ML19220C705
| ML19220C705 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/23/1979 |
| From: | Dante Johnson NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19220C706 | List: |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0087, ACRS-SM-87, NUDOCS 7905140054 | |
| Download: ML19220C705 (8) | |
Text
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.y ca s sapcm wpn 23 APRIL 1979 D.H. Johnson OBSERVATIONS MADE AT MEETING OF SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR REGULATION, COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS CONCERNING THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT Senators Present: Hart ( Chairman)
Simpson Baker Domenici Ra..dolph Schweiker (to Introduce Gov. Tho rnb urgh) 1.
OPENING STATEMENTS 1.
Hart (see attached statement)
- purpose of hearing:
a.
What caused the accident, and in particular, why plant operators shut two valves which crippled a major safety system in the plant.
b.
The state's preparedness for an evacuation and the Gove rnor's decision not to order one.
c.
Evidence that the Three Mile Island Plant is so heavily contaminated with lor 3-lived radioactive materials that it will be impossible to salvage.
d.
Ihe financial f allout of the Three Mlle Island Accident specifically the issues of whether the ratepayers should bear the cost of the accident or whether the utility should bear the burden and risk bankruptcy.
- why was NRC unprepared to handle the emergency?
- was the information from NRC to Gov. Thornburgh adequate?
7905140054 i,i, M 101 1/4
/
p i
e THREE MILE ISLAND 2.
Simpson the role of NRC in accident condition unclear was training of plant personnel adequate?
lack of engineering backup at site on part of utility noted did the operator have adequate information available to him?
has NRC focused too much on severe events and not on more likely events such as INI can decign defects be identified that *ere not detected by NFC how affective is NRC I&E's program (did inspectors miss closed valves during inspection two days prior to accident?)
questioned accuracy and timeliness of information flow between utility and NRC is there a clear chain of co= mand within utility? who is accountable?
questioned ability of state and federal of ficials to p ro-vide emergency response. Is the structure of NRC such that it is capable to respond?
3.
Randolph referenced article in the Economist, "We All Live in Harrisburg" 4.
Domenici called situation " sloppy," e.g., initial communicaticas problem (telephone lines busy).
Industry and NRC should apply ingenuity and technology to solve proble=s as do groups involved in other technical endeavors.
are the laws governing NRC 04?
101 175
THREE MILE ISLAND -
are NRC's licensing and I&E procedures adequate?
5.
Bake r identifies himself as an "early enthusiastic advocate of nuclear power."
He will now reexamine commitment to nuclear power based on the deliberations of the subcommittee.
nuclear power is still an option this may not have been the case if a general panic in the TMI region had occurred (Gov. Thornburgh should be con = ended for his actions).
II.
RICHARD THORNBURGH - Governor of Pennsylvania (See attached Statemen t) primary problem during the incident was information gathering (the " integrity of the facts")... he described a " kaleidoscope of signals" to his of fice f rom the utility, the political establishment, the media and NRC.
NRC didn't have " factual integrity" until Denton arrived at the site.
Described some media reports as erroneous,
alarming and irresponsible ; however, some inf ormation f rom the media was put in perspective better than that stemming from
" responsible otficials."
specific information gathering problem was sifting hypothesis from fact.
primary request is that a person with nuclear engineering experience be present in all control rooms on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis. This person (s) should be licensed and may be either a utility employee, a federal employee, or consist of an array of engineers from both groups. Along these same lines the gove rnment should certify the management and technical staff of the utility to insure competence on their parts.
The importance of having an onsite technical expert is underscored by Denton's reassessment of the situation upon his arrival.
(In fact Thornburgh regards Denton's arrival as the turning point of the crisis). Succinctly, the problems can not be effectively coped with from Washington.
secondary requests involved better inspection and enforce-ment of standards a-d a better system of communications.
ordering evacuation constantly on his mind for ten day period.
Facts available to him never justified the personal injury.
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-4 such an evacuation would involve.
Felt confident that any change in the situation (e.g., continuing emission of radioactivity, growth of the hydrogen bubble, etc.) would involve low probability events and enough lead time to permit evacuation on short notice.
He noted that each hour that went by furthered the com-petency of the Pennsylvania Emergency Planning Agency,
the agency responsible for evacuation planning and implementation.
Would like NRC to specify evacuation goals.
101 1//
. III. Utiity Representatives panel consisting of Willian G. Kuhns - Chairman of Genera Public Utilities Corp.
(see attached statement)
Herman Dieckamp - President of General Public Utilities Corp.
(see attached statement)
Walter Creitz - President of Met Ed.
1.
Diekamp incident must mt be viewed solely as a managemen /
operator error, if this is done valuable information regarding safety in general will be lost. There needs to be further work done in the field of human engineering...
the coupling of man and machine... this will raise con-sciousness of equipment.
operators originally viewed event as normal plant tran-sient like they have seen before.
Current investigation involving operators involves deter-mining:
a) information available to operators b) training of operators c) operators' knowledge of plant system d) time responses of operators during event a clear delineation of responsibilities regarding inter-action with state authorities exists... emergency pro-cedures were implemerited as planned.
more sophisticated plant arrangements dictate increased surveillance which in turn increase the probability of a TMI-type ev3nt.
- basic design of plant at fault... fuel was never expected to get hot enough for metal / water reactions to occur.
water demand controller indicator / controls in CR had tag which may have obscured indicator lights for 1 of 2 aux feedwater block valves... specific timing of closure of valves not known plant computer had CRT capability for (immediate) specific cotput request.
101 178
too early for even a rough schedule for clean-up (or cost estimates). This will be determined partly by avail-ability of funding.
Guesstimate is 2-3 years to return to operation.
operator was able to monitor TC on outlet manifold of relief valve (he could tell ic was open regardless of indicator lights) 2.
Kuhns would like to have cost of incident shared by customers and investors.
Doesn't think stockholders could afford the tab; utilities would have to restructure stock archi-tecture if investors totally liable. Simpscn noted that a regulatory response (from the state public service com-mission) is needed to forstall bankruptcy.
" consequential costs due to equipnept outage"-type insurance not currently available. S300 x 10~ coverage for plant repair.
three or four licensed personnel in CR at time of accident:
2 operators 1 shift forman with senior license possibly 1 shift supervisor with senior license Hart pointed out that reactor first went critical approxi-mately 4:28 a.m., 28 March 78, one year to the hour of the accident. Kuhns assured Hart that the operators were alert at the time of the accident, not partying.
IV.
Panel consisting of Carl W lske - President of Atomic Industrial Forum a
(see attached statenent)
John Conway - President of American Nuclear Energy Council (see attached statement)
Michael Bancroft - Public Citizens Litigation Group (see attached statenent)
Anthony Roisman - Natural Resources Defense Council (see attached statenent) 1.
Walske
- overall safety will benefit from lessons learned from incident
- no one seriously injured;most serious incident in 25 years of connercial operation (Walske presented a " business as usual" image, in general) k0\\
Hart proposed that a federal (nuclear) engineer be in each control room to take over the reactor controls in the event of an emergency. He noted that the operators today are responsible to the utility management and the stock-holders; NRC employees are responsible for the health and safety of the public. Simpson did not agree with this proposal and pointed out that federal enployees do not fly commercial aircraft... the basic problen involves the completeness of the operator trainina.
2.
Bancroft NEC should utilize startup experience to identify generic problems.
NRC should require workable evacuation plans before licensing. (He noted that his group petitioned NRC unsuc-cessfully in 1975 to test evacuation plans).
NRC should calculate the maximum acceptable dose involved in cleanup / repair. Met-Ed should review these calcu-lations to determine whether these limits could be met, if not then TMI 2 should be motFb:alled.
a federal monitor should t:e in the CR while the plant is operating.
the limit to the liability of the Price Anderson Act should be repealed.
the utility realized a $40 x.10 tax benefit for starting commercial service 30 Dece-ter 78.
the incident at the Davis Besse plant was a dress rehear-sal for 'IMI 2.
feels the " defense-in-depth" philosophy of NRC is a sham, utilized to avoid problems.
dose calculations from the incident are impossible.
3 Conway support for nuclear power reaffirmed.
media spread alarmist stories frcm self-appointed experts.
4.
Roisman
'IMI 2 early warning signs not heeded; this was not an isolated event.
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- effect of low lt: vel radiation a current question; irrespons-ible to claim no additional cancers at this point.
- the event is not over; the reactor is not in a safe condition yet.
- NRDC, UCS, etc., not allowed to participate in decision making processes.
- abandon cleanup / repair plans if daily worker exposure is high.
- the 1954 decision to turn nuclear power over to the private sector should be rethought.
V.
Media reaction to hearing Copy of Washington Post article of 24 April 79 attached.
Please contact me if I can answer any questions, X 43283 Attachments:
As stated cc: ACRS Technical Staff ACRS Fellows ACRS Members jUl R1 3n<
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