steps 3incitxied in the Periodic Test precedures.

2ere are rc Technical Specification requirenents regarding locked valve surieillance. An Adninistrative pro:edure, (A-52.2), governs the centrol cf all Mcked valves a*. cur facility, and states: "2e pur cse of tais precedure is to describe the require:ents for a locked valve, authorities isolved, doctraentaticn required ard instructicns relative to.

locked valve cperatien." 2e purpose of lecked valves at cur facility is to provide control of equi;raent and to caintain reactor safety, engineered safety fea*=es systen aligrrtent ard perscnnel safety. Se shift fore.an has the authority to issue a key to tnlock a valve and the head control cgerater has the duty te maintain valve status, if changed, in the locked valve operations icg.

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. Su:seillance of these 1ccked valves is accc plished by valve verification steps in Periodic Tests (Pr's) followi:q System 'Ibstirg ard by regularly scheduled syste:1 valve verification precedtres rcted below.

S-30.1 Safety Injecticn Syste:1 valve positicn verificaticn.

5-30.2 IGR S-30.3 Contaircent Spray S-30.4 Auxiliary Ebedwater "

S-30.5 Stan6 y Aux. EW S-30.6 Safeguard valve positien verification (inside C/)

551333

. Item 9.

PLEASE PPOVIIE A CO9IR:E RESPCUSE ':0 ITai 9 AND'IEC7rIIY 2CSE ISCULTIOi VALVES 'rHICH MAY BE REICSITIOiED AS A RESULT CF Pnc;mG C2CADF.DTI ISCLATIOi, nble 1 lists all lines Wich are designed to transfer potentially radicactive fluids fran contalment. Se cmtaiment isolaticn signal c1cses valves 1-28 (Table 1), trips the contalment sup p, ard initiates a centaiment ventilation imlation signal. Q:ntalment ventilaticn isolaticn closes valves 29 thru 38 (Table 1) and trips the pmge supply ard. exhaust fans.

It should be rotad that the resettirg of the SI sigral dces not reset contaiment isolation er contalment ventilaticn isolaticn ard therefore dces not reposition any valves.

Valves (by ru6er fran Table 1) 3, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 26 are the valves that are nc=nally cpan and would return to the cpen p:sition up:n reset of Contaimant Isolaticn unless additional acticns were taken t:0 preclude this. N::te that nur.ber 19, 20, 21, aM 22 will not reopen if a high radisticn conditicn in the stea:n generator blew!cwn systen exists.

Present IICA ard Steam Lire Break precedures regaire that the operators place all c:ntaiment isolation valve switches in the "c1csed" positicn, prior to resetting contaiment isolatien.

Furtherrcre, energency procedures have been redified to instruct the operatcr to place the centaiment su:o "A"

pps in the pull-stcp position prior to resettirg the contaiment isolaticn signal.

In the S/G tube rupture accident, it is our position that ner=al chargirg, let&wn, spray ard pcuer cperated relief valve ccerations rd to be established gaickly ard that to radicactive transfer is pessible fran centaiment to the erriirens, except thrco;h the secondary steam lines.

t terefore, contalment isolaticn is reset after the accident is identified as a S/G tube ru=ture ard the contaiment vessel su p pumps are pull sed, ard the letdcwn isolation and reacter c::clant p=p seal return centaiment isolaticn valves are closed.

Prior to the SiI Incident, there were several letters excharged bet'a=n IC&E ard the NPC which dealt with safety actuation circuits ard tieir cverrides. tese letters are prcvided in Attachnen: 1 to this letter for your corrienience. Furtherncre, contaiment ventilation isolaticn does ret autanatically reset when SI cr con-tair=ent isolation is reset.

"he reset of contaiment ventilaticn isolaticn regai us the use of a key which is held by the Shift Ebrenan.

551334

Item 10 a.

PLEASE PICVIDE 'IEE BASIS ECR 'EE COCESICN ' MAT EXISTDG Ppert74 ES ECR VERI?ICATICN T CPERABILITY T SAFE!Y-RET.ATC SYSTDS ARE SWFICIDE, Fran the basis of the Technical Specifications Secticns 3.3 and 4.5, the active cc penents (purps and valves) of safnef related systems are to be tested ncnthly to check the operaticn of the starting circuits ard to verify that the purps are in satisfactory running order. 'Ihe test interval cf one nenth is based cn the jtx$gement that more frequent testirg muld ret significantly increase the reliability (i.e., the pr=6 ability that the carpcner:t would operate when required) ard would result in increased war of 1crg.;nriods cf time.

If a wwr_nt is fourd to be irrperable, it will be p:ssible in cost cases to effect repairs ard restore the systes to full' cperability within a relatively short time. Ebr a single 7nent to be ireperable &es ret negate the ability of the system to perform its functicn, but it reduces the redurdancy provided in the react =r design ard thereby limits the ability to tolerate additional equi;nent failures.

':b previde raxitus assurance that the redundant cc ;cnent(s) will operate if required to do so, the redurdant w gnent(s) are to be tested prior to initiatire repair cf the irrperable w # nent. 'Ihis is applicable to the safety injectico ptr:ps, residual beat rencval p.:rgs, ard their associated valves (T.S.

3.3.1.2), ard to the centairnent spray pungs ard valves (T.S.

3.3.2.2).

'Ihe two contair: ment spray prps alsa =ust be tested to demenstrate carability before initiatire raic.:' nance cn an incperable chah filter tnit (T.S. 3.3.2.2). Wir cne diesel generater cut of seriice, the renaining diesel generator is n:n contintrusly provided such cperation is ret in excess of seven (7) days (total for both diesels) durirg any month, ard provided the station transformer is in sereice (T.S. 3.7.2).

Testirg of redundant c:r;=nents en the auxiliary feedwater system is rot required by cur 'Ibchnical Specifications.

Scwever, Paintenance and Turbine Plant Cperations procedures have been revised to rotify the IEsults and Test Department to test the redundant carpanent(s) prior to initiating repair of the inoperable w#nent. Table 2 lists the procedures which have been revised to incitee this regairement.

551 25

e 12 Item 10 b.

PLEASE PRNIIE YCCR n'rTT'IZ FCR CCMPLETHG EE Br/IEW MD

!CDIFICATICN CF PPCCEII;PIS. ' TISHI T,0 WEEFS M"ER CEMPIITEG EIS EITCRI', PIZASE SL' EMIT A SL7F.ARY CF EE RESULTS CF EE REIIEW AND EE /CfICt3 'IAKE21.

Maintenance pcocedures have bra review ard are sufficient to ensure the crerability of safety related syste:s after they are returned to service fbilcwing raintenance. After maintenance, the Pesults and Test Department is retified and perfoms the applicable pericdic tests to assure that the system is operable.

Pericdic test gMures have been reviewed ard changed as roted in Table 2.

After testing of a safety related systen, an additional verification by ron-test perscnnel is regaired. All safety related valves manipulated during the-test are decked to ensure they are in their prcper Ensition.

After this verificaticn, the ccrgleted test procedure must be reviewed by the Head Control Operator ard apprcned by the Shift Fore:an.

Iten 10 c.

PLEASE EC7fIFY TEE IZVEL CF ILN RECUIRED ECR RECIDG MD BEWFliDG SYSTEMS 'IO SERVIC MD DESCREE 'IEE MEIHCD USED ECR 'IPANSF':.'nROJG DEC??.ATICti ABOLT "HE STATE CF SAFEI'Y-PEIATED SYSTEMS AT SHIET CH74GE.

'Ihe Shif t Ebretan rust a;creve the rexual frc: ard the return to service of all safety related systens as reqaired by 7dninistrative procedure A-52.4, " Centrol of Limiting Ccrditicns for Cperating Equi;raant". A procedural change, apcroved cn Apri.130,1979, to A-52.4 also requires rctificaticn of the Sead control Cperatcr.

'Ihe W.sfer of infor=ation tout the status of safety related syste s at shift change is acecrplished through 7dninistrative precedure A-52.1, "Shif t Organization Felief and Turncver", which lists the recuirements for shift turnover.

G51m c" ent

Itec 12.

PLUSE PPCVIZ A SMU FCR h'dD1 PPhM EDIDG hT"51 EYIS" GEN GS IN T.fE PP.!'d.APY CCD2C SYS'EM hm EE PFZPAPID.

A gir ure t= deal with hyd cgen gas in the prir. arf NTant systen is beirs prepared c.ad will be apprcved by PCRC S r use by July 16, 1979.

f

_oc.

_14_

pre 1 C2nD5EN! ISCIZ'ICN V74VE CICSE 1.

ICI-313 Seal water retum isclaticn valve 2.

K W-813 & B14 Sq: ply & ret =n c:r:;:=nent bling water to react =r supscet c cling 3.

1c/-371 Lede isclaticn valve 4.

70/-539 Pressurizer relief tarA to Gas 1r21y:er 5.

G -846 Master N2 step to ;c=

: :lat=r 6.

ICI-951 Pressurizer stem space sa=ple 7.

G -953

' P&"urizer Ligdd s= ace Qe 8.

G-955 "B" Ices het leg sa

:ple 9.

/G-966A Pressurizer Steam s= ace sa: ple line isclaticn valve 10.

ICI-WC Pressurizer Ligdd space sa=ple line Lsclaticn valve 11.

/ G -9667 "B" Icep int leg sa=ple line isolaticn valve 12.

G -959 EER lecp sa=le valve.

13.

ICI-lCO3 143 1A & ~ 13 Feact=r Ccclant Drain "hrA st ~4~1 level c== = J.

14.

G -16CCA React r C clan. t Asin S-A to Gas Jr.abr.e

15.

G -1721 Sucti n line to Peac

=r C:clant Crain 'Or2 16.

LV-1786 Petr C cir.t Crain ' ora to ven: Eeader.

17.

G -1787 Feactor C clant Orain '"rA to Ven

Eaader Sedary isolation valve 18.

G -1789 Reacter CW m Orain trA to Gas ;e.aly er 19.

C7-70 "A" S/G bicwdcwn valves 20.

C7-71 "B" S/G blc@-n valves 1ggl b

n tr4"qg

~ _ _ -

- 21.

C7-76 "A" S/G bLh, sa=le isclaticn valve 22.

CV-77 "B" S/G bicwiewn sample isclation valve 23.

10/-1723 Ccntal. ment Su::p P=p dise.arge st::p valve 24.

107-172S Cbntalment Sc=p P7 Discharge rect valve 25.

107-508 Peactc Makeup Water to CV s:cp valve 26.

C7-74 Inst==ent air te centai=ent.isclatica valve 27.

1C/-8418 Ce=in. water te centai=ent isclation 28.

52 Pe-Hiner sciencid valves.

C7IArcer VCCI*.A*ICN ISCT.A"_ICN 7ALVE "EI 29.

107-5869 Purge supply cutside ccntaiment 30.

ICI-5870 Purge sqly inside centai=ent 31.

107-5878 P:rge ed.aust i.nside c=n*=iment 32.

107-5879 Pt.=ge ef2ust cutside centaim ent 33.

107-1597 Pe.diaticn renitcr scply valve 34.

107-1598 Fafiatien renitcr efaust valve 35.

cV-7970 Ccntai=ent depressuri

2:icn valve inside 36.

10 7-7971 Centai ent depress =izaticn valve cutside 37.

.G-CV1 C n*'i=ent air test s= ply valve 38.

.W-IC/2 t o c e d ment air test vent valve ATV3 ilb 8

551320

TABTE 2 PIOCEIURE OIAPEES PIOCFIJUltE OIAtOE PORC APPIlOVED l'P-2.1 Safety Injection 1). Verification by non-test personnel that June 4 Systun Plunpa all safety related valves manipulated durityj tie test have been returnal to tinir tujuired position.

2). Ibal Control Operator in aldition to Shif t Ebrunan is notified before anl af ter tentlig.

PI'2.2 lbsidual ifeat Ik5noval Systen l'I'2. 7 Setvice ibter Syston PI'2.11 Canponent Cooliry Water 1\\unp Syston l'I'2.9.1 Gieck Valve Exerciairvj Ouarterly finjuirunent (RCUP 1\\snp Dischatye)

O PI'3 Containnent Spray p

linups & 16011 Alditive A

Systun.

O PP-16 Auxillary Peedwater Systun T

TNlm 2 PIOCtJUllE OINJGES

_PIOCFIUllE CllNCE H-11.511 Major Mechanical

_POIlC APPIVWM Inspection of AEWP tbtificatial of ibsults & Test Dept. to test g

rahn3 ant plinps befom runoving a punp fran mrvice June 11 H-LI.5C Minor Fbchanical Inspection of AtWP m

H-ll.58 Pipetittera Inspection of Hotor Driven AfWP N

T-41B Tutbine Driven AEWP lunoval fran Service a

=

'P-41D Fblor Driven AEWP Isolation N

Cl W

a t.M

.D M - thintenance Procalutes I'l' Perioilic 'Ibst Procalures T

'thtt>lne Plant Operations Procalurcu o

~~

A"."W"EM.CC' 1

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gg y

R03 ESTER Ca31.4C E!.ECTRIC CCRPCRATICH 29 E:57 avEht'E. RC3ES-R. 4.Y. T:.Sa9 uo.< a==.rt. a.

.isa a= mew

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January 2, 1979 I

k GC w

f {> e.V y Directc cf Nuclear Reacts: Reculatic Attannics:

Mr. Da--is L. *ie=$

, Chief

(,d[

Cparating Reac crs Branch Nc. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulate:y Cc--d ssics Washing cn, CC 20555 t

Sch-j ect:

C sta - est Pc ging Curing "c =al Plant Cperaticas d

R.

E. Gi --= Nt.clea Pcwer Plan:

Occket Nc. 50-144 Cea: Y.r.

• L*~'-

4-nu.$3

,e...-

a, e

.;cy,

.e.

>c.,

s.

.e ~~. -

S egy ge

,yeg:

1973 which was received c Cec--"er 1, 1978 regarding elec rica'.

bypasses and. cverrides is the ces ai-ent pt:ge systen.

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valves will ante =sticall.v c1cse c a Sa'ec./

aectics (52) sic. a1 c- ~ "-'..". c

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5513G k

0

ROCHE3 ER C $ AMC E:.ECTRIC CCRP.

gutE no.

8 January 2, 1979

• r Mr. Cennis L.

ie= ann 2

potential hyd:cgen concentratien buildup follcwing a postulated LCCA when high centain=ent activity and SI signals could be present.

P ccedures associated with the activation of the centainment ventilatica isolatica system reset have been =cdified to alert the operater that activating the reset biccks autc=atic closure of the eight valves on an SI signal, If a high centain=ent activity alarm is present the reset should net he used until the high contain=ent activity alarm has been cleared unless SI has cecurred.

A review cf all re=aining safety actuatien signal circuits which incorperate a manual over-ide feature is in p cgress.

This review should be ce==leted bv =id Februarv 1979.

Until this review is cc= place the use c3 bypasses en'unreviewed cd --"'- y will be

-d d

d ed to the maximum extent passible.

It may, hcwever, be necessary in certain instances te e=pley everrides c: =csets in c der to perform ce-tain necessary cperations such as instrumenu tests c: ecuip=ent =aintenance.

Very truly yours,

• • e62b.

o. :mitz c=.

L.

NOO lI9flAl/l[

ssma

-R

L y

s RCCHESTER CAS AND ELECTRIC CORPCRATICN

• 89 EAST AVENUE. RCCHESTER. N.Y. 159 i.e...,,

..s. :::n n us.1 cc

\\

i A,

February 16, 1979p Y$ e Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulaticn GX g3 Att ention:

Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reacter Branch No. 2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc= mission Washington, D.C.

20535

Subject:

Review of Safety Actuation Circuits with Cverrides R.I.

Ginna Nuclear Pcwer Plant Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Ziemann:

Your letter dated November 29, 1978 recuested restricticns he -laced en contain=ent purt ine during normal operatien and that e

a review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incorporate manual everride features be =ade.

The Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG &I ) letter dated January 2, 1979 transmitted the RG&I cc=.itments on purging during normal operation and stated that the rec.uired review of everride features would be cc=.=leted by =id February 1979.

The aur:cse cf this letter is to transmit e

the results cf that r evi ew.

Details of the review are presented in Appendix A.

The review of all safety actuation signal circuits which incer: crate a ma.ual override feature indicates that actuatinc. a particular override ( reset) does net cause the bypass of other sadety actuation si nals.

The rese switches described in Appendix v

A are push butten switches located en the centrol beard with ne physical restraints.

In all cases where the safety actuatien signal is generated aute=atically and the reset switch is actuated, the saf e y actu-aticn signal vill be "ihited until all icgic paths for at:c-

=atically generating the saf ety ac:uation signal have opened.

Cnce.all logic paths open, the par-icular saf e v actuaticn si nal v

reset relays de-energize and re-establish the ability :

aunc-natically ene-a a

' - - safe:v actuation signal.

Since

'a

-=se:

a re=ains actuated only if the input signals causing the auncmatic safety actuaticn signal persist and these input signals are annunciated, ne separate annunciatien fer the rese actua:.cn :.s n ec es s arv..

Che c=. crater has suf ficien: infc =arien Oc deduce a c ar ain sys t em is in th e r es e t =cde.

Jbrq) hjM[

551.M i

RCCME5TER CA: ANO El.ECTRIC CORP.

fygg7 80.

care February 16, 1979 7.o Mr.

C.L.

Zie= ann, Chief 2

In ne case decs actuation of a particular rese switch prevent the operator f c= =anually operating the ecui,:=ene f c=

the centrcl beard.

Therefore, cperation of a reses does not prevent equipment f c= cperating which is necessary

=itigate the ccnsequences of a postulated accident.

Very truly yours, J + [n Wi L. D. White. Jr.

LCW:np Attachment I U lJ J gIf @If f/

f M s if,,

551345

A= endix A Review of Safety Actuaticn Si nal Circuits 9

Incorpcrating Manual overrides The followin9 su=marizes the results of a review cf safety actu-ation signal circuits which incorporate a manual overrice feature.

The purpose of the review is to ensure that everriding cf cne safe Y actuatics sivnal does not also cause the hv.r; ass et anv.

ether safety actuation signals:

1.

SAFETY INJECTION CIRCUIT:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the cperator the means of resetting saf ety in ection ene minute er 1cnger after initiatien.

Actua:1cn of the reset switch in itself does not change the state of any ecuipment, but per=its the operator to place the equipment af f ected by safety in]ection to the position desired.

If safety in]ection is caused by aunccatic actuation, and the reset switch is actuated, automatic safety ingecticn will be inhibited until all logic paths for autcmatic safety in]ection have openec.

Once all 1ccic paths open, the saf ety inj ection reset relays de-energ re and re-establishes automatic saf ety in]ecticn capabilities.

Manual safety inj ection initiatien is available at all ti=es.

Thr e is no annunciation of the saf ety in]ccticn c :cuit being in the reset mode.

The purpcee of the rese: switch en nc safety an;ccticn systen is to a110w ecuipment tc he realigncc for the recirculation phase of a pcstulated LCCA.

2.

CONTA NMINT VINTILATICN ISCLATION CIRCUIT:

This circuit has a reset sNicch which gives the opera:c:

the means cf resetting contain=ent ventilatica iscla:L:n.

Once the rese switch has been actua:ed, =cs: cf :ne eenip=ent will aunc=atically return tc the state select ed pric: to the iscla:icn signal.

If centain=en ventilaticn isclaticn was caused au:::uar: cal;y,

either by saf ety inj ecticn c: hign radiation alar = cn centain=en: gas and/c: particulate men :crs, and this c _- ' _' _ _' -

-..~. ~. _' _- ". e s.

ex _' s. a _'. a..-

..'. e _ v. s e s

...~... _s _e been actuat ed, then centain=ent ventilaticn iscla :cn cannet be achieved at:c aticallv c: bv the =anual ascla :en

s. a....,_ s.. - -.,..._. s., - _a - c.ea s.

C.

c.....

c-__._

3

---~

Icgic clears, the cen:a'- =-

ven:llatica sciaticn rese:

-e'

'~

---="-s ce-c.r.-,-

=.

1..'

.- c. - e s. a.'.. - -.. c -

i c

- -.- 1.'.- "-e...^=-

v-s c _ _= _ _ -. ~,_ a h _' _' _' _ _ =_.c.

=-

Pi l' F 4 " i Q Q

Manual operation of the valves frc= the centrol beard is available at all ti=es.

There is no snnunciation of the automatic containment ventilation isolation syste= being in the reset mode.

The purpose of the reset switch on the centain=ent venti-lation isclation system is to allcw purging of containment in order to limit potential hydrogen cenc'entration buildup following a postulated LCCA whe.n high containment activity and safetv in ection si3nals could be.= resent.

3.

CONTAINMENT ISCLATICN CIRCUIT:

'This circuit has a reset switch which gives the cperater the means of resetting centainment isolatien.

Once the reset switch has been actuated, sc=e eculpment will return automatically to the pcsition selected pric: to the isc-latien signal.

If containment isolation was caused autcmatically by an autcmatic saf ety inj ection signal, and centainment isc-latien reset switch is actuated without resetting saf ety inj ection, centainment isolation cannet ce obtained by the manual centainment isolatien switches until saf ety inj ec-tion is reset.

Actuatien of the reset permits the operator to place the

-valves affected by the containment isclation signal in the osition desired.

This capability is necessarv. se that e

the operater has flexibility in dealing with pcst acciden~

conditions within contain=ent.

There is no annunciation acf the autcmanic centainment isolation being in the reset mcde.

4.

CCNTAINMIST SPRAY CIRCUIT:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operater the means cf resetting containment spray.

Cnce the reset switch has been actuated the spray additive tank discharge valves will return autcmatically te the position called for by the centr:11er prior to the centain=ent spray signal.

The centain=ent spray pt=ps and their discharge valves would recuire cperater acticn te change state.

If contain=ent s :a.v was caus ed autc=aticall.v hv. th e hic.h contain=ent tr essure lec. ic, and this icgic centinues te exist after reset, centain=ent spray

-=~~r-S e init _at ed by the manual spray switches.

Cnce the hi:h.cressure Icgic has cleared, the containment spray rese: r elays de-energice and re-establishes autc=a ic cr canual centain-

=ent spray capabilities.

3f!OD 1 DIE N

'I 551347 L Un JuluinnL cc,ccm u u wu r

=

Actuation of the reset per=its the operator to place the valves and pt=ps aff ected by the centainment spray signal in the state desired.

This capability is necessary sc that the operator has flexibility in dealing with post accident conditions within centainment.

There is no annunciation of the autc=atic centain=cnt cpray systc= being in the reset =cde.

5.

FIECHATER ISCLATICN RESET:

This circuit has a reset switch which gives the operater the =eans of resetting the isolation signal-to the f eed-water bypass valves only.

The main f eedwater valves will remain closed until the isolation Icgic clears, and then they autc=atically assume the position recuested by their control circuit.

If feedwater isolation is caused by high stea= generator level logic, and this condition still exists after the reset switch is actuated, a safety injection signal wculd net cause an isolation to that particular feedwater bypass valve.

It shculd be noted that a saf ety inj ection signal also causes the main feedwater pu=ps te be tripped, therefore, closing the feedwater bypass valves en a safety injection signal is redundant.

There is no annunciation of the automatic feedwater isc-lation system being in the reset =cde.

6.

NUC;IAR INSTRCMINTATICN SYSTEM CIFIAT, BYPASS, ANO 3LCCK SWITCHIS:

This system has several switches which are used for the fc110 wing purposes:

(a)

Cef eat Switches - Defeats a permissive which rein-states a trip 1cgic.

(b)

Sypass Switches - 3ypasses a trip cr runback function for calibration er maintenance purpcses.

Prc:ectic:

is still previded 'cy redundant channel er channels.

(c) 31cck Switches - 31ccks trips generated by scurce, int erm ediat e, and pcwer range channels.

These switches are actuated as permissive secpcints are reach ed ec per=i taking reacecr critical and up in pcwer.

These blocks autc=atically rese: as pcwer s

decreased belcw its particular se pcint.

All the abcve switches if actuat ed, are indicated 'cy cne er =cre cf the fell wing: status light, alar: e n th e e c=pu t er,

c: ac: ste an ann'-

???

r, p 7SI I

f j

6:)

I i d)1 j.

rlv S N

a

7.

INSTRUMENT AND CCUTROL LEFEAT SWITCEES:

The fc11cwing switches and their circuits were reviewed Oc insure that they are only perder=ing their intended function, and no cther saf aty functions are being bypassed.

Ths purpcse fer these switches is to be able to switch contrcl f:cm one sensor Icep to another for testing, calibration and maintenance purposes.

In all cases, reacter trip and safety in]ection signals are generated prior to def eat switches, and are not affected by switch position.

(a)

P/429A Pressurizer Pressure Selector Switch - Used to select two of the four pressurizer pressure channels for controlling pressurizer heaters, sprays, and power relief valve PCV-43 3.

(b)

L/42SA Pressurizer Level Selecter Switch - Used to select two of the three pressuri:er level channels for contrelling charging pu=p speed, lendcun isc-latica, and pressurizer heaters.

(c)

T/405E and T/405F Delta T Defeat Switches - Used ec defeat a channel f cm the ever temperature anc cver power turbine runhack circuit, and to re=cve a channel Delta T signal f:cm the input of the sum =er fcr generating the average Delta T signal c the Rcc Insertion Limit Circuit.

id)

T/401A and T/4013 Tavg Defeat Switches - Us ed to defeat a Tavg channel frem the input :: the average Tavg st==er which is us ed fer full length red centrcl, cendenser steam du=p, and pressurizer level sc pcin:.

r

/

1

{

008 BBS/gz ss-4

.=.

u.

e m~

!Y~

M r. =::

' I,,,,,_

RCCHESTER GAS ABC ELECTRIC CORPORATICH e 89 EAST AVENUE, RCCHESTER, N.Y.14649 uc= o. wws.an.

m,

=====w

....e.u..

544.zvec m

aTs' M ach 30, 1979

.,, 'b k

C y

s /f >

Directc cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation I,

b[

Attentica:

Mr. Dennis L. Ziemann, Chief Operating Reacters Branch Nc. 2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatcry Ccc=ission Washington, D.C.

20555

Subject:

Review cf Safety Actuation Circuits With Cverrides R.E. G4"~a Nuclear Pcwer Plant Dcchet No. 50-244

Dear Mr. "iecann:

Your letter of Novecher 29, 1978 requested that we perform a review cf all safety actuation signal circuits which inccrpcrate manual everride features.

Cur letter cf February 16, 1979 pre-vided the results of that review.

The purpose of this letter is to supplement and a=plify the infer =ation en the centar.=ent ventilatica isolatica circuitry which has previcusly been pre-s ent ed.

The centain=ent ventilatica isclatics circuitry and the reset function were described in cur previcus letter.

The iscla-tien signal is generated either by saf ety inj ection (SI) er high centain=ent radiatic= alarm en containment radiation =cniters.

Once a signal is generated, the isolatic functicn is locked in and can c=1y be cleared through use of the rese function, even if the initiating signal has been cleared.

Further, once a high radiation signal is generated, the signal itself is locked is and

=ust be cleared.

This is net cleared by the centain=en 7 entil a-tien isclaticn reset.

As stated in cur previcus letter the reset function is cc e-u==iated.

Ecwever, the signals that g enerate a centain=_en,

ventilatic: 1sclatien signal are annunciated.

The pcsitien cf the purge valves is indicated by lights en the centrol board.

H enc e, a cc=hina icn of an isolatien signal

(>- unciated) and a lack cf a close lig'~

~5 e respective valve is pcsitive indica-tien the rese functicn has been actuated.

The res et switch is a key leck switch and its us e is ccver ed by strict ad=inistrative cent:01s.

Situatiens in which it =igh:

h e r ecuir ed ar e as f cllcws.

If a s=uricus S.I.

c: hich radiarien

~

signal were te generate an isolacien signa', it would be necessary m ocn u u.L 3aJt!

P00R DE rLL

ROCHEETER CM AND ELECTRIC CcRP.

DtEE' Mc.

DATE March.30, 1979 to ir. D.L. ::ie= ann, Chief 2

to use the switch to clear the inclatica signal.

Before using the reset, however, the plant operator would clear the spuricus signal..Thus, wh en the r es et was em=. le.ved, it would mcmentarily bicck the signals but following release would not bicck subsequent signals.

Precedural.crecauticus alert the c.oerator to the fact that the spuricus signal should be cleared prior to using de r es et.

Strict centrol of the key fer the reset under the shift Fcre=an ensures that proper precedures are fcllowed inasmuch as no single cperater error can result in improper use of the reset function.

A second situa:icn involving the use. of the reset key switch is fellcwing the =enthly test cf the centainment ventilation isolate.cn circuitry.

In this test, a simulated signal is input into the cir=uitry.

Following cc=pletien of the test, the test

- signal is re=cved and cleared.

Only after this is acccmplished is the isclation signal cleared, again under strict administrative centrols including decisions by two cperators.

A third circu= stance which cculd involve use of the key switch is an actual high radiation signal which isclates centain-ment when purging is desired.

Purging could be accc=plished by use of the reset functicn therehy everriding the high radiatien signal, however, this i.s act permitted withcut a detailed evalua-tien.

In addition, to

.3 be.st of cur kncwledge, this has never cecurred in near1v. ten.vaars of plant cperatic-

""e practice, a " crc ed hv. prec edure, in this case is to atte=pt te clear the high radinrica signal in case it is a spuricus signal.

If it is nct a spuricus signal, the set point of the =eniter wculd be evaluated and raised, while ensuring that all regulatory recuire-

=ents fer release cencentrations (e.g., 10 CF?. Part 20 li=its) are me-

• • ds would permit the h:.gh radiation signal te he clearad.

Cnce the high radiation signal were cleared, the ventila-tien isolatien signal eculd be cleared by =cmentary use of the resen key switch.

Plant precedures fer this situation, will explicitly prcvide infor=ation as to the function of the rese functica and the need to thercughly understand and evaluate the situatien at hand before using the reset.

.'i g a in, it has ne<

been necessary, tc the best of our kncwledge, te use the rese

=

cverride an isolatien signal in cur nearly ten years cf plant operatica.

Finallv, it may be necessary := use the rese: functicn in crder to purge contain=ent to limi: hyd:cgen buildup in centain=ent follcwing a design basis Icss of ecclant accident (LCCA).

F0110w-ing a LCca, bcth a high radiatien and SI signal will exist.

If, based en.hyd:cgen sa=pling cf the cenna'- en: a:=csphere, it is nec essar.i :: O. urc e, the plant cperater is provided detailed precautions en use of the reset.

He is directed :: place all valve pcsitien centrollers in the cicse position se that ac valve will cpen c-d

'-'ation cf the resen.

• hen the cpe ater actuates P00R [3 G R

=

. RCCHECER G.sS AHO ELECTRIC CDRP.

ZHEE: No.

- - ' care March 30, 1979 To Mr. D'.L.

Zie= ann, Chief 3

the reset.

Finally, he initiates contain=ent purge.

It should be noted that purging to centrol the post-accident hyd:cgen concentration is not necessary until at least several days after the evens.

In conclusion the G"'a centainment ventilation isolatica circuitry and precedures regarding its use are adecuate.

"his is based on the detailed p:ccedural controls which have been imple-mented, the physical cout:cl of the reset key switch which involves at least two cperators to use, and ten years of successful plant operatien.

Very t:nly yours, Wk n

(

L ecn D. White, w-.

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