ML19220D042
| ML19220D042 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/09/1979 |
| From: | Russ G Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) |
| To: | Bernero R NRC/OSD |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220D041 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905160223 | |
| Download: ML19220D042 (12) | |
Text
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[6' * ?d0 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
7101 Nconsin Avenue Washington. D C 20014 Telephone. (301) 654-9260 Cabie-Atomforum Washingtondc George D. Russ, Jr.
Editorial Projects Manager Aprfl 9, 1979 Mr. Robert Bernero Assistant Director for Material Safety Standards Of fice of Standards Development U.S. Nuclear Regul atory Commission Washington, D.C.
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Dear Bob:
Many thanks for the infor ation you furnished lasT week on decontamination and recovery procedures following a nuclear accident.
Enclosed is the ccmolete package of background articles we were able to assemble quickly, attempting to place the TMI situation in some perspective.
This kit is now being distributed to Congress, media, grass roots organiza-tions, our members and others.
Thanks again for your contribution.
Sincerely,
);#M y
GDR/dc
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Enclosure 93-3 290318o$$P1
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Three Mile Island Unit Two is a pressurized water reactor with a capacity of 850 megawatts electric. A system of this type consists of two separate water systems that meet in the steam generator. The water in one system does not mix with that in the other, but hear is transferred from the reactor system to the turbire-generator system.
Reactor Vessel <.
Steel-walled container housing reactor fuel core.
High Pressure Safety injection:
Emergency system designed to provide (A part of Emergency Core Cooling coolant to the reactor core in the System) event of a loss of coolant accident.
Pressurizer:
Vessel designed to control pressure level in reactor vessel and main cool-
=
ant system.
Relief Valve:
Designed to reduce energy frcm reactor coolant system during high pressure con-ditiens.
Reactor Coolant Pump:
Circulates water in the primary loop con-necting the reactor vessel, the preisurizer and the steam generator.
Steam Generator:
Where hot reacter water passes thrcugh tubes surrounded by water from turbine portion of plant heating it to make steam. Peactor water cooled and returned to reactor vessel.
Containment Building:
Structure of reinforced concrete, designed to isol3+a fission products from the environ-ment.
Turbine Generator:
The portion of the power plant where heat energy is converted to electrical energy.
Feedwater Pump:
Circulates non-radioactive water to the steam generator within containment from the turbine's condenser and back to the steam generator.
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump:
Sackup pumping system to provide feedwater for the turbine steam loop.
Condenser:
System to cool and return steain vapor to liquid state.
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.A Atomic Industrial Forum. Inc.
7101 Wisconsin Avenue Washington. O C. 20014 Telephone (301) 654-9260 Cable Atomforum WashingtondC
April 4, 1979/afteracon The following is our understanding of the sequence of events at the Three Mile Island incident as reported by the NRC Staff yesterday:
For purposes of this chronology, time "0" of the event is 4:00 a.m. on March 28, (Prior to time "0", between 3 and 4 a.m., maintenance was being performed on the feedwater system):
0 sec:
Lost feedwater and condensate pump; turbine tripped; 3-6 sec:
Pressurizer relief valve (RV) opened at 2250 psi; 9-12 sec: Reactor trip at 2355 psi; 15 sec: Reactor pressure = 2200 psi; 16 sec: Reactor outlet (hot leg) temperature = 611' F; reactor pressure =
2150 psi; 30 sec: All 3 emergency steam generator feedpumps (EFP) running at pressure, but no flow established -- discharge valves were closed; 60 sec:
Pressurizer level rising rapidly; steam generator levels low; 2 minutes: ECCS High Pressure Injection System (HPI) actuated at 1600 psi; 4 min. 30 sec: One HPI pump manually shut off; 6 min. : Reactor coolant pressure = 1300 psi; 7 min. 30 sec: Reactor building sump pump came on automatically (discharging water into auxiliary building tanks outside containment);
8 min: EFW flow established when valves are opened manually; 8 min. 15 sec:
Steam generator "B" at lowest level; 8 min. 21 sec:
Steam generator "A" reaches lowest level; 10 min. 10 sec:
Second HPI pump turned off manually; 11 - 12 min: Makeup pump started by operator (we interpret this to mean that the remaining HPI pump was placed in its normal Makeup and Purification System mode, ie.
supplying a small controlled flow to the reactor system) at this same period, the pressurizer level was back on scale; 15 min: Reactor drain tank (the tank to which the pressurizer relieved for quenching) rupture disk released at 190 psi; 20 - 60 min: Operators attempting stabilize reactor coolant system at pressure = 1015 psi, reactor outiu temperature = 550' F; 1 hr. 15 min: Both reactor main coolant pumps in loop "B" tripped off by operator; I hr. 40 min: Both reactor main coolant pumps in loop A tripped off by operator; 1 hr. 45 min.- 2 hrs: Reactor coolant begins a heat up transient, reactor inlet temperature 150 F, reactor outlet temperature = 620' F; 2 hr. 18 min:
Pressurizer RV isolated (by block valve before the RV);
2 hr. 30 min:
Reactor pressure dropped to 700 psi; 3 hr: Reactor pressure increases to 2l00 psi; 3 hr.15 min:
Reactor coolant drain tank indicates a 5 psi ' pressure spike; 3 hr. 48 min:
Reactor cuolant drain tank indicates an 11 psi spike, reactor coolant pressure = 1750 psi; containment pressure indicates rapid increase frcm 1 to 3 psi; 5 hrs:
Containment pressure reaches 4.5 psi and containment isolation actuated at 4 psi setting; 5 - 6 hrs:
Reactor pressure ranges from 1250 - 2100 psi, large temperature difference noted between inlet and outlet of reactor; 7 hr. 30 min: Operator opens block valve to pressurizer RV and initiates HPI; 8 - 9 hrs:
Reactor pressure falls to 500 psi; core flooding tanks (passive accumulators connected to reactor vessel) partially discharged; 10 hrs:
Pressure spike of 28 psi indicated in the containment; Reactor il9 q.-
Building (containment) Spray System actuated and sprays 5000 gallons of Na0H solution into the containment; llh 2b]
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13 hrs. 30 min:
Pressurizer RV shut (we iaterpret this to mean the block valve before the RV); main reactor coolant pump 1-A started; 13 hrs. 30 min. - 16 hrs:
Reactor pressure ranges from 650 psi to 2200 - 2300 psi; 16 hrs:
Reactor coolant inlet temperature = 400' F, outlet temperature = 560" F, cooling of reactor coolant established through use of Steam Generator A.
119 263
50 '32 C April 5, 1979 RADIATION LEVELS AT THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR PLANT Radiation levels above normal background have been detected out-side the Three Mile Island nuclear plant as a result of the incident that occurred there last week.
Radiation measurements have been taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a number of other agencies.
The NRC reports that the maximum potential cumulative dose which the most exposed individual might have re-ceived over the last five day period is 80 millirems (mrem) which is about the dose one would receive from two chest x-rays.
(A millirem is one-thousandth of a rem which is a measure of biological response to a certain quantity of radiation.)
According to HEW Secretary Joseph Califano, the average cumulative dose to individuals within a 50-mile radius is slightly less than 1 mrem.
Califano has stated that he would expect to find no ad-ditional cancers as a result of this low level.
The natural background radiation for the area around Middletown is estimated at about 100 mrem per year.
Background radiation in the U.S.
can be 165 millirem or more in higher elevations such as Denver.
The type of radiation which has been emitted during the Three Mile Island incident has been primarily from noble gases, largely xenon.
Noble gases do not interact with the body chemically or biologically and cause exposure by direct radiation from a passing cloud of gas.
After cloud passage, the radiation does not persist in the area and therefore does not continue to expose those in the vicinity.
In addition, the radioactivity is reduced during its movement through the air because of dilution and by radioactive decay.
Following extensive sanplings by the FDA and NRC, small traces of radiciodine have been detected in milk offsite.
Samples showed concentration levels of about 10 to 20 picocuries per liter, with a reported peak of 31 picocuries.
FDA " action levels" begin at 12,000 picocuries per liter.
The FDA has stated that there has been no risk to the area's food or drinking water.
Although iodine levels need to be monitored closely, the iodine half-life is only eight days and therefore should be declining due to radioactive decay.
Radiation in the Three Mile Island containment building shortly after the incident was detected as high as 30,000 rem per hour.
Although these levels are quite high, they have had no effect on the general population since the radiation has been contained.
Radiation readings just outside of the containment dome have only been 1 to 5 mrem per hour.
119 264
50 -32(:
EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAP ACCIDENT RECOVERY Although the safety record of nuclear energy is without parallel in the development of industrial technology, several accidents have occurred resulting in significant radioactive contamination outside the primary reactor system due to failure or malting of fuel in the reactor core.
In no case did an injury or fatality re,sult among the public.
Extensive investigation and recovery operations followed these incidents.
As well as increasing the safety of subsequent generation reactors, this experience has provided the nuclear community with detailed data on de-contamination and restora7 ion of plant operations.
The accidents described below took Dlace at nrototype, test and demonstra-tion f acilities and at military production reactors in several countries.
Accident sequences, accordingly, are not directly relevant to nuclear cower plants of current design. However, fission products released from any source cresent similar problems in cleanuo. This experience, there-fore, does olace in perspective the methods and times that most likely would be required for decontamination and reccvery following accidents at present facilities.
--During an ex eriment on December 12, 1952, the 30 MWe research and test NRX reactor, light-water cooled and heavy-water moderated, at Chalk Piver, Canada, experienced a failure of mechanical safety devices. The nuclear excursion resulting melted cart of the fuel in the core, burst scme of the coolent tubes and severely damaged the reactor vessel.
Acoroximately one million gallons of water carrying some 10,000 curies of fission products flooded the basement of the reactor building.
Some ecicactive material was released to the envircnnent.
No exposure of the public to levels of radiation above protection standards occurred.
After initial salvage operations, the vessel and its emaining centents were packaged and carried away for burial. Auxiliary equipment was decon-taminated dithin 14 months, the reactor was returned to operation with a new fuel core and vessel installed.
--On October 7, 1957, at the Wi ndsca le ai r-cooled, craphi te-moderated plutonium production reactor in England, temperature was permitted to rise too rapidly, resulting in the failure of some fuel cladding. The exoosed metallic uranium fuel oxidized rapidly and caught fire, releasing large amcunts of radioactive material.
"ost solid tission products were captured by filters in the distnarge stack, so that excessive radiation levels did not result from external exposurs However, coproximately 20,000 curies of lodine-131 were trans-ported througn +P.; atmosphere directly to animal feed in sections of land downwind from the plant Throuah selective untake of radiciodine by doiry 119 265
cattle, mi's subsequently was contaminated. Distribution of milk was suspended over a total area of 200 square miles. Within the rectricted area, use of milk by the population was prohibited for 25 days; in the most contaminated areas, for 44 days.
Except for this confiscation, no other environmental action was required.
The U.K. Medica! Desearch Council concluded that "it is in the highest degree unlikely that any harm has been done to the health of anybcdy, whether a worker in the Windscale plant or a member of the gereral public."
--Located at the National Reactor Testing Staticn in Idaho, SL-1 was a 200 P.We direct cycle boiling water prototype facility operated for the r ' ', ; ta ry. On January 3,1961, while the reactor was shut down for main-tecance and modification of the core, a nuclear excursion took place wher, the central control rod was suddenly and manually withdrawn. The resu. ting generation of heat..;elted part of the fuel in the core and pro;uced a pressure surge which dislocated the reactor vessel.
Three technicians working on the reactor were killed bv effects of the ble i Radiation levels in the reactor rocm read frcm 500 to 1,000 Roentgens per hour.
Even'though the shed housing the reactor was not de-signed for vapor containment, cnly small amounts of fission products escaped the building. At the boundary of the three-acre site, levels were within radiation protection standards.
On May 23, 1961, recovery operations, involving re ote control and direct access, got under way tc dismantle the reactor vessel and core and to remove large pieces of contaminated equipment and debris.
Subse-quently, the reactor building was razed, service buildings and work areas decontaminated. On June 22, 1962---18 months after the incident---the site was available for future utilization.
--Enrico Fermi 1 was a 61 MWe liquid metal fasr breeder reactor located near Yonroe, M: higan. On October 5, 1966, two fuel assemblies were partially melted as the result of coolant ficw blockage.
Surveys indicated the highee^ radiation level was 9 millirems oer hour at the outside surface of tne reacter building. The incident caused no hazard to public bn '
7, or safety, in December 1966, recovery becan with removal of all fuel assemblies, draining of coolant for inspection of the pressure vessel and recair or removal of damaged equipment. On J uly 18, 1970, the unit resumed opera-tion with a new core.
Subsequently, cwners of the facility decided, for economic reasons, not to embark on a further demonstration program.
In Dece-car 1975. decom-missioning of the plant was complete.
Later, its turbine-generator, coupled to a fossil-fired boiler, was used for peaking power.
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According to a preliminary assessment of the situation at Three Mile Island, unit number 2 could be decontaminated and returned to operation within one to two years, Some current technologies and procedures which apply:
---Primary coolant system-lon exchangers coupled to the primary coolant system wculd demineralize the inventory of noroximately 80,000 gallons. Capacity of this procedure is about 25 gallc u er minute.
As a further step, the water could be treated wi th polyure.
.e fonnaldehyde to recover and package it as a solid.
---Con t a i nme n t-sp ray systems would be activated to scrub off radioactive materials deposited on the liners.
Sodium thiosulfate added to the spray would rencve fission product Iodine f rom the containrent atmosphere.
Krypton could be removed by crycgenic distillation for separation as a liquid or by fluorocarbon absorption.
Xenon-133, the primary noble gas present, has a hal f-li f e of 5.29 days.
---Sump-some 200,000 gallons of conteninated water on the containment floor could be pumped to normal liquid radwaste systems in the auxiliary building. After deionization, i t could be recycled back to the containment sprsy system.
Following these procedures and eventual entry to the containment, operations could begin to remove the reactor vessel head. With no indication of vessel Jistortion, this procedure is expected to be carried out with existing equipment.
Vacuuming out of cladding and othor debris is made easier by the retailvely,large and simple gecretry of the primary coolant system.
SpeClal tooling, however, might be required to 9xtract the damaged fuel assemblies.
119 267
[C - 3.^C NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND THREE MILE ISLAND Just one day af ter the incident at Three Mile Island Unit #2, a team f rom American Nuclear insurers established a claims office in the area to begin making disbursals. As of Acril 3rd, $200,000 had been paid out to defray costs associated with relocation of families having pregnant women and/or pre-school children. A total of $560 million in nuclear liability insurance is available for such cialms.
The $560 million available is provided for through the Price-Anderson Act, first passed by the Congress in 1957. Price-Anderson requires that uti l i-ties operating large power reactors maintain financial protection equal to the maximum amount of liability insurance available from the private market.
Today, that amount is $140 million.* This coverage is provided oy American Nuclear insurers, representing groups of private companies, pledging assets which exceed the available resources of a single member.
Should claims resulting from a nuclear accident exceed this primary capacity of $140 million, the insurance pools would assess each nuclear plant licensee a premium of up to $5 million par operating reactor. WITh the numoer of commercial nuclear generating units now licensed, an additional $335 million would be available through these retrospective premiums. The final $85 million would be available from government indemnification, as provided for in the Price-Anderson Act, until enough additional plants are licensed that licensees have total responsibility for the $560 million. Then, as additional plants are licensed to opera'e, the $560 million now available will increase in
$5 million increments beyond the present limit.
Beyond this, Congress has indicated its intention to take whatever additional steps may De considered fair to compensate the public in the event a nuclear accident results in losses exceeding the funds available from both private insurance and federal Indemnity, if the Three Mile Island accident had been classified an " extraordinary nuclear occurrence," additional and extraordinary public protection features, such as waiver of defenses, would have f acilitated payment of claims. The NRC did not find suf ficient rediation release for making that designation.
Although damages to the Three Mile Island plant itself have yet to be computed, the f acility is cover ed by $300 million in property damage insurance.
- Shortly to rise to $160 million 9
263
5C-32C AIF PRESICENT CARL WALSKE ISSUED THE FOLLOWING CCMMENT ON THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT:
The accident at Three Mile Island is +he most serious in 25 years of commercial reactor operation.
It has been traumatic for the public, the utility that owns the plant and for those of us in the nuclear industry. We deeply regret the anxiety and inconvenience that it has caused, but we are also thankful that no one was killed or injured.
Although we take no pride in this accident, we shall learn many valuable lessons from it.
Nuclear power in the future wili be made even safer. The first order of business will te to investigate thoroughly every aspect of the accident, and to sort out for the public not just what happened but also the many dire things that did not happen. New operating procedures and additional reactor safeguards may be needed, and if so, the necessary changes will be made.
At the same tire, we al r eady know that, even in the face of this serious accident, the safety barriers designed and built into all nuclear plants did their job and restricted damage to the plant itself.
The public has been dramatically cortronted with the risk of nuclear power, but for them it rema i ns a potential -i sk The Three Mile Island accident must now be assimilated with the many rec! risks all around us.
The risks f rom nuclear cower remain srna l i relative to those f rom other available energy sources. Nbst importantly, the public must also appreciate the benefits of nuclear power. Wnen both sides of the nuclear question are weighed, I am confident that the public will want to continue to use an energy source that already supplies 14 percent of our electricity nationwide, and as much as 60 cercent in several industrial regions of the country.
Reactors under construction will have twice again the capacity of those in operation.
In making their choice, the public should also know that, even after we conserve to the utmost, we have only three real options when it comes to future electric power supplies:
coal, nuclear energy and shortages.
Coal has its own problems, and will do well to carry the additional burden now projected for it.
Nuclear energy--even wi th a l l its problems--is coming on f ast, and in the next tnree years alone will expand our nuclear electric capacity by 60 perceat.
The third option--Dower shortages--will surely be upon us unless we continue to employ both coal ar.d nuclear energy.
1iO
'O l 4tomi s trial Forum. inc.
ApriI 6, I979 7101 Wisconsin Ave' ue Washington. O C 20014
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Telephone 13011654-9260 Cable Atomfor m Washingtonde u
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NL' dAR REACTOR INFORMATION ?EPORT:
CURRENT TO MARCH 14, 1979*
72 WITH OPERATING LICENSE 3 92 WITH CCNSTRUCTICN PERMITS 4 WITH LIMITED WCRK AUTHORIZATION; 30 CN ORDER 198 TOTAL
- As of December 31, 1978, U.S. commercial nuclear reactors accumulated 463 years of operating experience.
- As of December 31, 1978, accounted for 9.7% of the total U.S. electric generating capacity.
In actual generation, nuclear power produced nearly 12.6% of the total U.S. electric output in 1978.
10 YEAR PROF;LE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UNITED STATES ADDITIONS' CUMULATIVE NUCLEAR
NUCLEAR NUCLEAR U.S. ELECTRIC,
OF TOTAL Y EAR PLANTS NNe PLANTS MWe CAPACITY (MWe)'
CAPACITY 1978 3
2,613 72 52,396 537,487 9.7%
1979 7
7,610 79 60,006 562,378 10.7%
1980 10 10,237 89 70,243 589,164 11.9%
1981 12 13,486 101 83,729 617,298 13.6%
1982 ll 12,025 112 95,754 647,256 14.8%
1983 ll 12,229 123 107,983 680,608 15.9%
1984 18 19,633 141 127,616 708,373 18.0%
1985 10 ll,791 151 139,407 743,373 18.8%
1986 12 12,823 163 152,230 773,946 19.7%
1987 9
10,099 172 162,329 803,482 20.2%
1988 10 11,417 182 173,746 851,344 20.4%
l.
Source: Atomic industrial Forum - based on current commitments as shown in the 1978 year-end report.
2.
Source:
National Electric Rel iabil ity Counci l.
oA 1,000,000-kilowatt power plant needs about 30 tons of uranium f uel per year.
A similar fossil plant burns 2.6 million tons of coal or 9.6 million barrels of oil.
oNuclear generation of electricity in 1977 offset the need for 440 million barrels of oil which would have cost $6 billion to import.
elf the nuclear kilowatt-hours generated in 1978 had been produced instead by oil, we would have had to double the oil normally imported per year f rom tran before the turmoil there cut off supplies.
119 270
' s NET ELECTRICAL ENERGY GENERATION
~
- MILLION KWHR --
1977 1977 PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NUCLEAR NUCLEAR 1977*
NUCLEAR 1978**
(1)
ECAR 371,343 23,600 6%
6%
(4)
ERCOT 136,060 0
0%
0%
(7) MAAC 158,423 32,064 20%
25%
(2) MAIN 162,624 37,424 23%
22%
(5) MARCA 90,594 25,741 28%
26%
(8) NPCC 191,319 46,130 24%
24%
(3)
SERC 444,128 73,047 i6%
18%
(6)
SPP 178,109 5,065 3%
5%
(9) WSCC 380,771 19,116 5%
5%
NERC 2,113,371 262,207 12%
13%
- Aciual nu-bers.
- Projected.
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SOURCE: National Electric Reliability Council 7101 W'sconsin Avenue Washington D C 20014 Telephone (301) 654-9260 Cable Atomforum Washingtonce
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