ML19224D252

Forwards TMI Questions to Be Addressed During ACRS 790614-15 Meeting

ML19224D252
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	06/13/1979
From:	Muller R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Baer R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ACRS-SM-0140, ACRS-SM-140, NUDOCS 7907110179
Download: ML19224D252 (5)

Text

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NUCLEAR REGUL ATOR Y CC"'i!88!CN

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3 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RE ACTOR SAFEGUATOS

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%..... e' June 13, 1979 R. Baer, Chief Light Water Reactor Branch 2, DR4

'U4I-2 QUESTICNS 'IO BE ADDRESSED DURING 230TH ACRS MIETIN3 JUNE 14,15 Confirming my telephone call of June 11, attached is a list of questions on 'U4I-2 to be discussed during the upcoming ACRS Full Committee meeting.

Those asterisked are principally to be addressed by the Staf? and these will be discussed during the session scheduled to start at 10:30 A.M. on Thursday, June 14.

We remaining questions are principally to be addressed by Met.Ed/GPU al-though the Staff may be requested to comment on the licensee reply. Mese will be discussed during the sessien scheduled a start at 8:30 A.M. on Friday, June 15, 1979. 'Ihese have been discussed in detail with Mr. Edward Wallace of GPU immediately following the Subcommittee meeting in Harrisburg and in subseyent telephone conversations. A tentative presentation schedule for this portion of the meeting is also attached.

This memo will also serve to confirm the Committee's request, relayed in my June 11 telephone call, for copies of LOCA Emergency Procedures for each B&W plant now opersdng or about to operate.

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Ragnwald Muller Senjor Staff Engineer Attachments:

As stated cc:

V. Stello H. R. Denton E. G. Case ICRS

/CRS Tech. Staff C. Michelson W. C. Lipinski I. Catton H. E. Voress D. G. Eisenhut D. Ross R. J. M:lttson 7907110r79

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MI-2 QUESTIONS 'IU BE ADDRESSED AT 230TH ACRS MEETING

• 1.

Met.Ed/ gps indicated (June 7 Subcommittee Transcript,

p. 337) they had never (prior to March 28) been influenced in their thinking and action by Regulatory Guide 1.97 or the NRC e instr'l-mentation to follow the course of an accident. hhy?

(3.CRS letter report of Oct. 22, 1976 on its review of 'D4I-2 stated "'Ihe Comittee recommends that, prior to commercial power operation of 'Ihree Mile Island Unit 2, additional means for evaluating the cause and likely course of various accidents, including those of very low probability should be in hand in order to provide imprtved bases for timely de-cisions concerning possible off-site emergency measures. 'Ihe Committee wishes to be kept informed.")

• 2.

Comment on education, training, and experience requirements for Shift Supervisors (those in actual charge when an accident occurs).

Are they adequate? Are they on par with those required of airline pilots? Coment specifically on training in fundamentals (e.g. reactor physics, health physics, thermodynamics, electronics, etc.)

(B&W has been reported to have stated that minimum requirements are a H.S.

education plus 12 weeks of lectures).

3.

Confirm that the current procedure for the test of mI-2 c 71 calls for disabling all redundant aux EW supply simultaneously. Was tap always so? If it is a revision, why was it revised and what was the review process?

Did P. involve NRC? B&W? Request B&W, NRC Staff coment.

4.

Discuss speed of computer at. 'IMI-2 (Requires 12 sec/line was continuously clogged). hhat should be dene about reactimeter speed - 3 sec/ signal?

5.

Discuss use of existing instrumentation in a diagnostic mode. khat upgrading will be necessary?

6.

Discus events starting with attempts to clear resin to loss of hot well and its recovery.

Include cause of water hammer that resulted in loss of air lines.

7.

Tail pipe temperature does not scem to relate to whether or not PORV is open. Assess and discuss.

(If thermocouple is mounted outside of pipe then thermal lay may be intolerable).

8.

hhy should not non-safeguards equignent be on daily check lists e_,peci-ally that interfacing safeguards equipnent or that which is equally important?

9.

hhat will Met.Ed. do to insure that senior operators are aware of LER's from cther B&W plants? How will System Engineering, Nuclear Safety be involved in these interpretations?

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. 10.

Discuss control room ventilation sequence. hhy were respicators required? Do they interfere with ability to commiinicate? Include discussion of ability to maintain control room on closed-cycle cooling and positive pressure, 11.

Discuss planned improvements in training program.

12.

Ibw does Met. Ed. assure that procedures are actually followed.

13. Discuss recommended changes in plant.

14.

Discuss instrumentation to be used to identify dispersed radio-nuclides in accidents.

15. Discuss circumstances under which natural circulation might be lost in TMI type plants and conditions for restoration if any.

16.

Did the hydrogen bubble calculation include partial pressure of steam in the bubble? Were the results correlated with the perfect gas law.

(PV & RT).

17.

How long can RCP's tolerate relatively high quality steam flow?

18. hhat was the source of radioactivity in the auxiliary building? What was let down pathway? Is gaseous leakage.: necked regularly?

19. Why was there no pressure spike in the drain tank at the time of the 28 lb.

spike in the reactor building? hhy does not the depressurization curve show an indication of valve operation?

20.

What was the duration of the 28 lb. spike? What is the sensitivity of the instrument which recorded it?

21. Were the make-up pumps turned on before or after the last coolant gimps were turned off?

22.

'Ihe bleck valves were closed. Did the automatic EW valves turn on at 30 inches pressure?

23.

How many items on the watch-relief check list? Confirm that the PORC did not review the check list.

24.

How many nuclear years of experience are represented by the technical functions group?

25.

Provide a copy of surveillance procedures for t. lie aux. EW system.

26.

Estimate the activity on the reactor building inside surfaces.

27.

Please provide copies of 'NI Administrative Procedure 1012.

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. 28. Was there any prmanent deformation as a remlt of the water ham.er?

29.

Please assess the desirability of providing enough pressure relief capacity so that depressurizing low enough to use the low pressure heat re-moval system would never be a problem.

30. hhat does Met. Ed. think about the Staff '2ccument on B&W plants dis-cussing the possibility of closing relief valves and block valves during power operation?

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TE!!TATIVE PRESENTATIOl SCHEDULE 230th ACRS MEUItG, FilIDAY, JUNE 15, 1979 DISCUSSION CF 'IEREE MILE ISL\\fD-2 Room 1046, 1717 H Street, N. W. Nashington, J.C.

Meeting with Metropolitan Edison / General Public Utilities Ti.nes are apprcx.

8.30 A.M.

I.

Introduction of Met. Ed/GPU team Mr. Robert C. Arnold, V.P., GPU 8:35 A.M.

II.

Possible Generic Improvements to:

(a) Operational Instruments (b) Diagnostic Equipnent and Instrumentation (c) Computer capability (d) Equipnent Design 9:00 A.H.

III Unit Coeration (a) Shift Check Lists, Iog Keeping (b) Use of LER's (c) Training and Procedures (d) Role of B&W Site Representative 9:30 A.M.

IV.

Kav Decision Processes (with examples) 9:50 A.M.

V.

Additional Questions (a)

Initiating events leading to water hammer and plant trip (b)

PORV/ Primary Safety Valve thermocouple arrangement (c) Control rocm ventilation - (Use of respirators in 'IMI-1)

(d) Conditions when natural circulation may be lost and bow to restore it.

(e) PCRV block valve operations (4-5 hours and 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> after trip).

(f) Other questions raised during Subcommittee rev4.ew, June 6 & 7.

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