ML19220C709
| ML19220C709 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Hart G SENATE |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220C706 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0087, ACRS-SM-87, NUDOCS 7905140061 | |
| Download: ML19220C709 (2) | |
Text
. )F SEN. GAR Y HART, D-COLO.,...
NEWS RELEASE For Immediate Release:
Contact:
Kathy Bushkin April 23, 1979 202/224-5852 9:30 a.m.
OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GARY HART CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR REGULATION HEARING ON THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT APRIL 23, 1979 I
Today's hearing is the second in our special investiga-tion and study of the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
We are still learning about how the accident occurred and what that will mean to the future of nuclear pcwer. As we now look back on it, however, one clear lesscn alre:dy stands out.
Until the accident occurred, the nuclear debate was largely a dialogue of the deaf.
Zealous supporters and opponents of nuclear power argued incessantly for years with-out persuading each other--while confusing the public with com-plicated jargon and technical arguments. As a result, most Americans had throsn up their hands, counted themselves out of the debate and hoped for the best.
Three Mile Island has changed all of that.
The American people are now deeply concerned and demand
> to be informed so they can understand and evaluate the pros
- and cons, the benefits and risks, of nuclear power.
As whairman of this Subcommittee, I an determined to reduce the confusion and involve the public in the nuclear debate.
In this sense, Three Mile Island is an opportunity that should not be lost.
Both the security of our nation and the health and saf ety of our people are at stake.
The purpose of today's hearing is to explore four critical elements of the accident:
1.
What caused the accident, and in particular, why plant operators shut two valves which crippled a major safety system in the plant.
2.
The state's preparedness for an evacuation and the Governor's decision not to order one.
3.
Evidence that tne Three Mile Island Plant is so heavily contaminated with long-lived radioactive materials that it will be impossible to salvage.
4.
The financial fallout of the Three Mile Island accident -- specifically the issues of whether the rate-payers should bear the cost of the act ident or whether the utility should bear the burden and risk bankruptcy.
What we hava seen thus far in sorting out the events of Three Mile Islant is a crisis of institutional response to the emergency. We have also seen a crisis of technology in the failure to prevent and effectively respond to an accident that was supposed to be so implausible as to be virtually impo s sible. And finally, we now see a financial crisis, since an investment ef nearly $1 billion may have to be written off as a total loss, and it is not yet certain who should pay the cost of this loss.
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The crisis of institutional response has already been explored at one hearing. Two weeks ago we received testimony from members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and we have subsequently read transcripts of their closed sessions during the height of the crisis. They raise the question of why the Commission was unprepared to respond swiftly and effectively to a potential catastrophe.
We have before us a Governor who was required to provide another kind of institutional response. Governor Thornburgh had to make a decision on evacuation after a hydrogen bubble was discovered in the reactor vessel and a release of radio-active gas was detected above the crippled plant.
Yet, the information available to him from the members and top techni-cal staff of the NRC was sometimes confused and conflicting.
I The Governor made a difficult and potentially very risky decision -- not to order an evacuation. We would like to explore with him, with the obvious advantage of hindsight, the basis for that decision and the lessons he learned which might be useful to other Governors in the event of future nuclear accidents.
The technological crisis has been just as serious. The first important techno?ogical question we will explore is why I
the two valves which blocked the main feedwater pumps from coming into operation at the beginning of the accident were shut.
We need to determine if shutting these valves was a serious violation of NRC regulations because it crippled a principal safety systen, and how it can be avoided in the future.
Another key technical issue is the extent to which operator error was triggered by design defects. The mysterious appearance and disappearance of the hydrogen bubble is a case in point.
If, in fact, the bubble had not been anticipated, we are confronted with a major breakdown in the design and operation of nuclear power plants. The hydrogen couldn't be vented from the reactor vessel because there was no relief valve for this purpose.
And, there was no instrumentation to
'. permit the reading of the water level inside the reactor. Both of these shortcomings apparently made it impossible to shut down the reactor safely.
It is also still unclear whether this accident could have been prevented if the utility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had heeded early warning signals in the form of mechanical difficulties encountered in the frequent shutdowns of this plant and others of similar design.
Finally, we want to explore the issue of who will pay for the accident. This will not be an easy issue, but it is critical to the future of both nuclear power and the utility industry.
The utility has warned it may be forced into bankruptcy if a large share of the cost is not passed en to its ratepayers.
But the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission has suspended a proposed rate increase until it can determine who is to blame for the accident and what the economic impact will be for Metropolitan Edison and its custcmers. The basic issue is whether private investors or the general public should pay l
the cost of nuclear industrial errors.
All of these iscues have a direct bearing on the future regulation of nuclear powar -- in f act, on the future of nuclear power itself.
Nuclear power can have a future only if the peopic are confident it is being safely regulated.
Congress has an essential role to play.
In fact, Congress must share in the blame for the degree to which the public has been ill-informed about nuclear ener gy and kept out of the nuclear debate. For too long, the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy monopclired nuclear issues and limited close public scrutiny of civilian as well as military nuclear questions. This Subcommittee, which inherited the Joint Committee's civilian jurisdiction, will make open and public dialogue on this issue one of itu highest priorities.
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