ML19224D651

Testimony of Pg Cleary on Behalf of State of Il Re Mod of Spent Fuel Pool.Since Uncertainty Re Adequacy of Emergency Plan Already Exists,Increased Hazard Makes re-evaluation of Plans Essential.Supporting Documentation Encl

ML19224D651
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Issue date:	05/29/1979
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f RRO PUBUC DOCar;'pr Wy UNITED STATES OF AMEFICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCFD1ISSICN BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFE""? AND LICENSING BCARD In the matter of:

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CCSDICNWFALTH EDISCN CCMPANY

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DOCKET Nos. 50-295 (Zion Station, Units 1&2)

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50-304 TESTDIONY OF PETER G.

CLEARY on behalf of THE STATE OF ILLINOIS Cop 7

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JUN 1.1979 > @

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My name is Peter Gabriel Cleary.

I reside at 1544 North LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois.

I am a citizen of the United Kingdom of Great 3ritain and Northern Ireland.

In June of 1972 I received the degree of 3.A.

(Honours) in Natural Sciences frem the University of Cambridge, England.

In December, 1976 I received the M.A. degree frcm the same university.

Since March, 1977 I have been employed as Staff Physicist at Citizens for a Better Environment, an Illinois not-for-profit corporation involved in environmental research and litigation.

In this position I carry out research on nuclear power and alternative sources of energy.

This testimony addresses Board question 4(b), viz.:

As a result of the proposed modification of the spent fuel peu R the proposed operation of the Station with increased spent fuel storage capacity, will it be necessary to modify the Physical Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan or the Emergency Plan for the Station?

In 1977 and 1978 I carried cut extensive researcn into emergency planning arcund nuclear pcwer plants.

In the course of tnis research I reviewed the Emergency Evacuation Plan, Zion Nuclear Power Station fcr Zicn Emergency Ser ices and Disaster Agency and Supporting Agencies prepared June 1975 by... Zion Police Department; the Ccancnwealtn Edison Generating Stations Emergency Plan (January 1978); the Ccmmonwealth Edison Zion Station Emergency Plan (May 1,1972); the Ccrmonwealtn Edison Zicn Station Emergency 444 140

Plan Implementing Procedures; the State of Illinois Department of Public Health Radiological Assistance Plan; Nuclear Regulatory Ccmission (NRC)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement reports on drills at Zion station, as well as numerous other documents relating to local, State and Federal emergency planning.

I also talked to knowledgable individuals in appropriate agencies, including the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency, the Illinois Department of Public Health, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, the Federal Preparedness Agency, the National Security Council, the Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

This research culminated in the writing, with David D. Comey, of CBE Report CSE-7865, ' Nuclear Power Plant Evacuation Plans.' This report received widespread attention from professionals and amateurs in the emergency planning field. The NRC Office of State Programs issued a critique of it.

In January, 1979 CBE received a copy of NUREG-0396, 'Plannirg 3 asis fcr the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants', with a personal letter frcm Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman of the NRC.

In March, 1979, I wrote a CBE Cement on this repcrt, CSE-79137, ' Analysis of NUREG-0396'.

Ccpies of CSE-7565, CSE-79137 and tne NRC analysis of C3E-7365 are attacned 3ased cn my knowledge and research en emergency planning, it is my professicnal opinion tnat the emergency plans for the Zion Station are inadequate.

As at other ccmercial power reacters in the USA, tnere is little or no assurance that the healtn and safety of the public will be protected.

The requirements for emergency plans are stated in the Coce of r deral e

Regulaticns, 10 CFR 50 Appendix E:

2 444 141

...the plans submitted must include a description of the elements set out in section IV to an extent sufficient to demonstrate that the plans provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency to protect public health and safety and prevent damage to property.

The Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) appears to provide a framework for " reasonable assurance"; however, a close examination reveals that many of the items in GSEP cannot be carried out.

For example, Section 3.4 of the Dec.

1977 revision states that:

In a General Emergency, the Station Director shall immediately notify the System Power Supply Load Dispatcher and alert the governmental agency responsible for evacuation.

Unfortunately, there is no such State governmental agency, as the Illinois Commission on Atomic Energy found in 1977:

At the present tite, there is no legal authcrity in State Government for the orderly evacuation of citizens frcm cne area to another in the event of a disaster that threatens the health and/or safety of the citizenry.

Thus this simple instruction, " Call the responsible agency", turns cut

o involve an ad-hoc guess as to which c,gency ougnt to be called.

No doubt plans would be fcrmulated, but GSEP papers over this tyce of difficulty.

A similar question arises regar::ing advice to the affected IM public. GSE? states en page 4.12 of :ne Dec 1977 444 Tdiicn:

3

If the appropriate government agencies are not imediate'y available and imediate protective measures are deemed neces-sary, Comonwealth (Edison) personnel shall make a reasonable effort to inform the affected members of the public of the situation and to recomend to them the appropriate protective measures.

Once again, at face value that appears reasonable.

However, there is enormous uncertainty about the relative merits of evacuation and shelter-ing, and no firm criteria have been developed for the emergency services.

Further, it is difficult to imagine how the public would be informed by Ccmonwealth Edison personnel.

If a car toured Zion with a bull horn, who would believe its message?

The only way to find and correct such points, where a sensible looking instruction in fact covers a pit of indecision, is to hold a drill.

This drill wculd be not just for the Zicn Station, but for the complete State emergency network. The recent incident at Three Mile Island demonstrated the need for better telephone links between NRC ano nuclear generating plants,3 and both the examples quoted above reveal ::roblems with the interf ace between the public and Zicn Station.

So far, this interf ace has only been tested at a very few points. Until the -est of the interf ace nas ceen probed, it cannot simply be assumed that tne Zicn Station plan is adeouc.te.

The mcdificaticn of the spent fuel pcnd affects a vital but unwritten part of tne Z cn Station Emergency Plan, i.e. the trust between the 444 143 4

population of the State of Illinois and the operators of Zion Station, Comonwealth Edison.

This confidence has been shaken by the events at Three Mile Island, and public concern about spent fuel storage at Zion is grcwing in nearby comunities. Without public confidence, the Emergency Plan may prove to be unworkable.

One way to reg..in public confidence would be to demonstrate the effectiveness of Ccmmonwealth Edison's emergency plans by a large-scale drill. The drill would enable Comonwealth Edison and the various State agencies to identify any problems before an accident, rather than af ter one.

The radiological hazard from Zion Station will certainly be increased by the proposed modification; others more expert than I will argue about the magnitude of the increase.

However, since there is already uncertainty about the adequacy of the Zion Station Emergency Plan, the increased hazard makes a re-evaluation of those plans essential.

References 1.

General Accounting Office Re:: ort EMD-75-110, cage 20.

2.

llinois Ccamission on Atcaic Energy Re:crt to the Governce 1977, page 2.

3.

See attached letter, James 3. Keppler (US NRC) to American Electric Power Service, May 22, 1979.

444 144 5

I have prepared and read the foregoing testimony and swear that it is true and accurate to the best of my kncwledge.

CD[

bu Peter G. Cleary y Subscribed and sworn to before me this ) 7 day of C Pe~

1979 m

'af'tv:YG NOTARf PUBLIC My cormission expires N u. f$n k. n, m 444 145

CBE-79137 c ogg cq y

Ana:ysis of NUREG-0396 March 1979

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Comments Filec 29 March 1979 cn Senalf of CITIZENS FCR A SETTER ENVIRCNMENT by PETE? CLEARY Staff Physicist en NUREG-0396 PLANNING S ASIS FOR THE CEVELCPMENT CF STATE AND LCCAL GOVERNMENT RADICLCGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS N SUPPCRT CF LIGHT WATER NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS Summarv Nuclear pcwer plants are viewed by differant sectors of the public in very cifferent w ay s.

To scme they are as safe as hcuses, while to others they are barely centrolad volcances, likely to spew death and destruc*.icn at any mcment. The perceivec reed for emergency plannirq similarly varies frem *hese vnc regard such planning as a pure waste of time and mcney to tncse who comcnc ccnstant preparedress for the wcrst of all pcosible accidents.

Federal acticn in thu area has been to provice "guicance", that is, cecuments like NUREG-0396. The Nuclear Regulatcry Ccmmission then sits back cententedly and waits for State and Iccal governments to comply with the " guidance". A few training ccurses in the Scuthwest may be offered as incucements. The utility clans emergency rescense up to the precerty lire, er perhacs to the ecge of ne icw pcpulation zcne. The utility has then dcce all :nat is legally required of i:, and may make millicrs of collars each year f em the cutout of me reactor wit" a clear consci ence. The ccmmunity gains by ne inciusion of :ne reac cr in its rate base.

The State attempts :o balance its bucget.

The stage is new se t fcr a c!assic ::agecy.

Inacecuate ancirq "as led :

inadecua:e clarnirg, cut until an emergency cccurs cnly ne clanner kncws mat.

Until a sniu tien has been fcurd to tne twin creciems of funcing anc :estin; emergency clans furtner ";uicance" is of !!::le use. In me case of such a flawed cccument as NUREG-0396, it is couctful if t e "gu:cance" wil' e',er ce :f any use.

unless ': is completely rawrit:en.

444 147

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T WHY W A5 NUREG-0396 0 2:4 RED?

Al! emergency plannirg involves :ensiders le guessw:rk and a 'ct of precaration fcr events wnich do not Occur. Fcr examcle, a ' ire :ecartment must always te en tne alert and ce acle to ccncentrate men and equicment en :ne site of a f;re in a matter of minutes.

Over a peried of years, tne size anc frepuency of fires is recorced, anc the fire department's mancewer is acjusted accercingly. Even so, much of a fireman's time is scent preparirg to act rather than actirg. To ccpe with unusually large fires, communicaticn between acjacent fire departments may be developed. Fleccirg is a s!igntly diff erent matter. Scrirq ficcds cccur regularly alcng me Mississippi, but they ncrmally cevelcp slowly. This allows the emergency respense teams to censist of mixtures of professicnals, trained volunteers and untrained volunteers.

A nuclear pcwer plant accident would be completely different. A large release of radicactive material has never occurred at a U.S. power plant, but if cne did it wculd require unprecedented rapid and widescread rescenses from numercus emergency agencies. Preparirg fcr an accident which has never happened comes very low en a State's budget, but the requirement *nat the resocnse be so f ast wcrries unn9 pared emergency services. Cut of this wcrry came a request to the Nuclear Regulatory Commissicn (NRC) from the Conference of (State) Radiation Centrol Program Direc crs askirg NRC to "make a determination of tne most severe accident basis for whien radioicgical emergency respcose plans shculd be deveicpec by offsite agencies".'

NUREG-0396 is a respense to this esquest. It is also an attempt to reconcile an inconsistency between NRC and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines. The EPA has published its guidance for radicicgical emergency respense in de form cf a Manual of Orctective Action Guides (PAGs). The idea of a OAG level is that, given an accident, cne may roughly calculate the cumulative ccse to an irdividual assuming no cretective action is taken. If dis " projected dese" is greater than me acccccriate PAG level, nen some predetermined prctective action srculd be taken. The aim of PACS is to greatly simplify emergency respense; at a given r,u level, a given rescense srcu!c Occur.

Within me general framewcrk Of providirg aximum re a! t-prctecticn f:r an encangered puclic, me cuc!ic Official cargec.v!t-rescense :

a ha:n-ccus situation may be f aced w: n a rumcer Of decisi rs wricn must ce mace in a sncrt time. A nuncer Of pcsst !e alternatnes f:r acti:n may :e avai! acte. Out me inf:rma !cn reece to select tne ctimum alternative may nct be availacie.

In :ncse situations unere a pubil: cf* m ust racicly se!e:t de best f

several alternatnes, it is Pe!cful ' me emner of :ecisicn :cints car be reCuCec 'urirg me accicent res:Crse ClannirC pnasa. IE.TCnasis 'n crigina!.)

Ihe reed f:r rJles in Na:ardCus sitJatiers 13 Oriefh :escribeG in a werk :n aCaCemic OC!itics:

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WS assumption. If :ne CB A/LCCA ccourrec at any One of tne cther 30% of tne units, olannirt; cut to 10 miles wculd be inacequate IC0% :f tne time. It wcuid be a f a:rt consolation to knew mat if :nly the accident had cccurrec at ne of tne 70% ::wer ccse sites, plannirg wculd have been sufficient.

The conc!usien :: be crawn from the CBA/LCCA cata is hat for some reacters, plannirg fcr this accident need cnly reach cut to 10 miles. For tne same protection at other reacters, plannirg wculd have to extend 20 miles Tigure I-6 incicates tnat 10% of tne react:rs exceeded the thyroid dese at 20 miles). To try to draw geretic cenclusiens from such site-specific data is pure scecula:!cn.

A seccnd basis given for th e 10 mile EPZ comes from analysis using RSS methodelcgy. The mcdel is no where cescribed; the results are presented with crthodox RSS inscru tability. 3 It appears that, fer a care melt accicent,(given the numbers in the RSS and same ill-defined metecrology) ccses of the crder of.ne PAG of 5 rem whcle bcdy radiation are moderately probable uo to 100 miles away; massive doses (greater tnan 200 rem) are pcssible arcund the react:c, but tneir probability crocs off sharply beycnd 10 miles er sc.

At tnis point all ideas of respcndirg to PAC levels are crcpped, since it is clearly impcssible to prepare f:r emergencies to to 100 mi!es away from the reactor. However, since shcrt-term lethal deses are cnly fcund within abcut 10 miles, this is taken as confirmation of the 10 mile EPZ cencept.

WHAT SIZE IS THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZCNE?

The 10 mile EPZ may be compared with the area which the RSY 3 assumed to be promptly evacuated in its calculations of reactor accident inje.ies and f atalities.

This was a keyhcie shaced area, defined as below.

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NUREG-0396's EPZ !s met se clear-cut; it is varicusif cesenrec as :eirg generi::

A generi area ce firec accut a u cle a.-

f acilitv :: f aci!itat e emergency :!annirg Offsite. It is cefirec f:r re :'.ume an: irgest:cn path w ay s.

In relaticn :: emergency res:cnse an EO is an area m wnicn best effort is performec makirg ' m " =xi tir; er ergency

lans anc is nct an area in wnien carti:uiar :riteria must ce et. --

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C!ainly, me mcre r;Ies ycu can invent, *.he !ess reec there will ce ::

waste time :ver frait!ess puz lirg accut right and wr rg. 7"e best sort of rules are mese whicn :rchibit impcrtant, cut c er fec tly innocent, actions, sucn as smckirq in Ccilege ecurts, cr walkirs to Madingle)

Sunday with ;ut academica! cress. The merit f such 00 regulations is that, havirg nothirq to do witn rign: cr wr:ng, they help to Obscure mese treaclesome consicerations in ctner cases, and to relieve the mind of all sense of ocligaticn towards scciety.

The Roman sword wculd never have ccnquered tne wcrid if de grand f actic of Roman Law had net been elaborstyd to save *.he man behind the sword from having to think for himself. '

The EPA guidance acclies to react:rs since NRC staf f analyses of tne cesign basis less of ecciant accic.ent (DS A/LCCA) and tne Reacter Safety 5tucy (R55Panalyses incicate mat in the event of a core melt accident projected ecses a::cve PAG levels are quite likely to occur cut to several miles away from the reactor.

A dilemma results: EPA has dec!ared that PAG levels should trigger a response:

Protective Action Guides are the numerical projected deses which act as trigger points to initiate protective action.:

NRC has found that PAG levels may be reached several miles away from the site of a reactor accicent.

Therefore somecne shculd be plannirg predetermined respense actions; something shculd happen when the trigger is pulled.

HOW CCES NUREG-0396 CEAL WITH THESE ISSUES?

NUREC-0396 elaccrately avoids bcth tne request to cefine a "mes t severe arcident" and tne pecblem cf havirg no plans at a!! for areas wCere P ACs require swift respcnse. It coes this by incependant sets of Icgic wcrthy of :ne senciastics.:

First mere i an analysis of tne CBA/LCCA at 129 react:rs at 67 sites.~ The resu!!s vary wicely; e.g., tne myrcic cese at 10 miles ranges fr m accut i rem t:

re m ' Figure I-7;.

v er 15 level. Tre recert Ocncludes:r 7C% cf me sites *ne rcse is less man 3 rem m Frcm these.msu!ts, me Task F:rce renc!ucec mat accut a 1: -le Emergency P!arnirg Z:ne f:r One :!ur e ex;csure :atn u ay ass justi':ed to as ure mat creceterminec act!:rs woul: ce ;!irrec in mcse areas wPere PACS oculd :e exceeced in me event af a release Ocmcara:ie 'c a de!!gn :: asis SCOicent.3 I"is !3 :::vicusly Cnsense.

It assumes ma* Sveragirq Ov er me "Iame" 300! ent at 129 un!*s is equivalent to averaging over 129 aCOiCents at ene unit a :: tab inv alic f

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Or as beirg site-specific:

It is exoected

• n a t judgment cf tn e planner will be used in determinirq the precise sics anc snace of One EPZs censicerin; !cca!

cencitiCns such as demcgrachy, toccgra::hy and land use characteristics, access

. cutes, jurisdictional bcundaries, and arrangements with,the nuclear facility operator for notification and respcnse assistance.*-

No guidance is presented as 'c how mese different factors influence One sice and shape of he EPZ. It is clear that the EPZ fcr Arkansas 1 will be very different from tnat of Zion 2, but no help whatscever is given to the planner in this regard.

THE ADVICE THAT IS GIVEN IS AME:GUCUS The guidance tnat is given is often extremely weak, and would. ily serve to con fuse. For example, the following is the advice to clanners scout " melt tnrcugh" accidents:

Evacuatien accears to provide the greatest benefit of any protective m easure.

However, sheltering, particularly in areas where mest homes have basements, also offers substantial benefit, and mav in many cases offer an acceptable alternative to evacuation. Iccine prcphyla xis, if administered in sufficient time, cculd also effer suostantial reduction in the prcjectec ccse to the thyroid. (Emphasis added.) ' 3 While for "atmcspheric" accidents:

Within 5 miles of tn e re ac ter, evacuatien accears to be mere e f f ec tive 'han sheltering in reducirg tne numcer of early Fealth effects, as Icng as the delay time and rencarticicating 'racticn Of t~e populaticn can be kept sufficient!v smal!. Setween 5 and 10 miles, inis distiretion is ret as acparent, anc sceltering in areas uhere basements are widely available 'fclicwed by racid m!ccatien) mav be as e ff ec tive as evacuat;en witn.eist;vely sma!! Celay

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f ~Cnas:s addec. 3 4.

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Tre vital wercs 'accears", "may" and "suf ficient" are newre.e i terpretec.

=.=-.o. r F. 2 The recort ;s fu!! cf errces;.: seems nct to rave ceen prccf-read.

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list of ralf-lises of t*e nuc!!ces given :n cage 23 ras tne wrcrg alf-iives f:r :ccire 132 and fer [Ccir.e 133. D e r?ference !!st en cage 23 Incluces ref MeECes 0,12 anC

.1 which are FC; given in 'n e 'e xt.

Cran'ma*ical ericts are tec au.~ercus *

• ention. I*. seen s *. net mere !!me was st ent en *ne crawirg cf tne ecw :n figure 1 a a g

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(wrien is much improved from tne Ncvember,1977 craft) i. nan was scent cn mcre sucstantial parts of tne recert.

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Craft cow Final cow An errer which perva, des the whole repcrt is the uncritical use of the RSS, a study of cubicus accuracy.'" As ncted abcve, the two reascns given for the generic 10 mile EPZ are first the CBA/LCCA data which are invalid by reason of tneir extreme site-specificity, and second RSS derived analyses cerf:rmed independantly by the Task Force, and by Aldrien and co-wcrkers. The RSS results:

... served to confirm the Task Fcree judgment that offsite planning fcy, a generic distance around nuclear power plants is prudent and useful."

This is impcssible, since th e.

way the methcdology was used pree!uded th e pcssibility cf reaching a site-specific distance. The in;ut cata fer the RSS analysis were compcunded data, averaged ever dif ferent sites. The Task Fcree thus acpears to have taken data for a number of sites, averaged them into :ne compcund site, performed an RSS analysis en the averaged data, and declared that the results show that the same " generic" EPZ should be used fer all sites. This type of calculation can only yield a " generic" result. The way to confirm the " generic" EPZ wculd have been tc have performed a number of site-soecific RSS analyses fer cifferent units; if tne results were similar, tne generic EPZ cculd be justified. Thus not cnly has the Task Fcree used cubious methodology, it has used it incorrectly.

CONCLUS CN It is self evicent that here must be scme kinc cf emergency :lanning :utside me low ccculaticn rene, and that this must be tne result :f a : -crcinated effort y me util:ty, !ccal, State and r deral agencies. The Federal agencies claim to nave e

ne autnerity, State and Iccal agencies claim te nave ne meney, and tne ut:11ty ciums to nave ne resocnstoility. T: Trew " guidance" int:.nis mcrass of inacticn will ret crecuce emergercy :! anni g.

A3ramewerk is recutre urerecy a :reven emergency O!an is a conditi:n of eacter start c, just as an emergency elec -ic generator is.

It mignt ce ::cssible c: begin with a crimit:ve ;lar for a smai! ::re at unc me Nact:r. Crce nis plan was.ntec and perfected. Se ::ne ::uld :e steaci.y steacily ex;ancec until tt reacntc me approcriste size for mat react:r.

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444 152

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Where de money wcuic Ocme ' rem is a mceny uesti:n. In June,1973 tne NRC Cffice cf State ::r: grams :remised to have,a reccet :n emergency :!rn 'uncirg

' efere :ne C:mmissico :n Ee: ember,1973.- :t.s et cw ex:ectec be':re 2: :!,

undirg cannot ce as simcle as it seemec :: NRC at hrst sight. -cwever, 1979. r further talk accut me cetails of emer,ency plarnirg is rutile until enf:rca:!e criteria for plans are sat uc, and until funcing is ;;rovicec to enabie clans to eet these criteria.

It is not encugn *: set tasks, we must als: solve the crcblem cf me metheds for cerrving tnem cut. If cur task is to crcss a river, we cannot cc,ss it without a bricge er a beat. Unless *he bridge or beat proclem is solved, it is ic!e to sceak Of crcssing the river. Unless the problem of mothed is solvec, the talk abcut tne task is use!ess.'

444 153 e # #

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rs.:.: _.2 :N,C:c-1.

Plannirg basis fcr me ceve!coment of state and !ccal gcvernment racicicgical emergency resocnse plana in succert of !gnt water nuclear power plants, NUREG-0396; EP A 520/1-79-016. Office of State Programs; Cffice cf Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. NRC Cffice of Raciaticn Prcgrams, U.S.

ER A.

December '973, p.1. Hereafter NUREG-0396.

2. Manual of Prctec tive Action Guides and Prctective Acticas fcr Nuclear Incidents, EP A-320/1-75-001, p.1.2.

3. F.M Corn f ctd, Micrecesmographia Academica, Sowes and Scwe. Lorden, F.. gland, Eighth Edition 1970, pp.10-11.

4.

Reacter Safety Study, Wash-1400, U.S. NRC, Cctober 1975

5. Reference 2, p.1.3.

6. See, for example, Erasmus of Retterdam, Praise of Folly (1509?), Trans!sted by Setty Radice, Penguin Scoks, Great Britain,1971, p.152 et sec.

7. NUREG-0396, pp.1-27,1-30.

8. Ibid, p.134

9. Risl Assessment Review Group Repcrt to th e U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commissien, NUREG/CR-0400, U.S. NRC, September 1978, pp. 32-33

10. Reference A, Apcendix VI, p.11-5

11. NUREG-0396, p 27

12. Ibid, p.14

13. Ibid, pc. 50-51 la. Ibid, p. 51

15. NRC Statement en Risk Assess.- er.t anc 're Reacter Safe y 5tudy Reccc: W a s:'-

140C' in Lignt of the Risx Ascessment :eview Grouc :eecrt,2an. iS,1979

.! 4. N 'v Ps.C ^a c3:. 4, r. o

17. L.5. NRC Cffice of State Oregrar s Staf' analys:s of n e '-ig r!!c ts of

• e "Citi:ers fcr a Better Envircnmer.t" =eccet C5E 7365 Nue: ear cwer :: art Evacuaticn O!ars" May !?7S, 2une 23. !973, c.3

18. Cuctaticns frem Chairman Mac Tse Turg,.rcreign Larguages Cress. 2ecrg 1967.

.mn.

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cy PETER C. CLEARY 5taff :nysicist 2nd DAVID DINSMCRE CCMEY Executive Directcr e q - c, p*l C..N 1

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-y 4 V.4% wn 44 y 1 l 1/ l",4 N a r L F; M "', C. i l C..% 0.1 25 May 1972 EXECUTIVE SLMMARY AND CCNCLUSICNS Why is it imccrtant to have et etive plans fer evacuating large numbers of people who live arounc nuclear powet plants? To keep casualties :c a minimum in the event of a sericus accicent at a nuclear power plant, such as a reacter core meltdown and subsequent release of large amounts of racicactivity into the sur cunding envircnment. Such a majcr accident could result in over 300,C00 total fatalities unless a significant portien cf the peculatico residing cownwind from tne reacter can be evacuated in a very shcrt time.1 In this repcrt, we have examined the status of the radiclegical emergency response planning to see whether effective plans exist. Cur cenclusien is that trey ce not.

First of all, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission refuses to take resconsibility for evacuating pecple surrouncing the civilian nuclear power plants tnat it licenses.

It assumes rescensibility up to the fence-line bordering the nuclear plant, but leaves it to other agencies to hancle the proclem cnce the radicactive plume travels ceycnc the licensee's prcperty.

At:empts Oc come up witn a Feceral Resocrse Plan for Peace !me Nuclear Ernergencies" nave gotten nowhere f:r tne last :~ree years because :ne ;!an assigns tre resocrstb:lity fer evacuation planning in case :f a majcr nue: ear :lant accicent 10 :ne Cepar:r er: Of F-cusing arc Orcan Cevelecmen:, an agency 19a: is reit er

ualifiec Oc cc t' e jcc rcr interestec in

cirg it- :: nas fiatly efusec to cercur 'n

e : an. even :Pcugn all the c:ner agencies inve!ved in me clan nave agree:

"c acce:t r eir reies. Irus trere is ne feceral agency cevelcping ::iars :: evacua:e ia.ge nur cers :f eccie in :~e event of a ajcr accicent at a nuclear ;cwer :12nt Ibe reie of eVacuatien ?iarnirg thus f alls 10 3 tate anC !ccal agenc!93, wne a^e.1-e;ui:Ced, unCer:rainec. and aimCst :ctall'/ unfunCec. Ibelr cegre9 f crecareCress 10 ev3:uate 3!gni*icant EUr" ers :f ecGe 'n a nuCicar pian", accicert ranges 'rc~~

egligicie :c screxistent. It is ct : eir facit: :ney ave :een given eitner : e funCs rCC :. e guicarC5 *: cc *.'e jCc. E3 !"i3 reOCr: Fa <as cle ar, ev e" in dicis.

tr'e State Wl!"' the largest numCer cf coerating nuclear pCwer ?!a90s, l'ere.s 3;..!

nC ScecifiC ev aCuat. n plan.

444 156 e

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iCEE767rr CSE-7365 The real :ulcrit is tne U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Oc.~missicn wrien ;ealcus!y guarcs its legal autnerity to regulate tre small racicactive releases at reuLneiy emanate frcm nuclear power plants, cut :tsciaims any rescens:cility for ensuring :na; :ne puclic is evacuated in tne event of larce racicactive releases tnat woule result f rcm an accicent.

It is cbvious that tne Nuclear Regulatcry Ccmmission

.3 vic!ating its coligaticns under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which recuires that the peaceful utilization cf atomic energy must be to the maximum extent consistent with the commen defense and security and with the health and safety of tne puclic.2 We intend to pursue legal remecies very scen to rec.ify this egligence en t9e part c f the Commission.

We also believe that the culpa::ility for the current situation extends to tre White hcuse, where the Naticnal Security Ccuncil, the Office of Management anc Sudget, and the President's Recrganizatien Prcject nave producec no sclutien to the impasse en developing a feceral plan for peacetime nt-lear emergencies. Cespite the f act that the President ts a nuclear engineer and is w 2:1 aware of the hazarccus consequences of a major nuclear power plant accice"t (he has several times suggested that reacters be located ceep under;rcund,', tnere seems te be no sense of priority for rescIving this issue. We hcpe that the revela !cns fcund in this repcrt may serve to create a sense of pricrity.

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In Cet:cer 1975, the U.S. Nucicar Regulat:ry Cer-missicn puclisbec its O.eact:r Safetv Stucv JN A5H-liCC), scmetimes referred to at tre "R2smussen Re;:crt.

WASH-12C0 cetimistically conc!uded that in the esent :f a nuclear ?cwer plant accicent involving a react:r core meltdown anc sucsecuent major release of radicactive fissico procucts, crly 3,300 persens wcuid ::e killed, and ! ng-term cancer f atalities wculd be limitec Oc approximately 23,CCC perscns. -

Such minimal casualties frcm a majcr react:r accicent decend heavily :n the assumptions in W ASH-la00 that 43% of the pecple in a keyhcle snaped are a extending 25 miles dcwnwind frem the reacter can be evacuated witnin one hcur."

(See page 27. )

In Ncvemcer 1975, we wr te a critique of WASH-lSCO f r the Bulletin of tre Atomic Scientists, stating why we thcught such evacuaticn estimates were quite unrealistic:

Althcugh the Commission ecunts heavily on evacuatien t: hcid ecwn fatalities in W ASH-14CO, its legal requirements for evacua:!cn plans are so lax as to constitute a clear-cut violaticn of its statutory coligatiens under the At:mic Energy Act of 1954 to protect the public health and safety.

Its regulatiens ce not require utilities acplying fer a nuclear plant license to submit detailec evacuation plans. Respersicility is lef t up to state and !ccal agencies, yet tne Commissicn licenses plants in states where evacua*icn plans are v;rtually non-existent er clearly

nacequate. <,,O c n,,e t G o u e n t., e.rnt: i rat.p adiaticn.:ne,',

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s of tre Atomic Scientists, Ncvemcer 1975, pp. 45-07)+

The Cerecal Accounting Cffice 'GAO; ::rducted an investigati:n of One 3;Lation arc issue: its repcrt en Maren 13,1976. Among its conciusiers were:

State arc :: cal autncrities are rescens;:!e f:r ::cirg a;tn raciati:n emergencies 1*'.at extend CeyCnC tre immediate vicini*.y of EuC; ear pCwer-Olan*s; PCwever,

".c FeCer al agency 'as autFCT ty 0: TeCulre States 00 CevelCC raCiatien emergency ?iars.

In6 NuCies" Regu!a*Ty Commiss!Cn has been evaluati g 3 tate raCiati:n emergenOy res:Crse lans. Its evalLa*.;Ons Of ~any Of CNese plans adC C AC's exa"inat!CO Cf f tr 3tates' Oian3 isci:SeC S*"!:us CeficierCies.

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'iOerse 9uCle ar f aO;L;;es in 3tates w; trout aceCuate Cians. 3

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The Nuclear Regulat9ty Cor-mitaien ).RC; cisagreec

" ne f;9a1 : Orc;us!:r Interest:rgly enougr, tis

,vn Acviscry C:mmit:ee or Re a:*:r Saf eguarcs ac,Lst re:O mm encec - that a state nave an acequate rati2ti:n emergency pian sf:N cperating a nuclear power plant within the state. Inis rac omment,,a *,; n u as nc

• acceptec Oy tne NRC; NRC Cfficials saic tnat acceptance of tne A CR 3's r*ccmmencations is Opticnal, not mancatory, even :ncugn an ACR$ recort on eacn reactor is requirec cy law before tr e NRC can issue an :cerating license f:r :ne Ta a C ;o r. '

A group of environmental ceganizaticns, led by :ne Puelic interest Researen Group, filed a petition for rulemaking with the NRC.

The petiticners requested :nat an amendment to Part 50.ecuire licensaes (the utilities operating tne nuclear p! ants) to (3) cistribute instructions explaining wna: emergency safety steps :ne a t t::en should take in case of a nuclear incicent to tne pectic within a racius of at ! east A0 miles of the facility; (b) disseminate information explaining these plans tnrcugn ecucaticnal scurces anc One puolic media; (c) ccnduct an actual puolic evacuation drill in full confccmity with tnese plans; anc su mit to the Ccmmissten a repe r:

demonstrating compliance with the amencment.7 Tne Commissicn deniec the petitien en July 7,1977, saying tnat its current precedures adequately nancied the m a tt e r.

It also refusec to enceurage cissemination of emergency plans to perscns resicing anc working within 40 miles of tne nuclear plant, saying A program for initial cisseminatien of sucn plans shcu!: :e coucled witn an acequate follow-u prcgram to assure tnat mccif.:a::cns are provided to all persens pcssessing One initial plan, in cr:er to avctc the simultanects existence of Ciffering versicns of :ne same plan.

Such wicespreac cisseminati n of all revisicns t: Ne plan to every housencic, anc at. er estacitsnmen:3, uitnin 40 miles Of a fact.iq woula Oe very 01,. f; Cult. 2 EvicenGv :.e NRC never nearc of :ne e cetriy :;il: g inserts : a: tre eie::T!:

li*.;es f r*quenti) use :O eX :il 'ne safe!'! Of nuOlear ::Wer 3C0 * ~ e re f 0 re COL.C rc;.magire

CW eVsCuatiCC :ianning inf:rma;1CC 00LiC :9 si~!iar

!!sse.~ C ateC anC r*%iseC.

Te ret result :f :nese various per:urca:!:ns:

verj !!:de e3nirgful ;r:gress

uar ef'ective evacua:!cn plans f:r nancli.g nuclear ;cwer piant sc:::en;s.

I: Clar!7y ~CW *ar1C.60 *,ne si;Jat;Cn ;s, :"e r*~.airCer of 7is r?pCr*. is Civ! ec FC

nrae se0:icns.

The *!.s 3eC i0n is a review ;f Pe ursuCOess ?;i e ** r": :)

• 'e f eCeral gOver~mer' 00 COr"e JC w::n a plan for "pearatir e ~cclear emergerC.es" *. T*0ia0e *.9e C raser *

{ 'OC rOOeCures Oe!",g WCrAeC ct :9" Neen "e NRC anC.:Ca. agePC:ss.

444 159

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.... -s Tre second sect:en is an ev a!.at;cn of NRC's makesrif t ef':rts :: n rx : >.

v:luntary 1."."angements wi*n state agenC;9s :: Cre3t e 9v acuati:n !ar.s.

The tnirc section examines in detail tre f ailare :f evacuati:n clanning in :!!incis, the state with t.9e largest numcer :f Ocerat.ng react:rs.:ever.) and tre largest numcer ptanned :r t.nder ::nstructicn (seventee n).

Were tne implicatiens of all trese f ailures not so grim, wrat fel!:ws :uld well serse as tre script for a Feyceau f arce.

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Eecause we had been tre recipient of a serias of 9eated teieprene ca!!s in Cecemcer 1972 frcm a pcmecus Wh.te Hcuse Official wnc insistec cn ceing adcressed as " General Gecrge Abraham Line:In," we were alreacy aware f nis existence when we opened uc the Feceral Recister en.:anuary 24,1973, anc read a One-cage notice entitled "Nuc! ear inctcent Warning - Fixed Facilities," signed y "G. A. Linccin, Direct:r, Cf fice of Emergency Preparecness."

In tne notice, General Lincoln proclaimed that henceferth, he, the Office of Emergency Preparedness, wculd " exercise general meritorsnip of Federal nuclear planning activities." Tre notice enced by mentioning that Other Federal agencies will be invcived in scecific instances of nuclear incident planning participation and assistance in acccedance with their basic resconsibilities and functicns.

Cetails of such participation as part of the coercinated Federal effort will be a develcpment of each localized planninc' activity.3 Since the entire notice made no sense, and its auther was running essentially a ene-man operation in a remote garret of tne Cid Executive Office Builcing, it generated no visible response en the part of anycne.

But it is an nistorical document, nevertheless, since it marks the beginning of the Grail-like search for a Plan to handle emergency evacuatien from nuclear accicents.

Five mcnths later, the " Office of Emergency Dianning" disappeared irto the lacyrinth of the General Services Acministratien, never to be seen again.

The. lan surf aced again, hcwever, as a l!-page nctice in tre Feceral Recister rearly three years later.

This tim e, the title was a bit icnger as wei':

nc,aciclegical 7ncicent smergency Kespense ptanning; r txed r aci1ities and Trans-ce rt a t:e n." It was written by :ne Gener2l Se. vices Acmintstra:icn, uncse eceral Preca edness Agency said trat it was issuing 9e rctice

crevice ru!1 pu li: inf:rmati:n :cacer i g tre ;erera1 ::crse arc

.etecc by unicn certain cri !cgical incicent emerger:f resterse

!anning resecrsicilities are :nannetec anc ce:er-! rec.

Sirce "ful! pu !!: infctmati:n" accut the subject acuic scarcely :e fitte: rt: :e l'-page ~Ct!Ce, it was Carefully exO!3! rec : rat 10 is intendeC "at *he clans an0 a rancemerts Ceveicce by #ederai agerCies aFd y One 3t3tes f 0r res CnCirg t tre Ocnti gencies set f Or *. N in :T43 "'Cti~e Wi!I be encOFCa 3ec su:secuentiV in Eederai anC 3 tate Oianning :CC':n'ents Nrich, provide

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?e acet!~'e SLCiear e'*ergencies. ~

in ctrer wcr:s. : ey were promismg :: 00meuc wit' a O!an. ' n c ne y :10 in ' e ss

Fan a year. There emergeC frOm

'e IeCeral ErecareCness AgeICy b 3 Ehree-7 0!ur" e 7eceral ResCCOsa O!an

1. P E 9 a C e !!.~" e NuCie ar D er:e"Oies

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Cui:aFCe, afieCtiCnately knCwn :y.:s aCmirers as CR ACNE,

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{gyfff CEE-7363 This cccument sea.s f:r;h tre beginning of a Ocm:renens:se !an :: cever a!! :yces of pe ace time nuclear emergencies.

These are cescr:bec and :!vice: In t categcries:

Categcry I - A nuclear incident wrien is :imitec in that 4:s effects re mince and !ccalized...

Category II - An incident which has the potential of precucing a nuclear cet:na:icn and/or widespread dispersal of racicactive con-taminatien.

Categcry III - An cccurrence in which, cesci:e a!1 preventive anc controlling efforts, there is a nuc! ear cet: nation and/or widespread dispersal c: radicactive centainination.

Category IV - The pcst-Category III envircrment during which icng-range recovery and renabilitatien are ef f ectec. 2 Included in a list of illustrative incicents fer Cateegy II !s:

Takeover of a reacter cr Other fixed nuclear facility with the tnreat of cestructicn of the reactor er the facility.12 Four cepartments and agencies have majcr cperaticnal response planning roles in develeping measures to deal with Categcry II incicents. These are the COJ, CCO, ERCA, and NRC.+13 These agencies have, as of May 1973, agreed with the FRPPNE.

If there is widespread cispersal of racicactive contamination, as in tne case of a react:r meltdown accicent, the " incident" moves int Categcry III.

Four cepa :ments and agencies have majcr aceraticnal rescense plannirg roles n ceve!: !ng rescerse measures : ceal w::r Categ:rs III peacetime nuclear emecgencies. Tnese a e CCO. ERC A, NRC arc CHLC.+ b The CCO sca!! precare an acerati:na! ?secrse :ian;s; f:r res:cncing

:ne ace:cental r unautrctizec ce::na::en :f, or wicesorea:

racicac::ve centamina:!:n f rem, a re !e a-wesocricaci ac: se materials uncer :ne : ntrei cf :ne CCO wrien cces ret Hvci<e aj r property camage and :cses 'it:!e :r rc :nrea: Of casual:ies.

+CCC is :ne Ce art. ent :f Cefense.

ERCA was : e Energy Resear:n anc Ceveicement ' cc,inistrati:n;.: is rcw :a. : :f CCE. : e ~ ecar: men: Of Energy.

NRC.s :re Neelear :egulat:ry _:r m:ss::r.

CHLC.s :ne Decartment of :-cusi g anc Ur an Zevel:cmert.

CCO.5 T-E u,e:ar: ment of,:tst.:e.

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Tea EROA sna!! prepare an operational resecrse plan f:r rescen.ir.g to the ac:icental cr unauthorized detona:! n of a nu:! ear weacen, or wicespreac contaminaticn frorn nuclear materials, uncer the : rtrol of the EROA unich does not invcive major procerty damage and Ocses little er rc threat of casualties.

The NRC shall prepare an operational resperse plan for rescending to accidental widespread contamination from racicactive materia s under the centrol of licensees which does nct involve majcr property contamination and pcses little er rc threat of casualties.

The OHUD snal!, to the extent rec:ui. e d by the provisicns of Executive Crcer 11051, as amendec, and Executive Crder 1390, as amended, develop a comprehensive, cocrainated Feceral operational plan for rescending to Category III contingencies involving a nuclear incident wnich could be reascnably excected to resul; in severs property damage and/or a large numcer of casualties, er wn:ch involve widespread contamination cf people and property by racic-active materials..e in simple language, CCD handles bombs, ERDA (OCE) takes care of its cwn reacters, NRC takes care of its nuclear plant licensees, but onlv if the incicent dces net involve major prcperty damage er many casualties. If :nat is tre case, as it would be in a nuclear power reacter meltdown accident, CHUD is res;cnsible.

OHUD is also involved rignt at the beginning of a te.r:r:st :akeover:

(The) Fece. a! Disaster Assistance A ministrati:n (FD.'A) cf the Ce art en: of -cusing and Ur:an Deve:ccc e-: srcui:, uncer :re crevisicrs of Secticn 202 of tre C:saster O e.ief A:: Of 1972, :e nctifying accrecriate State and :ccal officials and ercargere :ersom of a Octential majcr cisaster.3 Seeirg tre P!an sc :!:se, we recently mace an ircu: y :: :Or f' -~

was real. Cr ceing read th.s last cucte. Leo 'AcNamee Of ; e TD'A p a r: Of Cr-U C), sugge ste:

tre: FOA was Ut of its minc.

'"he Ocn't get invol sec in ceace:Ime nuclear emergercies," e said.

A : ele:rene ca!! l0,'.crn Ncci:3 O f F':A ::n fl.-~ e c tra : is ass re :sse. -e sa :

nat FC A A aas the Orly agency anicn mad ct ::ncu-ec n::, :me 70 ONE. anc

a: l' ecessary, TP A wou!: take :ver : ese parts Of : e pian arten sneui: ave

een car :ec :ut ::y FC AA. A!se if :ne Pres: cent cecia.ee a :isaster. FDAA wcu!:

tren aut:matica!!v :e invel< ec.

Tre regi:nal CHUD emergercy services f ticer aac et ear: :f : e F:. CNE. :-e a xec f r.:3 exa:: title sc Fe : u!: ;et ect: cf a :::y.

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m The 10 cal CHUD emergency services :f'icer in Chicago Mac earc of tre T R F C N E.

In f act, "I ave nac ne persen worxing n tnat, anc since :nen He as retirec, so.we can't rave it cc cletely workec aut."

This was cisturoing. If FF A had ;r:cuced !"e cefinitive Plan, an: if CHUD arc FDAA were so ceeply involved, uny cid CHUD knew so little abcut it and FDAA ciscwn it?

A member of the Emergency prec ar ecness st af f of CHUD in Washington, CC, revealed the answer. -,lthcugn CHUD is tne agency in tne plan that must rescend to an incident involving large numbers of :ssual*ies and extensive property camage, it has not agreed to the plan.

This means tnat r,c federal agency is precartrg resperse plans f:r a large release of racicactivity; FR??NE mignt as well be thrown away.

Cern M. Gibsen, the Director of Emergency Preparedness at CHUD, confirmed in writing tnat tne Cepartment had nct ccrcurred with the plan. He acced weakly that it was hcped that appropriate language could be adcoted which would be acceptable to both OHUD and FPA.

rhis is at oces with cpiniens stated by memcers of his staff. Mr. Kemble thougnt FRFFNE was unnecessary, amcrg cther r easons, becaus ! it was NRC's proclem. Ancther staf f member said:

Using tne rubric of a peacetime nuclear emergency, they (FPA) have presumed to place FDAA uncer tneir direction, whicn is legislatively incorrect.

We have the pct of gold at the end of the road, and they have ncthing, so they're gcing to acquire centrol over those funcs by virtue of a plan?

This is ret the only time A has creatively interpreted executive Orders.

Dr. Rcger Mclander, a staff member of the National Security C : e n ci! ( N S C ;,

confessed to having " ut them off at tne knees.vren :ney triec to cc :ca sert :f thing abcut a year age." Unc:rtunately, a number of te!echene enversa:!:rs with t e Office cf Management and Sucget and the Nati:ral Security Ccurc:! revealed rc One arc Oculd ;;ve an ince:encent view of tre tussies cetween CO A anc Cr UC.

Mr. Xierten, A:3:stant Cereral Counse! a: tre Office of Management arc Bucget, wbC e name was *n emergency :!anring COrresCCCCerce a! 0 CHUD, wa3 i :all.

unacie to arswer any :ues:icrs anc ::ec;-icaif recues:ec ci :: ce cuttec. A One OcInt 'e W3itec a Nil I";nute bef:re *ct arswer'"g a Les*icr. Even *he Pre 31:er: 3 EeCrganicat;Or Or0lec*., in *Ee eersOn f 3ancy 3r::ker, a:new CCt'ing a: Cat t*.s

ress if f erence Of

;inicn.

'n tne eantir e, mere is rc agercy rescensib!e f:r riarning recccrse a: : e 'ecera.

levei t0 3 !arge rele ase f raCicaC:;Vlty, "CwsOevt ' CauseC.

10ccr !rg *. 2:nn Ne ;ta at rFA in Nasring::n, When

30. e:7i ag "a00?rs.

• 'e 1 cal an c *..e state Of*icia.s sr e Crimar!!y res:Orsicie *O res Orc.

3c ~Lcn f00 !Ne feCera. ?!ar.

' et is new sae ara; :e sta*.es an: ' F C sre 3LcpCsec 1 ';e Ociag.

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M4.L/, s, -l I M & C. O Sack in 1969, the state Of Minnescta get tcc big fcr its cri::nes. I Nac the nerve to suggest inat the permissible levels for releases of racica::1vity frem nuclear power plants were much tcc high and cught to be revised downward. Since the U.S.

Atomic Energy Ccmmission said it had no intentic, of c:ing so, tne state cf Minnesota's Pollution Centrol Agency anncunced it would cc so ins:ead. This put the Northern State Power Ccmpany's Menticello nuclear plant in peril cf not t'eing acte to cperate because it mignt not meet the state's mere restrictive stancards.

So, with streng encouragement frem the AEC, the gewer company teck the state te court, and in Northern States Power Cc. v. State cf Mirreset s (5th Circuit,1971),

it was held that One feceral Atomic Energy Act preempted the states frem regulating radioactive emissiens from nuclear power plants.

The AEC had successfully def t: ded its hegemeny, and therein lies scme ireny.

The AEC's successer agency, the NRC, has :aken exactly the same pcsition. It jealcusly guarcs its autnerity tc regulate small racicactive re! eases ' at routinely emanate frcm nuclear plants. But what abcut larce raciCactive reler that wculd cccur in a major nuclear plant accident?

Alas, the NRC says it has no autPcrity to ensure that the puDlic is pro ected by means of evacuaticn.

Under cur constitutional fctm of gevernment, tHcse (nuclear) emer-gencies, unless they cccur in federally centrolled areas or invcive federally cwned material er epuipment, are in,,the first instance, a matter of concern to state and local authcrity. '

So wnile the NRC has been willing to fccce the states :: submit to federal authcrity cencerning small racicactive releases, it is care ful :n et serve the Ccestituticnal niceties witn respect to 'arce racicactive releases and leave tre c:nsequences of these uc to the state ar c iccal authorities :: hancle.

, ust in case One state anc iccal autnerities ce nct ha:: pen to rave legicns of ruclear emergercy ecerts :n neir payrcils. : e NRC nas bcugntullv set uc an Cf' ice cf State Programs and ras an Asaistant Cirecter f:r Emergency Crepa ecness. '-ar:lc E. Ccl!!rs, w-c eals aitn :ne creclem.

C:!1 ins cas statec tra: re trinks : unli k el y :na: : e NRC nctid ever recutre aCCrovec state ?9ergency ?lars as 3 cc n ci *.!:0 Of giving a ^uclear ptart in ccera*ing licerse: Pe says *na NRC ar.C the states are geirg "".e ccCperative rcute."

Uncer t.is system. a st ate ceveiccs s Ow n racic!:gical e ergency :lan anc

• er sucmits *. :: NRC #sr a:Crevai. [f tre 3:2:e'3 : ans Tee

• NRC guice!!nes. *.~e 3:20e is given a ":cnCurence," :Pe NRC seal f sect:V ai.

444 16$

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-a NRC's guicelines 0: assist a state in crawirg ua ;ts raci:1:gi:3'. mer;ency :ian a e set f:rtn in NLREC-75/'ll, wrien 9as the unw:elcy 0: tie of Omice and Che w!!st f:r Develecm ent and Evaluation of State and Local Ocverrment.- ac:: tact:

.~ e r -

cerev se: Orse rian of F.xec Nuclear a c:1:t t es. NLREG-7 5/...

.v as pu::1:srec :n r

Cecemcer im anc centa:nec a crecx!:st of 13e e'ements *nat a state plan shcul centain. But ret a single state or !: cal municipality cculd meet all 15s items en the checklist, sc on Marcn 15, 1977, t."e NRC issued a Supplement Nc.

1 ::

NL r.:.u,,5 /,, downgracing its :r:ginal eneck!tst to :nly 0,, essential Olements.,,,.

Mest of the states still could ret meet even the waterec-ccwn guicelines. Asof May 1,197s, only four states had been issued a " concurrence" by NRC, confirming

• hat they had an acceptacle racicicgical emergency plan:

Connecticut, Scuth Carolina, Wasnington, and New Jersey.

Oces tre f act tnat a state's racialegical emergency plan has been given an NRC concurrence mean tnat it will werk? Nct necessarily.

New 3ersey was given a cencurrence on September 30, 1977. Shcrtly befcre, en August 2,1977, a drill was carried cut based en a simulated incident at tne Salem I plant. Within the plant, everything ran smccthly, but numercus cifficulties were cbserved in the state ccmmunicaticrs chains.

The final paragraph of the NRC repcrt of the crill nctes that:

All cbserver and particicant corrments wculd be reviewed and evaluated in detai.l so ths;. tre neeced improvements may be mace in a timely manner. 2 Local newspacer rescrts reveal details.

Acccr:ing to state and feceral officials whc presided at a pub!!

information meeting hele in L:wer 1-11cwavs Creek TLAC: in January, the :nain :f ::r municati:ns ' rem t9e :siand. " rough 5 tate li:e and varicus state agercies, to the governce and back to tne t:wnship ecu!c be acc:mplishec in -ire minutes.

Curirg Tuescay's cril!, wri:n began at 2 p..~..

• e ::wrsri: *i 2.

receivec Of *icial rctif!:at::n f O'e "inc1 cent" at 3:4 0. -, : C O if Oner af ter pr:r cting :) 3 state Ci9il cef ens 9 Of *lcial.

arc Ibe c::11 ::: viced ef#iCials wit"l a :narCe :: See rcw N91. eia: Crate

mmunicaticn. ires wou!:.v W.

'e answe.- ir Ost :sses was t at all."

Ecr irstance, e*ergerCy telecrCres '~stailec ;- t*e AC ~. uni !:al OU !ciPg ci: not wcW, :U t t.~ g "e

• : w n s F L :'s C c m F u rie sti r ef f ect!Veres3 OcrSider 3:!y.

444 166

C C E E.T.N R. Q ~.~.'

CSE-7565 Townsnip politics played an impcetant raie. E!s:recc T wnsnic was infer e:

Of the test, cr of a "racicactise ! ue".vnich pa: sed over., E'sincorO is f e.cing witn Lower Ai!cways Creek, in wrese rate case One alem plant is placec, anc cccperated uncer protest.

Cuinten Townsnic refused to cecperate because it wculd like money from Lower Alicways C.eek :r the utility to tuy uniforms:

Cfficials in Guinter refused to partic:pate in the test, anc One saic that they will continue to refuse unless somecccy cuys unucems for emergency officials. Cuinton was also "in danger."-

Af ter this drill, some changes we-made to speed up the flow of information througn the state anc to ensure trat all townsni;s around "e plant were centacted, nct simply those initially expected to be uncer the plume of.acicactive gas. 7/ind direction may change, as it did in the drill.

Local politics remain constant, nCw e v er.

Cn November 29, 1977, two ment s after NRC approved the New Jersey racic!cgical emergency plan, a drill wa.

arried cut at the Oyster Creak plant.

There were numercus fcul-ups in this drill, mcs: Of trem at the plant.

"Tne inc! dent initiated 9:03 a.m., and simulated scram was at 9:05 a.m.

9:57 a.m. was the first time we get any infccmatien, any real infccmaticn from them." (Mr.J.

Vann, N.J.

Sureau of Padiation Protection). The dry NRC report notes that the Oyster Creek drill

....incicated a need for the implementation of immediate corrective actions in several a,reas and an in-depth review of the em.rc.encv, plann.ing program. '-

!ndivicual areas of concern were:

The acticns of One sea cn anc.escue team, cre :f ree :ff ute merit: ring teams, incivicuals whc perfccmec perscrre! mcnit: ring act.vities, anc perscrs erf:rm:rg e ass essm ert :' eff site cen-sequences were rCt in ECOcrCanCe Nita estaclisned Or0CeCLres; Ibe !!ieOnCre PClifiCati:n/verP!Oa'icn system Cic Pct funC!!:n as intenrec; C mmLniOati0ns eCu!Cment avai!30ie f r 29 by *."e var:Cus ele-er:3 Of 0 e emergency resOCnse OrgantratiCC CiO n0 ? nc*.:On as ! terce ;

anC Oravis!Cns # r

• ansCCr* at:On in su;CCit Of res:Cnse IC*i:ns CiC 900 suC00-0 existirg neeCs. ~~

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Tre at:itt,. management made tre following state ~ent.

as a r e su a,, a

-i ne cr:.i1 mad net gene as well as rac teen ant.:i;atec.

cetailed review of tre :rtil resuits.vcuic be perf:-~ec wttn a ser:es of mini-crilis cencuctec to verif y nat cr:t. cal :r:it icentifiec preciem

-e areas are ccrrectec.--

Tnis NP.C rescrt uas delayec so that it ceu!d be issued at the same time as the rescrt cf tre secerc crill at Cyster Creek, ne!d on Cecemcer 2C,1,77. This cri!!

was nelc to confirm tnat : rrective acticns nac teen taken.

The actions that had b - er sken includec:

...tne !icensee nac inspected and repaired racies insta11ec in all emergency use vehicles. 3 That ne ccu t helped. Scme state procecures were simplifiec. Finally, This ciscussien indicatec :nat tne licensee-st a t e inte-face hac

~

improvec signific.ntly.

The crill ran smcothly en this seccnd attempt. It is interesting to note tnat Cyster Creek has been in cperation since Decemccr 1969 and that cnly new has its emergency plan been put in wnat NRC consicers proper crcer.

These three.~.Jls incicate that em award of NRC concurrence is not encugh to ensure smccth cperatien of an eme.gency plan; it is essential that tests of the plan te 03rried cut. As a result of having testec its alreacy accroved nian, the state of New Jersey was acle to vastly :mprove its respcnse capacilities.

In 1977 :nly eignt states carriec cut crills :: test the.acic!cg::si eme.gency :lans iney nac in har.c. The NRC sent ccservers :: four anc fcune severe ceficiencies in all of them. It secula te ncted tnat rc res! evacuations ::ck : lace in trese cr';1s;

ney were ::asically telegncne crills to nake sum inat the pr:;er aut9cr:::es woul:

ce rctif t ec.n tne event of t e real ninc..

CLvlCu d/, all.3 rCt weil N!!n tre NF,C C0rcurr ence Cr:grir"..'. C af

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The Craf t 0.esciutien begins:

The existing concurrence procedure cf t e U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Commission (NRC) as cescricec in Fecera! Register Volume 40. No.

248, Decemcer 24,1975, has ceen inef f ective.

The Committee recommends tnat in cecer fer the concurrence precedure to be effective and realistic the fclicwing is offered: The issue of the neec for dynamic, viable emergency plans fcr peacetime nuclear emergencies is of sucn significance that the best efforts of the total available rescurces from all apprcpriate anc responsible local, state and feceral governments must be fully utiliced in the deve!cpment of such plans.23 A number c' excected imcrevements are given, including that the NRC sbculd give funding to the states to enacle them to carry cut the necessary planning, and that NRC snculd schedule exercises to realistically test the state and iccal plans develcped. It is evicent that the Committee dces not want tc throw away concurrence; it merely seeks to improve it.

It is not cnly cencurrence states that have breakdowns in evacuation crills. Cn January 12,1978, a " General Emergency" type crill was carried out at the Fort St.

Vrain nuclear power plant in Colcrado. It was not a success:

The inspectcr stated that the January 12 drill results did nct achieve its int-days., ended purpcse....a follow-up crill will be conducted witnin 60 Cne item of concern was:

...inf ccmaticn sucplied by plant perscnnel to the '.'/ e !d County Ccmmunicaticrs Center and PSCc (Puclic cervice Cemeany cf Colcracc) coeratcr cid not inciuce tre categcry cf incicent anc eff-site areas aff ected. "

h cther wercs, tre ccwer plant cic not tell tre emergency sar.!ces anstnirg accut new mucn racicactivity was being releasec cr wnere the radicactnity was c. circ.

EeVen Cays later, a real uncianne: Celease c' ~3mcactive 9eliu" gas fcreec !~e clant tc ce eV3Cuated. Ine NRC recCrt cf On!'

. :c N snCws

...t*'e initisi nCtificatiCO cn

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' O~ 3, cic "ct inC!uCe t~e categcry cf t9e inCicent anc sr Sectcr anc cistance.2 444 169

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Exactly tre same proclem as hac ::een highligntec at tne cri!M.rurtrermere A sheriff's cecartment recrcsentative statad tnat they were reluctant to immeciately senc their pecple into the field recause of the lack of infcrmation cencerning raciaticn conditions near the plant. It was not until the sheriff's office called the plant at 1030 that information regarding categcry anc a ea affected :ecame known. 22 This inadequate initial infccmaticn was also late.

The licensee determined that conditions were sericus encugh at 0950 to evacuate the plant. However, the Weld County Communications Center and the PSCc operater were not notified until 1014.33 Cne result of the delay was as follcws:

One of the majcr functicns of the State Patrol and the reacbiccks, acccrding to the plan, is to not only centrol access to the area, but to direct people exiting from the area to centrol points for menitoring and decentamination.

This revealed a proclem since by the time reacblocks were estabhrned, plant persennel had long since cleared the area, hcpefully to tN Ochnstown Center. In real,ity, according to the Division Commander, they have gene anywnere. "

There was some confusion about tne quantity of racicactivity released. Because of faulty instrument design, it at first appeared tnat the rate of release was 5C00 times the allowed limit. (Later analysis of tne filters showed that the limit was never reachec.) Calculations made by the utility at 0945 incicated a release cate of 0.67 curies per second of i: cine (I-131). 35 At 1100, the utility mfccmec tne Calcrade Department of Healtn (COH) that the release rate was 6.67 curies per seccnd. At 1155 the utility told anctne. mem:er of tre CCH :nat tre re! ease rate nac been 0.67 curies per see nd.3 It appears tnat confusion was the Order cf the day.

Several comments were mace regarding confusicn and the lack cf crganizaticn that existec at :.e central center :urirg tne incicent. 3~

e Ccrt::1 Center was at tne ::nnst:wn Cor mand P:st. :ut at 1000:

Scme personnel strtec to estaclisn Centr:1 Cen'.er at Visit:r Center-

'NCTE: This was :entrry :: instructicns cut cut ever cal-Tr:nics to all perscnnel. ) 23 444 170

.CEE.MM. ~,

c3E-7865

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The utility also get the winc cirection wrcng:

Ccn Alexancer (Senice Health Physicist at the plant) incicatec re was positive that the wind cirecticn never ceviated frcm the east to west (i.e., 80-90). He said his original assessment of a wind cut cf tne no rth was errenecus and was caused by a misalignment of ne transcarent overlay. ~n The best way to remcve pecple from tre centaminated sectcr is at approximately right angles away frem the sectcr.

• Thus if people had been evacuated using the utility data, they would have been moved frem a safe sector scuth of the plant to a contaminated sector west of the plant.

Other real life incidents have shown the fragility of paper plans. A fi.e occured at the Brown's Ferry plant in March 1975.

It was started by two werkmen with a candle searching fcr an air leak. Before it was extinguisned, nearly seven hcurs later, it nad burnec through decens of centrol cables and threatened cne of ne dreaced happenings at a nuclear pcwer plant, a "!csa of ccciant" accident. In such a event, the reacter's radioactive ccre can't be kept ceci, and melts the thick concrete anc steel walls surrcuncing it, spreading radicactive gases Over large areas. M There was a plan then, and there is a better plan new.

...Mr. Black (Civil Defense Officer) has a plan to evacuate everycne living within seven miles of the plant...

The plan was testec !ast scring, says Mr. Black. Deputies delivered explanatcry pamphlets to each family. The test teck 9early three hcurs. The only flaw Mr.

Black sees in the plan is that somecedy may fail to alert him to an accident, as haccened in the big fire cf 1975.

"Tre fire was en a Saturday," re says, "but I cicn't rirc cut accut it until Mcreay mccring, wren I uas cvsr in tre ccff ee srec." 4 444 171 9

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THE STATE CF ILLINCIS A5 AN EX4 MPLE Illinois nas the largest ccncentration of nuclear :cwer plants of any state in One coun try. It has seven nuclear cower plants in cperation (Ores:sn 1, 2, 3; Zicn 1, 2; and Cuad-Cities.,2) and seventeen planned er uncer construction (Clinton, LaSalle County 1, 2, 3, 4; Byron 1, 2, 3, 4; Braicwced 1, 2, 3, 4; Carroll County 1, 2; and Hencersen Catnty 1, 2).

It also has no raciclogical emergency plan. The Illinois Ccmmissien en Atomic Energy has declared that At the present time, there is no legal authcrity in State Ccvernment for the orderly evacuation of citizens from one area to another in the event of a disaster that threatens the health and/cr safety of the citizenry. '3 Having made this disquieting finding over a ; sar ago, the Commission appointed a committee to handle the proclem, but it has never met. A letter from Gerald R. Day, Executive Director of the Ccmmission, t: us dated May 15, 1978, -

indicates that the subject will be placed on the agenda of a future meeting, this having been requested cy Ms. Catherine Guigg, a Iccal environmentalist. In Illir cis, planning fcr raciclegical emergencies is shared between the Cepartment of Puclic Health (IDPH) and the Emergency Services and Disaster Agency (E50A).

E. Erie Ocnes, Director of ESDA, has a very low cpinicn of NRC concurrence, and ESDA has neither the manpower nor the money to provice the site-specific cetail required by NRC. The agency has recently received a cre-year grant from CCPA for " State Planning fer All Risk Crises (SPARC)", and has two men werking on the prcblem.

Illinois' plan has not been concurred in by NRC, perhaps because the Illinois Cepartment of Puclic Health sees little point in inclucing scecific catail fce power plants.

(The) state agencies have felt inat cur primary goal must be the develecment cf an effective state respcnse plan for any ty;:e of racicicgical emergency, anc ret just related 0 fixec f acilities. 4 No site-scec:'!: cetail nas since been acced to tFe plan, which remains a genera!

quice as :: wnat to cc in tre event of a racicact:ve release. Ce.: :ne curie sr one

"'ill!On :Uries. This OcCument, *Fe !!!!rCis RaciClOgiOni A5sistance O!an, emCCcies tFe state View?Ci't tnat i* is !"'CCSsiO!9 C: foresee ai! asOe003 Of a "uClear !".Cicent anc tra*, ratner t'an Oe traCCec ";y inflexiO[e prOCecures, "."e bes; strategy.s CO make an infcfmal 30 "Oc ::!an 3aCh time. Ine OcpCs!!e View?Cint U Fei: C) t~e NRC, wnien wcuic :ref er t: see all : curses :f acticn set ccwn as accre,ec OrOCeCur?s. Ic CC this NOuld Cest large sums Of "'Oney, wriOn One sta*e is Jnwn.i g 10 sOenc On " insurance" fOr, in it3 Ocin!On, an unlike!N evet, anile t'.ere are "" Ore urgent cemanOs. "It's Farc !O Seil One state nsLrance," says Cary Wrignt sf CD.

444 172

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[f an event occurrec, tNe ulinois 3ssCiclogiccl Mss; stance ie3m s

q s %.5m i / WC U.C picCeec t One site by Car, plane Cr etnerwise, 3s Cne cCeasion cemarcec. Iney expect to de sole to reacn anywnere in tre state witnin two ncurs. Cnce tnere, tney wcula use utility data to cetermine if any immeciate evacuat:cn snculc ce startec.

Whetner the utility wcula or could tell them is ancther matter. Fce example, Ccmmenwealtn Ecisen operates seven nuc! ear reactors in nortnern !!!incis.

In Fecruary 1976, Ecisen nac discuss;cns with the ICPH about wnat racia:!cn levels srculc trigger an evacuatien plan.

During the review cf emergency plan implementing prececures, the (NRC) inspector determined prececures delineating the criteria to be uti!!:ec in tne recommenc.aticn fcr evacuaticn to cff site agencies, were not clearly cettnec. -c The ICPH was unaware of these ciscussiens and stated that the persen involvec had since movec to the U.S. Envircnmental Protection Agency. Cn reing contacted at the U.S. EPA, he hac no reccliecticn of ceing involvec in any seen ciscussions. The Emergency P!an ccercinator for Ccmmenwealtn Ecisen has aisc been replacec, and the new man, who has ceen in this pcsitico fcr accut a year, xnew netning accut it.

The inspector who wrote the report is no longer with the NRC. Coly wnen CSE inicrmec NRC abcut tnis ccnfusien earlier this year was scmething dene. A recent NRC report en the Zicn statien incicates that the matter has finally :een rescived, af ter two years."

No cecisicn has been mace en iccine blocking by IESDA cc IDPH. (The ingestion of a large dose of ncemalicaine prior to being ex;csec to radicactive iccine clocks tne uptake of the latter. Some incivicuals nave an acverse reactico to iccine.';

Tnere is also an ill-cefinec difference of ccinicn between the state and Cemrncnwealtn Ecisen regarcirg emergency cri!!s. In the course :f its regular emergency crills at nuclear power piants, Ccmmenwealth Ectsen teiepncres :ne varicus state and !ccal agencies 0: ecnfir-tnat telecncre rum:ers have c; :een

nangec anc :nat alc cculc ce pecvicec if necessary. No active carticitation Oy

s. ate anc 'ccal af#icials is invcivec.

In a weti-cuclici:ec 1975 interview, E. Erie Ceres, Cirec::r :f te Jirc ts Emergency Services arc Cisaster ' gency, :a.c:

We trin.< we nave a gccc firs: craf t f:r :re Zicn area. But :: tel.ycu we nave an aCce:t3cie plan for al. :"e nLXes in Enis state wout Ce a

latant li e.

Even ' e Eicn ?lan is n accectacle antil ~. 's :een exerc;seC w;tn 3 CT!!I. And :Nat ne ncce "; cc in CFe n9x: f:Gr Oc :;X OCntns.4 444 173

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i.CEEX E C CSE-7963 That.vas t9ree years ag. Such a :est of Zicn's emergency :lan ras still nct taken place. Leo Parke, tne ESCA cccccinst:r fer tre area wnicn incluces :ne Zi:n staticn, wcula li<e to hcid such a test witnin the next few mentrs because

...it'll be mass ccnfusien if we can't Save one and something haopens there. I'm ali fcr it (a drill).

Mr. Parke saic he nad raisec tnis issue with tne utility previcusly and had been asked to hold off until some cetails of planning had been clarified. He said he was going to raise this isme at his next meeting with Zicn staticn. Cc!cnel Jim Teslik of I =.:Dx. also agreed to mention it at,.is May.,0,.3 9,e _a, meeting with tne.,:. ten c.:Or,.

Vern Chaney, Commenwealth Edison's Generating Stati:n's Emergency Plan cccccinator, said the ccmpany would like to hold a joint test of its plan and the state's plans, but that the state agencies were unwilling to cccperate.

(Many agencies other than IESDA would be involved.)

A. David Rcssin, a nuclear engineer with Commonwealth Edison, presents a different view.

Cur pelicy is not to get peccle uptignt about scmething that will never happen in a predicted way, anyway. Public drills are a bad icea because until an accicent actually occurs ncbedy knows which way the wind will be blowing; ncbedy knows what time it will occur. We don't schedule cur accidents.

• In Wisconsin, a utility believes in igncrance, while the emergency services think informati:n wculd help.

"It merely ccnf tses the public to tell tnem ::c much," says Roth Leccick, nuclear plant prcject manager for Nortnern States Power Co., Minnespe!!s.

That view dic net sit well with the ceputy cirect:r cf the State Civisicn :f Emergency Covernment....

"The ecucati:n cf :ne auc!!: in a!! manner :f hazar:s. :nciucing :-is one, is vary imper

• ant. as [Cng as. is ke:t in :a rsce:MV *, said Cer:en Reese of :ne emergency gcvernment civisi:n.I A :cwn ir Massa:nusetts nas :recucec and distri utec a set cf um= =mergercy irs: rte:icrs f ar tr.e public. Mas: panic cces net seem :: have ensuec.

Ccnfusien is ai: ::c ~:mmen. C n,recruary 10, !975. ;crn rascia, ESC A C cr:irat:r f:r Ccck County, ahien incluces Cnicagc. cic not nave a :isas er ;ian f:r :ne Chicag0 3raa 2nd Nas una:ie : say if *Fe Cisas".er :ian nCitC3C a sect. n On i

evacua*i:F. He "ac raturaec nis :::y Of !Pe '*isaster :!an *. :ne Ci:y of CP! Cage ::

Ce ucca:ec and eX:90 Sc *.: Fava a ew Oc y in trirty ca'ys.

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Fire Chief 5:nu!!er, en being askec if ne nac an evacuat:en plan fer Chicago, saic.

"We have ne sirens."

-e acvisec calling Jcnn Fascia :: Octam more ceta:Is of tne evacuatien plan. Senuller :s uncer Acting Fire Commiss:cner Albrecnt wnc is in cnarge of cisaster planning for Chicago. His secretary forwarcec a tnin cecument called "Tne Disaster Plan fer the City of Chicage." It denctes tnree subclans. P!an

1. 1 for 5 30 victims, anc P!an #3 for 30 er more victims.e.to 15 victims, P!an //2 for 15 ::

Plan >, would presumacly e swung into actico y : ire Ccmmissic: -

Albreent in the event of a peacetime nuclear emergency. There has been one ns.f-hearted attempt to evacuate Chicago by Ccmmissicner Guinn, tne previces Fire Commissioner en Septemcer 22, 1959: af ter the Chicage Wnite Scx nad wen their first American League pennant in forty years, tne acting defense corps cirector sounded the air-raid sirens.

The 5 minute wail of more than 100 sirers at 10:.'O p.m. Tuesday sent tncusancs rusning into the streets and caused near panic in almost every section of the city....

The sirens' blast, wnicn awakened tncusancs, tccugnt t :e Illincis Sell Telepnene Company its greatest overicac since the encing of World War II. Newspacers, racic anc television stations were swamped with calls from people asking if the Russians were attacking.C Commissicner Guinn was unrepentant.

Quinn acced that the siren alarm c! ear!y cemenstrated that pecple did not know their civil cefense ins *ruc*iens.

If they cic, ne saic, they would have *uned into the civil cefense frequencies (640 and 1220 k!!ccycles) and learred tnere was no cause for alarm.53 Ancther accicental evacuatien tc:k place in 1974 A leak at a bulk storage facility in Chicago a few years ago precuced cicucs of acid tumes :ver a per:cc of cays.

The early stages of tne incicent were as foll:ws:

5hertly af:er 2:00 p.m. Charles E. Willarc cf :ne Illinois EP A :rie: to call the Chicage Civil Ce'ense Agency, cut nc :ne arswerec :ne chcne. Willarc tren ca!!ec Pe Cht: age Fire Cecar* ment anc askec to speak with F;re Ccmm:ssicner Gu nr.

". n o is ne civil cefense OOcidin.ator fOr One City Cf Chicago.

W illar C was t:ic y

' ire SUCerintenCent Nevi!!e Onat Cuinn was gliing a sOeeCn at C %a re F eic, anC *.na* ai! Of One civil Oefense eersennet -ac accaren.., awen l

tFe af terCCCC C f.

WillarO ::lC Nevule a Cut One lead anC aSxec One f

• re CeCartment to respCCC arc *O senc gas T.asxs, cu* since 'nere was CCC d

• ire Neville :iC nCC Onink One *i re C e: a r* '" e n t SnCuiO ge iCVOlVec. Finally One Of W;liarO'3 SuccrC. nates :nCne: 'n a

• ire alarm f00 Uuik Ierminals.

W!!nin minutes Chief #!re M a rsn ail W illiam F iey :C:ereC twe Chemical Rescue Unt*.s :: go : One site of Pe lead; ne also cr0ereC a #!re Ce:artment Teil:0 ter : f!V O v e r 7 e 3. *. a.I' h8

\\15

~.n.

iw

iCEEMM'"

CSE-7a65 Testifying at the Commissicn's public hea&gs. ' ciey acmittec that for tne first f ew hcurs the emergency operaticrs were pretty chactic, and that he received some conflicting infccmation from Buik Terminals and Cacct Carpcration recresentativ es regarcing the methoccicgy ic be emolcyed in cealing witn the leak. Foley said that there were so many people around that for a while ne did not know who was who.

"It was hard to sert them cut, until we finally blew the whistle."

Foley said. "Encugh is encugh, tnere will be ene program here anc we will run it. We will cefine what's going en and straighten it cut. I think at that point we began to make some cefinite progress. "

Later an evacuatien of a small area (Altgeld Cardens) was carried out. Fire Chief Foley testified:

He said that within the confines of the City of Chicago there is only one man who can order an evacuation; that man is the Fire Commissioner.

"The Fire Commissicner did not ceder an evacuation of Altge!d Gardensf' Foley insisted. "To my knowledge we still do not know who cid it."

• Fire Chief Schuller recently premised to call us back to give mere details Of Chicago's evacuatien plans. He never cid. Cn being asked again, he said that they were under a new regime (Albrecht having replaced Quinn)and that he expected nis own replacement to be named by May 15 Evacuaticn of a large city such as Chicago cbvicusly pcses intractable pecblems.

Even the cetimistic Reacter Safetv Stucv (the NRC's f amcus "Rasmussen Study"'

notec:

...there is ne presumcticn that 9e ;cculatien in any of these majcr cities (New Y rk City, Scsten, Ohi!ade! nia, Chicagc) cculd e mcvec in less than 1 week. :'

Feceral precarecness is so enactic trat it seems unabf e :r unwilii g :: eh: ne siri! arty Onactic and perniless state arc iccal cretarecness e f f:r..

Senat:r Orcxmire :! aimed tnat:

(The) current cicture of ur feceral preca ecress eff:rt is one :f cisjointed Organi:st:en, ciffusien of autncrity anc respcns::ility.

inacecuate tucget ocntr:1, bureaucratic confusi:n arc :u:1!:stien, conf;!: ting pricrities, anc general neglect :f precarecness., at :e hignest ;evels of Ccvernment, ex:ect af ter a isaster :ccurs.

• f u..

176

_r.

g M. Tam?e w=t.-766)-

w s.

n "e, along with Senator Percy, was intrccucing a Senate bill to recemcIne FDAA, FPA anc CCPA. The differences of coinicn cetween FDAA lCHL'C) anc FP A (CSA, have already been cetailed. Senator Percy pointec to the rect of tnese cifficulties:

None of these (agencies) are reccqniced by congressional statute, ncne of them hcids cocrdinating authority over the other two, ncne of them wields sufficient power to assert leadership and establish direc tion. 53 The bill introduced by Senators Prcxmire and Percy, S 1209, is cne of several which aim at tidying up emergency preparedness. These bills are being ne!d up pending the results of the President's Recrga.112aticn Project, which is locking into all aspects of emergency preparecness. As mentioned earlier, Ms. Sricker, secretary to this project, was unaware that no agency had accepted responsibility for planning for large peacetime nuclear releases, nor coulc sne suggest anycne who might know about this area. This gives one litt!e faith in the project.

The last werd must go to a staff member of the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency. Agreeing that this state has no specific plans for a peacetime nuclear emergency, he noted that " Necessity is the mother Of invention."

In the event of a reacter meltdown accidert er racicactive waste release at Zicn er Dresden, instantaneous wholesale inventisn will be required by both the state and federal autnerities.

444 177 r,,2 m,m

.+

,_ w_/a.62 r

p 4.

.&..i e

r v C,.N.,

i uis i*The Risks of Nuclear Ocwer React:rs: A Review of :ne NRC React:r Safety Stucv W A5m-1-C0 (Camcricge, Ma, August 1977, unt:n er Concerrec Scientists), p.13e.

9' Atomic Energy Act, Section 3(d).

3W ASH-10CC, pp. 72-76.

4See Appencix A and Figure 1 fcr an explanatien cf this numbe..

5 Strencer Federal Assistance to States Needed for Radiatien Emercency Rescense 01anninc M ED - 7 6-7 3,,

cN asnington, CC, Mar:n 13, 1976, General Accounting Of f tee), pp. i-iii.

6 Ibic., p. 9.

7Federal Recister, Vol. 42, July 14,1977, p. 36236.

8 Ibi c., p.,o,; /.

,c 9Federal Recister, Vol. 38, January 24,1973, p. 2356.

10Federal Recister, Vct. 40, Decemcer 24,1975,p.59492 11Federal Rescense Plan fcr Peacetime Nuclear Emergencies (Int erim Guidance!, UNasnington, CC, Cecerrcer 1976, General Services.,cm:nistraticn, Feceral Preparecness Agency), pp.11-12. NOTE: This cccument is hereinaf ter cited as "FRPPNE."

19

'~~- e csJc,p. lo.

r ne. i 11 s - - " C, A.' 1, p. 9 '.

~

enr n 1

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,=.= p> r,,nn _x u, ~..

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• / e.n.e C N T,.:.n n m< 1,

. f. _'.

!Q^~Cuice arc Checx:!st f r Ceve!: ment and Evaluatier of State src '._: cal Ccver ment ;ac::::c:ca! Emercercv ;es:cose ; tans r Eurocr :- ;:xe: 3.c:. ear

-= :a::es NtRi~.-75:___,

w asningt:n, CC, Eecemcer 19 7, u.3. Nuc.e ar Reguat:ry -cmmtssi:n, arc Sucotemert Nc. I to NL EC ~5Lill M ar:n

_3.

s

.t.

.s i.

NRC Inscection anc Enf:rcement ecert 50-272/77-2~,

.5.

- 6) -

l f

P=-(e=n n e :-. --,3

.a 1

.-i:e a

~.

r vC i i aC i :_S sc-n :.u._

c v

.w

'OTodav's Sunceam (Salem Ccunty, N.';, ' ugust 3,1977.

71 Q *

~

• • rg C.,.m$ugust -,19~//.

w1 -

??

.. m. s.

swlw 23NRC Inspecticn and Enfercement Reper: 50-219/77-23,p.5.

24ra.d.

i 25 Ibid.

tnspecticn and.nrercement Repcrt so 9_.3 7,j~/ / -3.1, c. >.

zn s NRCr 27Ibid.

oo

'*Encicsure te letter dated March 1,1973, from David D. Snellings, Jr.,

Chairman, Intercrganizational Ccmmittee en Raciclegical Emergency Rescense Planning and Prepa edness, to R:bert G. Ryan, Direct:r, Office cf State : cgrams, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, p.1.

?9.RC Inspect:.cn and ntercement xepert ;0

,__4 /.f._ 0,, p. c,.

a.

se_

N 30Ibic., p. 7.

3^1NPsC Inspecticn and Enfercement Report 50-267/78-03, Enclosure 1 (Nctice of Violation), p.1.

39" Ibid. p. 27.

33 Ibid., c. 27.

,s

s. 6. d., p. 4, 0.

3 5...,

m.,

5.

3 6,, -

.3, u.-

3, c:rt St. '/ r ai r

,a c::!:gic a.,

..mergency -.es:c ese,.,

.anuary

/

Racia:.

• Incicert :le :Cecartment of aciciegt ai -ealtn, Sta:e Of C:icracc., p.

5.

NRC Insce::icn anc infere: ment r epcrt 5C-267/73-03, :. 37.

n

'*:bie.. A::acrmer: 3, p.

3^#: ef erence 36, p.10.

em d

e d

e C e:ar: ment, 2;cn, u, June H:,, p.

- 2' -

444 179

• 4es

KC CSE-7365

g. m

. u,0 i.g~ i a s c en t ir.c e c',

IDcuglas R. Sease, " Athens, A'a., Cecices TVA Nuclear :)lant Isn't Cccy Neignoce," Wall Street icurnal, April 13,19 73, pp.1, l.-.

4Ibic., p.14, 431977 Recert to the Governce f em t ie Illincts Commissicn en Atomic Er.erev, p. 2.

1. 1. Letter cated May 15,1978, from Gerald R. Day, Executive Directer, Illinois Commissicn en Atomic Energy, to Peter G. Cleary, Staf f Physicist, Citizens fcr a Better Envirenment.

45Letter dated January 3,1975, from Joyce C. Lasncf, Directer of Puclic Health, State of Illincis, to Mercert H. Brown, Director, Office of Government Liaisen-Regulation.

46NRC t.nspecticn anc Enfcrcement Repcrt 50-295/76-05:50-304/76-Ct

p. 8.

47NRC Inspection and Enforcement Repcrt 5C-295/78-07:50-304/78-07, p. 2.

48William J. Lancuette, " Evacuation Af ter a Nuclear Accicent: Can It Se Ocne?", Natienal Observer, July 12,1975.

9 Ibid.

50The Cacitai Times (Macisen W;scensin), Octccer 27,1977.

51Chicacc Disaster Plan (Chicago Civil Defense Corps, Cece~cer., 974),

p. 7.

52Chicaco Oailv Tricure, Sectemcer 24,1959.

s J J T'.c;w.

" Chemical Leax at t. e Eu!W Termtrais arx ar A :sccrt to : e c'.

General :ssemcb ov tre lin cts mectslat:ve invest:catmc Jerr iss:cn, ure.9 ;,

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bbf Carcressienn.! :.ecc. c. Aprd 1,1977, c. 53.'d.

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Reactor 45a W ASH-1200 assumes *. hat peccle will be evacuatec frcm the accve keyncle-shaped at three speecs, as fc!1cws:

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i.GE@T CSE-7863 APPD, DIX.i.continuec)

Figure 1 snows how Chicago would ce affectec by releases from the currently ecerating Zicn Staticn in Zicn, Illincis, or the Sailly Statien under construction in Inciana (Inciana has no emergency response plan yet';.

Sctn 25-mile anc 40-mile racil were crawn, since we believe tnat an area at least 40 miles downwind from a reacter accicent would nave te be evacuatec. We case tnis both en many ciscussions with the NRC staff members and the review cf W ASH-1400 cene by the American Physical Society's Stucy Grcup on Lignt-Water Reacter Safety, which assumed an evacuation racius of 60 kilometers (37.3 miles).

(Reviews cf Modern Physics, Vcl. 47, Supplement No.1, Summer 1975, p. 546)

At Zico Statien, the wind blows toward tne southwest through :cutheast cre 29% of the time. (Zicn Statien Final Safety Analysis Repert)

At Sailly Station, tre wind bicws tcward tne scuthwest tnrcugn ncrtnwest are 22%

of the time. (Sailly Station Preliminary Safety Analysis Report) 444 183

,s

p : r.o r..,s i.

The nuclear industry's se cret weapon for reducing f atalities.

h-f rom power plant accidents p:1,e.

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iOans.

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flw will couplete the five remaining (hapters of its llanual of Protective Ai tion Guides (IW.s) e anil Protect ive Actions f or liuclear Incidents wi thin the next lit to ?4 n,nths itinual s hap t ee.

have been c.onple ted Ly f PA in.-ludiny l'AGs f or t he air borne esposure pa t he.iy.

Iklpae twn t_ o f ilea l t h, E duca t ion _and_Wel f a_rc tellW guidance on the tese of potanlawn todide* as a tisys oid blin l isiy age rit for use as a (*ioli1 t e ve-e was ui e in the event of an als hoi ne radioloyli.a l i clease i s a hins t. t o be pub l i s heil in the led r al 1

lle9 s t er.

e Pe nt ec tive Ar tiori Guldes f or f oJds and aninul f eeds are in final f oe m and at e wait iny appioval f einn the Consnissione of the i ond and Drug Ailminist ration.

tjepartuent of Iransporta tion fly the end of 19/0, 00f will publish tr ansportation of radioactive malertals emeigenc y plan.,,gt e

guidwce to update the guide prepared under NitC contract by the Western Interstate fluc lea s 11oa rd.

(UI will also develop a transportation operations ciurinal for itse by cce s-ier s, shippen s, '.t.iles e

a.d lin al gover nments by the end of 19/H, and a s~adlological suppleim nt t o.i hatardous malers.ils t r aining course by mid-1919.

A fk; par huent of incrgy tinder einit rac t to filtC,10f's Urookhaven National l abora tory has con.pleted wor k on the de ve l opwn t a

of a prototype radiolodine air sanpling and humitoring devic e to asscu airhoe ne releases inom nuclea r-f aci li t le s. The device will int r e.idy sur final testing this fall.

Sp t ri its 19HO at budget submission, has called for $200,000 to sr.inu f at. tun e and dist ribut e abou t 1,000 of these C) devices to the States and local governments. (tto te : A similar di vic e is I cinq developed by beden and other furopean rountries f or u'.e near t heir nuclear f acili t ies, )

e bul 's Handla l abora tories under contract to fillC is developing accident uenarios to test ewi gem y plans.

they will he c<mpleted early next year.

Anistante: tiltC and seven other involved lcderal ayesicles have: eleveloped a lis Id au t' t ain e pi og r.mi t o a u i s t li e Sta tes arid local goverims:nts in developiety, ippi ovisiy.ind tes t ing t he s e ewe 9eniy plans supportive o ' nuclear facilities. len ledet al inlei agern.y itegional Advisus y t u.ne t t ec-ase set np loe this purpose, lhe Conmi tlees die the primary vehit le through whic h s oni ni s ern e in T

State plans is granted, and the Consnittees also evaluate encicises to test plan. ion.hnled by the s ui..s ana ihe.i, iec.ii ynve, nim.nts.

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the (bu lcar itequiatusy tousnission is lhe Atomic inergy Act of 1954 does not give the NRC any aulhnrity to (dis y out any cwl yem y p l.unisset violateny i t s oh i l ya l ions nenk r t he and pr epaiedness ac tivi ties with the S ta tes aml local epiveniments, or to intei f et e ui t h es t.1 Ato e.

lociyv Aet of i%4, whi4 h s e-inq s talietoey authori t ies and respans ibilit ies o f the States.ini Incal m vesni.en h to pi ot ee 8 8hc

.ps s e e-that fler p-a c t ul ut i li tat ion heal t h and sa f et y of their ci tisens. One otition fur the flNL to omsider pointed out s ee the CAsi itepost ut a t innt e ene s q y poc. t Ian to the tongress * $ t ronger fen.lera l Assis t ante t o S ta tes Neuded for Radiat ion f wryon< y Heslawne planntrof (MU Heport Ht tb 4 L1, Hars h 10, 19 /(* ) ' i s ' t o s ee k legis latitm or uthes plans to enable Oi(t in t he ina n innna e s t ent (twi-to qel S t ates t o pr epare adequa te radiation essa?iqcuty eesponse plans.

Il ledesal efforts to a iupi n ve sistent usth the c onnoen deleie.c anel.ciusity, and

• t a t e radia t ion ewi gency plans as e unsm t ess f ul, t;HC woul t leave to detrimine whether at.hnnfd enn g

ggg gg, N date, usth the healt h and sa f ely N

has not suuyht such legislation test has soudit to woik mopesatively with the *. tales in oniaqinq ut the publia..

and assisting them in developing these plans, the Illi Hepost in.ficates that (H1.

intenih to puesne legal n ewdles On Augus t fe, 19 /S, the public Interes t He: cart h f.r oup et. al., f iled a pet i t ion im sulemd inq the ves y soon to settify this pe t illoner s reqinisted tha t an amendwnt to Pas t

',0 s equite licensees to (a) distsibute s us i e ur t ron.

negilgent e on the pas t of the ciplaining what energenc y safety steps the citizen should take in case of a nuslear innident to lhe fo m i u lon.

public within a radius of at least 40 miles of the facility; (b) disseminate inloe nut ion erplaininq these pl m s through educational sources aavi the public nn?dia- (r) (onduct an.ittual publie e vai nal iani delli in full s unfus w* ty with these plans; arid siihuil t to the Consutu loti a s epne t deirini. t e a t leiy i nen -

pliance with the awndment.

lhe requisements s'eques ted was e to be t al rieil out annually.

lhe petitioners also icquested thai the tenuission issue a new settiun to past 50 requiring (a) that the tomdssion not intee a construction permit or lic ense or aint sided peiniit or aim: sided lit eita e inilil the opplic ant has (1) dist rlhuted to the public within a 40-mile

,.dlus of the f ac ili ty seu t iinr. es t its h eliminary Saf ety Analysi; Heport or f inai Safety enalysis lleport which discuss puh tit evaination

1. ~

plans, (2) disseminated inf ormation explaining these plims theough edm at tunal sumies and pubite wdia, and ( 1) submi tted a the Coneniss ion a seport desmi;is trat inq full concli,nue with the above M

s equi v eria'n t s ; and (h) tha t the Ctanission no*. inue a license or awnded license unt il the apples ant has (1) c omInt ted an actual evaueat ion drill in (un f oa mil y wi t h t he applia ant's plans for inpinq with cwe genties a f fecting t he public, and (2) sulant tied to the Coinuiu ion a e cport demons t e a t inq f ulI ampliante with this requirewnt. This sec tion would.lso require that shere a hvas ing is held, IN opplli ant mus t (onply wi t h these regulat ions a t least 50 Jays pilur to the he u t ny.

s so Also the pc t itioners requested tha t the Couanin ion amend part 50 f u :eipet ic t ha t Iinal 1alety Analy.is Hepurl' tuust include detailed emergeru y plans and implementation prm edures On July /, 19//, the Cnnonission denied the pet i t ion for rulemakiny. lhe i nneni s '. lon " om iudcal t ha t the tanunission's pr esent regulations provide for adequate ewryem y planning and thal the pioposed inte would not f ui ther ensur e the heal th ami sa f et y of the public, and in tatt may i m i c.ne lhe pinhabilely of injuries and 1o% of life, in addit ion to caus ing other inconvenis m es and i n t s unl a nimm se.m.it e with the benelit.

ihe (iminission also helieves that its ongoinq efforts in the ewigeniy picem edne Q

ar ea will pe uvide a (ont isueing level of cir..e gem y planeiiioj sul f ic ient foi l he pi ni ci t i nii of ihe publia

'a==%.,

health and salcly? (ledesal Register, Vol 42, No. l~lS, July 14, 19//)

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6 I hu gin ecsted aint emen t ised Seet6un entitled:

"ihe ite l.s t_ lung this is (ci tainly true in the setise that plasis are paper dotisiin's.ts t hat inus t he ship, th t ween tie flug lear, tu assure their validity. No one can guai antee that ariy plan whesi innplmin nt ed, wi l l tan k pi ri i se l y hegulatoryj oosnission.and the.

in the manner in which it is perceived to be atale to work.

Ihis is the s eason f or tesi!nq l he p l.ni States "

perludf rally, in work out the

• bugs," test capillunent, and pr ovide the involved persmeiel wi t h.m opportunity to wo: L wille the plan t hrough an exei c ise whic h s hnolales a s ea t emergem ).

tunicetly, the latt that a *, tate's nadio-imf. a nncus e ente pe oreduc es f or State and local governnn:nt rad iolog ic a l cuici gem y e s", lune.e pl.ne.,

logic a l emel gem y s esponse plan sequire that to maintain oisr conceirrence, we enpect the plans to be tes teil and upilat ei :ni.ni annua l s

h.e. heen given an tml comur' has is to ensur e tinit t hey are operable a id prat.t ica l. A siumher o f S t a t e i n pi e".en t a t s ve. Ine vi-ainli-s em.e ducs not nei es tav ily rate et Unal ps'tur to HitC granting a concur ente in a State / local gove siment emes qi ns y p l.ui a an i a" s au a n I ha t i t wi lI wm k.

Iul test ut this plan should he demonstra!cd. We intend io nunliiy oar i um urs em e pe m.com e.o a m J ingly.

Lect lam ent it led:

"Ihr State it is imion-tuviate that Messrs. C<wney and Cleary selected the State of Illinois as "an cuampic. "

lin.

of Illinois ay an.luample."

State's activities in developing and testing itadiological Imergency itespr

,e plans ar e mit t yp ia.il of what is f oimd in most States. When c<mipat ed to other Sta'es, Illisiois has a lair ly latyr stall in both the leergency Services and Disaster Agency amt the Department of Publit llca l t h ( t he tuo prim.ny agencies for this type of planning). For one acason or another lumever, neither ni t hose airm les has developml an adeituate ciiiciljency plan supportiva of Illinois' many nuc lear tari t tlies. ImL amt A

ot her f ederal agencies havia tried to encourage the: State to elevelop an adeepsate plari, but with f ew g

satisfattbry I'esults.

lhe Clll report indicates that at least oeur spokesman f or the staie'- laigest utility (Conmonwealth (dison), "would like to hold a joint test of its plan, aint the State's plair.,

but that the State agericles were uriwilling to (ooperate." Another in.uit f esta t line of d e ll it eil t ie ori the emer ge:K y planning f ront in Illinuls, is that the former l edeial Ul t ite of t mer gency Prepaiedness (Ut p) used malt hing emer gemy planning grant funds in t he annunt of $U,h39 in i Y 19/1 under the pio-

~^

'O visluns of public law 91-606.

for this amount, Illinois pr oduced an emergency plan t unsider ed t o be N

quite inadespiate in the radlulogical cineagesicy response area by the Olp and fmL staf f per senmet who seviewed it in 19 El. In contras8 to this poor performante in the planning acca, the State has pas t -

iripated fully in all NltC tralraing programs and apparently can lleld lar ga, well equipped emergem y aesponse team; fmil : lhe semaindes of the r eport deals with the activities of other I'ederal agencies (not analyicd) avid includes a c:nnpilat ion 01 various state ment s and rpinions t onien ning emergem y planning and preparedness, made hy a variety of persons at. the lederal, State avid loc al epivernn.cnt level.

Sumnas y I valuat son:

A i n i t e.a l m illen s eport whi<.h in t he main v erounts the opinions and views of various individuals, and quotes exs ee pts ol v ar inus doi tmien t s a n.1 publiiations on the subject of radluluglial emeigetwy ecsponse planning. the report dismisses NltC proys ams in this area as " man c.hil t,".m unwareanted, unli ne, and imf air evaluali -

lhe report is gr ossly unbalanced in that it innt ains not one woo d of arinowledqisnent ul enistseusimi and ol her i citee a l ayem y mee geni y pl.uming and gu epai edness tu oyrams wi t h t he St a tes and their Im.a l quvei nna rita.

Ilic.i lei l i nii ol lilinois

c. he i ng ".m e s aup l e" o f wh.n l is happening in lhe S t at e' wi t h s ey.ii d to r ailloloyiral emergem y response planning at l iv e l le-I.antm lunate

. i ni.

' tate is not icpiesenlative of the qenetal level ul Int et es t and pos i t ive approat h in must. ot her Sl a tes wi t h opei a t ing i t ud nu. le.n la. olites.

shal

, n evi ( in - a.c jp ein ca to a few isnidents libe the be own 's l e = r y I ( r e, the lort St. Vrain helien:i gas s elease, a n d a mic cacia sti" s on.bn ( c.l i n Heu h e '.e v.m f.o hn aihe, t he repos t dm" lint amunlin einenlene y Manning and [HTpadness in St ates wilith have been i nopet al ive.

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la ti.e main, t i.e s ep n t is a siries of t ueit. lis'.on y s t a t emen t s clinu t tiie filtC, otlier l ederal agenc ies and t!.e h es tilent, an.1 eti.es not i sent a an any tontecte,.pce ii i. peupusal for it..pi ov emen t o f tiils type of emergency planning. A principal deficiency, in our visu, 6 *. t h t it e.pi.ite:

"emen yent y pl.nuairvi" wi t ti "eva(uati<

p l.i nn i ng. " llic teein emce gent y platuting s.<miprelien.js a si. ember of elements. nut as t ions whic h m.iy 1.c talen so s c <. pan.1 t., a g i ven emei 9ein-y:

one ni t hos. et ments is evatuallon, ausi aviollier triight he a lic i t e r l eie; depe n.liri.; oir t iii. e i n s ione. t a.i<.."

Asisel he s might he thye oial blan b arp*,

Varlous sitateqle-ot (umbinations of SLsategies mi 9 il tu' teseil ileperietisig oit llie a irrnssis t an4 s",,

t he-.i f im i. l.li. s e, lhe t

t ypog r..phy, time popula t ion elen.i t y, lhe transpostattun system, even the time of slay.

It conf uses the inne and inhibit.. s at s ona l ali.s u.

on lo opiale the t ei m.

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/ 10 Itober t G. Ilyan, lli res. Lnr

.Inne J.1, 1 9 /11 Of t h e of 'ita te 1.r ograms ll.S. flutlear itegulatory Cuiniluinn 4%

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