ML19241B129
| ML19241B129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/21/1979 |
| From: | Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7907110717 | |
| Download: ML19241B129 (6) | |
Text
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,(gsa *'ok uq UNITED STATES y
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMfwlSSION 1
E WASHINGTON, C. C. 2t 555
- Q.
- -
e May 21, 1979 Docket No. 50-286 Mr. George T. Berry General Manager and Chief Engineer Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019
Dear Mr. Berry:
During the site visit -f members of our Fire Protection Review Team to Indian Point Unit 3 on May 3-4, 1979, a request for additional informa-tion regarding your proposed alternate shutdown capability was left with your staff. A copy of this request is enclosed.
We are also enclosing with this letter a copy of our staff positions that were discussed with your staff during that visit Wa ask that you respond to these requests and positions within 30 days of receipt of this letter.
Sincerely, fa A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
1.
Request for Additional Information 2.
Sta*'f Positions cc: w/ enclosures See next page s
307 19^
v 79071107/h
Mr. George T. Berry Power Authority of the State of New York May 21, 1979 cc: White Plains Pubiic Library Mr. J. P. Bayne, Resident Manager 100 Martine Avenue Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant White Plains, New York 10610 P. O. Box 215 Buchanan, New York 10511 Mr. Lewis R. Bennett Assistant General Manager -
Mr. J. W. Bl ake, Ph.D., Di rc: tor General Counsel Environmental Programs Power Authority of the Power Auchority of the State of New York State of New York 10 Columbus Circle 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 New York, New York 10019 Anthony 2. Roisman Theodore A. Rebelowski Natural Resources Defense Council V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 917 - 15th Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 38 Washington, D. C.
20005 Buchanan, New York 10511 Dr. Lawrence D. Quarles Apartment'51 Kendal at Longwood Kennett Square, Pennsylvania 19348 Mr. George M. Wilverding Licensing Supervisor Power Authority of tne State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 Mr. P. W. Lyon Manager - Nuclear Operations Power Authority of the State of New York 10 Columbus Circle New York, New York 10019 307 195
ENCLOSURE REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INDIAN POINT 3 FIRE PROTECTION DOCKET NO, SG-286 1.
Verify that changes to safety systems will not degrade safety
- systems, (e.g., new isolation switches, control switches, and instrumentation, should meet the same design criteria and standards in the FSAR for electrical equipment in the system that the switch is to be installed; cabinets that the switches and instrumentation are to be mounted in should also meet the sane criteria (FSAR) as other safety related cabinets and panels, including seismic, and a single transfer switch or other new device should not be e source for a single failure to cause loss of redundant safety systems. )
2.
Verify that procedure (s) will be developed which describe the tasks to be performed to effect the alternate shutdown method.
Provide a summary of these procedures to be reviewed by the staff.
3.
Identify the manpower required to achieve safe shutdown independen, of the cable spreading room.
Verify that the manpower required to perform the alternate shutdown functions using the procedures of
- 2. (above) as well as to provide fire brigade members to fight the fire is available as required by the fire brigade technicai specifications.
4.
Describe the acceptance tests to be performed.
These shouid verify that:
equipment operates from the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is placed in the " local" position and that the equipment cannot be operated from the control room; and that equipment operates from the control room but cannot be operated at the local control station when the transfer or isolation switch is in the normal position.
5.
Technical Specifications including the surveillance requirenents and limiting con;*itions for operation for new instrumentation should be pro.ided.
6.
Provide simplified one line diagram (s) showing typical circuits for diesel generator control, diesel generator breaker control and instrumentation at the new instrument panel after modifications.
The drawing or sketch should show normal and remote control points and identify those portions of the circuit that are located in the cable spreading room.
307 i96
2
-2 7.
On equipment layout or cable raceway layout drawings, show the routin9 of generator control ables, of generator' breaker contro1 cables, and cables for the new instrumentatic.n that will be u-ad to effect safe shutdown indeoendent of the cable spreading room.
8.
Control circuits that may be used te effect safe shutdown typically contain fuses for overcurrent protection.
These fuses may be blown by the effects of a cable spre: ding room fire and thus pcwer may not be available for these control circuits even af ter isolating the cable spreading room cables by operating remote disconnect or transfer switches.
Verify that for systems required to effect safe shutdown independent of the cele spreading room, spare fuses are available in the area of the existing contr:i circuit fuses and the procedure used for shutdown by this cethod fcferms the operator to check these fuses if equipment fai'is tc operate.
i 307 197
STAFF D05!TIONS INDIAN POINT 3 - FIRE PROTECTION DOCKET NO. 50-286 1.
During the site visit of May 3 and 4,1979, it was noted that some cabling was located in a below-floor space ir the MCC area of the Prinary Auxiliary Building.
If any of these cables are safety related, smoke detection evices should be located in the below floor space.
2.
During the above referenced site visit, we were inforred of the planned location for the 3-hour wall referenced in the PASNY letter of April 16, 1979 to be located between the cable tunnels and cable spreading room.
With this location, an open area would exist between the end of the tunnels and the new wall.
This open area will contain redundant safe shutdown cables.
The staff concern is that the proposed fire protection using closed heads adjacent to the trays may not be effective in detecting and suppressing a fire in this area.
Although manual suppression may be available to suppress a fire and protect redundant cables, we prefer to not place primary reliance on the fire brigade to prevent a fire from affecting redundant safety divisions.
To provide adequate overall protection for cables in this area between the cable spreading room and the cable tunnels, one of the following should be provided:
- a. Extend the floor / ceiling separating the tunnels with a 3-hour rated barrier up to the new wall',
- b. Extend the closed head spray nozzles into the tray area so that nozzles are located above the trays, and use horizontal sidewall type nozzles to provide coverage of the trays.
This type arrangement should extend for at least 15 feet into the tunnels, or
- c. Use open head spray nozzles in this area and extending for at least 15 feet into the tunnel.
The system should be actuated by detection devices located above the cable trays.
If alternative (b) or (c) is chosen, the suppression systems protecting cables on each side of this open area should be on separate feeds such that failure or isolation of any secticn of fire suppression '. ping will not incapacitate both systems.
3.
Barriers are provided at certain locations inside containment to separate redundant safe shutdown instrumentatien cabling.
No barriers are provided between redundant instrt.mentatico cabling at the penetration area.
To provide adequate separation between redundant cabling, both the following should be ret:
- a. Provide test data to demonstrate the adecuacy cf the existing barri ers to prevent a fire below the barrier from daraging cables 307 MB
t
-2 in trays above the barrier, or install tested thermal barriers,
such as Kao-Wool, to insulate the lower cable tray containing instrumentation cables of one channel where the redundant instrumentation cable trays are stacked above each other.
The fire barrier installation should conform to a design which has been tested to demonstrate a 1-hour fire rating, and b.
Thermal barriers, as above, should also be installed to enclose one channel of safe shutdown instrumentation both where the cabling crosses from the stack of trays over to the penetration area, and at the penetration area.
An alternative to this would be to provide tested barriers to separate cable trays presenting an exposure hazard to the safe shutdown instrumentation.
The channel to be protected should also be the channel th&t is located in the lowest tray where the redundant instrumentation cable trays are stacked above each other (channel 4).
307 199 9