ML19220C666
| ML19220C666 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/13/1979 |
| From: | Bryan S, Moseley N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| To: | Engelken R, Grier B, James Keppler, James O'Reilly, Seyfrit K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7905110413 | |
| Download: ML19220C666 (3) | |
Text
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j U"JiTED STATES 3K NUCt. EAR REGULATORY COMMISslON
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April 13,1979
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ME.".0RANDUM FOR:
B. H. Grier, Director, Region I J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Regicn II J. G. Keppler, Director, Regicn III K. V. Seyfrit, Director, Region IV R. H. Engelken, Director, Region V FR0it:
Norman C. Moseley, Direc+.or, Division of Reactor Operatiens Inspection, IE
SUBJECT:
IE Bulletin No.79-06B, REVIEW OF OPE?ATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT The subject Sulletin should be dispatched for action on April 14, 1979, to all Combustion Engineering designed pres ;urized water power reactcr facilities with an operating license.
Facilities with a construction permit, Ft. St. Vrain, BWR, Westinghouse and the S&W facilities with an operating license should receive the subject Sulletin for informatic only.
The text of the Bulletin and draft letters to licensees are enclosed for this purpose.
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Nnrman C. f*cseley, Di' rector Division of Reactor Operations Inspection Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Enclosure:
1.
Draft Transmittal Letter to Combustion Engineering plants 2.
Draft Transmittal Letter to Operating Licensees of Westinghouse, General Electric, E&W plants, Ft. St. Vrain and all Construction Fermit Holders 3.
IE Bulletin No. 79-068 CONTACT:
S. E. Bryan, IE 49-23019 7 905110N 9 g 29')
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(Draf t letterto all B&W, Westinghouse, and General Electric, power reactor facilities with an operating license and all power reactor facilities with a construction permit and Ft. St. Vrain.)
IE Bulletin No.79-06B Addressee:
Tne enclosed Bulletin No.79-06B, is forwarded to you for ir#ormation.
No written response is required.
If you desire additional information regarding tnis matter, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Signature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
(Draft letter to Combustion Engineering reactcr facilities with an operatinglicense.)
IE Sulietin No.79-065 Addressee:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No.79-06B, which requires action by you with regard to your Combustion Engineering designed pressurized water reactor facility (ies) with an operating license.
Based on our current understanding of the Three Mile Island accident sequence, and discussion with the designer of your pressurized water reactor, we have reason to believe that pressurizer level indication in your facility may not provide reliable information regarding level in the reactor coolant system under certain transient or accident conditions.
You should immediately instruct your operating personnel a'cco rdi ngly.
In addition you should consider this possibility in responding to the enclosed bulletin.
Should you have any cuestions regarding this Eulletin or the actions required by you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, Signature (Regional Director)
Enclosure:
UNITED STATES
?!UCLEAR REGULATORY CO:';iISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 April 14,1979 IE Bulletin No.79-06B REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT Description of Circumstances:
IE Bulletin 79-06 identified actions to be taken by the licensees of all pressurized water power reactors (except Babcock & Wilcox reactors) as a result of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident.
This Bulletin clarifies the acticns of Bulletin 79-06 for reactors designed by Combustion Engineering, and the response to this t'ulletin will eliminate the need to respond to Bulletin 79-06.
Actions to be :aken by Licensees:
For all Ccmbustion Engineering pressurized water reactor facilities with an' operating license (the actions specified below replace those identified in IE Bulletin 79-06 on an item by item basis):
1.
Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the,TMI-2 3/28/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
a.
This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the extrer.e seriousness and consequences of tne simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Un_it 2 plant and other actions taken during the early pnases of'the accident; (2) t.be apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core damage; (3) that the potential exists, under certain accident or transient conditions, to have a water level in the pressurizer simultaneously with the reactor vessel not full of water; and (4) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
b.
Operational personnel should be instructed to: (1) not override autcmatic action of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (see S r g #= i gd I'\\ yy gggg tional decisions based indication when one or DUPLICATE DOCUMENT available.
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