ML19224D169
| ML19224D169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1979 |
| From: | Boehnert P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Okrent D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0132, ACRS-SM-132, NUDOCS 7907110020 | |
| Download: ML19224D169 (1) | |
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UNITED STATES S E =- cJkM)' %
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS r. - -'
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f W ASWNGTON, D. C. 20555
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June 1, 1979 D. Okrent, Chairman Subcommittee on 'IMI-2 Accident Implications DISCOVERY OF DELETERIOUS SYSTEMS INTERACTION AS A RESULT CF NRC MANDATED FIX 'ID FWRs FR04 'IMI-2 ACCIDENI' Wisconsin Electric Power Company has identified a deleterious systems interaction that could result in a simultaneous safety injection in both Units of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. 'Ihis situation was brought about by the order from NRC requiring the pressurizer level bistables be perma-nently tripped.
A copy of an NRC Amendment to the Point Beach OL (attached) discussess this item and its resolution in detail.
While the probability of occurrence of the conditions required 'or simul-taneous safety injection is low (loss of all offsite power with a LOCA in one unit, and a battery-supplied safety 'njection actuation instrument channel test or failure in the other unit.), this incident raises interesting questions regarding systems interactions vis-a-vis the plant modifications mandated in the wake of the 'IMI-2 accident. Your Subcommittee may want to explore this point.
/
0 Paul Boe ert Reactor Engineer
Attachment:
as stated cc: ICRS Members ACRS Technical Staff I. Catton W. Lipinski C. Michelson T. Theofanous 1Do@
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
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Docket Nos. 50-266 and 50-301 Mr. Sol Surstein Executive Vice Presicent Wisconsin Electric Power Company 231 West Michigan Street Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201
Dear Mr. Surstein:
i The Commission has issued the enclosed Amendment Nos.38 and 42 to Facility i
Operating License Nos. DPR-24 and DPR-27 for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. I and ?.
The amendments consist of changes to tne cperating licenses and appended Technical Specifications in response to your request dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7, 1979.
l The amendments require actuation of safety injection based on two out of three channels of Icw pressurizer pressure, revise tne opening logic for the pressucizer power-operated relief valves, authorize modifications l
to the power supplies for safety injection actuation channels, and recuire that a unit be shutdown in the event certain channels should fail pending completion of the power supply modifications.
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Copies of the Safety Evaluation and Notice of Issuance are also enclosed.
S i ncerely,,
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A. Schwencer, Chief i
Operating Reactors 3 ranch =1 j
Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
1.
Amencment No. 38 to DPR-24 2.
A; encment No. 42 to CPR-27 3.
Safety Evaluation 4
Notice of Issuance
~~
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cc: w/ enclosures See next page DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Entire document previously entered into system under:
OMSO375 ANO 260 0's0 No. or yeyes:
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/,.a at;w UNITED STATES
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[1 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5,, ' l[.,'
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER CCMPANY OOCKET NO. 50-266 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 1 AMENOMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amencment No. 38 License No. OPR-24 1.
The Nuclear Regul atory Commission (tne Commission) has found that:
1 A.
The application for amendment by Wisconsin Electric Power Company (the licensee) dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7,1979 complies with tne standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amendec (the Act),
and the Ccmmission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application,
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the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of L.
the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amencment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuanca of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the puolic; and E.
The issuance of this amencment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations anc all applicaole requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, tne license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as inoicated in the attachment to this license amencment, Inc paragr3Dh 3.3 of Facility Operating License No.
DPR-24 is hereoy amended to read 4frT X __,,
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Safety Injection System Actuation Protection against a Loss of Coolint or steam line break accident is brcught about by automatic actuation of the Safety :njection System [ SIS] which provides emergency cooling and reduction of reactivity.
The Less of C0olant accident is charactericed by depressuricatien of the Reactor Cociant Syste.1 [RCS) and less of reacter ecolant to the centainment. The Engineered Safety Features have been designed to sense the effects of the Loss of Ccclant Accident by detecting icw pressuricer pressure and generating signals actuating the SIS active phase based upon this signal.
The SIS active phase is also actuated by a high centainment pressure signal (Hi) brought abcut by additica of high enthalpy ecolant to the centainnent. This actuation signal acts as a backup to the icw pressuricer pressure signal actuatien of the S!S and also adds diversity to protection against loss of ecciant.
Signals are also provided to actuate the SIS upon sensing the effects of a s ~ a. a.
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1.
The high cc.ntainment pressure limit is set at about 10% of design centainment pressure. Initiation of Safety Injection prctects against i
l loss of coolant (2) or steam line break (3) accidents as discussed I,
in the safety analysis, t
l 2.
The hi-hi containment pressure is set at about 50% of design centainment I
pressure for initiation of centainment spray and at about 30% fer initiatien of steam line isolatien.
Initiatien of Containment spray and S' aa= Line Isclation prctects against large icss of c'colan (') or stea= line break l
accidents (3 ) as discussed in the safety analysis.
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3.
The pressurirer icw pressure limit is set substantially below system operating
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pressure limits. However, it is sufficiently hich te protect against a 1 css of' ccclant accident as shewn in the safety analysis. (*i*
4.
The steam line low pressure signal is lead / lag ccmpensated and its setpoint is. set well above the pressure expected in the event of a large steam line s
break accident as shown in the safety analysis.I3) 5.
The high steam line flev limit is set at approximately 22% of nominal full E
load flew at the no-load pressure.amd the high-high steam line flow limit is set at approximately 120% of nominal full lead flew at the full lead pressure in order to protect against large steam break accidents.
The ccincident icw Tavg setting limit for stea= line isclation initiatien is set belcw its het shutdcwn value. The safety analysis shcws that these settings previde,cretection in the event of a large steam break. P')
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Orl<ItATOR ACTIO!1 11 0 OP t1III.
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PEftt1ISSIBLE IF COllDITIO!!S OP 11 0 OF CitAtitiELo OPEftAHl.E DEGREF. OF DYPASS COf.I fitti 3 Olt 5 flO.
I'lftiCTIOfiAI, llt1IT ritAtitil:I.S TO TitIP CliAtitlET.S fil:DtJtJDAtJCY CO!!DITIOf 3S CAllt!OT DE fil:T
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SAFETY I tkiECT IOt1 c2 a.
flarmal 2
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1 Ilo t Sim tdown * *
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Illyh Containment P' essure 3
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1 Ilot Simtdown***
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Steam Generator Low Steam Pressure /I.oop 1
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1 Primary Pressure in IAss than 1000 psig Ifot Shutdown ***
d.
Pressurizer I.ow Pressure 3
2
.2 1
Prirnary Pressur e is f.ess than 1000 psig Ilot Simtdown* *
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cot 3TAltit1EtiT SPitAY a.
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Ilo t Simtdown * *
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111 -111 Contaltunent Pressure 2 sets 2 of 3 2 per 1/ set flo t Shutdown * * *
(Containment Spray) of 1 in each set set
- - ttost actuate 2 nwitches simultaneously.
- * * - If minimum conditions are not inet within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,' steps shall be taken on the affect 6d unit to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions.
Amendinerit No. 311, Unit 1 l
46 9
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UNITED STATES 7
~ *g NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMtsstCN y ',,
gi WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 O
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WISCCNSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-301 POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY CPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 43 License No. OPR-27 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
The application for amencment by Wisconsin Electric Power A.
Corppany (the licensee) cated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7,1979 complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 3.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorizec by this amencment can be concucted without endangering the health and safety of the puolic, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with
=
the Commission's regulations; 0.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to tne health and safety of the puolic; and The issuance of tnis amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR E.
Part 51 of the Commission's regulations ano all applicable reouirements have been satisfied.
ccordingly, the license is amended oy c'1anges to the' Technical 2.
a Specifications as indicated in :ne attachm'nt to tnis license 1mencment, and paragra::h 3.3 of racility Joerating License No.
DPR-27 is hereoy amenced to read as follows:
D c %Y 4
(o7 ';D -
260 066
l -
I I
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"(B) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and 8, as revised through Amencment No. 43, are hereDy incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications."
The license is further amended by addition of new paragraph 3.F to read as follows:
"F.
Safety Injection Logic and Power Mocification The licensee is authorized to modify the safety injection actuation logic and actuation power supplies and related changes as des:ribed in licensee's application for amendment dated April 27, 1979, as supplemented May 7,1979.
In the interim periac until the power supply modification nas been completed, should any DC powered safety injection actuation channel be in a failed condition for greater than one hour, the unit shall thereafter be shutdown using normal procedures and placed in a block-permissive condition for safety injection actuation."
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors Branch fl Division of Operating Reactors Attachmen t:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: May 11, 1979 260 06'
i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 43
[.
t' CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FACILITY CPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-27 i
DCCKET NO. 50-301 l
l l
Rc/ise Appendix A as folicws:
I Remove the folicwing pages and insert identically numbered revised pages:
t i
15.3.5-2 15.3.5-4 Table 15.3.5-1 l
Table 15.3.5-3 I
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-e.a s
7 90;NG) 260 06f:
Safety Injection Systen Actuatien h.
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t 6
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EdG j ' (;
l Protection against a Loss of Ceclant or stean line break accident I
l about by automatic actuation of the Safety Injection Systa= [ SIS) which provides emergency cooling and reduction of reactivity.
The
- css of Ccolant accident is charactericed by depressuricatien of the Reacter Coolant Syste= (RCS} and loss of reactor ecolant to the centainment. The Engineered Safety Features have been designed to sense the effects of the Less of Ccolant Accident by detecting low pressuricer press"-a
=d generating signals actuating the SIS active phase based upon this signal.
The 5:S active phase is a.so actuated by a high containment pressure signal (Ri) brought about by addition of high enthalpy coolant to the centainment. This actuation signal acts as a backup to the low pressuricer pressure signal actuation of the SIS and also adds diversity to protection against less of coolant.
1 Signals are also provided to actuate the SIS upon sensing the effects of a s. a..=....i.'.a. e b.- a. a.>. a -. ' d e.... ** e -a..'c.-a, S *. a-
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break is designed te occur upon sensing low stein line pressure.
The increase in the extraction of RCS heat follcwing a steam line break
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a icw pressuricer pressure signal actuating safety injection.
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Setting,i. tits j QQoe V. W (iLI L
-2 1.
The high centainment pressure limit is set at about 10% of design i
i containment pressure.
Initiation of Safety I.njection prct :ts against Icss of ecclant (2)
(3) er steam line break a:cidents as discussed in the safety analysis.
4 2.
The hi-hi containment pressure is set at about 50% of 3esign containment i
pressure for initiation of containment spray and at abcut 30% for initiation of steam line isolatien.
Initiatica of Centainment Spray and Steam *ine Isolation.Orctects against larc.e less of c'eclant (-) er steam line break j
accidents (3) as discussed in the safety analysis, f
J.
The pressuriter icw pressure limat is set substantially belcw system cperating pressure li=its.
Hewever, it is sufficiently high := protect against a less cf ecclant accident as shewn in the safety analysis. P')
4.
The steam line low ressure signal is lead / lag ccepensated and its set cint r
e is set well above the pressure expected in the event cf a large steam line break accident as shown in the safety analysis.(3) 5.
The high steam line ficw limit is set at apprcximately 20% cf ncminal full icad flew at the nc-Icad pressure and the high-high stea= line flew limit is set at approximately 110% of ncminal full lead flew at the f.11 lead pressure in crder to protect against large steam break accidents.
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TA ts[ '; 15.3.5-1 El1GIllEUlWD SAPLTY PEATUIES It3ITI ATIOt1 IllSTRU!!EtiT Sifl"PIrlG lit!ITS I
11 0 1' tith'TIOt1AI. till IT CilAtJtit L SE'ITIt!G I.IttlT 1
liigh Contaisunent Pressure ( 11 1 )
Safety Injection *
< 6 psig 2
liigh Contaltunent Pressure (Ili-ili) a.
Containment Spray 30 psig b.
Steam Line Isolation of both Lines
< 20 psig 3
l'ressurizer Low Pressur e Safety Injection *
> 1715 puig 4
1.ow Steam I.ine Pressure Safety Injection *
> S00 psig Lead Time Constant
>_ 12 seconds I,ag Time Constant 2 seconds S
liiyh Steam Flow in a Steam I.ine Steam Line Isolation of d/p corresponding to Coincident with Safety Injection and Af fected I.ine
<0.66 x 10 lb/hr at low T 1005 psig g
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- 540 P Ch CD 6
liigh-high Steam Flow in a Steam Line Isolation 5 d/p corresponding to Steam I.ine Coincident with of Affected I.ine I x 106 lb/hr at g
x, Sately Injection 806 psig
- Initiates also containment isolation, feedwater line isolation and starting of all contaisanent fans.
d/p means differential pressure Amendment flo. 4 3, linit 2
TAllLE 15. 3.5-3 I:MI:RGEllCY COOLIllG 1
2 3
4 5
OPERATOR ACTIO!!
l 11 0 O l' tiltl.
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PEIU4ISSIBLE IF CO!!DITIO!1S OF 11 0 OF CllArital:1.S OP t:I(AllLE DI:Gl(EE OF DYPASS CO LUt-!!1 3 Olt S tid.
l'titlCTIullAI. UrllT CllAtltil:LS TO Ti(IP CliAtitiLLS REDUt3DAtlCY CutlDITIOtlS CArillOT DE ttET 1.
sal'ETY I11.1 L:CT IOil a.
llanual 2
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1
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la.
tilyh Coint.a isunent Pressure 3
2 2
1 Ilot Shutdown ***
St e.un Gene ra tor Iow St etun Pressune/I,oop 3
2 2
1 Prirnary Pressure in Less than 1000 pulg Ilot Shutdown ***
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Pressusizer few Pressure 3
2 2
1 Prirnary Pressure is Less than 1800 psig Ilot Shutdown ***
2 Coll!'Altal1EllT SPI (AY a.
Ilanual 2
2 2
Ilo t Shutdown ***
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Ili-ill Cont a i sunent Pressure 2 setu 2 of 1 2 per 1/ set ilo t Shutdown ***
C'on t a i s unen t Spray) of 1 in each set uet
- - fluat actuato 2 nwitchen sirnultancoinsly.
- - If miniinuni conditions are not inet within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, steps shall be taken on the affected unit fy, to place the unit in cold shutdown conditions.
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Amendment flo. 43, Unit 7
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UNITED STATES e
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMisSION J.-
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j WASHINGTON. O. C. 20555 s,4 4[j 7
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SAFETY EVALUATION SY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGU'_ATION SUPPORTING AMEN 0 MENT NOS. 38 AND 43 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-24 AND DPR-27 WISCONSIN ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 Introduction As a result of our ongoing review of the events associated with tne March 28, 1979 accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2, the NRC Of fice of Inspection and Enforcement issued a number of IE Sulletins describing actions to be taken by licensees.
IE Bulletin 79-06 (April 11, 1979) called for licensees with Westinghouse PWRs to instruct operators to
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manuall., initiate safety injection whenever pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint wnether or not the pressurizer level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint.
IE Sulietin 79-06A (April 14, 1979) further called for these licensees to trip the icw pressurizer level Distables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the icw setpoint, safety injection would ce initiated regardless of the pressurizer level.
IE Bulletin 79-06A, Revision 1 ( April 18, 1979) modified the action called for in 79-06A by alicwing pre;surizer
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level Distables to be temporarily returned to their nor :al (untripped) operating positions curing the pressurizer pressure channel functional T
surveillance tests so that these tests can be conducted without causing a false safety injection actuation.
Tripping the pressurizer low level bistables, which are normally coincident with the pressurizer icw pressure bistacles, has the effect of reducing this safety injection actuation logic to a one out of three icgic'.
A single instrument failure of one of the three (or one of the two for Point Beach) low pressure bistable channels could therefore result in an unwanted safe:/ injection. To prevent this, the licensee proposed in an Acril 27, 1979 letter, a design accification which wcul:: a!ign i
One existing pressurizer icw pressure bistacies in a two cut of nree logic.
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'Tc arevent spurious sarety inject:cn a 3each in the event of Icss of off-site Entire document previously entered pc level channels, nus cnanging actu into system under:
i ni s medi rica tion i s requi red in orcer ANO]hb(g2bb3 on.ec sel generators at Point 5eac 260 071 no. of vases:
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7590-01 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSICN 00CKET NOS. 50-266 AND 50-301 WISCCNSIN ELECTRIC POWER COM?ANY NOTICE OF ISSUANCE OF AMEN 0MENTS TO CACILITY GPERATING LICENSES The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comnission) has issued Amendment Nos. 38 and a3 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-2 A and i
CPR-27 issued to Wisconsin Electric Power Company, which revised Technical l
Specifications for operation of Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit Nos. I and 2, located about 15 miles north of Manitowoc, Wisconsin. The amencments are effective as of the date of issuance.
The amendments require actuation of safety injection based on two out of three channels of Icw pressurizer pressure, revise the opening logic for the pressurizer power-operated relief valves, authorize modifications to the power supplies for safety in,iection actuation cnannel s, and require that a unit be shutdown in the event certain channels should fail pending C./-
ccmoletion of the power supply modifications.
The application for the amendments comolies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissicn's rules and regulations. The Commission has made accropriate findings as required oy the Act and :ne Ccmmission's rules and regulati:ns in 10 CFR Chapter I.
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amencents.
Orior puolic notice of Entire document previously entered ne amencments do not involve a sig-into system under:
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