ML19221A963
| ML19221A963 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1979 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-75-087, NUREG-75-087-02.4.9, NUREG-75-87, NUREG-75-87-2.4.9, SRP-02.04.09, SRP-2.04.09, NUDOCS 7907120068 | |
| Download: ML19221A963 (2) | |
Text
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/1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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9 OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SECTICN 2.4.9 CHANNEL DIVERSIONS WEV!EW RESPONSIBIllTIES Primary - Hydrolo<;y-Meten rology Branch (H"B) l Secondary - None I.
AREAS OF REVIEW Ia this section of the applicant's safety analysis report (SAR) the gechydrologic design basis is developed to assure that the plant and (ssential water supplies will not be adversely affected by nat;ra! stream channel diversica, or that in such an event, a: ternate water supplies are available to safety-related equipment.
The review includes:
1.
Historical channel diversions, ine.luding cutoffs and subsidence.
2.
Regional topographic evidence which suggests that future channel diversion may or may not occur (used in conjunction with evidence of historical diversions).
3.
Alternate water socces and operating procedures (ceordinate review with that of SAR Section 2.4.I1.6).
II.
ACCEPIANCE CRITERIA The analyses will be considered acceptable if at least the following are addressed:
1.
A description of the applicability (potential adverse effects) of stream channel diversions.
2.
Historical daversions and realignments.
3.
The topography and geology of the basin and its applicability to natural stream channel diversions.
4.
If applicable, the safety consequences of diversion and the potential for high or Icw water levels caused by upstream or downstream diversion adversely to affect safety-related facilities, water supply or ultimate heat sink.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES Site-specific publications and maps are reviewed to identify historical channel diversi>ns and evaluate (by independent conservative calculations and professional judgment ) the USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN e,
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2.4.9-1 Rev. 1 7907120ofd
potential for future diversions. Where an alternate safety-related cooling water supply is provided, the criteria for SAR Section 2.4.11.6 apply and are checked for consistency.
The above reviews are performed only when applicable to the site or site region. Some items of review may be done on a generic basis.
IV.
EVALUATION FINDINGS for construction per.T.it (CP) rouipws and when applicable, f'.ndings will consist of a brief genpral description of historical channel diversions. If the staff concurs with the appli-cant that channel diversion is unlikely or that the plant is protected and alternate essential water supplies meet the criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.27, the findings will so indicate. If the staff evaluation does not support the applicant's contention of cha,nel stability, an alternate source of water may be required.
For operating license reviews, findings will consist of the same material, updated as required to reflect new information available since preparation of the CP findings.
A sample CP stage statement follows:
" Diversions of the A River are well-documented in historical and topographic data.
Oxbow lakes, lew-lying swamps, and bars, and chutes provide elonnent evidence of historical diversion. Others are planning further bank ptotection measures, additional to the existing levee system, in the vicinity of the plant intake structure. However, the diversion of the main channel by degradation / aggradation within the confines of the levee system, or by breaching the west levee during major floods, cannot be discounted. The ultimate heat sink (as discussed in l
Section 2.4.11) is not directly dependent on the rivec intake. We conclude t!.at channel diversions present no safety-related hazard to the plant."
V.
REFERENCES No specific publications can be cited for general use; however, site-specific publications and maps can be obtained from the United States Geologic Survey, Soil Conservation Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Corps of Engineers, and state and other agencies and organizations, to identify h;storical and potential future channel diversions.
1.
Regulatory Guide 1.70, " Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Pcver Plants."
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants."
145 332 Rev. 1 2.4.9-2