ML19220A849

Forwards 1977 Paper Preliminary Design of Containment to Withstand Core Melt for 1300 MW Electricity LWR Sys

ML19220A849
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/06/1979
From:	Stevenson J WOODWARD-CLYDE CONSULTANTS, INC.
To:	Hendrie J NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 7904250033
Download: ML19220A849 (11)

Text

s h Woodward-Clyde Consultants s".";ggn;f,g*="

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April 6, 1979 Dr. Joseph M. Hendrie Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

Dear Joe:

I am sure over the past two weeks you have had enough suggestions and recommendations to last you a lifetime.

By this letter, I want to burdca you with one more.

Normally I wouldn't bother you with a suggestion of this type, but I am surc in these extraordinary times, much of any redirection of safety research will be coming directly from the top of the Commission and the Staff Divisions.

Attached hereto please find the copy of a paper I presented in August, 1977 concerning the design of a containment system to resist core melt where I performed a preliminary cost and design evaluation of such a passive containment structure.

The idea was also submitted to the NRC Division of Reactor Safety Research in the form of an unsolicited proposal to develop the design in more detail where additional development ef fort would have been shared between my organization, Argonne National Laboratory which has donc considerable research in the effect of core melt on concrete and a major nuclear Architect-Engineer.

Of course, up until now, containment design to accommodate a core melt has not been considered a rational requirement.

Unfortunately, the recent 3 Mile Island e:-:perience may have changed that perception.

In any event, I would be happy to discuss my idea further with the NRC staff or resubmit my proposal if it is felt the idea has any merit.

Thank you for your attention.

Sincerely,

.53 C

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'Ys N N. x q:, w &

j'l Jonn I Stevenson ss

.TDS/ijz Enclosure cc:

Mr. Harold R.

Denton Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Re gulation 2,., E m er.m ercosa Mr. Saul Levine Director, Of fice of Nuclear Regulatory Research.L ra zm ro eca sc em _:s c..

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1 PRELD11 NARY DESIC,N OF A CONTAIN3 TENT TO hlTHSTAND CORE 31ELT L

FOR A 1300 31We LWR SYSTE31

• J.D. 3TEVENSON R

J D. Sresenson Considt:nts Din:iow. 4rthur G. McKee & Comp:ny,6:00 On Tree Bmdescel.

I (7eseland. Olrio 44131, USA i

I Received 28 October 1977 a

I This paper identifies several of tbc romble acaJent sequences inc!udig postulated reactor cure melt of sah low pro-f bability that tyricallight water reactor nuclear paa er a tions are not specifically designed to eniti. 2te their af fects. !! then klentifies a conceptasi design and presents a preiin. nary cost study for a passive contanment u stem designed ta mitigate the consequences of such low proNbhty acadent sequeners. The cenceptual containment design thus d rveloped appears to offer an economic alternative to underground winng or moie elaborate and redus ! ant emergency core cooling s> stems.

1: L Introduction containment design ba.

.s described in this paper.

j Ris paper will discuss, based on existin;; techno-1 in recent years there has beea such an increased bgy, the conceptual design and costing of a contain-

{ cencentration of attention and effort on the analysisment structure dets;ned to accommodate core melt,

, pcocedures required to evaluate design loads or, nu ! ear major component rupture and simultaneous primary

} power plant cotuainments, there is a tendency to lose and secondary sy stem blowdown.

3 si;ht of the nuclear pour plant system fadure modes it should be emphasi/ed that nothing in this paper f trat containments are not dest;ned to accommodate.

sh;uld be interpreted as implying that current contairi-1 Rose failures which containments are not des: ped ment and engineered safeguards design criteria is ina-I to accommodate are summarized in table 1. Largely l because containments are not designed to ritipte the I consequences of the failures shown in table 1, oser the WI i

Pc tutated failures or accidents nuclear power plant contain-years there has been a gradual growth m. tha num.c e r, m it structures are not design,.d to resist function, desica conservatism and redundancy of engi-l r:eered and administrathe saf: guards.~.nese safeguards

. tapr comronent rupture (i.e. reactor sessel, steam generator.

I are required to assure the postulated system fadures, pressunzer and whnt pamps),

h such as a loss of cool:nt accident leading to cor: melt l

or sessel or component rupture, wili not occur or they Simultancaus rupture of both primary coolant and secondary g

steam astems in PWR's.

reduce the probabihty of such an occurrence to an acceptably low value. In the author's opinion, this Simultaneous rupture at inore than one location Oe;;) of the growth of safeguard requirements has reached the primar> c%ian: 53 steen f point where it might be well from a cost ef fectise as well as a safety newpoint to review the basic cracria Ruptu:e of coolan: punip (b whccl.

bed in containment design and to consider alternate Cocarse of major component surrort.

Core melt sufficient to lose core coan: geometr> att recu: tine Invited Paper J1/l presented at the 4th InternationalCon-in mit.throu;S of the textor sewel(e.g. sur:4. ant failare ference on Structural \\lechanies in Reactor Techn A. ().

of Se core coobn; sy stem).

3 San Francisco,Cahfornia,15-19 August IS 1 70-313 1

x<,

e s_.

r L$8 J.D. Steven:an / Contamment to wthst.:nd core md: fur a 13C0.11We f.WR sy stem dquate. What is offered herein is an alternati.c con-loped which would permit complete flooding of the t:unment system wi h more emphasis placed on the reactor coolant compartment [3]. Howeser, to date, t

containment physical structure as the prunary safe-no LWR nut! ear power plant in the wor!d has been guard rather than material and non-destructive exami.

designed and budt with such adJition21 engineered nation and redundant emergency core cooling system safeguards not are any planned at this time.

technology. ilowever, the alternate containment design proposed herein coupled together with existing core cooling sy stems and engineered safeguards might be

3. He concept considered as an alternative to underground or applic-able to metropolitan siting.

In fig.1 is shown the conceptual design of a con-rainment structure designed to resist those postulated failures listed in table I not currently considered in

2. !!istorical development of containment system design containment design. In developing this conceptual requirements desi n, the material contained in refs. [4] and [5] was reviewed for app!icability to develop input design The current design basis for LWR containment as parame ers. Once these input design parameters were developed in IAEA and ISO requirements which was defined as shown in table 2, the containment structure e>tablisheJ in the early 1960's is the postulated double was sized and designed in accordance with the require.

ended rupture at a single location or within a single leg ments of CC 3000 of ACI-359 [6]. It should be unde-of the largest reactor coolant pipe.The containment stood the design basis defined in t'ble 2 was bsed on is designed to accommodate the prompt pressurizacion a review of the current literature as applicable. No of the containment due to the release into the contain.

attempt was made within the limited scope of this ment through the postulated break of the core coolant effort to develop a detailed design of the containment inventory. In addition, some carry oser heat transfer structure based on basic detailed NSSS and site depen-from the secondary steam system in PWR's is included.

dent input data and detailed calcu!stion. It is hoped As a result of the postulated break, the reactor is shut that interest in the apparent advantag s of the pasci.e down and a number of emergency core cooling systems containment system desenbed herein may promote are activated which are designed to Good the core ini-the funding of such a detaded effort in the near future. I tially wah cold water and to recirculate water collec.

In 0;. 2 is shown an alternate cont'inment struc 3

I ted in the containment sump into the core to keep the tural system which con;eptually at least would permit Me 2 core from melting as a result of residual or decay heat the climination of conventional containment 2.d P.

generation.

heat removal systems in fasor of an externally coo!ed f

[#""2in-Acting in conjunction with containment cooling radiator. In this concept the containment atmosphere 3 D%rar s ar l

!. Prept pressuritar systems. the emergency core cooling systems are within the primary prestressed concrete containment designed to maintain the abdity to cool the core and would be circulated to a steel shellir.termediate radia.

to keep the containment design pressurcs and tempera.

tor contlinment through pressure relief vahes where tures within the irjtial pressure and temperature bui!d.

external water spray would cool and condense the up for an indefinite period of time while operating on containment sapers. Surrounding the steel intermeic

' D% rresurirat emergency as well as conventional power sources to containmen; wou!d be a more or less conventional M l the plant.

logical shield and ensironmental protection concrete in the past, additional safeguards and more stringent shie!d structure-1 design bases commonly associated with more metropo-

}

litan siting have been contemplated for some specific nuclear power plants which included a core catcher to

4. Design features j

accommodate a postulated core melt [l] or a guard 1.1. De conninment vessel to accommodate postulated major component i

or reactor vessel rupture [2]. There also has been pro-De passive containment internal structural ddf f

posed a passive emergency core cooling system deve-above the reactor coolant compartment floor as sh C l

j

~ rirenure f

o kf' W rature l

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l J D. Stevenan lCantm mer:t to m alarand care melt for a 1.100 Mh? L Wl: n uc'n 159 e

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,is conceptuai c

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input design hj'_d y parameters were 40 "e 5[t

(',n. f.*_Q ainment stracture 9

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' wi:h the require

% sy 3,,.,a s,,a N *'E ^' ' M S' 5 *"

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scope of this M FT s

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CC'.T A,NaNG B A3 AL Tic, aCCK IC t COntair'meitt l

[l oa or e a toc. ciascun iS and site depen.

on. It is hoped

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- m rm us of the pas 3ive Qu_i. n".fwzg 3

5.AJN may promote y

YtNoeN cattan,gs N"

in th.: near future.

'ainment 5:ruc.

Fig.1. Passive containment structure usirg ~ensentional containment coetin; sy stemt ait wou'd perimt Me 2

.nment acudent PWR passive containtnent system design par 2me'ers sternally coold lent atmosphere Design parameter Cause C2:culated value te containtnent ermediate radia.

1. Prompt oressurization Simultaneous blowdown of prirmry 105 psi

' " ' "" d 5 "d ' Y 5'

ef vaives where system in 2 PWR.

ondense the steel intermediate

2. Delayed pressurization Vaporization of water by meiltant

ons entional bio.

cor after vessel rupture, ction co;; crete including (2) water in reactor cavity 95 psi S) water of cryst 2hzaten frorn concrete 5 psi (c) hydrogen from zirconium-vrater reactors 5 psi (d)CO ginerated from concrete 45 psi 2

Total 150 psi ructura' lesign

+;03 Design rmtgin 30 psi 11000r as shown Design pressure ISO psi Design temperatu.e 3 ; S* F F

3-pjt-

.s d

,. r -

160 J.D Sinenwn / Cont. wient to wuthst.inJ core melt f>r a 13C0 MWe LWR system The containt 17 compa rtmen t il

rnas sozztts to rac.,os co rw. ussr port slab is spac A

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cootiNG tainment design N,

space for fluid a e

si in conts:nment.

>N ponents current:

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j bu:.,u,mg w hich r

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f. Pot AR CR aNe Containment sys

'r AQ tiie that the arn l\\

/j potential conta;.

250 n-4 70 F r. I D -- d to limit the pote t

tion. In the dcSg

- sTt AM GENER ATOR would also funct mM}

N^t a o F'-

ment into the ab!

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REacrCACCOLANT The contair:m t

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CoMPAL

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g coetant compartr h%.-

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proposed by Van i

[ " " r,;l N:2 *"*'e aracroa enesaune melting cavity we hdj VESsFL Cent 2jnment to p.

.ruzm,N.?N J

'~ 5E oa' 'sc spect baffels used or ah f

fa cd with refrae:

neacroa vstav

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sueecar st As a, n er.

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n ammen[ CoC!j So Fr mi OrtvE MLTWG etJ se costwsc aAsAtric Rocx e ;ineered sarcs d

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ca orsea to.v c..aaosAYe

[g u A r e ni al 4, and ah -

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a 2 E ant radiator N

j TEP. DON GALLARIE s 3g j

.g 'reby ' duce or.

• nn:nt coalinc :

! h. 2. containment structure using radiator ecteept for con:2irnnt cooUng s) stems.

, ut ofanchor e j :Le s'ab wou!d h:

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el shell to apero n t'.;

I w culd be very similar to conventional pre.

stressed concrete 1300.'lWe PWR containments 11.

- ;.n made to e

Ja

,.mcJ waerete u:';L: barrier containment design design pressme was se!ceted based on the analysis r-2 se'eme, but it we eu.q ' t'm th; extainment c%cdcr walls and dome sented ;n Append:s Vi!! to WASl! 1400 [4]. The n -

i ner study.

uo.id b, r.oumately S.0 and 4.0 feet thick rather mum containment d termined in that study which 4

tiun the surrent 3.5 and 2.5 feet, respectively.This v.ere bounded were approximately 2.5 times des::-

l

'l Emergency cor inst u,cd t!nAness would be required to carry incre.

pressure. Considering that the containment eva'u2,..

r.:aimnent Jesi n pressure as shown in table 2.

was performed on a subatmosphere type containc ' '

[3 gg a,cJ o in.i Luoa. tt 8.0 feet (2.44 m) se :eted is approxi.

with an air insentory less than typict! and given ut -

n 7 sy mue! em: ! n, the 7.75 feet (2.38 m) used for the design margins a factor 3.0 times current des;n in O phiic health it BI rc t.it burst protecnon structure for the reactor ute was selected. Also, the postulated simult::nco-l

~l b'owdown of the secondary as well as ptimary s9 1

scue: 1!m h ' id a function of containing potential nu, des trem a burst vessel.

in a PW R could give rise to a containment prew j

1he.

.:n pressure selected is !SO psi which is three approximately twice that currently consid:re-.

! CCS would ja i-s + den;n pressure typica !y used in current pre.

design.

d ofth m u 4 e i

'70-316 j

f 1

m =

3 I

m ti J.D. Sta enwr / Ceummn: n a:hsun I cm nu!r jaa Huo.ttwe I wR syum 16I s

i; The containment sect:an below the reactor coc! ant components so that the systems wou!d be opecatise 8 epartment Coor and abose the reactor systcm sup.

during maint: nance outage. B sides the obvious reduc-3 l yrt 51;b is space which dues not exist in current on-tion in Jtreet rapital costs, the congestwn in the rea:-

er l a.nment deugns and could read.ly be used to prosid tor building for ssstem support anJ distnbution sys-1 pee for Ruid and electrical distribution systems with.

tems. requirements for mscruce inspection and main-f a containment. It mipu aho be used to locate com.

tenance, control. instrumentation, and emergency j pents currently suuated in the rea; tor ausiliary power requirements wou!d all be reduced. Find:y, f M! ding which require little maintenanc=. For this the dauen of the reactor coolant system, RCS, would I ;sainment system to be effective,it would be impera.

Se simp!!Ged with the reduction of the number of f :ise that the amount of water and normal concrete in ECCS injection nonI:s in the RCS and their attend.nt

! ptential contact with the moltant coie is minimized effect as a d;scontinuity and potential for loca!ized j to hmit the potential for steam and CO: gas genera.

stress concentrativa which could lead to failure.

l ::an. In the design, the reactor system support slab

' would also function as water barrier from the contcin.

43. Gmt;inment cooling system cent into the ablative mdting bed.

n i

The containment configuration below the reactor in the concept shown in Gg.1, there would be no l coolant compartment Coor is essentia:ly the same as functional chang to the containment cooling system, 3 proposed by Wn Erp [5j. It is anticipated the ablative CCS. However, since both primary plu> secondary s:, s-j thelting cavity would be steellined as is the rest of the tem b:owdown in PWR's as well as additional pressuri.

1 containment to prodde a vapor barrier and refractory zation fue to increased zirconium water reaction and baffels used or alternatively. the stect :iner would be generation of CO2 from the concrete in c.mtact with faced with refractory to insure no melt.through of th the moltant core, some modiGcation of CCS would be a

j 1mer.

expected.

1 In the postulated d: sign shown in Gg.1, normal la the cuncept shown in Sg. 2, CCS system fun;-

I containment cooling systems would be supp!ied as an tional r~equirements would be changed, and it is antici-Q" en;ineered safeguard with the usual triple redundancy.

pated reduced signiScantly as a fqnction of the shell in G;. 2 and alternate seheme is shown where a G2t radiator openting characteristics.

hottr n, free standing steel shell would be used to act as a giant radiator to provide containment coo!!ng and 44 Cwponent supports thereby reduce or eliminate the need to proud can.

I tainment cooling as an engineered safeguard. Practical Currently, a prime function and the ene that !argely limits of anchorage of the steel shell to a Gat concrete dictates their design in PWR's is the requirement that base slab would limit intema! design pressure on the the reactor coolant system, RCS, support structures steel shell to approximately 15 psi. No attempt has isolate the effects of a postulated rupture of the pri-om amments' This been made to evaluate the detai!ed practically of such mary system from tbc secondary system and vice sersa.

in the anal) sis pr-1400 [4]. 'Ihe max.-

ther study.

rupture m the primary system does not cause rupture at study which 3 5 times design of the secondary sy stem or dce versa sine: the con-inment evaluated

42. Emergency core cooling system tainment is not d:siened for this simult:tneous enerev

.ype containment release.Tnis criterion requires that the RCS support ~'

q and given usua

In the pasive contamment d sign emergency core structures be designed for equivdent static re=Foa cooling system, ECCS would no longer be required to loads whi;h vary between 2.5 and S.0 X 10 pounds.

6 re_, msign press.

m s:multancous assure public health and safety. As such,it would be These loads are tvriediv an order of magnitude greater s primary syste-s wy W n pnt operadng systerm h Nn & suppens en M nom openn.

,,,nt pressure desien would be dictated by economic (potentialloss in the U.S., these extreme:y larg: RCS or steam onsidered in f pl nt investment) rather than safety considerations.

rupture loads aho have comoined with the leads asso.

The ECCS would !ogically be reduced to a single train ciated with the Safe Shutdown Earthquake, SSE. adding instead of three trains with perhaps Stemative actise even more to the support design load.Such adJinonal a.g n

, t bu 4

~-

• " ~

n

I62 J.D. Stevenson l Containment to wuthstand cure me!t for a liC0.tfWe f.WR rysten Tabte 4 Table 3 Cost compatiam Quantity estimatcs conventional prestressed concrete compared to concrete passive containment design tems and equW

l. Conventional Design - 140' l.D. licight to springline 140' prestrewed co. crete wall 3.5 fr. thick ind hermtspherical dome 2.5 f t. thuk, deisgn pressure = 60 psi.

Element Concrete Rebar Prestressing Liner I.

Conventh.

(cu. yd s.)

(tons) ft. of 170 wire tendons (sq. ft.)

2,500 - }" pl 27,380 s Reactor sump 600 125 4.675 t Base mat 6,950 2,450 I4,000 - {~ pl Cylinder 3,330 350 17,000 horizontal 62,000 - [" pl 0

13,500 vertical Dome 2,950 150 10,500 31,000 - j~ pl Interior ff.

Passise a co ncrete 8,500 1,600 Totals 27,380 4.675 41,000 109,500 69.400:

12.200 t.

ll. Passive containment - 140' '.D., lie.ght from reactor coolant companment Ibor to seringline !!0', heipt from containment j 33,999 :

base mat to top of reactor coolant cempartment floor 120', w all S.0 ft. thick and hembphericaldome 4.0 ft. thick, Jesign 149.200 n 45,660:,

pressure = 130 psi.

49'000 II 3

Elcment Concrete Rebar Prestressing Liner Misc. (> d y

(cu. yds.)

(tons) ft, of 170 wire tendons (sq. f t)

Base mat 14,200 7,000 14,000 - {* pl I!!.

pass se c7 Cylinder 31,700 1,000 S5,000 horizontal 101,200 - {" p!

SS.350 1 65,000 vertical i 4,30 r..

Dome 6,500 500 32,000 34,000 - }" pi j

15 2,001 st Interior cencrete 17,500 3,800 l

100,000 t M3F ) rr Dasalt rock 45,600 45.660 3r Totals 69,400 12,300 182,000 l 'o,200 45,600 49.000 ::

1

}

Ill. ! mive containment - Same as 11, except surrounded by steel shell radiator with an asera;e 1.0 thickness and re nforced j

concrete shield bailang 2.5 ft. thiek walls and 2 ft. thick dome.

,f IV. En;ergna,

Element Concrete Rebar Prestressing Liner misc. (> d )

l 3

Co'n entio n (cu. yds.)

(tons) ft. of 170 wire tendons (sq. fr.)

Lat.115 Base mat 18,850 8,500 25,500 - [" pl j

C> 1inder 31,700 1,000 85,000 llorizontal 101,200 - I" pl

,I 65,000 Vertical PmiveCa Lor. A Is Dome 6,500 500 32,000 3 4,000 - [" pl j

interios concrete 17,500 3,S00 Dasedt rock IC 3,000 - 1" pl 45,600 Ct' 7 ta.n u Radutor shell Jhidd bIdg.

14,300 500 s'

C n.cnt; a E or.1 ty Total 88.850 14,300 182,000 160,000 - I pl 45,600 163,000 - 1" pl i

t 3

70 318 5

?

I i

l

?

1.D. Stes enson / Conrain~ivir ro withsm:J ccre mdt f.>r a 1300.tf We L is R s s srun 163

~

i I

2Mc 4 I

g et con parison beta een can.entional motainnunt pJ5Oc containment, contairfdent coolirc; and emC fency cure coehng y s-

'g,and equipment supports '

rrmapherw.1 eg,,c,,

2 Duest und Total cust l

6 (S x10 )

l

~ ~.

I

{

I.

Conventio nal co ntair.rne nt 3

3 27,350 yd concrete x S120/> d 3.286 4.675 tons rebar x 5900/ tan 4.203 f

41,000 ft.170 wire tendons v 540!!t 1.640 10h000 f t. linct pl 1/4" x S45/tt:

4.933 I

I Total 14.122 29.9 l

II.

Passhe containment 3

3 8.328 69,400 yd concrete x 5120/yd 12,300 tons reba. x 5900/ ton 11.070

~~-

ht from contarnrnen

182,000 ft.170 wire tendons x 540!ft 7.280 0 ft. thick, deugn 149,200 ft; hner pl 1/4" x 40!!t2 5.963 3

3 45,600 yd bault rock X $30/> d 1.363 3

3 49,000 ft refractory brick x 510!ft:

0.490

^

3) o Total 34.504 73.1

~

f l

Passive containment with radiator

$j 88.850 yd con' crete x S120/>d3 10.662 3

g 14,300 tons rebar x $900/ tor.

12.370 152,000 ft.170 wire tenians x 540/ft 7.250 2

160,000 ft liner pl 1l4~ x S40/ft 6.400 2

163,000 ft radiator p11" x SS0!ft 33.040 9

J 3

j 45,600 > d t>ault rock x 530!>d 1.368 49,000 ft? refractory brick x 510/ft2 0.490 l

und reinforced

.i Total 52.110 110.0 IV. Ernergency core cooling system

)

Conventional containment ECCS 17.0 36.0 hlaint. & 151. 25/yr x 40 yrs.

10.0 Total 56.0 Passive Containment ECCS 7.0 14.3 Alaint. A ISC 0.10/yr x 40 yrs.

4.0 Total 18.3 V.

Containment cochng system Conventional CCS 7.0 14.S hlaint. & ISI 0.10!)r X 40 yrs.

4.0 Total IS.S r~p. 9 g

(-

L..s g-C 4

- ^'- ^- - ' -

- - ' ~- "

/

J.D. Stever. son l Con:amment to mi:hst:nicare mdt for a 130) MWe L WR syste n 164 T21e 4 (sontinued) 3eig j,,jg g 2

of'the LOCA Direct cost Tut 2) cost the LOCA c:

(5 x 10)

cornbined wi 3

P2 wive Containment CCS 3.0 4.24 the reducho; 1.00 tian caused L Staint.11510.25/> r x 40 yrs.

por!5 5.24 VI.

NSSS Camponent supports

5. Compadso Co nv entio nal eu ntaintnent 3.0 6.36 2.00 Sisint. i 1510.05/> r x 40 yrs.

q table 3 son between Total 3.36 drical contair Pauive containment 1.5 3.17 the two conc.

1.00 Slaint. A 1510.025/yr x 40 yrs.

g,g g 3"d CO "P3fi2 Total 4.17 continment Tot al cost

,,g Vll. Cost summary

=

(S X 10 )

.ind redundan doIInjsys!c*

Conventional containment 29 9 Passive containment 73.1 Ofety related Passive containment w/ radiator 110.0 Jesign is dier,:

Conventio nal ECCS 56.0 with pob th e

Passne ECCS 18.3 g lg3 g g I Conventional CCS 18.3

'.n addcJ s Pa ssive (radiator) CCS 5.2 Conventional NSSS supports S.4 T.esented in t.

M5enice inspe P2ssoe NSSS supports 4.2

! Ahieved by re VI!!. Cost differentials

($ x 10 )

g 6

fo (.,ocding

!E 3:1! operatin

1. Pmive versus anyce.onal Shh and saft

a. Containment cructure

(+) 4 3.2 i

A!so presen

b. ECCS

(-) 37.2

! 2ductian in t!

c.CCS I

2I2 dd'

d. NSSS supports

(-) 3.3

)

& loMi indi Net dif ference

(+) 2.2 3

9

2. (Radiator) passive verns conventional lt I

2. Containment structure

(+) 80.1 b.ECCS

(-) 3 7.1 e c. CCS

(-) 13.6 4

d. NSSS supports

(-) 4.2

c. CieJ4t for double versus sin;Ie barrier g

cont.

(,-) 10.J J!

3 Net difference

(+) 15.2

}

8 Quantitics and estunates show n do not nesessari', include the total cost of :ha component but does include tho>c items *W I

cost differentials betwee s the various contammen: 53 stems evita2ted exist.

s 2 Total costs include both direct 2,1d indirect costi as defined in taw 9.W uli 1345 " Power P! ant Capital Cost Trends a nd S I

tivity to Etunonne Parameters normalized ta 7lI/77 dollars. A factm of 2.12 is uwd.

3 Direct cost factor decreased to 1.41 since system would be non-nuclear.

70 320 s

i 4

i i

9 eema.un e= v.

_-. peg =- ee ee *""

eme.wwe.ge e r==

a.a<=.-oe w w

+

1 t

?

j J.D. Steve nrwr l C,n ta.e:ent :a a em st nJ core wit f a a iJ';9.11h t itGi,.<v l65 i

~

fsmic loads typically range between 10 to 50 percent out failure or signiGent Jntorti s, w ! bs t!r postu.

l < the LOCA load effect taken alor e. Elin:inatien oflated double ended rupture et the mau Ant piping i

'e LOCA or steamline break isobrian requirement combined with safe shutJf.vn er. :qd.

l nbmed with SSE uould ha,e a se;mGcant effect on

~~

j.-: reductwn in supi, ort capital costs and the cunges-

} ea caused t y the design of massive load resisting sup-

6. Summary and conclasions t etts.

l Based on the co3! e3timate nunma. < m at sec. 3 of this papei. it wou!d appear the panne co.ta.nment

5. Comimison concept md reused dmgn bas:s ; r o ed n sel 3 merit further study from n econemic a ac!) as an l

In table 3 is pre ented a quantity estim:*e compari-improsed safety standpoirt. Thh > ptwubth true j < sa between conventional prestressed concrete cylin-when considering ether attematn es emrently bem; l Jrical containments for a typical 1300 MWe PWR and 4

promoted, su h as undergroundm; unclear punt tacMi-the two corcepts suggested in this paper as shown in ties. In 2dditwn, b sed on % preh " mary study. thme j figs. I and 2. In table 4 is presented a cost estimate does appear to be a centaannent aad nU:ar rower l 2nd comparison between convention-J and the passisep!arit Jesign option at least fn,m a po tubted.cident

containment tyg,es described in table 3. Credits are also standpoint which would pu " cor.x

ratwa for metro-considered associated with reduction in the complexity politar. siting.

and redundancy associated with the emergency core l cooling system ia downgrading such a system from 2

( safety related engineered safeguard to a system whose References

! des:gn is dictated by economic censideration associated

! with protection against siar.incant core melt 2nd the

[1 j Pukmnan Dmn ( nmia. Irk, g(.errnans P cactor t Unit 2. IF6.

[2l De>i n Critcria,l'edcral kcco.c 4g loss of the power pbnt investment.

Sarciy Comminion (Pro;+ce) uAsl Poact su ;0n in l

An 2dded signincaat effect on overall pbnt costs Ludairshaven on Rhine.

presented in table 4 is the reduced requirement for

[3] EX K!eimola, et al. "Th: passne ' wainment Smem/

inservice inspection during plant life which would be Paper presen:cd at Amerian NuJc;. Society.\\teetim;,

a;hieved by reducing the compicxity of the Emeruncy a shir 'ta n, D.C.. No.c mbe.,19 F si

[4] "Ar. dents :a Reactor Sate. arudy.. w.ASFf-1403 idis Vill Ph> ml Prmme> in R eactor Wi:a n i Cc re Coo!ing System, ECCS. and downgrading it to a '

A cci j plant operating system which is not essential for public (NtRtc _75,014), U.S. Nuc:e2r Regulat;. Gomission, j health and safety.

October,1975.

Also presented in table 4 is the estimated signiGcant

[5] J.B. van Erp Trans. Amencan Nusiear Socie:y, ~.2 (1975) reduction in the cost of major component supports which are designed to accommodate the extremely (6) ACI-AS\\tE Joint Commi: tee, ASME Boir & Presu:re

\\.essel Code,Section III - Dim.icn 2 and ACI Star.Jard large loads induced m. the reactor coolant system with-359 74,1975.

ose items where f

. TrenJs and Sensi-W 221 w,

p,, -

i

{

1 f

i 1

167 wear Enginetring and Design 49 i197Si 1$7-205

Narth-ifo!!and Putlahing Compam ii EXI5 TING 5!ETHODOLOGIES IN Tile DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF OFFSIIORE FLOATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

• k P.V.T!!ANGA51 BABU and D.V. REDDY Faculty of Engineering at:J AntirJ Science, Stemorarl Uniiersity ofNeufounJknJ, St. John's, NewfounJknJ, C:n:J: A LC SS7

)

Reaived 11 November 1977 The paper presents a comprehensive statemf-thNIt on the design and analysis of float.;:g nudear power pl:nts (TNPs).

I Tht iecent 2ccelerated growth of the utishore oilindustry has conuJerably increased the contiJence in the orfshore ESP f

conapt in view of the ust potential for the transpoution of avnLble techno!agy. Tbc rn:in ajuntags of FNPs are: (1) g unlimited wpply of the cuoting water;(2)isolatian of thermal, noise anJ raJioactne po!!u: ion;(3) chmination of the need f

for lar;;e areas of unoccupied lands usu211v reqaired for safety precaution; anJ (4)linancial sasi.ys by u>ing standardized desiga and prnduction tinc ap; raach.

The topics covered in this paper are:

f Offshore concept cycluction: h) Comparison of the ariaus off>hore concepts, namely, artificial idands, jack-up tyre, floating-deep, floatmg-shallow and sea bed,includ:n.: evaluation bascJ on cost, environmental impac teasib.hty, pl m wl-f' nerabihty md nudear safety:(u) accept:5dity of the offshore floatinp eep plant a the most suitable ceacept.

j j

S, ting conr!Jer:tions: (i) Favors influenemg site selection with so-:e reference to the economic ergonomi nd ensiron-nental constra:nts.vii) study of bearing capacity, slope -tabdi',) ar. i witlement,liquetaction potcn::.:1 and scouring beha-viour of the sea bed.

En/ironment.1 considerationr: ( ) Effect of the plant or, the w.oundir g enuronment;(ii) esal;2 tion of environmental load > - wind, waves, curren:s, ice, c:rthquake, tsunamis, etc Design conrlerctions: (i) Conceptual des 9n of the rrsin compnents of the I3P: (a) the fbating platfarm for cordi-nations of dead. imposed and environmentalloaJm;s;(b) bu: tom-theJ :nd Goatin; brtaiwaters,(ci ti e moormg s3 stem, I

(d) power tran eission cab! s; and (e) cther wmponents lJ : in-ta;; stru.'ures and cootm's> stems.

l F23rication cnlinstalkron procelarcs: Rules, regu'ations and recommenJations in f.:bricativa and insistlatian of the l

cff.hore Ibating Nructures.

j Stanc anJ dy ncette encl,, us: Discussion of avai!at!e ana!ytic:1 frocedures for the sta:ic aaJ dyn2mic ana:ysis of(a) the floating platform;(b) the breakwaters; and (c) the macre; sy stens.

Modelstudies: (i) Scaling of the model; Gi) two-and threedmensional model studies to evaluate (a) platform rasn to environmentalloads,(b) the by drodynamic coe:Scients of the platform, an1 (c) :he noorin;; strut 'brces, etc.

Other consider tianr: (i) f atigu. and cack prop;ption;(u) stabihty criMria:Wi) fc undation an2!ysis: (b) safety;(v) waste disposal:(u) imtrumentation;(ni) corrosian control;(ix) noiw ard ubration lesels;(x)Icgal.apecs; and (xi) cost estimates.

The presentation inc!cdes a detailed list of references and a sclered biNiogr:phy.

Discussion: The immedure need for further research in the fob mg areas is i-d cated: (i) prob.bihtLs of fai:ure;(iP improved mathematical med:!!ing tecViques;(iU) dynamic an,1ys:s in;!udir4 water-structure interactian, t: king into account the nonlinear effects of the sup;o: ting medium and the mooring systems;(iv) rnodel testina;2nd (S) water slaihing within the breakwater.

1. Introduction

• Exp:nded ve mn of Invi:ed Paper J2/5' presented at the Ideal sites for nuclear powe r plants, requiring large 4th lat.rnational Canf"en e un Structur:1 M echanics ir anunt of cooling water, are the shorelines border:,q Reactor Technolo;y, San I-ranenco, Caldarnu,15-19 the estua:ies, bays and oceans. The worsening trend :n August 1977.

findng suitable lar;d sites alonc: the coast and the growing 70 W P

,