ML19220C670
| ML19220C670 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1979 |
| From: | Shewmon P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Okrent D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-SM-0013, ACRS-SM-13, NUDOCS 7905140012 | |
| Download: ML19220C670 (2) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
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,/ q NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 3$g
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A' WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 April 18, 1979 TO:
Dave Ckrent, Chairman 'IT4I Consequences, Subcommittee FRO'4:
P. G. Shewmon SUPJCCT: FCCOMNDATIONS 'ID THE COMISSION I won't be able to attend the Monday of your meeting on 'Ii4I, so let me put some comments and questions ti writing.
I feel our response to the Ccmission has been too narrow.
I am not te" sanguine about the approa:.h I will characterize as "if we are just ciever enough and try hard enc. ugh we can design a plant which will cope with all accidents".
We shouid try, but shouldn't limit our interest to pushing for more ana.'yses cf how to recover degraded plants from potential accidents.
We have completely avoided any talk with the operators involved or their supervisors.
Since the operator will remain a vital factor in avoiding such t.ccidents, what do we plan to do about learning their perception of the accident, and getting into what should be done to strengthen that line of defense?
Are we in effect precluded from this by the need to hold public reetings on matters which may be litigated?
its time we heard from Met. Ed.
If not I think We've touched two aspects of aid to operators - how to get the operator clearer indications of plant statua, and clearer instructions on how to take a degraded plant into natural circulation cooling. These only address our perception of what we 'hink would have helped the operator.
I feel uneasy guessing at Uat a person's problems were.
Have we ever gotten into or..a m w in ' ng and examinations, e.g., what are the philosophy and goal-? Lho will be looking at that? hhen?
A second general area is how t.ie NRC organizes to respcnd to accidents.
It's probably just as well to let this go for a month or two, but not too much more.
They should be working on it, and we should ask and listen.
A part of the "respons"" question is the identification and organization of technical expertise.
A division cf this, yet indicative of a broader question is that of chemical expertise in the NRC.
I perceive it as a weakness that shows up in several areas.
It helped scare hell out of the 98 356 79051400lA s
4 D. Okrent April 18, 1979
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Country when they couldn't find anyone who knew how to ask or answer questions about recombination.
Ic shows up, in my experience, in weak-ness in their response to steam generator /condensor leak problems, crud buildup, and IGSCC/ water chemistry problems.
I suspect it in our treat-ment of containment spray additives, and Steve suspects it in their treatment of fission product filtering and/or fixation.
The fact that this weakness added gratuitously to the public scare over nuclear accidents seems to me more than enough reason to suggest to the Commission they look into it.
The argument that the Staf f realizes it and thus we shouldn't mention it, evades me.
I'm sure we can find members of the staff who realize 98 to 100% of the stuff we recommend, yet we recommend it, primarily to strengthen their hand and nudge the NRC in the direction we believe they should go.
98 357 r-s