ML19224B607

Util Senior Staff Recommendations Re TMI Following 790328 Event

ML19224B607
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	05/01/1979
From:	Geoffrey Miller Metropolitan Edison Co
To:	Mullinix W NRC/IE
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR TM-0432, TM-432, NUDOCS 7906150390
Download: ML19224B607 (26)

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The e.ergerrf plans and prccc-dure.= dould te changed to include the appropriate ca.., rica'.icns in all organications at tra Se io: level including professional interface with th-2 mjor media.

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• tith outside agencies) defined in the e.ergency plan ere in place imediately and worked effectively.

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Recc.mmerid a t i on s :

Summari:M belov.- are my reccamendation based on my impressions and experiences associated with the March 28 TMI Unit 2 accident.

It is intended that these recommendations are as subjective as passible, and that they are designed to promote a safer and more efficient oparatic, of not only the TMI Unit 1 and 2 Power Plants, but the industry as '.. ell.

"y reco mend 2 ticr.s follow:

1.

A ceans is required in order to vent the reactor ccolant loops to assure that non-condensible gasses as weli as steam, follouin ; this type of On future incident, can be vented and guarantee natural circula tion.

lo:aticn ';f where it designs the position of the pressurizer and th2-J in 1i;tt of 'ais ties into the loops ceeds to be t'oroughl; r nctcr '

~.21.end is incident.

Also a neans to rcmotely vent :

needed.

2.

A means to moni tor the level of the Rea;t:r Bid;. sun, c, ' ' al to the Reactor Bi 2., i s requi. 'd.

9 3.

A meacs to s: ple the contcnts 'nd th;au;'l) mi.

t'; crt: 1> of the Reactor Eldg. basemant sump are re'ui sd.

- isi-'>='in

' " - ' to i

.. ' r wl d assure " it no pockets of deminerali ad :'ter m

-v.

v

". _ r. w. m..., '.

's a, e

c. - t, o r. o c r #

• We.-...*

, 1.,d., e _

m t.ccoling is esablished.

s.

,v3

,a t

s.

t'r c>u,.,-.~~u....> u.. a n. ~,, y,,. '.

u,..,. 9.. :..,,

,c 2

to the ". actor Bldg. to avcid nigh a:.:ica '

,.m

.s

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'. o -' r m.i. S_ C,,v

• t, ' r. > ' ;

o..

i f L._ "-;"

e_. ~m. l.

is i..

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~

7 c

... =

5.

It would be valuable to have contairmit ccncas ir; tail ed.. ich 1re cape' ale of operating under high radiation levels, in order to ~ nitor the operation of equipment during such an incident.

6.

Separate hot sample labs rust be provided in th2 future, the fact that we save money by ccabining Unit 1 and 'jnit 2 orinary &712 labs have now proven to be a crippling affect on the unaffected unit.

7.

I strongly recommand a type of casitt and off site ~anitoring sys ten whi n is comprised of autcratically ini:ictM filling d hal Sa b111 cons whicn would be released to ex.tc.d sarpling tuHs into %e air at various ir smplers i

elevations arnund the plant site, 'hich '..oal a U ca.r.e:ted to whose readout; would be displayed in the E2rgency Ccnvol Center This earl'/ nor.itoring uculd alleviate the need to have ensite and offsite monitoring teans dispatched and ',-: auld give much earlier information on the plumb characteristics follcuing such an accident.

I have an idear as to how this system could be designed and I would be glad to discuss this schema with anyone who is interested.

f e

e 4

m 8.

I feel strongly that the drage done to our conuni ty was dm a not by the TMI accidenc, but by the irresponsible reporting of the news nedia.

I feel that a trenc..dcus ef fort Fr+'

to be 2dc tu prsperly brief all the news redia which ~cy ce' involvec..ith such an cmergency.

in and around any plant site so that they ere aware of the jargon associatcd with the paratecFr.clogy and that they can accurately repcet conditions of the plant ar.d put the status of any plant ex.ergency in the proper prospective so as not to prey upon the fear of the unknown that the public m g have.

I feel that people need to '

. tht tnere is a sericus problea but that the details of t!.

probl: - ha put in the proper m_e.c,.,.

%. _ c o %.. _.. w p 7 c.

-, -.. #..e-, mas,o-c.

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n...

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that

. y are prepared to ta ke '.. utever 7:;n~.

.i w recc

-ded N-s the *~C 'ri the 5 tite goveer om bu t a t t?.

nm 2, no t r_r ic to t.._

o.

point

.are there is total cF o in t!_ cc'

nity 9.

Ue hn _ al.zis been taught to r=fer all off site -

' ions to t' 2 Cc

.;n ;

1 aticna A ccices Depart ent,

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.a'. a a re:, n eed s to b e studicd ena res;1ved,~ s e the f u tu:

10.

It is clear to re that the traditional local emer;2ncy responses are i.ot enough to prevent a serious accident frc, occurring a t duclesc Dlants.

I feel that further work neeJs to : 2 parfm.ed to s tuy all types of transients, responses, and that opcrators need to be drilled ami treined in the ';inds of transients *.:hich e 9 3ditionally believed to not occur.

I feel that this event has proven that our previous assumptions of the accident probabilities were in error, and therefore, we need to look at those things that we previously felt could ne/er occur, hace v a valve uculd.ot fail or a pump '..culd not f a il, or etc., or an operc.tx..ould recognize a condition within an apprcp-ia te peried of ti e.

H.

The dyncaics of hydrogen generaticn r.:eds to be re-re"ie, zed to de*.enine if there is any other ways of prt /entir.g sericus hydrogen buildup.

It nay be prudent, for instance, to install scme type of ignition systca in the reactor bldg. to maintain the levels of hydrogen below levels which could cause a significant pressure rise.

I feel that this incident has shown that while the hydregen genecation problem is a serious concern, that the detinaticn ef fects of hydragen cor.centrations greater than C nay not be nearly as ca tostrophic as had been assmed.and it ray be batte to facce the hydrogen to Srn as it reaches C rat'.er than to allcw it tc buildup to a greater value and ri2 a high energy type of detina tion.

t o

4 O

dD 12.

I feel that the hydrogen rectobiner piping should not b tied into the nornal purge duct pene* ration, because these penetrations a a tOO largo and should DeVer ha'le LO be epened follOtting a lO. ', Of coolant accident, rather the purge d;; ting should be arranged to utilize separ tte s ull sized pe. eten.crs to nininice the radia tica levels asscciatad.zith the large purge pipica.

13.

The location and design of tho radia tic, mon i torir,g syn te~ ne >ds to g_ c a...,. q.,. -.. u..

s a,

2

.,. -.,..i.x.,.,.

m...ys-..:a cu. i r,

' ',, c' ' '_ l'. _

< 3 e r --

u m_.

..,s iencc during this i nc id en t.

?'aisture -

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17.

E e '. sys tv.s within conta i.~ent should.e prn' tided wi th the c'ubili ty of rani toring '.:ey p' ram ters f ror cutsid. o f thu hc tr Bldg.

For Instance, taps should ce provided outside cantait eat under the caergency conditions

• e experien:et; a t n..I, to noni to pr essurizer l evel, primary sys tea pressure, GTS.G le.el, etc. as a ' 2cha

..h'n the nac 11 ins t:

v'ation t a l,i s u n a,2: n i g n ra d i a t h n,i e '. c i s.

13.

-nst:_:.>tation shculd be loc 3'ud at le /al ulich n rld be cerism.;bly unaffected by the ',..ater le/el tha t,.; '" exis t in a t: nta ir ~en t base-rollouing :ucn an ancit,ent.

rcn.e 19.

Instrt.nentation needs to be revie.;ed n order to cc:n2 up..ith the neans to better recognize the conditinns '..Sich led to tho T.1I-2 fut failure.

For instance, with the pressurizer level pegged high, i t 'zas helieved that the P.C5 was in a solid candition ' :en indeed i t wa s no t.

S~ ?.cu the a,v ru'tcr na"_d-

'u o h,.,. ". o m3. o.

'cs" p ". c f.

i.". a 'vr s-- w '

_... e.

i s~i l, r i.. d ". s d t ~I J ~,, + H... +c-

. m aa v

t s

clearly infsr..s him of the coolant im/e.atory of the : eac tor.

I wauld I

j I

a G

t e

4 4

19. cont'd.

strongly recc.mnd looking at a CRT display of the reactor coolant syste,conditisns.

These condi tions '. auld be d ispla r ed for all locations in reactor coolant systr, laep and if properly instranted tell the oper t:r eactly. hat his cariditions throughout the O.CS loop.

Again, I could be happy to describe, in nare detail,.that kind of a CRT display shoald be designed.

20-p, s me. -., r., m c i s, - -

w,'.,

r.,,, un.,

-. n noc e t', c,*'^M- --

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s r - - - - -

- - - - / * --' : -

of h diing uc'n l eger inv n toric ; c

' a ter on m e

",G ancy basis.

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7. a.,

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c.,..,. :.,, s ar - _, c i c> -

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a s-such :s this.

I eel that t?._ ha'ip valune sh;uld b in the range of 2m 'u a v n.c v, a u.j

o.. _. a.+., a

_+,.. s s.,

o. -C.c. a - s_ _ '.,o,

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21.

nit;.; ;n I can't celieve en;:na :2s really looked into this m detail, I s ti ;r. gly feel tha t there

~.a; M a rela tienship bet..an the electreatic relief /alve pilot valve being sclidly piped into the relief iina to the drain tan':, a nd U.e fa c t tha'

'ealve failed.

I feel tha t the pilot valvt is cesigned to be discharged into a lon pressure envirament such as can-tainment.

Rather than being disOarged into the San. 'ines that the elec trra tic relief valve is ven ting to.

It is possible that the high discharge pressure causing a bac': p essure on the pilot valva ray have lc

+,

e.r. n r. s,. c.

t. w....

b. r,-. c.lc

%.-..u.-

a. c. i u, c m.clc.e. f e :i i e m m e u

- - a

,,_en.

Ln_ Uni.

l_..

n u

the pilot valve to the electrolatic relief valve disc' arges right into the con ta i r.nen t, thu s ca u si ng no :.ac'-

pressure.

In Unit 2 folicuing this

'incident, I no ted tMt the pilot ci.e is piped into the electrom tic and the code ca fets valve divh::ry piping direc tly.

Which may have caur a large back pressure to occur in the pilot valve asse.nly and may have allo'.;ed the ele trcnatic relief valve disc to continue to ba unstaged.anc thus not reseat. This needs to be checked.

I have pointed this out to GPUSC when I recognized the piping arrangn.ent ar.d they did not feel it was a criticel issue at the tine but I feel this should be checked.with

. h o.

.. c. c. u.u -.u.

22.

Indica tion of the positica of the elec tre.atic rel ief '.elve mst be prcvi to the operator so that he can clearly ascertain Ather or ;ot the electrr~.atic relief valve is indeed open.

Ir.d ica ticn o f the ;icnal calli for the valve to be open is clearly not crough.

The actual valve positis needs to bt alar.ned or ind ica ted to the opera tor.

0 9

e

.. -.. - - +

- + - -

- - - = -. -

-e-e-e=

w 4

23.

The design of the Unit 2 condenser re 2' to be revin.ud very carefully.

it is apparent th3 t th_e l evel indica t :an is totally sa. red up and that everytime the bypass valves CNned the level indica tion sha.c a lc.i level and allows the ccndenser hot wells to be filled.

The unst ela condition caused by this could resul t in se cere d=mge.anc it hn Luen a factor in diverting the opera tor's a ttention frco the cara e v tant atters of v imary systcn control.

It shsuld be noted tha t this is the tre of a t

e i pr-b em tha t '.;2s identi fied t'uring the s ta rtup acrogr n end nesce received pr:per attention. and resolut in..that the startup grcup should have been responsib,ie ior.

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m future emalayer: should be infccred of this.

It is unfair to the cast r,ajori ty o f cropl e ' 'o respsi'aly s tayed and d id c. _; j thing 'li thin their poaer to sa fely H.u Joun ti.e plant, ' nd p ro tec t tr'.e p ubl ic. to h3 /0 these people just cerely ;Jit end iw. ;i t rut any kir.d of of ficial response by the com any.

Perhaps this is rm rcelly practical, and aybe ve:y subjective, but I just don't feel it is fair to all the people in Met-Ed

'.!ho really pitched in and contir.u'd to fully support the opera tion.

27.

In future c.mrgency drills it ray he very helpful to have ':ey r: embers of the re.;s nedia observe d.e couct of tha drills m.d atter.d bnefing so that th'y will better undersund *% na ture of hucl(ar Plant accident responses.

This may tend to r ue tha nws med ia co', erage of en event, su:

as TMI's 2 accident, a more objective and public se. vice oriented type of Coverage.

L e

e e

O

23.

An auxiliary Failer duplex unit should be provided to Unit 2 to avoid the loss o f acuu:1 in both Unit 1 and 2 follo ing the Unit 2 trip.also more attention must be paid the Unit I aux. boilers so that thei. r? 'ab is improved to the point that at Icest one boiler can be brought c ne reliably under any circumstances.

29.

The human engineering of thu con _rcl mais shou'd have a closer revie t' b.y c u ra t i on s p ma nnel.

Im teac i r. a_,

r a.

n locations for control r

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!at,all vul nc i; totalij Ir Is :eit t a t a volu:re closer e.,,. ;.... -..

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sys tems r.eed.,d to cope,ti th a steins once through ste2n genera tor tube leak.

This incident poinitJ cut ?.2 fcct to e t?,tt we were e <tremely lu ] a r.d r. o t a l l ou i ng a nJ~ toba lE3h:2 to c,et into thu s eco n d a r.v. side.

Contanina tion 9 the sec;ch j side,mld h /e s.:cicusly cozoundad our recovery ef forts in the plent.

I still reccmac;d that holdup voluma be provided for the su ps and f:r p:l': 2r rcg en era t io."..a s tes a nd r esins,

inard2r to properly clcan up the :a ~;;j s.cc end ;oltiup tha. :ste.' o 1 for ultimate processing.so as to elinirate any liquid releases to the ri 33.

I strongly recer.2nd that camra ;,ui; ment be installed in the reactor b tu observe the opera tion of 'mj erp;r ant such a, P.C pumps in the. seal areas, RB srp end other aceas tit af :..ed to Se to benefi t to such a view.

Alcnj uith this it mula e 1.

that indt;.undant explcsion proof lighting '.. auld need to be prc tid:-d, for ins tance, the hydrogen explosion experienced in Unit 2 may have rc :dared virtually all our 1ighting inope able, even if the lighting did not fail, ue deliberatly de-energized as ruch of the lighting circuits es possible to prevent any father hydrogen explosions.

The design of the reactor bldg. sarp!ing system rus t be tot revised to elininate the mois tcre problms..hich had t.een experiences in the past and under an accider:t situaticn, this roisture problem v;ould be greatly exagerated due to thc ;dditicr al steam in tho bidg.

t t

e e

34.

I feel it v;ould be beneficial to have some type of radiation #tector probe that could be inserted into the reactor bldg. ta determine the amount of radiation and then wi thdra'..n tr avoid the gestions that exist about the reactor bldg. dor.e accuracy.

35.

This ite, may sound a bit far out but in light of what we are g-)ing taru with onsite and offsite r:nitoring, may pay of f in long tern benefits following an accident such as at 1."I or even a much severe accident.

The item is to purchase 8 to 15 apo;;5cric monitors which be rade n bile and' driven around the site or " rmen:1 placcJ in all the sectors cround the plant and this atmosphori rz. t;r.;ul jS/e e s a s'c. tion a t;;;n ho e

, ale suspended with a Felium b 'llou,

..chr t o g e '.,' l t _ / :r cl av> ' i 'n desired, and these m aitars

' C.

, :m pl w :d in to re dw t dir'ctly

,;a.-

e of "

, wir!"" 'e n eft in to ECS, this would e! " ir 1,

end if thesu were e rmar._.;tl.

^l ace d a the cas i tz.

,c o ti

s, mul u b' readily used by thc ECS withi

t!.e. cry firs t few m.=nts of an accident and take v e c ^ the pressu a f g<.tting onsi te c ' a f f;i tu v a mb il i;

'ind af ftu? that uauld he c oplojed sc n

nere as rm.y "

iations of Di:

of them + ap ",,i.

o t h e,,

1 : :_el 2 : ' '. t i > :' ~ nphc ic. ' n i tcrs OugI

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_ _.. n s. %

y alley cm._ tw it

- T'! ty g r /eill:

c: e ur u..

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~he industry c

I.

.,~.m..>,,.,

.or acvJ i e) i,.

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i

.u go into th, ->;aup Enk r r

' ' f or,. h m ini - type of sensors, c'etect tho source of 1927_.

Nther 1.- rple of using this device.;ould be to send into Oa ' ;ricas high radia tion level rocms ar.d cbtain excuratt surveys by a ly

.;r. ting a C", onto the device and obtair renote readout, this devic., n aid.. e a simpl e l'! temera wi th zeam par a

and tilt fe.tures.;itha 1ight scv:e cn2bling op; a tars to inspect pressur gages such as on the ma k p p "p

"d. eri:y o il flc-in the bearin';s and verify oil levels.

Currently.;e ar; m.ablt to parf arn this type of surveillance due to the extremely high radiation I r.els in these areas and this inability to nonit ar the cpacation of the equip..ent locally, cou render tht equip'nt inoperable in the near future.

I think the develop-nent of this kind of device s*.ald be done rightnow so we can utilize thi-enuipment within the next fet. '1ys or next v;eek or so to start this type of surveillan.eein high radi;.;n cubicles.

38.

It is obvicus that our PJ.3 was totally inadequate before the TMI-2 accidc due to high backgrounds and t'r.;

/acinity of the monitors and the fact tha the majority of then pegged of fscale eithte through the direct readings o-the background.

It would appear that a significant amount of design revie',i needs to be perforc.ed and a solution found for this probica.

/

(

. o 5

t e

G e

~

ME.TRO PO LIT AN EDISON COMPANY u s..t,,,. a c m.m, n.

u m,o m ce,,,m,,

Su'o,iac: 'D2 Station Unit 2 - Reccerendations Folls.tirg tn cjgg T!E Muclear Station 3-28-79 Event

?liddleto.n, PA 1705' Cate

?.hy 1, 1979 To J.G. I? erb 31n Tr.e 1MI Statica Senicr Staff r.ct en 4-14-79 and contained f n this letter are er reccmendations follc< ling tha su'oject e cent.

The rcmrr c~1aticna

,r, centainal in e cici tre to titia 7 tror.

G'm m r. 57 7.O ication iI _.

1_ f t '. E a n _.

-'_ m ' s lo

?.

l um tre

71., d COCO 3Od3 t[_Cr l l'

'r'

' Cr"at !!:rC L i ". C Z act1C.a 3 r, t O

'.I H nit I w s-e u..; ).

fl C's 3-.

_.y l

l/l/ ' //

l r

n l %ji,

),. -f j,',

V

/,

L,

p ',/,,

/

--/G.:. Miller

/./ L td t 1C n 7.1. '. 7._C (7

' 'n

^

n et

/ U'

~

/

< ' 'i e

e

,r1 6.r.

.:(lr.

t.s. s e O.,.m7.-

e p.c

.ns'

. )u s

t U.

,s e

.s Enclonure 1 Reccirendations:

l.

The crergency plans and pr ocm,ures s,rculd,cu c,n ingec, O e&. y "b tb c'

'~

accccariate ca unications in all crc;2nizatiano at the Scruor 10V01 i$[cluding profecsicnal interrare,ath tiu majo. -;dia.

D1-ing the ae p, a. n

. S th< 1nl, n,'-

'IME incident the ccci.unicatlcna cot,n ins 2ce t1

' c with outsida agencie3) defined ir the mergency pl an tara in place irrediately urd <ccrh'd effectively.

A review of th' varicus agercies logs will show proTpt and continuous cm 2nicationn yet &nior of fici.al3 s < m_ a_ >..a'm-t.' o,v o a,,

,, s_ n..,, c e. g v,,,~ ~....u, a.~.,.,.

t, -

e, i n u.,.c_,

o ev

<ac

. m. m. m c

. m were uninEor:ad.

I paracmlly hcard pvple en th, phone reprn "ntim p,,_ o,u,. u,. u...a

. y <w~ _ ua 1,sy m _.,.;.-, t a-

"e. " m _ 1 u~. # t' ~ in

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m

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f. T C. "n L..

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m em m w or evacin tica, ' et O ' other s

'l oE

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. v.

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u-d t.... y~.L~;-

'm y^i 6 I strOn"uly-b-

~

~

~

i level team Ath decisive tec'=ical peaple to in= xfiat'ly c:me into erfect in these situaticna.

4.

In assesm.ent chould b.' mde relative to the handling oE these amergencies at the 5:aticn %perintenient/:~anager le.el.

It is cen a vable that a hir an bein, cauid break down un::3r the stress of t ry.3 to talk to tc-3 mny outside prtm. along wi.th the nlant !, nublic rc:,,~ ibility.

Tha 1

i res;nnsible ind b < ' 21 v'm 1s in c'r.atw of the plant ma not he on th.

pl.cne half cf cach r. cur while the tnit ia unntable and tlm full blavn l

cmrc.ancy D an is t=.r.aY.

5.

The energency plan shculd hre dircct links to tha local media.

These should 're exercised reriodi.cally and :mst assure th ' local populate receives accu: ate and tirmly uphtea ir an cc,argency of this typ2.

./

I f

e e

4

e

. Recanan-lations Cont'd:

6.

Tm following item should te in prcgress r.cw.

A cocrplete technical review of this incident must h+ P2rfomd to includ2 iters such aa Core InstruM'ntatica, Iiotlegs b2ing higbar than the Pressurizer, Enviren ental Cu21ification of instnrents, qurading of Valves like the electrcratic and blod valw, Sam. lin,> syste rs, Ventilation &

Filter Syste:rs, Reactor Buildir.g Cmenicetion with oth2r huildings and Radiaticn Manito. Systes.

7.

AccouMability incido the Station is r.ct H-n7y.

In this incidant, e.,._,

c,.-_ ~., + qvli 'L.y p a w, m...-ue

.z., L u t..,.a L,,. 1,. m, m

+'-3_,,

aau w> a w.

r e

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h. i ., CQ~sl (j }ys o,. ps. q s

c. t m~ '. x r _ s. :i { { -. f.d,,.

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y

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l'

[I y

e e

~ E. closure 2 Rocca.undations:

1.

Eased on the initial pressure the e argency directoc is Under there should te a billet in the organization desig ated "corrun'i.cator".

"1his person should either te the cpposite unit operintendent or cpposite unit Superinter. int Tcchnwat support.

His job should be to Fadle not so r.ztst the initial offsite nctification hut to ' candle al1 interface '.rith cccpr.y nunaganent a.d all interface ttith State Cafer:rnant a-d 2C :tt.agment.

In this way he could filter appropriate canagerial ccarents to the crergency director at the prcpe.r time vice randomly th cughout the crergency.

The 3 a n c o r_.m,f,1r.., o_.. t c H

,p yeal mo.. m_

".,m ~w 'o,. _ ;

h, a. bin 'o

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m p.,,.a n tk.n... fL t i q.1. n_ p.~..,..~y..,..L.

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s o v rnake all pre.ss ccr.mnications fro-- the outset.

A sp cial NRC or State

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th ough the "cccrsnicator" and t':.2 resident IGC Inspector.

6.

Cutside orgr.izatica cc.ecgen y plans ne-d a very E

-4 Icok.

1:e folle</cd ours explicitly, but I feel U2 are taking the rap

'r outside organization r.on-existent plans.

M 7.

Neu systen designs should inco prete the ability to cooldo.in the RCS without bringing large quantities of the RCS cutside of the ccataircrent bul Gin /.7..

8.

High ranga radiatien :.onitoring qfgent on installcki systms should exist.

V.' hen existir.g equirn:nt gces off scale the ability to use the high rarge equip ent should e:.ist.

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4

4 Reccccerdaticas:

1.

Put alanns ir eccputer ark! cn visual Ic-rds for vah es (critical) out of naaiticn.

2.

Provide trairdng in license progara for eo's on.:cc,r.,ity for const. int

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Includ.e casuality in sirulation *: raining.

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9.

Far nore phone lires are needed in th cc: cal rocci.

T: O shoulcn't come through the switchtmre but should come as outade lines directly into the comunication.s room.

10.

It '.e.s r.ever r.cessary 'o use the r. orth m.d south ' rashhc ar m s.

i'here would the nmof f invc gone? I luve a feeling this part of our eka do',ild have fallen flat.

Site e/acuatica to a,cu'ch.n area r.rada to be practiccd.

11

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cnclosure 4 9'*

P.ecorrenda t i ons :

Sur.arized belov, are my reco mendation based on my impressions and c/periences asso

- ted m th the March 28 TMI Unit 2 accident.

It is intended that these recc..endations are as subjective as nassible, and that they are designed to promote a safer and r. ore efficient operation of not only the TMI Unit 1 and 2 Po..er Plants, but the industry as well.

My reco-nenda tions follow:

A nearis is required in order to vent the reactor coolant loops to assure 1.

that nr.-candensible gasses as well as steam, follcwirg this type of On future incident, can be vented and guaontee natural circulation.

desirs the cosition of the pressurizer and the location of where it nto tm io. x nods to 5e thoroughly revie,:,d in light of this ties is Al so a reans to rc notely '.ent the reactor vessel nead incident.

D?d :d.

sur, e/. t ernal to the 2.

A rcons to canitor the lc.el of the "cactor Sldg.

O 2ctar g.,

is requircd.

3.

'. u ns t' srole the contents end thoraughly mix tha cn tents of the Ica c u r U dg. Las n.;t x -

-e recuired.

This is ne adcd in ord c to

,: J c '. t;it no ~0 P ts of 'cri: 'ralized uater are for~ed, shich c0ulo ga a itical '. San tN Peactor Dis g re c i rcul ui a.:

_ sctcc,

C cc a. '.g i s e s ti al i shH t

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, i.

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a.

3.

.+~

t3 Ihc

2CJr Cldg. IU WDid

1. gh radiation levels in s..e Eux. Ul@.

sa A

..a-e i.-

if ?c _ re m l systcr ust he placed ir opera tion r ollowing this t.i n d

,c

., - c ;

..r L, i d 'w.

V1 L. v b It, culd be valuaale to have containmnt cameras insteiled *..hich are 5.

capable of operating under hi h radiation levels, in erder to nonitor 3

the operaticq of equipnent during such an incident.

the fact that Separate hot sample labs rust be provided in the future, 6.

we save.ar.ey by ccnbining Unit 1 and " i t 2 primary sa.mple labs have ncw proven to be a crippling af fect on th unaf fected unit.

I strnngly recor.end a type of onsite and offsite ronitoring sys tem 7.

which is conprised nf cutcritically initir. Led filling of helium balloons whicn, auld be released to extend sa7oling tubes into the -:r at various ele :tions ecuH the plant site, unich ': auld be co-nected to air samplers This whose readouts 'cauld be displayed in the Energency montrol Center.

early nonitoring would alleviate the need to have onsite and offsite monitoring teams dispatched and.:culd give ruch earlier infonnation on the I have an ideas as to plumb characteristics following such an accident.

how this system could be designed and I would be glad to discuss this scheme with anyone v.ho is intererted.

h 8

o G

8.

I feel strongly that the damage done to our cc:rranity was done not by the TMI accident, but by the irrespansible reporting of the news nedia.

I feel that a tremendous effort needed to be nade to properly brief all the news nedia :hich nay get involved with such an emergency.

in and around any plant site so that they are aware of the jargon associated with the paratechnology and that they can accurately report conditions of the plant and put the status of any plant emergency in the proper prospective so as not to prej upon the fear of the unknown that the oublic may have.

I feel that sc ple need to kncu that there is a serior proble, but that N de: ail; ;f the probleni be put in the proper prospective so that people cce not sared out of their wits.

The public needs to % ab m i aly 2.d c L.. t i r a l,

, liorned a f the condi tions, so s

that c ' _ / c re "re'

'dtat9e

';a.;

ury nry actions reccrcmended by the

,,5 f.d b e S O N 7, -

.t. n at the m, tire, not panic to the paint..:ert there is L 2: cnaos in tha ccr runi ty.

9.

We have al i t2en t1 G t tl r-Or all o f f s i te qu ?s tions to the Corrnunf t h

ation: 5ec ices " ~ ri nt, S:. s:r, inspite of this it appears that Met-Ed

..au lost

't. ally al' c: s i tnili ty i: the nc.us r:edia and with ti publ;c, ir_ 1 -i s of 'he :.

. ;,ns of this e'.er. t,,eeds to be sta"i ::

7 :'

lly, a t

--1, 2

Cc

<.. cat. ion, Services Depart.:.

but b; o C, y t'.e Sc ' ' "

21L, nd ev > ; r te in lived in this incid2V, so t b fu' c: -

aica t.ons are cLj u._ive, ef fec tive r,

and in tha pec.1 ;

np2:ti.e.

I feel that the crergency las handled c.

ex t: c 21 f,cil ms i te a: " t _ ccmaricatiuns Ut. wen th; site and the ou side % ancies is uactly had

.a.,

>c t ice-i over the pa s t coupl e of years in our ea urgr,cy d rill, hou m e beycnd tha t poin t, it aonears that tha c; n ni:=.ticns and ccnten1 or :.is mergeacy ca. ple tely broke do.,n.

This hole area needs to be studied and reso!.ed. for the future.

10.

It is clear to ~:e that the traditional local emergency responses are not enough to prevent a sericus accident frcm occurring at Nu:lcar Plants.

1 feel that further work nceJs to be performed to s tudy a.1 types of transient >,, resporses, and that :ptrators need to be drilled and trained in the kinds of tran:ients. iich a traditionally believed to not occur.

I feel that this event has proven that our previous assumptions of the accident probabilities were in error, and therefore, we need to look at those things that m previously felt could never occur, because a valve uauld not fail or a pump would not fail, or etc., or an operator would recogniza a condition within an appecpriete period of time.

11, The dynanics of hydrogen generation nteds to be re-reviewed to determine if therr. is any other ways of preventing serious hydrogen buildup.

It ray be prudent, for instance, to install some type of ignition system in the reactor bldg. to maintain the levels of hydrogen belo,i le /els which could cause a significant pressure rise.

I feel that this incident has sho'.in that while the hydrogen generation problem is a serious concern, that the detina tion effects of hydrcgen concentrations greater than C nay not be r.early as catostrophic as had bcen assu ed.and it may be betti to force the hydrogen to burn as it reaches G rather than to allow it t:

buildup to a greater value and risk a high energy type of detination.

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?

12.

I feel that the hydrogen reccmbiner piping should not be tied into the normal purge duct penetration, because these penetrations are too large and should never have to be opened following a loss of coolant accident, rather the purge ducting should be arranged to utilize separate small sized penetraticns to minimize the radiation levels associated with the large purge piping.

13.

The location and design of the radiation monitoring system needs to _

be cooletely reviated and revised as appropriate.in view of the exper-ience during this incident.

"oisture problems as well' as high %ckground problems have rendered cost of the OS incapable of performing the intended functions.

I suspect S.:"er, tha t i t,:a s mnvisioned tha t the R"5 would experience the kind of radia tion level s tha t

'.,e experienced as a result of this :ncie mt.

14.

I have felt, ever since I got into thic mystery tha t, t;e volumes and waste storage capacities providad in the, m,;as te systems bo th liquid and gaseous, are totally inadequ a te.

I feel that this area ra ds to be improved upJn tremendously.

15.

In additica to the photarap's of individual val"es '.thich tere t:en du r the startu; myr, phcicy'9s of general areas of all the pr ":ry..i' of the plc nt sh:Jid be tJ.en so that these can be used for planning purposes. :en r adiation areas proh: bit iong e tay times in an area.

These general e: aa pSte;raphs will emble batter job plarn ng, prior to entry i

in any of the a:eas uhart high. x i' tion level s are e p fitnced.

16.

I feel tha 'nd :trj needs to

.cicp ::: :ct rnnitor.ng davices, call c

then robots i f jeu ';ill,,:h i ch ig. my a remo telj con troll ed camera,

G:1 tube and light source which : uld allow the ranipulator or robot to go into arcas where high radiation levels exist to monitor equipment ar.d eliainate high dose ra tes ta personnel.

17.

r:ey systems within contain:r.ent should be provided with the capability of monitoring *.;ey parameters f ec n outside of the Reactor Bldg.

For instance taps should be provided outside containment under the emergency condition-we experienced a t TMI, to r:o; i tor pressurizer l evel, prinary sys tea pressure, OTS9 le/el, etc. as a backup t; hen the normal instrunenta tion f a ils under high rad ia tion l e'.el s.

18.

Instrumentation should b2 located a t ; level which auld be reasonably unaffected by the water level that would exist in a containment base-nent following such an incident.

19.

Instrumentation needs to be re/ie. ed in order to come up with the means to better recognize the conditions '.6ich led to the THI-2 fuel failure.

For instance, with the pressurizer 1._ vel pegged high, it was believed that the RCS was in a solid condition when indeed it was not.

Sonehct the operatar needs to have some type of instrunentation or indications that clearly informs him of the coolant inventory of the reactor.

I would 3

(;<.

-i

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-~

19. cont'd.

strongly recom mend looking at a CRT display of the reactor coolant system conditions.

These conditions would be displayed for all locations in reactor coolant system loop and if procerly instr =ented tell the operator exactly what his conditions throughout the RCS loop.

Again, I would be happy to describe, in acre detail, what kind of a CRT display shoald be designed.

20.

The Aux. Eldg. sump capacity is totally inadequa te end rust be capable of %ndling uch larger inveneries of water on en energency basis.

wi thou t flo' ding ou t the Aux. didg. basemen t.and eli i ts associa ted equipment.

It is felt that ar9rgccund tants e/ ttcal to the olant should be pcc.;

d and c,tric tly controlled so that its sole function is to be used as an external surge for relcase cancity for er rgencies such as this.

I feel tha t the holdup volume should be in the range of 200 to 300,C00 gal. and the tanks. should be absolutely leak proof and have a eackup sysica to prev =. t any leakage of the potentially highly radioactive fluids ntc the grmrd.

These tanks Juld provide holdup i

capac ity 'or 1:ng term s torap of, Chly contamina ted coolant 2 n d 9:a ul d advert the # c s th2t ue A n.cn =2 during thi: -:ccidan t.;here all the extra

c ficcau a :t "

1.

Oldg. b e semt and cnised high releases to t:.e public.

If this

.a of addi tional tan':ege was install-during initial construction, i ts.:uld be minor cc mred to the exnense that le will go tircugh to install the tanP farn and ctpgua cleanup systems '.:hich.,ill be necessarj t; clean up our plant following this incicent.

21.

Although I don't believe anyone has really looked into this in detail, I strongly feel tha t there may be a rela tionship between the electromtic relief valve pilot valve being solidly piped into the relief line to the drain tank, ard the fact that valve failed.

I feel that the pilot valve is designed to be discharged into a low pressure environment such as con-ta innen t.

Rather than being discharged into the sa"e lines that the electrcmatic relief valve is venting to.

It is possible that the high discharge pressure causing a back pressure on the pilot valve reay have Ic to the fact that the electrcmatic relief valve failed open.

IILUn.i.t_1_.

the pilot valve to the electrcmatic relief valve dische A right into the containment, thus causing no back pressure.

In Unit 2 following this i n c i d.e n t, I noted that the pilot valve is piped into the electrcmatic end the code safety valve discharg2 piping directly.

Which may have caus a large back pressurc to occur in the pilot valve assembly and may have allowed the electrcmatic relief valve disc to continue to be unstaged.aac thus not rese t.

This needs to be checked.

I have pointed this out to GPUSC when I recognized the pipir.g errangement and they did not feel it was a critical issue at the tine but I feel this should be checked.uith the ver. dor.

22.

Indication of the positicn of the eiectromatic relief valve aust be provi to the operator so that he can clear'y ascertain "hether or.no t. the electromatic relief valve is indeed con.

Indice sion of the signal calli for the /alve to be open is clearly not enough.

The actual valve positic needs to be alarned or indice ted to the opera tor

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23.

The design of the Unit 2 condenser need to be revie.yed very carefully, it is apparent that the level indi:ation is tctally screwed up and that everytime the bypass valves opened the level indication shows a low level and allcws the condenser hot wells to be filled.

The unstable condition caused by this could resul t in severe damage.and it has been a factor in civerting the operator's atten'.ica from the r:3re innortant ratters of primary systo coatrol.

It should be noted tha t this is the type of a problem that was identified during the startup program and never receiv.=c proper attention. and resolution that the startup group should have been responsibl e for.

24.

A new separate primary sanpl ng lab should te designcd for l'-it 2 to : ci the problems that '.-;e experir. cad this time. In ":c t tr de3 fgr :f xch a sanp,.ing la.b s, o u,i o, a, o v e ry cu i c,: t y I n o m

10, i, ' a i u 1

'a n

.m e

o from Unit 2 sannlings this would allow Unit i ta,

ol ' ^ Evn -

C' 1 lab and permit it to support unit I sie -tt p in a t gerisd of timc.

25.

Coordination of S cott A ir P acks, respire tors, TLD's, dosimters, ar.d Just about every aspect of the P process hed been a f, It p ch2bly a."

as '.; ell as it could, and for that I have to ccngr 4 -.;l a o

/ r_co n e sl.s howeer, thecujh this incident,;e hne

.e will a

.2 t'

n. er2 Dec-bably tto nades of :pera tion, nar.>l r.ades af - _..

'e c _7 :..:

cardition.

In both cases, exposura levals,

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,, 4..

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_ w n J. c

_s is u um support, Jers:r".el supp or t,

'w._ to b2 well

>m n ;d f' c.

't The t:irds of things tha t a s t ca w'wd cu t ar s

a c; f..:ir S cot t A i r P m.f<s,..a ta':es o f ci r ;ng mas:s, a.

_ 31 < a. _

to be established, etc.

25.

For those people

e deaerted tL_ : ip, so to,

.,i :a

tl a and any others, they should eitner Le encouraged t 3 come inck to.;3rk, or some type of disciplinary discharge should be

! st r=d and their future employers should be infccmd of this.

It is unfair to the tast najority of people who responsibly stayed and.id eenryt.:!nu'.tnin thcir power to sa fely shu tdown the plant, and protect t he cablic. to ' ave these people just merely quit and ! eave.;ithout cny '..d v f of ficial respose by the company.

Perhaps this is not really practicei, cr,d mybe very subjective, but I just don't feel it is fair to all the people in fiet-Ed who really pitched in and contir,ued to fully support the o,'ra t;on.

27.

In future emergency drills it.ny be /ery helprul to havr Ley m sbers of the ntus riedia observe the conduct of the drills c ;d a ttend briefings so that they uill butter understend the nature of '.. clear Plant accidcn t responses.

This rnay tend to me:e the nev;s media coverage of an event, su as TMI's 2 accident, a more objective and public service oriented type of coverage.

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28.

An auxiliary bailer duplex unit should be prov:ded to Unit 2 to avoid the loss of vacuum in both Unit I and 2 following the Unit 2 trip.also rore attention r.ust be paid the Unit I aux. toilccs so that their relieb is inproved to the point that at least one boiler can be brought on line reliably under any circumstances.

29.

The 1.unan engineering of the control panels should !.2 /e a closer r.reieu by operations parsennel.

Ins teed of 2 c,ng c :n:

', 1tions for con tr:.1

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This incident pointed out ne f act to me that we were e.tr,. 31y lucky and r.ot allowirig any tJbe le '.cjd 10 Sdt intO the secondary side.

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L recovery efforts in the plant.

I still reccanend tha t holdup zolun be provided for the st.rps and f pi.c.

gnn erati a.' tstes and resins, inorder to properly clean up L.m se:cn bry side c od holdup the..as ta vol-for ul tima te processing so as to.elinica te an.,11qu id releases to the ri-33.

I strongly recomend that crera aquipent be installed in the reacter b to caserve the operation of key equi;. 2.1t such n, RC pcaps in the seal areas, RB sump iind o ther cros th't ~c. nxd to be to lon2f: t to :...h a vieu.

Along with this i t wuld any.2r ti.a t 0. e. den t explos ion proo f 4:

lighting '..could need to be provided, for instance, the hydrogen explosion experienced in Unit 2 ray have rendered virtually all our lighting inope:

able, even if the lighting did not fail, ue delibera tly de-ener giced as r.uch of the lighting circuits as possible to pre /ent any t uther hydrogen explosions.

The design of the :eactcr b1dg. sc~; ling system must be toti re cised to elininate the r.oisture problene, which had '.an e m ciences in the past and under en accident situation, this noisture problem uculd be grea tly exagera ted due to the Ldditienal steam in the bldg.

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34.

I feel it would be beneficial to have same type of radia tion detector probe that could be inserted into the reactor bldg. to determine the amount of rac iation and then withdcaw, to avoid the q 'estions that exist about the reactor bldg. done accuracy.

35.

This item 2y sound a bit far cut but in light of.; hat se are going thru with onsite and offsite 'onitoring, nay pay of f in long term benefits follo ina an accident such as e t T:H or cven a nuch stvere accident.

Tha, item is to curchase 8 to 16 a; m32pheric.anitors uhich be made nobile and driven 2round the site or,cer w tly pl accd in all c.e c.ectors ara nd th_

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obtain,ccurate surveys by.arely mounting a G:1 onto the device and obta h

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i and tilt fea tures witha light source enabling opera tors to ins;er.t pressur gages s"-S as on the r2keup pump and verify oil flow in the b33 rings ar.1 veri fy oil level s.

Currently vie are unable to perform this type of surveillence due to the extrenely high radiation levels in these areas and this incili;y to monitor the operation of the er;uipment locally, cou render tht ey1;. men t inoperabie in the near fu ture.

I think t!'e develop-rant of this kind of device should be done rightnow so we can utilize thi:

equipn nt,ithin the next few hys ce nmi.aek or so to start this type of surveillance in high radiati n cubicles.

38.

It is obvious that cur RMS vias total'y inadequa te before the Tl'I-2 accide:

due to high backgrounds and the vacinity of the tonitors and the fact tha-the maacrity of them pegged of fscale either through the direct readings 0:

the background.

It would appcar that a significant amount of design review needs to be perforned 3.~.d a solution found for this problen.

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