ML19220C760
| ML19220C760 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1974 |
| From: | Harold Denton US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905140193 | |
| Download: ML19220C760 (5) | |
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. ac re,.b sis t an t Dir::ctor for ign 4atar Aeactor.3, Group 1, a T331E HILE ISLAiD L.;II 2 Q-1 PLX!NKE: Lree Mile Island Crdt 2 LICL.?SLG STAGE: OL W Cd:,I aube.1: 50-320 EdF0tiSISLZ 53SiCH: LW2 2-2, B. W. Wasnburn, LFM S.'qUZS!i:.2 CGi!?LZTIC. D/J. '-.tugus t 2, l' 74 J
EE 'Ir4 STAI'JS: AAL Q.i Lotplete Enclosed is our Q-1 list for Three Mile Island L' nit 2.
This reviev van coordinated by Charles Ferrell, Sita Anal' s t, Accident Analysis Branen. It should be notad that the applicant bas not yet responded to Iten 12-3 of our acceptance review letter of March 15, 1974, regarding rail transportation accidanta near the site.
The Accident Analysia 3 ranch staff menbers who perforned enin review are:
SECTICN TITLE RIVII'JE1 2.0 Site C:aractaristics C. Ferrcll 2.1 Geograpny & Demography C. Ferrell 2.3 avaluations H. Fontec111a/
C. Ferrell 6.2 Centainwnt Syste:s W. Pasedag/
E. Adansan/
R. Zavadoszi 106 238 O F *tC. D Form AIC-31d i Re. 9 5 5 ) AICM 04 44 8"O C'8 7905110$
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W. ?asedagf C. Ferrell 00fm21S:gnedby IL R. Cacts Harold R. Denten, Assistant Director for Site Safety Directorate of 1.icensing Enclosura:
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Docket Files A. Giar.cusso AD/SS/L W. Phld L/RDG J. Panzarella AA3/RDG cc w/ enclosure:
S. Hanzuer H. Fontecilla F. Scaroeder W. Pasadag R. Soyd E. Adens a V. P. core K. Ca=pe R. DeYounS C. Ferrell i06 239 IR A/3's SS L/C's IR I/C's S. Wasnourn
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31-1 31.0 ACCIDEM i;ALYSIS 3PMCF.
31.1 Provide a list of the voluzes of regicas of the centain-(6.2.3) ment which are act dl;ectlj covered by the spray, and which have res.ricted corrunica icns with the =ain sprayed regien.
31.2 Descrfse :he tests to be perforced to verify that the (6.2.3) system, as installed, is capable of delivering the proper sixture of boric acid, thiosulf ate, and sodiu: hydroxide within the concentratica li=its specified in Sectica 6.2.3.1.
31.3 The respcase to Questien 12.4 was inadequate as it did not (6.2.3) address the request for us.for:atica relating to the air filtration syste=s.
List each engineered safety features (ESF) filtratica system. Tabulate each ESF filtraticn system with respect to each pcsitica in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (see 3ellefente Nuclear Plant PSAR Tables 6.2-2a, 9.4-2, 9.4-3).
Discuss each ite: of non-cc:pliance in detail. Any references to other parts of the docket cus; be specific and indicate page and paragraph.
31.a Esticate the gaan. dosa rates to control roc: cperators due (6.2.3) to iodine accumul.tien within r.he recirculatica charcoal filters. Express the dose rates un a per unit curie basis with respect to the iodines wi'.hin the charccal filters.
31.5 Identificatica shculd be 22de (see Regulatory Guide 1.78) of (6.2.3) toxic raterials (quan ities, nethod of storage, etc.), such as chlorine, that =ay be stored en c-in the vicinity of the site, which, assuntag a ec,ntainer ru ture, may interfere e
with control roca cperatica.
31.6 In the event of a chlorine release, the time period between (6.2.3) chlorine detecticn and a buildup of chierine concmatration within the control room to dangerous levels can be relatively short. Consequently, (see enclosure on chlorine protectica) it is necessary to have aute=atic actuation of an apprcpriate protecticn action for the ccatrol roca. As outlined in the enclosure, plants with a single f resh air inle: shculd have an au:ccatic centrol roco isolatica capability in conjunctica with a chlorine detector signal. Ccepare your plan: design agcinst the enclosed design recc :endaticas and provide us with the results of your review and a descriptica.cf any changes that may be necessary to achieve a degree of protecti:n equivalent to that which is described in the enclosure.
106 240
t PROVISIONS FOR ADECUATE PECTECTION AGAINST A C1'LORINE RE'.EME Adequate protection of the control rocs against an on-site chlorine : elease will be achieved if provisions are included in the plant design to isolate the control room auto =atically to limit the potential build-up of chlorine within the control room, and if equip:ent and procedures are provided to assure i==ediate use of breathing apparatus by the control room operators. Similar precauticas would help sitigate consequences of =ost postulated toxic gas releases.
To accocplish the auta=atic isolation quick-response chlorine detectors should be located in the fresh air inlets to the control room. These detectors should be able to detect and signal a chlorine concentration of 5 pp= cr less. The detectors should cause isolation of the control roc = wi.in 10 seconds after arrival of the ehlorine. Detectors should be provided at the control roc = fresh air inlet for all plants that have stcrage facilities that =ight acefdently release a total of 500 pcunds of chlorine. Additional detectors should be provided at chlorine storage locations that are.less than 100 eters froa the control toc = or that may release core than 3 tons of chlorine as a result of any postulated accident. These detectors should be placed, and the detector trip point adjusted, so as to assure detection of a leak or a container rupture. Detector trip signals should initiate auto =atic isolation of the control room and provide an audible alars to the operators. The =eans used to iniui=te aute=atic isolation should seet single active failure and seismic criteria.
Adequate isolation requires all openings to the control room to have icw leakage characteristics. This would include doors, da=pers, and penetrations. Total infilt ation into the isolated control room should be less than 100 cf:* assuming a 1/8" water gage pressure differential across all openings and the =axi=um operating differential across the isolation dampers upstreas of recirculating fans. This leakage limit should be reduced to 25 cfs* if chlorine storage is within 100 =eters of the control rcce of if ecre than 3 tons of chlorine can be released as a result of any postulated accident. Normal fresh air
=ake-up should be limited to no : ore than 1 air change per hour.
An administrative procedure shculd provide all doors leading to the control room be kept closed when not in use.
- These leakage rates are based on a control roco volume of 100,C00 cubic feet and thus should be adjusted as directly proportional to actual centrol roc = volu=e.
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Control rocm isolation should be followed i==ediately by the start-up and operation of the emergency recirculating charcoal filter or equivalen equipment designed to remove or otherwise limit the accuculation of contamination within the control roca.
Under certain meteorological conditions control roca isolation may not be sufficient by itself to limit chlorine concentrations to levels belov those which cause physical disec= fort or disability.
Therefore, the use of self-contained breathing apparatus should be considered.when develeping a chlorine release e=ergency plan.
Since calculations indicate that rapid increases in chlorine concentrations are possible, amergency plan provisions and rehearsal of these provisions for immediate donning of breathing apparatus on detection of chlorine release are necessary.
Storage provisic as for breathing apparatus and procedures for use should be such that operators can begin using the apparatus uithin two minutes af ter an alar.:.
Donning of breathing apparatus should be =andato ar prior to the determination of the cause of an alarm.
A toxic environ =ent cay be present for several days or longer if a chlorine leak cannot be fixed or the leaking container removed..
In any event, adequate bottled air capacity (at least six hours) should be readily available on-site to assure that sufficient time is available to locate and transport ;ottled air from off-site locations. This off-site supply should be capable of deliverino, several hundred hours of bottled air to the me=bers of the crergency crew.
Isolation and air supply equipment relied on should acconnodate a single failure of an active component and still perform the recuired function.
(In the case of self-contained breathing apparatus this may be acco:plished by supplying one extra unit for every three units required.)
Protection requirements for plants located nearby other facilities that store significant quantities of chlorine or plants located nearby =ajor chlorine transportation routes vill be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly plants having storage facilities that night accidentally release a total of SCO pounds of chlorine or less will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to deter-nine need fcc protection against accidental release.
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