ML19221B039
| ML19221B039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-09.2.3, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-9.2.3, SRP-09.02.03, SRP-9.02.03, NUDOCS 7907120291 | |
| Download: ML19221B039 (5) | |
Text
NU R EG.75/087
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3 i, - A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
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OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REG SECTICN 9.2.3 DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) l Secondary - Structu: al Engineering Branch (SEB)
Mech;nical Engineering Branch (MEB) h erials Engineering Branch (MTEB)
Effluent Treatment Systemt Branch (ETSB)
Instrtmentation and Control Systems Branch (ICSB)
Power Systems Branch (PSB) l I.
AREAS OF REVIEW The ASB reviews the demineralized water makeup system (DWMS) from the supply connection of the service or maaicipal water source to the points of discharge. The capability to provide an adequate supply of treated water of reactor coolant purity to other systems as makeup, ard to provide other plant demineralized water requirements is reviewed.
The design of the DhHS is generally not safety related; the review is primarily directed toward assuring that a failure or malfunction of the system could not adversely affect essential systems requirements in accordance with General Design Criteria 2, 4 & 5.
l.
The ASB review of the DWHS system includes the following considerations:
a.
Capability of the system to effectively store, handl3, and dispense all chemi-cals.tilized in the demineralizing and regeneration process.
b.
Capeility of the DhMS to op eate within the environment to which it is exposed.
c.
Prov sions for the receneration wastes to be directed to a suitable point in the radwaste systcm or other specified areas for subsequent processing prior to discharge to the envir n ment and instrumentation and isolation capabilities provided, incluJing the abi;ity to detect corrosive solutions and the valving necessary to isolate the sy, n.
2.
The ASB reviews the system function relative to other safety-related systems to determine whether portions n' the system are safety related and to determire whether a seismic C?tegory I make up source is required.
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a 3.
The DWNS is also reviewed to assure that a malfunction or f ailure of a cc.nconent will not have an adverse effect on any safety-related system or components.
I Secondary reviews are performed by other branches and the results used by the ASB to complete the overall evaluation of the system. The secondary reviews are as follows.
USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN sienderd re w piene er, proper.d for the guidence of the o+fic.of Nucieer nascio, neguietion even roepone. bio for ene rev.ew.t esp..cee.one to construct end operate n c. ear power paonte Theee documento are made evocabse to the public es part of the Commiteson a pohey to 6n'urm the nucteer industry and the general puM4C of regulatory precedures and poetenee Stenderd review piene are not substitutet f or regulatory guedee or the Cornmiecion a regodetions end comp 4bente wtth them le not requered The etendard review pian ooetione are heyed to Rev eson 2 of the $tendard Fo. met and Content of Safety Analysse Reports for Nuc4eed Power PLBete Not edi sectione of the Stenderd Formet heve e coneependie'0 rew'** p6en PuM*ehed standerd rev6ew piene wsH be rewteed pertadscelty. es appropriate to acco mtsac. rommente end to reftect new enf ormation and esportence C.ommente and suggestione for 6tnprovement waft be considered end e ould be sent to the U S Nucteer Regulatory Commboeson Office of Nucteer R* ecto, n
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Rev. 1
lhe SEB deteruines the acceptability of the design analyses, procedures, and criteria used to establish the ability of seismic Category I structures housing the system and supporting systems to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as the safe shut-down earthquake (SSE), the probable maximum flood (PMF), and tornado missiles. The MEB reviews the seismic qualification of components and confirms that the components, piping, l
and structures are designed in accordance with applicab!e coces and standards. The MTEB verifies that inservice inspection requirements are met for system components and, upon request, verifies the compatibility of the materials of cons + uction with service conditions. The ICSB & PSB determine the adequacy of the design, installation, inspec-l tion, and testing of all essential electrical components (sensing, control, and power) required for proper operation. The ETSB verifies that the limits for radioactivity concentrations are met.
II.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Acceptability of the design of the DWMS, as described in the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR), is based on design criteria or regulatory guides that apply dilettly to l
the safety-related functional performance requirements for the DWMS.
The ASB assures that the system is capable of providing the required supply of reactor coolant purity water to all systems.
Several general design criteria and regulatory guides are used to evaluate the system design for those cases when a failure or malfunction of the DWMS could adversely effect essential systems or components (i.e.
those necessary for safe shutdown or accident prevention or mitigation). These are as follows:
1.
General Cesign Criterion 2, as related to the safety-related portions of the system being capable of withstanding the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, or floods.
l 2.
General Design Criterion 4, with respect to the system being capable of withstanding the effects of internally generated missiles.
2.
General Design Criterion 5, in regards to the effect of sharing in multiple unit facilities.
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, as related to the quality group classifications of components
& systems.
S.
Regulato g Guide 1.29, Position C-1, if any portion of the system is deemed to be safety-related, and Position C-2 for nonsafety-related functiuns.
6.
Appendix 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.56, for an acceptable standard for purity of the demineralized water prod 4ced by the DWMS.
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9.2.3-2 Rev. 1
7.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, as related to the flood protection provided for nuclear power plants.
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, as related to the r,issile protection provided for nuclear power plant's structures, systems and comp (nents.
9.
Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, as it relasas to h;gn and moderate energy breaks or cracks in piping systems outside containment.
For those areas of review identified in subsection I of this SRP section as being the responsibility of other branches, the acceptance criteria and their methods of application are contained in the SRP sections corresponding to those branches.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES The procedures set forth below are used during the construction permit (CP) application review to determine that the design criteria and bases and the preliminary design as set forth in the preliminary safety analysis report meet the acceptance criteria given in subsection II.
For the review of operating license applications, the review procedures and acceptance criteria are utilized to verify that the initial design criteria and bases have been appropriately implemented in the final design as set forth in the final safety analysis report.
l Upon request f rom the primary reviewer, the secondary review branches will provide input for the areas of review stated in subsection I.
The primary reviewer obtains and uses such input as required to assure that this review ptscedure is complete.
The reviewer selects and empi2 sizes material from this SRP section, as may be appropriate fcr a particular case. A determiration will be made ac to whether the DWMS or portions thereof are safety related, including whether a seismic Category I make up source is required for safe shutdown or for accident conditions. In confirming this design aspect, an analysis is mace in which it is assumed that any DWMS pipe fails or component malfunc-tions or fails in such a manner as to cause maximum damage to other equipment located nearby. The system will be considered nonsafety-related if its ilure does not affect the ability of the reactor facility to achieve and maintain safe shutdown canditions.
1.
The ASB evaluates the system design information and drawings and, utilizing engi-neering judgment, operational experience, and performance characteristics of similar, previously approved systems, to verify that:
a.
The system is capable of fulfilling the requirements of the facility for makeup water on a day-to-day basis.
b.
The component redundancy necessary for the system to perform its design func-tion is provided.
c.
Precautions are taken or incorporated into the system design to properly store, handle, and dispense corrosive and toxic chemicals effectively and 7.2.3-3 Rev. 1
safely so that a hazardous condition does not result from mishandling or leakage.
d.
The components utilized are compatible with the associated chemicals.
e.
The potential for leakage and accidentai spills has been minimized.
f.
In the event of a leak or spill, there would not be an adverse effect on safety related systems or components.
g.
Instrumentation (e g.,
a conauctivity monitor) has been provided together with the capability to isolate the system shouid planred operating conditions be exceeded.
h.
Piping has been provided as necessary to direct solutions and regenerative wastes to the radwaste system or other specified areas for processing and disposal.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS The reviewer verifies that sufficient information has been provided and that his review supports conclusions of the following type, to be included in the staff's safety evaluation report:
"The demineralized water makeup system includes all components and piping associated with the system from the service or municipal water source to the points of discharge to other systems or to a discharge canal. [The review has determined the adequacy l
of the applicant's proposed design criteria and design bases for the demineralized water makeup system, regarding safety-related requirements (if any) for an adequate supply of reactor coolant purity water during all conditions of plant operation.
(CP)] [The review has determined that the applicant's analysis of the designs of the demineralized water makeup system and auxiliary supporting systems is in conform-ance with the design criteria and bases. (0L)]"
"The basis for acceptance in the staff review has been conformance of the applicant's designs and design criteria for the demineralized water. makeup system and necessary auxiliary supporting systems to the commission's regulations as set forth in the general design criteria, and to applicable regulatory guides, staff technical positions, and industry standards and is acceptable."
V.
REFERENCES 1.
General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for D rotection Against Natural Phenomena."
2.
General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases."
3.
G(neral Design Criterion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Compc::ents."
4.
Regulatory Guide 1.26, " Quality Group Classifications and Standards for Water,
Steam, and Radioactive-Waste-Containing Components of Nuclear Powe,- D]3ntg,H 5.
Regulatory Guide 1.2), " Seismic Design Classification."
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9.2.3-4 Rev. I
6.
Regulatory Guide 1.56, Appendix, " Maintenance of Water Purity in Roiling Water Reactors."
7.
Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants."
8.
Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification."
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9.
Branch Technical Position ASB 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment, attached to SRP section 3.6.1.
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