ML19224C338

Forwards Proposed Change to App a of Tech Specs,Changing Safety Injection Sys Initiation Logic So two-out-of-three Low Pressurizer Signals Would Result in Safety Injection

ML19224C338
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	06/26/1979
From:	Dunn C DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-11901, NUDOCS 7907020172
Download: ML19224C338 (8)

Text

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th (412) 471-4300 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 June 26, 1979 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors, Branch No. 1 Division of Operating Reactors Washington, DC 20555

Reference:

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Request for Amendment to Operating License Technical Specification Change Request No. 38 Centlemen:

Enclosed are three (3) signed criginals and thirty-seven (37) copies of a proposed change to the Beaver Valley, Unit No. 1 Appendix A Technical Specifications to change the Safety Injection System initiation logic such that a two out three low pressurizer pressure signal would result in a safety injection.

Safety Evaluation Three existing pressurizer pressure channels are used for safety injection and two channels are used for control system functions. Control and protection interaction requirements set forth in IEEE-279 are satisfied by the fact that control transmitters are independent from protection transmitters.

All current ECCS analyses are valid and appropriate with safety injection as function of pressurizer pressure signals only. Presently, safety injection is initiated on coincident pressurizer pressure and level signals with the level bistable being maintalined in the trip position, except during periodic testing.

The effect of changing to a pressure only signal will result in either an earlier safety injection or no change in the time of safety injection initiation for all break locations. For small leaks in the pressurizer, the pressure only signal will assure SI actuation; therefore, current small break analysis assumptions, concerning safety injection initiation time, are appropriate.

268 064 7907020 / 7 k /

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-334 Request for Amendment to Operating License Technical Specification Change Request No. 38 Page Additionally, the ef fect of safety injection initiation time on peak clad temperatures is negligible when initiation times being considered correspond to RCS pressures above 1400 psia. The switch to a pressure only safety injection signal results in a negligible impact on large break analyses. The two out of three coincidence is designed to minimize spurious safety injection systems initiation caused by instrument channel malfunctions.

We have determined that this Technical Specification change should be categorized as a Class II, pro forma change due to the fact that the elimination of the level signal from the S1 logic was instituted to comply with IE Bulletin 79-06A.

A check in the amount of $1200.00 is enclosed in accordance with 10CFR 170.22.

Very truly yours, C. N. Dunn Vice President, Operations Attachment 268 065

Mr. A. Schwencer Technical Specific ation Change Reques t No. 38 June 26, 1979 (CORPORATE SEAL)

A ttes t :

t H.W. Staas Secretary COMMONWF.ALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)

) SS:

COUNTY OF ALLEGENY )

n On this x6' day of v c ' N c- , 1979, before me, I)ONAT,T) W RRAmint7 , a Notary Public in and for said Common-wealth and County, personally appeared C. N. Dunn, who being duly sworn, deposed, and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Company, and (3) the statements set forth in the Submittal are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belie f.

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f , a - u.< a .p k_ , ._,1. w w s - rw' XNt;D W SH.iNNGN, NOTARY PUBLIC P11I5%'9GH. ALLEGHENY COUNTY k'Y COMM;S 10N EXFIRES JUNE 7,1983 Member, Pennsy!vania Associatsen of Notres 268 66

TABLE 3.3-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION 9

5 MINIMUM I TOTAL N0. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE . MODES _ ACTION c; 1. SAFETY INJECTION AND

$ FEEDWATER ISOLATION

~

a. Manual Initiation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 18

b. Automatic Actuation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 13 Logic

_7 c. Containment 3 2 2 1,2,3 14

• Pressure-High g d. Pressurizer 3 2 2 1, 2, 3# 14 g a Pressure - Low PJ h

e. Differential 1, 2, 3f#

g-*. -

Pressure Between Steam Lines - High Three Loops 3/ steam line 2/ steam line 2/ steam line 14

"*J N Operating twice and 1/3 h) cn steam lines b

dh].

Two Loops 3/ operating 2 ###/steam 2/ operating 15

[.y Operating steam line line twice in eitMr steam line operat.ag '

g"" -

steam eine ,

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)_ .

b. Above P-11 or P-12, demonstrate that the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; operation may continue with the inoperable channel bypassed and one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With.less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operation may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES INTERLOCKS _

CONDITION AND SETPOINT FUNCTION DESIGNATION

~

With 2 of 3 pressurizer P-11 prevents or defeats P-11 the manual block of safety pressure channels > 2010 psig. ,

injection actuation cn low pressurizer pressure With 2 of 3 T a, channels P-12 prevents or defeats P-12 the manual block of safety

> 545'F injection actuation on high steam line flow and low steam line pressure.

With 2 of 3 T8V9 channels Allows manual block of

< 541 F. safety injection actua-tion on high steam line flow arid low steam line pressure. Causes steam line isolation on high steam flow. Affects steam dump blocks.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-21 268 068

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

3. Pressurizer Pressure-Low

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 27.0*/13.0#

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0

c. Feedwater Isolation 1 75.0(1)

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" 1 22.0#

e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable 0 ##

f. Rx Plant River Water System 1 77.0 /110.0

4. Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High a, Safety Injection (CCCS) 1 13.0#/23.0##

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 3.0

c. Feedwater Isolation 1 75.0(1)

d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" 1 22.0 /33.0

e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable

f. R Plant River Water System 1 77.0 /110.0

5. Steam Flow in Two Steam' Lines - High Coincident withT avg --L w-Low

a. Safety Injection (ECCS) 1 15.0#/25.0##

b. Reactor Trip (from SI) 1 5.0

c. Feedwater Isolation 1 77.0(1)

~d. Containment Isolation-Phase "A" 1 22.0 /33.0

e. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Not Applicable

f. R Plant River Water System 1 7.0 7 /110.0 x

g. Steam Line Isolation 1 10.0 268 070 BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 3-26 ,

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TABLE 4.3-2 o ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

,@ . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 5 CilANNEL MODES IN WHICH

$ CilANNEL CilANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEll. LANCE E FUNCTIONAL UNIT CllECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED 0

i 1. SAFETY INJECTION AND

<= FEEDWATER ISOLATION N.A. 1, 2, 3, 4

a. Manual Initiation N.A. M(1)

]

Automatic Actuation 1.ogic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 b.

Containment Pressure-liigh R M(3) 1, 2. 3 L c. S Q d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low S R H 1, 2, 3 5@ M 1,2,3 Y c. Dif ferential Pressure S R 0$ Detween Steam Lines--liigh b

sc _ f. Steam Flow in Two Steam S R H 1,2,3 W

Lines--liigh Coincident with ,

T --Low-Low or Steam Line h) wa N P9E9sure--Low

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