ML19225C743
| ML19225C743 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1979 |
| From: | Clayton F ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908020389 | |
| Download: ML19225C743 (3) | |
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F t ct m oa, Jo June 22 979 Docket No. 50-348 SRC 1E Bulletins Sos.79-06A and 06A Rev, 1 Mr. James P 0'Reilly U.
S.
Nuc l ear Re,;t lato r. C om i s s i o n Recion 1I 101 Marietta Street,
..e.
Suite 3100 Atlanta, t.eorgia
- 30F, Dear 'tr.
O ' R e i l l '.
Alabama Power Company has prepared the enclosed responses to items 2,
3, 6, 7, 8, and 12 from the ',RC " Evaluation of Licensee's Responses to IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Revi.; ion 1",
dated June 7, 1470 I: vu have an. questions, please advist.
't o u r s very tecIy, t
x F.
L. Clavter, Jr.
FLCJr/ KAP:bhi Enclosure cc:
Mr.
R.
A.
T ho".a s Mr.
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F, Tr swbrido Mr.
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ALABAMA POL'ER COMPA'.T Response to Evaluation of Responses to IE Bulletins79-06A and 79-ObA Rev. I 2.
The Dwner's Group will send the generic response and procedure revisions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 29, 1979.
3.
Placing the low pressurizer level bistables in the tripped condition when these bistables are required to bo operable by technical specifications is no longer applicable. A design change has been implemented and the tech-nical specification change approved for the removal of automatic initiation of Safety Injection on coincident Low Pressurizer Pressure and Level and to add the automatic initiation of Safety Injection on 2/3 low pre 3surizer pressure signals.
It will not be necessary to change the Emergency operating Procedures, because the Farle) Operatina Procedures states " Initiate a manual reacter trip or safets injection if the actuation paraneters for reacter tri;
.r safets injet tion exceed tht:r actuation setpeints and autonati actuat. -
d o e.s not occur" This change was incorporated into the procedure May 16, 1474 6.
The plant utili.es a passive reactor coolant system relief syster utilizine the bellows type spring leaded residual heat remova 1HE; svster relier valves.
One relief ealve is installed in each of the t.e RHK pu ;
suction lines downstrear of the isolation valves.
The relief valve' dis-charce via a commor header into the pressurizer relief tani.
The re.: t :
ealves are set to start opening at an upstrear pressure of 450 psie an_
will be fulls open at 495 psie.
Control ree-indications available or the plant operater's use te deterrine the syster's condition are the tollowinc The operator has RHR valve position ind ication f or the ise-lation valves with an associated alarm for incorrect valve position.
Leaking will be detected using the alarms associated with the pressurizer ielief tank.
These alarms are high teaperature, high pressure, and high level.
k'h e n the system 13 in operation, there is an overpressure alarm which is actuated at 450 psig.
Disarmint of RHR isolation valv e alarm and overpressure alarm is administrativelv con-trelled to allow defeat of the alarn when in mode, where tht l ' c.-
tenperatu t overpressurization syster is not re-quirel-7.
The U.m e r ' s G r o u p w i l l send the generir response and procedure revisions to the Nuc lear Regulatory Commission on June 24, 1979.
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ALABAMA POWER COMPAh7 Response to Evaluation of Responses to lE Bulletins79-06A and 79-06A Rev. 1 S.
At the tine IE Bulletin 79-06A was received, FNP was in mode 6 for refueling and is currently still in mode 5.
At this t ime the review of FSP procedures relating to va've alignments and requirements to perform valve alignments for saf/ v related (Engineered Safeguards Features) systems has been cmap1 ;ed.
As a result of these reviews the following procedural changes were implemented:
(1) Administrative Procedure for Operations Group Conduct of Operations was changed te make the requirements for performing system check lists more explicit.
(2) Administrive Procedure for Equipment Status Control was changed to make the r eq u i r em e n t s for return to service of safety related equipment more explicit and to require explicit notification of the plant operator when such equipment is removed from or returned to service, ii.c perf,rmance of actual system checklists is being conducted prior to syster operation for current plant conditions or prior to the system oeinc declared operable to meet technical specification requ mnts.
For example, the Auxiliary Feedwater System Checklist was periormed on 5-28-79, to allow system operation.
Due to the uncertainty of the completion date can be provided for all checklist startup schedule, no com;letion.
M.;c tht surveillance test pretedures for all Engineered Safeguards Features System do not require pericdic surveillance of locked valves, FN Administrative Procedures in conjunction with Svstem Operating Pro-teJures requ ire verif ication of position for all locked valves on at least a refueling basis.
Due to the larte number of locked valves ir the Au 111ars Feedwater System, the monthly flow path verif ica tion sur-vaillance test procedurt for this system has been expanded to include verif; cation of all locked valves in the Auxiliary Feedwater Syster flow path and thase in possible bypass flow paths.
12.
Alabama Power Company will request the Owner's Group to provide recommen-datiens on how to determine if a naniondensable gas bubble has formed in the Hea,ter Coolant System.
Because of the Westinghouse design of v.r Far l e-Plant the volume of the n.'ncondensable gas is not a critical
<<a ern a' it will be remeved usine the sa e methods regardle%
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t !.e va l ume,
Pro edures for the removal of nant andensable cas tram t he Rea t.ir Co,lant System in a Post-Accident condit.on are under den le;' ment and wilI be <ompleted by Ostober 31, 1979