ML19224D268
| ML19224D268 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1979 |
| From: | Bates A Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Kerr W, Okrent D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0124, ACRS-SM-124, NUDOCS 7907110225 | |
| Download: ML19224D268 (1) | |
Text
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g' n ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS U L' I.h3:d/f W ASMNGTON, D. C. 20555 k
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May 25, 1979 W. Kerr, Oconee Subcomitee Chairman D. Okrent, 'IMI-2 Long Term Implications LOSS CF FRESSURIZER LEVEL INDICATION IN CXXEEE UNIT 3 The attached LER presents several interesting questions when veiwed in relation to IMI-2.-
hhile in a hot shutdown condition to investigate the source of a primary system leak it was discovered that the pressurizer level indicato control room was stuck.
The low level was caused by continued letdown and no make-was discovered.
up flow.
How long would it have taken The reactor was in a hot sSutdown condition.
to loose significant quantities of water out of the primary system if the bhat happened to redundant indiction stuck indicator had rot been found?Are there no low-level alarms or warmings from other level measurements?
during conditions of hot shutdown (or even cold shutdown)?
One of the changes made to operating PdR's since TMI-2 has been the reroval of a reactor trip on low pressurizer water level (coincident low level and low pressure was required for some plants for safety injection activation).
Should the coincident requirement have been removed rather than the low level portion of the signal so that trip and safety injection signal would occur on low level or low pressure.
Following the incident the center control rod was vented and no gas was No mention was made of possible gas accumlation at the top of the found.
I assume that the reactor pumps hot leg entrance to the steam generator.
were kept in operation and any gas muld have been swept into the reactor vessel.
I sucWhat-cownfteen questions be addressed during the review of
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the long tern Implications of TMI-2.
CE, O A. Bates Staff Engineer
Attachment:
as stated cc w/ attach: ACRS Members ACRS Technical Staff O c.o u e. 8' 79071E M y9 4 261 1R cc
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