ML19220A768
| ML19220A768 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1974 |
| From: | Tedesco R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7904240604 | |
| Download: ML19220A768 (14) | |
Text
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DISTRIBUTION
/,UG 5 m
Dccket File L Reading L:CS APCSB Docket No.
50-320 V. A. Moore, Assistant Director for Light Water Reactors, Group 2, L REQUEST FOR ADDITICEAL INF0WATICS, ANTT TARY AND POLT.2 CGT2ESIDN SYSTTAS BRANCH PLsnt N.me: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, U.11t 2, Matropolitan Edison Ccnpany Li m nin? Stage: OL Docket Number: 50-320 Responsible Branch: LWR 2-2 Project Manager:
B. Eashburn Raquested Couzpletion Date: August 2, 19 74 Applicant's Response Data:
The Ain414 =7 and Power Converseon Branch has coupleted the first round review of Three Mile Island, Unit 2 FSAR. The enclosed re-quest for additional infornation covers those portions of the ISAR for which this branch has prf mry responsibility. We find that additional information vill be necessary to completa our evaluation of the safety ralated systams.
In responding to the encio, ed questions, the applicant should provide aufficient descriptive mattar and details to allow su sm<faracanding of the various sysr*= and the capability to function without ecmpromis-ing directly or indirectly the ucclear safety of the plant under both nomat operation or transiant conditions. E=phaals should be placed on those aspects of design and operation that affect the react or and its safety fatturas or contributa toward the control of radioactivity and that all pertinent criteria are met.
Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Cone =4-t Safety Directorata of TMeanning 1*n ci r=ure :
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02-1 02.0 AUXILIARY AND PCWER CONVERSION SYSTDIS 02.1 Discuss the effects of aircraft.1= pact on the roofs of the
~
(3.5) buildings listed in Table 3.5-l with regard to consequences
-that may affect safe plant shutdewn capability.
Include tn_.
the discussion a description of the added effects of burning fuel on the roof tops.
02.2 Provide a complete tabulation listing all moderate and high (3F) energy syste=s as defined in Mr. J. F. O' Leary's letter dated July 12, 1973. Describe all syste=s that have not been already described in the FSAR.
For those syste=s that have been des-cribed, identify (on the tabulation) the section(s) where the description =ay be found.
02.3 Describe the location, physical separation,.or protective (3F)
'~ barriers provi'ded for the auxiliary f eedwater pu=ps to en-sure their operation if flooding or gross failure of adjacent components or piping were to occur.
02.4 Discuss the potential for flooding safety related equip =ent (3F) in the event of a failure in any line carrying high energy fluid.
02.5 Provide the results of an analysis which de=onstrates that (3F) critical cracks in high energy lines will not have an adverse effects on essential equip =ent.
02.6 In order to mitigate the consequences of =any of the postula ted (3F) high energy breaks, equipment which is non-seismic or dependent on off-site power is relied upon.
Provide the results of a high energy linebreak analysis assuming the non-seismic equip =ent is not available and off-site power is lost.
Pr5vrde plan and elevation drawings which demonstrate that pipe restraints, walls or the relocation of equipment will avoid damaging safety related structures, equipment or components.
02.7 Provide the seismic design require =ents for the diesel generator (8.3) exhaust syste=.
02.8 Provide a discussion of the installed protective type devices (8.3) that are incorporated in the design to protect the diesel generators fro = exceeding operating limits or otherwise pre-vent them fro perfor=ing their intended function curing a DBA.
What measures will be taken to =inimize the poss4 bility of the above devices fro needlessly preventing the diesel frc= operating when required.
Gr304
02-2 02.9 T1.e FSAR states the diesel engine day tank capacity is sufficient (8.3) for approxi=ately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at full load operation. ?: ovide a discussion of the factors considered in arriving at this capacity.
Include in the discussion the range of =alfunction considered, and the time i.,*.rval between the low level alar = and when the day tank will be e=pty.
Relate the time period required to carry out the various re=edial actions of the =ain fuel storage syste= to the time period available.
02.10 In regard to potential failures or =alfunctions occurring due (9.0) to freezing, icing, and other adverse environmental conditions for those co=ponents not housed within te=perature controlled areas and which are essential in attaining and =aintaining a safe shutdown, identify and discuss the protective ceasures tAken to assure their operation.
02.11 Provide a tabulatica of all valves in the reactor pressure boundary (9.0) and in other seis=ic Category I systems, as reco== ended in Regula-tory Guide 1.29, e.g.,
safety valves, relief valves, stop valves, stop-check valves, control valves, whose ope = tion is relied upon either to sssure safe plant shutdown or to =itigate the consecuences of a transient or accident. The tabulation should identify the syste= in which it is installed, the type and size of valves, the actuation type (s), and the environ = ental design conditions to which the valves are qualified.
02.12 For all vessels that contain gas under pressure (such as nitrogen, (9.0) chlorine, hydrogen, oxygen, air and CO, tanks) provide the following:
(1) the design and operating pressure, (2) the =axi=u pressure of the gas supply, (3) the location of the vessel, (4) the total energy released if the largest pipe connected to the vessel should rupture, and (5) the protective =easures taken to prevent th, loss of f uncticn of adjacent equipment essential for a safe and =aintained reactor shutdown 02.13 Provide the results of an analysis which de=onstrates that failure (9.0) of any non-Category I auxiliary systen or co=ponent (including associated turbine systens and components) will not have a detricental effect (such as flood, spray, leaks) on safety related syste=s or prevent safe shutdown of the plant.
u.,-305
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02-3 02.14 According to Section 9.1.2 the key-interlocks which prevents (9.1. 0) the fuel handling crane from passing over the spent fuel pool are imposed only when the ' crane load exceeds 15 tons.
Provide the results of an analysis of the effects of dropping a crane load approaching 15 tons f-.to the spent fuel pool.
Assume the object is dropped from the =aricum lifting height attainable by the crane hook.
02.15 Provide a description of the seismic Category I water source (9.1.3) and =ake-up syr n to the spent fuel pool.
Include in the descriptica the edundancy or bac.kup provided for the =ake-up syste=.
02.16 According to Figure 9.1.3
.c spent sel pool cooling systen is (9.1.3) interconnected with che decay heat removal syste2.
Provide
-- - a description of the = ears of isolating the two syste=s and the restrictions under which the DHR systen will be tied into the spent fuel pcol cooling syste=.
02.17 According to Figure 9.2.3 the outlet of the spent fuel pool (9.1. 3) cooling system is well below the nor=al fuel pool water level.
Provide a description of the anti-siphoning devices incorporated in the design of the pool cooling syst2m to prevent draining of the fuel pool assuminga pipe or coryonent failure.
02.18 Present information to demonstrate that a power failtre during (9.1.4) refueling or spent fuel handling operations will not cause dropping of the fuel assembly.
02.19 Describe and discuss the plans and neans provided to abscrb the (9.1.4) resulting impact should the spent fuel cask be dropped in the cask pool. The discussion and analysis should include:
(1) An outline drawing of the cask, cask di=ensions, and center of gravity.
(2) The cask weight, assumed drop height, deceleration distance, deceleration force versus stroke, velocity at inpact (3) The maximum possible drop height.
(4) The means, aside free ad=inistrative control, to liair the drop height to that assumed in the analysis.
(5) Information which de onstrates that th; cask cannot be tipped before being dropped or if tipped what prevents the cask fres damaging the stored fuel or other safety related ecuipment including those that may be b' low the operating e
ficor.
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02-4 02.20 Provide a list of all =ajor tools and servicing equipment (9.1. 4) including cranes necessary to perform the various reactor vessel servicing and refueling functions and indicate whether each is designed to seis=ic Category I requirements or their storage locations are designed to these require =ents.
02.21 Describe in detail the applicable codes and standards used in (9.1. 4) the design, fabrication, installation and testing of crane, rails, supporting structures, b;1dge, trolley, hoists, cables,
. lifting hooks, special handling fixtures and slings.
02.21 For each crane, list its design load ratire preoperation test (9.1. 4) load, taximum operating loads and the test loads that will be used throughout the life of :he facility.
02.22 Describe the = odes of failure that were considered in the design (9.'. 4) of the spent fuel cask crane and reactor
'l'r crane such as a
breaking of cables, lifting slings, sheat; shafts, keys, stripped gear teeth, and brake failures. Also discuss the limitations and control that will exist in handling objects over an opened reactor vesnel.
02.23 What are the gec=etric enanges of load position that =ay occur (9.1.4) in the event of =alfunction or failure in the hoisting syste:
(the hoisting system includes th~e load and all ite=s of mechanical and structural support on the bridge trolley).
Provide an evaluation of the effects of these geometric changes on the fuel handling and storage area and any other safety related equipment.
02.24 Provide an outline of the cask handling procedure including a (9.1. 4) sketch or drawing which shcws the routing of the scent fuel hand-ling cask from receipt to the pool for loading with spent fuel to its return to the transporting car ready for shipment fron the nuclear plant.
02.25 Describe the protective =easures provided to avoid damage to a (9.1.4) fuel element due to the fuel transfer cart moving through the fuel transfer tube while the fuel ele =ent is in the vertical positien.
02.26 Since the fuel handling builning crane is shared with Unit I, (9.1.4) discuss the means of preventing a heavy object taken frc: L' nit I from being carried over the fuel storage areas of Unit II.
Gr307
02-5 02.27 Provide a description including drawings of the use of the (9. 3.1) outlet water fro = the nuclear service river *ater system for deicing the river water ntake structure.
In particular dis-cuss the potential of short circuiting the cooling effect of the service water syste= due to the war = cutlet water fro = the Nuclear Service River Water Syste= (NSRWS) being drawn into the river intake structure.
02.28 Figure 1.2-20 shows the river water pu=p house contains four (9. 2.1) nuclear services water pu=ps sad three non-seis=ic secondary service water pu=ps.
Provide the results of an analysis which de=enstrates that the failure of any co=ponent in the pu=p
-house will not da= age safety ralated equip =ent due to internally generated =issiles or flooding.
02.29 It is apparent fro: Figure 9.2-1 that the failure of a single (9. 2.1) line of the NSRWS can result in the loss cf cooling watar te the following co=ponents:
(1) control building liquid chiller condenser (2) control building river water booster pu=ps (3) control building =echanical roo= fan cooling units (4) control building area fan coil units Discuss the effects on the safe shutdown capability of the plant due to the loss of cooling water to the above =entioned syste=s and describe any =odification that could be =ade to elirinate the single failure.
02.30 According to Section 9.2.1.1.2 a acn-sais=ic =echanical draf t' (9.2.1) cooling tower is e= ployed to cool che NSRWS discharge. Discuss the means of preventing the debris due to the collapse of the cooling tower fro = restricting the flow of the NSRWS.
02.31 Provide the nu=ber of Nuclear Servicas Closed Cooling Water (9.2.2.3)
Syste= (NSCCWS) pu=ps required for a nor=al cold shutdown of the plant.
02.32 According to Section 9.2.2.3.3, a backun supply of cooling :ater (9.2.2.3) to the nuclear oriented equ ; cent coo:ers which are essentf.al 4
for post-LCCA cooling require =ents is available fro = the NSRWS.
Identify the interconnections and valving arrange =ents of the NSRUS with all the essential coolers shown on Yigure 9.2-5.69-308
02-6 02.33 lt is apparent frc: Figure 9.2-5 that a failure of a single (9. 2. 2. 3) line in the NSCC'4S tan result in the loss of cooling water to any one of the e. tential ccclers. Discuss the effects on the safe shutdown capability of the plant due to the loss of cooling water to each of the essential ccolers.
02.34 Identify all co=ponents that have a single barrier between the (9.2.2.3)
NSCC'JS and the reactor priuary coolant syster and describe the isolation and/or pressure relief provisions provided to preclude damage to the NSCC'JS.
02.35 Demonstrate that in the event of a syster leak or rupture, the (9. 2. 2. 3 )
compenent cooling surge tank capacity is adequate to assure a continuous supply of ec=ponent ecoling water to equipment re-quired for safe shutdcwn until the leak can be_ isolated.
Describe any autcratic devices provided to ritigate the effects of syite: leakage or rupture.
02.36 Discuss the design provisions provided to prevent the flooding (9.2.3) of essential equipment in Unit 2 due to the rupture of the decinerali:ed water storage ranks of Units 1 or 2.
02.37 Provide a legible plot plan of the facility indicating and (9.2.5) identifying all essential lines (cooling, power, sensing, and control) that pars between scismic Category I structures.
Dis-cuss the reasures taken to prevent the loss of those lines re-quired to attain and main ain a safe shutdow-te to seismic event, =issiles from rotating equipment are to r Joes, fires, floods and the collapse of non-seismic structures.
02.38 List all air operated valves whose ualfunctica can afie. paa
~
(9.3.1) safe shutdown, provide their failure =cde and deconstrate that their faTIure code will not cc prc isc E fe shutcown of the plant.
02.39 Provide additional explanatior and
- su=ptions used in determininr (9.3.3) the drainage systems adequacy for precluding backficoding fre ene co=partment to another containing safety related equip
- ent.
02.40 Provide the seis=le category for se:p pump discharge systems (9.3.3) that are required to prevent the floeding of areas containing essential equipment.
02.41 Provide the taximum alicwable temperature for the. cake-up (9.3<4) purification de=ineralizers nixed bed and cation bed resin and the consequences of exceeding this temperature.
63 309 O
02-7 02.42 The letdown temperature in the letdown line downstrea of the (9.3.4) coolers is alar ed and provides an interlock for isolatica to protect the purifica:ica syste=.
Is the letdown te perature always indicative of the pressure associated with the letdown syste ? Discuss the effects : hat the interlock failure would have on the purification systa=.
How would excessive tempera-ture and pressure otherwise be detected?
02.43 Letdown flou rates are controlled by a fixed block orifice, a (9.3.4) parallel re otely operated valve, and a second manually positioned valve also parallel with the block orifice.
Discuss the operation of these valves and describe the associated conditions required for operation.
Consider also the effects on letdown flow and syste pressure with eit er one of the valves open and with both valves open.
02.44 In addition to the nor=al
.C e-up line, two alternate raths (9.3.4) for adding boron to the reac:or coolant syste are ident;fied.
Determine the limiting condition for boration and provide the cargin associated with the alternate injection method to caintain subcriticality during reactor cooldown or accident conditions.
02.45 Provide a discussion of the means of isolating the chemical (9. 3. 4) addition systems frc: safety related systems.
Include in the discussion the number and seistic classification of the isolatica valves and identify the: on the, appropriate PSI diagrams.
02.46 Provide the seismic classification of the fire dampers in the (9.4.0) air intake tunnel.
02.47 Provide the temperature and humidity of the cutside air used in (9.4.0) the design-of-the
.a lous 'ca....g u.-
air condl m.ing sys cts.
02.48 (RSP)
According to Section 9.4.1.2 make-up water for the chilled water (9. 4.1) loop 1s supplied fro the non-seismic decineralized water s: stem.
It is our position that a seismic Category I cake-up source be provided for the control roc: chilled water syste:.
02.49 Provide a description of the instrumentation used to detect fire, (9.4.1) s=oke and radiatica in the air in:ake and in the ducting asso-ciated with equipment that =ust be protected.60-310
02-8 02.50 Discuss the consequences of the singla exhaust damper for (9.4.1) the control roos kitchen or toilet f ailing open during an accident which could cause the intake of radioactive or noxious gases to the control room.
02.51 Discuss the consequences of the da=per in the intake of the by-(9.4.1) pass supply system failing closed during an accident which requires the isolation of the control room.
02.52 State the design ventilation capacities required for the (9. 4.1) control room, equipment and cable room ventilation systems.
This should include flow races, cooling and heating require-cents.
02.53 Discuss the consequences of the loss of off site power on the (9.4.1) control room air conditioning, heating and ventilation system.
02.54 Provide the results of a failure codes and effects analysis (9.4.2) of the auxiliary building heating and ventilation systes including loss of off-site powet.
In particulat discuss the effects of a failure in the intake supply damper and supply fan on the temperature of co=part=ents containing escential equipment.
02.55 Discuss the effects on essential equipment contrined in the (9.4.2) auxiliary building when the non-seismic heating and ventilation system co=ponents do not function or are isolated due to an earthquake.
02.56 Identify on Figure 9.4.3 the ducting and isolation dampers in (9.4.2) the auxiliary building ventilation system that are seismic Category I.
^
g 311
02-9 02.57 Provide the results of a f ailure code and effect analysis (9.4.3) for the fuel handling area ventilation sys tem, including the effects of the inability to maintain preferred air flow patterns.
02.53 Since there are no radiation conitors at the spent fuel pool (9.4.'
surface provide the results of an analysis which deconstrates that the tonitor upstream of the exhaust filters can der.ect the radiation fast enough to divert the exhaust air through the filters before the conta=inants can esca a to the environ-ment.
.02.59 Identify on Figure 9-4.4 the ducting and isolatior. da=pers (9.4.3) in the fuel handling building that are seisuic Category I.
02.60 Provide the seistic classifica*. ion of the isolation dampers (9.4.3) and the exhaust systes radiation =onitor.
Also discuss the consequences of a failure in the radiation monitor during a fuel handling accident.
02.61 According to Section 9.4.6-3, "If co bustible fumes enter the (9.4.5) 200 CFM ventilation air line, they vill be detected by an inf rared analyzer in the pucp house which shall cause the bu?terfly valves in the air supply lines to close and the ventilation fans to s top. "
Di' cuss a) the consequences of a failure in the inf rared analyzer, and 'o) the effects on operation of the nuclear service water pumps with the river water ventilation fans turned off.
02.62' Since a portion of4e riv
-- -supply-to thur=p house (9.4.5) cooling coils is non-seismic, discuss the effects of the loss of the coiling coils on the nuclear services cooling water pu=ps.
02.63 Provide a description of the exhaust portian of the rive r (9.4.5) water pu=p house ventilation system.
02.64 Provide a failure = odes and effects analysis, including loss (9.4.7) of off-site power, for the cable room ventilation system.
W,..313
8 02-10 02.65 Provide the seismic dlassification and a failure modes and (9.4.3) eff acts analysis of the isolation da:pers for the service building ventilation system.
02.66 According to section 9.4.6. 3 cctoust 'ble f u=es f rom the (9.4.9) control building area will be detected by an infrared analy:er.
Discuss the quantity and type of combustible fu=es that can be generated in the control building area and the means by which they are generated.
02.67 Discuss the consequences of a seismic event disabling the (9.4.9) non-seismic control building heating ar.d ventilation system thad could effect safe plant shutdown.
02.63 If one of the two fan coil units were down fcr maintenance, (9. A.9) the other unit will satisfy the heating load temporarily.
Provide the duration that the one 50% fan coil unit could satisfy the control building area heating load.
02.69 According to section 9.5.1.2 a halogen deluge system protects (9.5.1) the air intake tunnel. Discuss the consequences of the halogen deluge system leaking into the air intake tunnel and the resultirg fumes being drawn into the control room.
Describe the =eans by which the control roca personnel would becoce aware of a leak in the deluge sys tem.,
02.70 Demonstrate how equivalent safety is achieved by the present (9.5.1) fire protectica systen in order to meet the positions set forth in Regulato ry Guides 1. 70., and 1. 73.
02.71 Provide-the-results-of a f ai-im%e - nd ef f ect+-analysis f or
( 9. 5.1) the fire protection system, including an analysis of potential adverse effects caused by operation of the system. Also pro-vide a discussion reinting to the reliability of the firc detection equipment in terms of sensi:ivity, nean time between f ailures, and other operational expcriences.
02.72 Describe and identify the location of any applica:ica of
( 9. 5.1) polyvinyl chloride (PVC) in the construction of the plant.
Discuss protective features provided to prevent or control burning or overheating of such caterial in ene plant.
02.73 One deluge system protects the cro cooling air intake openings (9. 5.1) to the emergency diesel generator building.
Discuss the effects on the performance of the diesels if water is drawn into the diesel penerator rooms through the cooling air intakes.
GS"313
e 02-11 02.75 Describe the potential fire hazards in each plant area, (9. 5.1) fire protecticn requirements and the fire risk evaluation utilized in the design of the fire protection system.
02.7:
Discuss the potential of a fire protection 2:este: storage (9.5.;)
tank rupture and the ef fects upon safety related syste=s.
02.76 Deconstrate with elevation drawings that the fire pu=p
( 9. 5.1) locations are coepatible with minimum and maxinus supply source levels. State the required and available :!PSH at minimum supply levels.
02.77 Provide a discussion of the precautionary ceasures taken to (9. 5.1) prevent the buildup of( fla:nable sixtures of hydrogen given off by the batteries in the battery room.
02.78 Prov'ide a description of the protection methods provided (9. 5. 4) for the fuel oil syste= piping and tanks frc= tornado missiles.
02.79 Discuss the ef fects that a major leak of a ruel oil storage (9.5.4) tank would have on essential equiptent. Discuss the means of containing the spilled fuel oil.
02.80 For the diesel generator cooling water system, air starting (9.5.5) sy; tem and lubrication system, provide a discussien which (9.5.6) de=onstrates the capability of the systens to satisfy the (9. 5. 7) design basis including a f ailure codes and ef fects analysis In addition provide a dcscription of the tes ting and inspec-tion programs to be performed on the systems.
e 6'r314
kh 02-12 02.80 Provide the percent of nor=al turbine speed at shich the (10.2) va rious turbine overspeed trips operate.
02.81 Provide elevation drawings showing the water level in the
,(10.4.5) turbine building at various times af ter a co=plete rupture of the main condenser circulating water rubber expansion
~~
jcint. For each time increment discuss which, if any, essential syste=s and co=ponents could be rendered inoperable.
Include in your discussion the consideration given te passage-ways, pipe chases, cableways, and all other possible flow
. paths joining the flooded space to other spaces containing essential syste=s and cenpc;snes.
Discuss the effect of the flood waters on all subcerged essential electrical systens and components.
02.82 Describe the means provided to detect a failure in tae (10.4.5) circulating water syste= and how and in what time interval flow will be stepped, considering all f actors,.e.g., operator reaction time, drop-out time for control circuitt/ and coast-down.
02.83 (10.4.7)
Referring to Figure 10.1-2, discuss the consequences of a rupture of the high energy emergency feedwater line between the steam generator and the valve EF-V123 coupled with a single active failure in valve EF-V12A.
Such a sequence of postulated events should not effect the ability of the plant to be safely shutdown.
VJ-315